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TM 32-220

TECHNICAL MANUAL

BASIC CRYPTANALYTICS (U)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

AUGUST 1970

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Downgrading and Declassification



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: J9069-92
4 March 1993

Mr. William J. Neill
1231 Crescendo Drive
Roseville, CA 95678

Dear Mr. Neill:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 16 January 1992 for an original copy of TM 11-485 and the declassification and release of TM 32-220. Your request has been processed under the FOIA, and although we do not have an original of TM 11-485, a copy of that document is enclosed along with a copy of TM 32-220. Certain information, however, has been deleted from TM 32-220.

Some of the information deleted from the TM 32-220 was found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12356. This information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in subparagraphs (a)(2), (a)(4) and (a)(8) of section 1.3 and remains classified CONFIDENTIAL as provided in section 1.1 of Executive Order 12356. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. section 552(b)(1)).

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in TM 32-220. Accordingly, those portions are also exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 403(d)(3); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Since these deletions may be construed as a partial denial of your request, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may, within 60 days after notification of the denial, file an appeal to the NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal Authority. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of

Serial: J9069-92

access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes release of the information is required. The NSA/CSS Appeal Authority will respond to the appeal within 20 working days after receipt.

On 5 February 1993, you spoke to a member of my staff who advised you that we anticipated costs of \$100.00 to process your request, and you agreed to pay that amount. The actual fees incurred total \$96.80. The search for records responsive to your request took 4 hours, and 412 pages are being released to you. You are allowed 2 hours of search and the duplication of 100 pages at no cost pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (4)(A)(iv)(II). The remaining charges are assessed in accordance with DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, which assesses \$25.00 per hour for search and \$.15 per page for duplication. A bill for the total due will be sent to you under separate cover.

Sincerely,

Linda J. Miller
for MICHAEL A. SMITH
Director of Policy

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HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 20 August 1970

BASIC CRYPTANALYTICS (U)

PART ONE. INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTANALYTICS

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

	Paragraph	Page
Section I. General.....	1-1	1-1
II. Terminology.....	1-5	1-2
III. Cryptographic systems.....	1-9	1-3

CHAPTER 2. SECURITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS

Section I. General.....	2-1	2-1
II. The cryptanalytic attack.....	2-4	2-2
III. Analytic aids.....	2-10	2-5

PART TWO. TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 3. GENERAL TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

Section I. General.....	3-1	3-1
II. Route transposition systems.....	3-6	3-3
III. Columnar transposition systems.....	3-9	3-5

CHAPTER 4. SOLUTION OF MONOPHASE TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

Section I. Principles of solution.....	4-1	4-1
II. Solution of incompletely filled matrices.....	4-9	4-6

.....	5-1	5-1
.....	5-4	5-4

CHAPTER 6. GRILLE TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

Section I. General.....	6-1	6-1
II. Solution of grille systems.....	6-6	6-4

PART THREE. MONOGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 7. UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS USING STANDARD CIPHER ALPHABETS

Section I. Basis of substitution systems.....	7-1	7-1
II. Uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution.....	7-5	7-2
III. Solution of uniliteral monoalphabetic ciphers using standard cipher alphabets.....	7-9	7-4

CHAPTER 8. UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS USING MIXED CIPHER ALPHABETS

Section I. Generation and use of mixed cipher alphabets.....	8-1	8-1
II. Recovery of mixed cipher alphabets.....	8-5	8-4
III. Solution of uniliteral monoalphabetic mixed alphabet ciphers.....	8-10	8-8

CHAPTER 9. MULTILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. Characteristics and types.....	9-1	9-1
II. Analysis of multiliteral systems.....	9-5	9-4
III. Analysis of multiliteral with variants.....	9-9	9-8
IV. Multinomic systems.....	9-13	9-16

PART FOUR. POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 10. CHARACTERISTICS OF POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. Characteristics of polygraphic encipherment.....	10-1	10-1
II. Recognition and identification of polygraphic substitution.....	10-5	10-5

CHAPTER 11. SOLUTION OF POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. Analysis of digraphic ciphers.....	11-1	11-1
II. Analysis of two-square ciphers.....	11-4	11-8
III. Analysis of Playfair ciphers.....	11-7	11-14

*This manual supersedes TM 32-220, 5 April 1950.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PART FIVE. POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

	Paragraph	Page
CHAPTER 12. PERIODIC POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION		
Section I. Introduction.....	12-1	12-1
II. Theory of solution of periodic polyalphabetic substitution.....	12-6	12-5
III. Statistical test for determining periodicity.....	12-11	12-8
CHAPTER 13. SOLUTION OF PERIODIC POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS		
Section I. Systems using standard cipher alphabets.....	13-1	13-1
II. Systems using mixed cipher alphabets.....	13-9	13-9
III. Special cases and their solution.....	13-17	13-19
CHAPTER 14. INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLE APERIODIC CIPHERS		
Section I. Simple aperiodic systems.....	14-1	14-1
II. Solution of simple aperiodic systems.....	14-4	14-3
PART SIX. INTRODUCTORY CODE SYSTEMS		
CHAPTER 15. CODE SYSTEMS		
Section I. Introduction.....	15-1	15-1
II. Analysis of codes.....	15-5	15-6
III. Analysis of matrix codes.....	15-9	15-9
APPENDIX A. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENGLISH DIGRAPHS.....		A-1
B. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENGLISH TRIGRAPHS.....		B-1
C. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENGLISH TETRAGRAPHS.....		C-1
D. WORD AND PATTERN LISTS.....		D-1
E. USEFUL TABLES.....		E-1
INDEX.....		Index 1

CONFIDENTIAL

ILLUSTRATIONS (U)

Figure No.	Title	Page
1-1 (C)	Transposition systems (U)	1-5
2-1 (U)	Frequency tabulation 1 (U)	2-5
2-2 (U)	Frequency tabulation 2 (U)	2-5
2-3 (U)	Standard uniliteral frequency distribution (U)	2-6
2-4 (C)	Uniliteral frequency distribution, transposition cipher (U)	2-7
2-5 (U)	Comparison, standard uniliteral frequency distribution and transposition text (U)	2-8
2-6 (C)	Uniliteral frequency distribution, monoalphabetic substitution cipher (U)	2-8
2-7 (U)	Comparison, standard uniliteral frequency distribution and monoalphabetic substitution cipher (U)	2-9
2-8 (C)	Point of coincidence, normal uniliteral frequency distribution and ciphertext (U)	2-9
2-9① (U)	Comparison, standard uniliteral distribution and reversed standard cipher alphabet (U)	2-10
2-9② (U)	Comparison, standard uniliteral distribution and mixed cipher alphabet (U)	2-10
2-10 (C)	Expected occurrence of vowels, English plaintext (U)	2-11
2-11 (C)	Expected occurrence of high-frequency consonants, English plaintext (U)	2-11
2-12 (C)	Expected occurrence of medium-frequency consonants, English plaintext (U)	2-11
2-13 (C)	Expected occurrence of low-frequency consonants, English plaintext (U)	2-11
2-14 (U)	The Lambda (λ) test, expected number of blanks, occurring in English plaintext (U)	2-12
2-15 (C)	The Phi (ϕ) test, tabulation of frequencies (F) of letters (U)	2-12
2-16 (C)	The Phi (ϕ) test, calculation of ϕo (U)	2-12
3-1 (C)	Matrix routes (U)	3-2
3-2 (C)	Columnar extraction routes (U)	3-2
3-3 (C)	Reversed writing (U)	3-4
3-4 (C)	Reversed phonetic writing (U)	3-4
3-5 (C)	Plaintext, reversed phonetics (U)	3-4
3-6 (C)	Vertical writing (U)	3-5
3-7 (C)	Keyed columnar transposition (U)	3-6
3-8 (C)	Keyed columnar transposition with incompletely filled matrix (U)	3-7
3-9 (C)	Addition of nulls after encipherment (U)	3-8
4-1 (U)	Letter sequence, incompletely filled matrices (U)	4-2
4-2 (U)	Uniliteral frequency distribution, ciphertext (U)	4-3
4-3 (U)	Standard uniliteral frequency distribution (U)	4-3
4-4 (C)	Determination of column length (U)	4-7
4-5 (U)	Transposition ciphertext uniliteral frequency distribution (U)	4-10
4-6 (C)	Isolation of columns in ciphertext (U)	4-12
4-7 (C)	Repeated sequences, cipher message A and B (U)	4-13
4-8 (C)	Stereotypes as repeated sequences (U)	4-14
4-9 (C)	Row sequences in a progressive key (U)	4-16
4-10 (C)	Recovered matrix and keys (U)	4-18
5-1① (C)	[REDACTED]	5-1
5-1② (C)	[REDACTED]	5-2
5-1③ (C)	[REDACTED]	5-2
5-2 (C)	[REDACTED]	5-9
6-1 (C)	Simple cryptographic grille (U)	6-1
6-2 (C)	Use of simple cryptographic grille (U)	6-1
6-3 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-2
6-4 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-3
6-5 (U)	[REDACTED]	6-4
6-6 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-4
6-7 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-4
6-8 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-5
6-9 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-5
6-10 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-6
6-11 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-7
6-12 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-7
6-13 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-8
6-14 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-8
6-15 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-8
6-16 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-8
6-17 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-9
6-18 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-9
6-19 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Figure No.	Title	Page
6-20 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-10
6-21 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-11
6-22 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-12
6-23 (C)	[REDACTED]	6-13
7-1 (C)	Monalphabetic encipherment (U)	7-4
7-2 (C)	Encipherment by a direct standard cipher alphabet (U)	7-5
7-3 (C)	Encipherment by a reversed standard alphabet (U)	7-6
7-4 (C)	Unilateral frequency distribution, substitution ciphertext (U)	7-7
7-5 (C)	Identification of ciphertext values by comparison (U)	7-8
7-6 (C)	Solution by completing the plain component, direct standard cipher alphabet (U)	7-10
7-7 (C)	Solution by completing the plain component, reversed standard cipher alphabet (U)	7-11
8-1 (C)	Derivation of mixed sequence by decimation (U)	8-3
8-2 (C)	Decimation, reuse of letters in count (U)	8-3
8-3 (C)	Repetitions in decimation as a result of even numbers as interval (U)	8-4
8-4 (C)	Relation of column order to sequence order (U)	8-6
8-5 (C)	Comparison of sequences (U)	8-6
8-6 (C)	Keyword and alphabetic segments, keyword mixed alphabet (U)	8-7
8-7 (C)	Recovery of a decimated alphabet (U)	8-8
8-8 (U)	Unilateral frequency distribution, mixed monoalphabetic substitution (U)	8-9
8-9 (C)	Ciphertext work sheet (U)	8-10
8-10 (C)	Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U)	8-11
8-11 (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution (U)	8-12
8-12 (C)	Condensed table of repetitions (U)	8-13
8-13 (C)	Vowel consonant relationships (U)	8-14
8-14 (C)	Analysis of <i>Wc</i> as <i>Ep</i> (U)	8-15
8-15 (C)	Partially recovered plaintext (U)	8-17
8-16 (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution (U)	8-19
8-17 (C)	Consonant line diagram (U)	8-20
8-18 (C)	Vowel equivalent line (U)	8-20
9-1 (C)	Simple bilateral substitution systems (U)	9-1
9-2 (C)	Artificial code language matrix (U)	9-2
9-3 (C)	Multilateral systems with variants (U)	9-3
9-4 (C)	Preliminary matrix with row and column indicators (U)	9-7
9-5 (C)	Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U)	9-7
9-6 (C)	Insertion of plaintext values (U)	9-8
9-7 (C)	Solution of matrix (U)	9-8
9-8① (C)	Preparation of ciphertext for digraphic frequency distribution (U)	9-10
9-8② (C)	Digraphic frequency distribution (U)	9-10
9-9 (C)	Match of rows A and B (U)	9-10
9-10 (C)	Matching rows N and O inserted (U)	9-11
9-11 (C)	Possible matches of row E (U)	9-11
9-12 (C)	Completion of row matches (U)	9-11
9-13 (C)	Matrix with both rows and columns matched (U)	9-11
9-14① (C)	Digraphic frequency distribution, message A (U)	9-13
9-14② (C)	Digraphic frequency distribution, message B (U)	9-14
9-15 (C)	Superimposition of messages A and B (U)	9-14
9-16 (C)	Chain of equal values (U)	9-15
9-17 (C)	Reconstructed matrix (U)	9-16
9-18 (C)	Recovered matrix (U)	9-16
9-19 (C)	Columnar numeric system (U)	9-16
9-20 (C)	Encipherment using the columnar numeric system (U)	9-17
9-21 (U)	Four-part dinomic frequency distribution (U)	9-18
9-22 (C)	Monome-dinome system (U)	9-18
9-23 (C)	Ciphertext and monomic frequency distribution (U)	9-19
9-24 (C)	Cipher message and monomic frequency distribution (U)	9-20
9-25 (U)	Initial placement on column indicator (U)	9-21
9-26 (U)	Expansion of matrix (U)	9-21
9-27 (U)	Second expansion of row and column indicators (U)	9-21
9-28 (U)	Final reconstructed form (U)	9-21
9-29 (C)	Example of monome-dinome-trinome system (U)	9-22
9-30 (C)	Trinomic system (U)	9-22
9-31 (U)	Reconstructed matrix (U)	9-23
10-1 (C)	Reciprocal cipher table (U)	10-2
10-2 (C)	Nonreciprocal cipher table (U)	10-2
10-3 (C)	Four-square matrix (U)	10-3
10-4① (C)	Enciphering operation, four-square matrix (U)	10-3
10-4② (C)	Deciphering operation, four-square matrix (U)	10-3

CONFIDENTIAL

Figure No.	Title	Page
10-5 (C)	Horizontal two-square matrix (U)	10-4
10-6 (C)	Vertical two-square matrix (U)	10-4
10-7 (C)	Numeric variation, four-square matrix (U)	10-5
10-8 (U)	Digraphic Lambda (λ) test (U)	10-6
11-1 (U)	Uniliteral frequency distribution, four-square cipher (U)	11-2
11-2① (C)	Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U)	11-2
11-2② (C)	Digraphic frequency distribution (U)	11-3
11-3 (C)	Assumed plain component, four-square matrix (U)	11-4
11-4 (C)	Insertion of cipher values (U)	11-4
11-5 (C)	Placement of cipher values by assumption of sequence (U)	11-5
11-6 (C)	First partial reconstruction of plaintext (U)	11-5
11-7 (C)	Test of cipher value placement (U)	11-6
11-8 (C)	Second partial reconstruction of plaintext (U)	11-6
11-9 (C)	Insertion of cipher values through analysis (U)	11-7
11-10① (C)	Partially recovered four-square matrix (U)	11-7
11-10② (C)	Partially recovered plaintext (U)	11-8
11-11 (C)	Ciphertext for analysis (U)	11-8
11-12 (U)	Digraphic frequency matrix (U)	11-9
11-13 (U)	Test for probability of transparencies (U)	11-10
11-14① (C)	Possible transparencies from ciphertext (U)	11-11
11-14② (C)	Possible transparencies reversed (U)	11-11
11-15 (C)	Preliminary reconstruction matrix (U)	11-11
11-16 (C)	Analysis of cipher-plain value location (U)	11-11
11-17 (C)	First expansion of reconstruction matrix (U)	11-12
11-18 (C)	Second expansion of reconstruction matrix (U)	11-12
11-19 (C)	Rearrangement and expansion of reconstruction matrix (U)	11-12
11-20 (C)	Third expansion of reconstruction matrix (U)	11-13
11-21 (C)	Initial construction of two-square matrix (U)	11-13
11-22 (C)	Rearrangement of square P2-C1 (U)	11-13
11-23 (C)	Rearrangement of square P1-C2 (U)	11-14
11-24 (C)	Partially recovered horizontal two-square matrix (U)	11-14
11-25 (U)	Example Playfair square (U)	11-14
11-26 (C)	Reciprocal, reversible relationships (U)	11-15
11-27① (C)	Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U)	11-16
11-27② (C)	Digraphic frequency distribution Playfair cipher (U)	11-17
11-28 (C)	Use of rule 1 to determine plaintext values (U)	11-18
11-29 (C)	Construction of preliminary matrix (U)	11-19
11-30 (C)	First expansion of matrix (U)	11-19
11-31 (C)	Second expansion of matrix (U)	11-20
11-32 (C)	Third expansion of matrix (U)	11-20
11-33 (C)	Reconstructed Playfair matrix (U)	11-20
11-34 (C)	Playfair matrix reconstructed (U)	11-20
11-35 (C)	Playfair matrix (U)	11-21
11-36 (C)	Recovery of mixed keyword sequence (U)	11-21
11-37 (C)	Matrix permutation (U)	11-21
11-38 (C)	Repetition of column permutations (U)	11-21
21-39 (C)	Selection of current permutation (U)	11-22
11-40 (C)	Recovery of keyword mixed sequence and original enciphering matrix (U)	11-22
12-1 (C)	Example, polyalphabetic substitution (U)	12-2
12-2 (C)	Columnar encipherment duplicating key period (U)	12-3
12-3 (C)	Table of expected polygraphs (U)	12-6
12-4 (C)	Ciphertext with evidence of periodicity (U)	12-7
12-5 (C)	List of repetitions and factors (U)	12-7
12-6 (C)	The ϕ test for factored periods (U)	12-8
12-7 (C)	Index of coincidence for factored periods (U)	12-9
12-8 (C)	Expected values of ϕ_r and ϕ_p (U)	12-9
12-9 (C)	Computation of ϕ_r long periodic key (U)	12-10
12-10 (C)	ϕ_r long periodic key computation (U)	12-11
13-1 (C)	Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U)	13-1
13-2 (C)	Uniliteral frequency distribution of ciphertext on period of five (U)	13-2
13-3 (C)	Recovered enciphering matrix (U)	13-3
13-4 (C)	Completion of the plain component (U)	13-4
13-5 (C)	Completion of the plain component, text arranged by period (U)	13-4
13-6 (C)	Generatrix identification (U)	13-5
13-7 (C)	Generatrix identification using arbitrary values (U)	13-6
13-8 (C)	Location of probable word (U)	13-8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Figure No.	Title	Page
13-9 (C)	Key derivation (U)	13-8
13-10 (C)	Key derivation, step 2 (U)	13-8
13-11 (C)	Case II secondary alphabets (U)	13-9
13-12 (C)	Letter placement, direct symmetry of position (U)	13-9
13-13 (C)	Placement transfer, direct symmetry of position (U)	13-10
13-14 (C)	Placement transfer (U)	13-10
13-15 (C)	Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U)	13-10
13-16 (C)	Determination of period (U)	13-10
13-17 (U)	Unilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 1 (U)	13-11
13-18① (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 1 (U)	13-11
13-18② (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 2 (U)	13-12
13-18③ (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 3 (U)	13-12
13-18④ (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 4 (U)	13-12
13-18⑤ (C)	Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 5 (U)	13-13
13-19 (C)	Condensed table of repetitions (U)	13-13
13-20 (C)	Identification of cipher to plain equivalencies (U)	13-14
13-21 (C)	Identification of vowels and consonants (U)	13-14
13-22 (C)	Reconstruction matrix (U)	13-15
13-23 (C)	Recovered value transfer (U)	13-15
13-24 (C)	Additional value placement (U)	13-15
13-25 (C)	Partially recovered plaintext (U)	13-16
13-26 (C)	Insertion of recovered values (U)	13-17
13-27 (C)	Insertion of recovered values, step 2 (U)	13-17
13-28 (C)	Expansion of matrix (C)	13-17
13-29 (C)	Plaintext partially recovered (U)	13-18
13-30 (C)	Ciphertext for analysis (U)	13-19
13-31 (C)	Rough scoring of generatrices (U)	13-20
13-32 (C)	Unilateral frequency distribution, secondary cipher sequences (U)	13-22
13-33 (C)	Matching by cyclic shifting (U)	13-23
13-34 (C)	Ciphertext reduced to monoalphabetic terms (U)	13-23
13-35 (U)	Unilateral frequency distribution of monoalphabetic terms (U)	13-24
13-36 (C)	Period determination (U)	13-24
13-37 (C)	Unilateral frequency distribution of periodic cipher alphabets (U)	13-25
13-38 (C)	Possible matches, periodic cipher alphabet 1 and 2 (U)	13-25
13-39 (C)	Final match of periodic cipher alphabets (U)	13-25
13-40 (C)	Ciphertext reduced to monoalphabetic terms (U)	13-26
13-41 (U)	Unilateral frequency distribution of monoalphabetic terms (U)	13-26
13-42 (C)	Solution of ciphertext (U)	13-27
13-43 (C)	Recovered matrix (U)	13-27
14-1 (C)	Encipherment by arbitrary group length (U)	14-2
14-2 (C)	Numerically keyed encipherment, standard alphabets (U)	14-4
14-3 (C)	Aperiodic cipher message (U)	14-4
14-4 (C)	Expansion of matrix (U)	14-5
14-5 (C)	Matrix reduction (U)	14-6
14-6 (C)	Partial matrix and recoveries of plaintext (U)	14-7
14-7 (C)	Insertion of cipher values (U)	14-7
14-8 (C)	Transcription of matrix (U)	14-8
14-9 (C)	Recovered matrix (U)	14-8
14-10 (C)	Idiomorphs formed in encipherment (U)	14-10
14-11 (C)	Frequency distribution columns 1-10 (U)	14-11
14-12 (C)	Plain letter as interrupter (U)	14-12
14-13 (C)	Cipher letter as interrupter (U)	14-13
14-14 (C)	Repetitions as a result of interrupter letter encipherment (U)	14-14
14-15 (C)	Frequency distribution and polygraphs of superimposed columns (U)	14-15
14-16 (C)	Initial placement of value (U)	14-16
14-17 (C)	Completion of assumed sequences (U)	14-16
14-18 (C)	Insertion of plaintext values (U)	14-16
14-19 (C)	Completion of matrix (U)	14-18
15-1 (C)	Two part code (U)	15-2
15-2 (C)	Matrix code (U)	15-3
15-3 (C)	Upper case, lower case, matrix code (U)	15-4
15-4 (C)	Syllabary square (U)	15-4
15-5 (C)	Operator's code (U)	15-5
15-6 (C)	Arithmetic enciphered codes (U)	15-6
15-7 (U)	10 x 10 matrix, single digit coordinates (U)	15-8
15-8 (U)	10 x 10 matrix, dinome coordinates (U)	15-8
15-9 (C)	Idiomorphism in code sequences (U)	15-10

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF TABLES (U)

Table	Title	Page
A-1 (C)	Frequency distribution of digraphs (U).....	A-2
A-2 (C)	The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	A-3
A-3 (C)	The 18 digraphs composing 25% of the digraphs in Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically according to their initial letters (U).....	A-5
A-4 (C)	The 53 digraphs composing 50% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically according to their initial letters (U).....	A-6
A-5 (C)	The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically according to their initial letters (U).....	A-7
A-6 (C)	The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	A-9
A-7 (C)	The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by final letters, then by absolute frequency, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	A-12
A-8 (C)	The 18 digraphs composing 25% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U).....	A-15
A-9 (C)	The 53 digraphs composing 50% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U).....	A-16
A-10 (C)	The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U).....	A-17
B-1 (C)	The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	B-2
B-2 (C)	The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	B-2
B-3 (C)	The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by central letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	B-3
B-4 (C)	The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by final letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	B-3
C-1 (C)	The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times arranged by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of assigned probabilities (U).....	C-2
C-2 (C)	The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies accompanied by the logarithms of assigned probabilities (U).....	C-2
C-3 (C)	The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times arranged in alphabetic order by their second letters, and then according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	C-3
C-4 (C)	The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times arranged in alphabetic order by their third letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their probabilities (U).....	C-3
C-5 (C)	The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times arranged in alphabetic order by their final letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).....	C-4
D-1 (C)	List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U).....	D-2
D-2 (C)	List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U).....	D-11
D-3 (C)	List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U).....	D-20
D-4 (C)	List of general digraphic idiomorphs (U).....	D-39
D-5 (C)	List of Playfair digraphic idiomorphs (U).....	D-41
D-6 (C)	List of four-square digraphic idiomorphs (U).....	D-44
D-7 (C)	List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U).....	D-48
E-1 (C)	Expected number of repetitions, polyalphabetic ciphers (U).....	E-2
E-2 (C)	Expected values of ϕ , and ϕ_p (U).....	E-3
E-3 (U)	Factor table (U).....	E-4
E-4 (C)	Table of primes up to 2000 (U).....	E-8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PART ONE (C)
INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTANALYTICS

CHAPTER 1 (C)
INTRODUCTION

Section I. (U) GENERAL

1-1. (U) Purpose

This manual presents the basic principles of cryptanalytics and its relation to cryptography. Cryptography deals with the art of secret communications while cryptanalytics treats of their solution by those who do not have access to the plaintext communications. The manual is primarily a training text, designed to promote an understanding of the practical application of cryptanalytics to provide the student with the knowledge of the techniques and methods used in the cryptanalysis of common codes and ciphers.

1-2. (U) Scope

This manual has been organized into six parts. The first part deals with the fundamentals necessary to study the remaining five parts. In each subsequent part, the manual covers a type cryptographic system, its practical application, and the appropriate analysis methods. The material presented in each part represents a more complex cryptographic system than that preceding it and, therefore, requires a more detailed study. All parts except the last two are thorough in the scope of their study. The last two, due to the extreme difficulty of the subject matter, have been limited to an introductory study only. Note at the outset that each system presented has many possible variations. All the variants have not been included. The contents have been deliberately limited to those systems, methods, and techniques which offer the broadest possible application, and which, when mastered, will provide the greatest degree of understanding of the subject area.

1-3. (U) Changes or Revisions

Users of this publication are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the

publication. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding General, United States Army Security Agency, ATTN: IAFOR-RL, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va. 22212.

1-4. (U) Developments

Cryptology, the branch of knowledge which treats of the principles of cryptography and cryptanalytics, is not a static art or science. Constant change, both in the systems used and in techniques of analysis, is its hallmark. What is regarded today as unnecessary, or as wholly impractical, may become possible and absolutely necessary tomorrow. The development of cryptology has a long history. Basic systems of cryptography and of cryptanalysis developed in the past, although relatively simple by today's standards, still are applicable. In some cases these same systems and techniques, or variations of them, are still in use today. These systems vary, from the relatively simple hand-generated ciphers and codes to the highly sophisticated and complex machine systems. Accordingly, the methods and techniques of their solution also vary from rather simple methods to highly involved studies requiring a great deal of time and skill. However, the basic techniques used in the solution of the less complex systems form the basis for the study and the analysis of the more complex systems. For this reason the following text progresses from the simple through the more complex.

Section II. (C) TERMINOLOGY

1-5. (U) Basic Definitions

In cryptology, as in any other art or science, a host of words and phrases exist, each having special meanings within the context of the subject area. These meanings may or may not relate to the common usage of the word or phrase. As forms of verbal shorthand, it is invaluable to state exactly what is meant with the minimum use of time and words. For the purpose of this manual it is necessary to understand some of the common definitions at the outset. Other definitions will be introduced and explained in detail as the subject is presented. For a complete list of definitions the NSA Basic Cryptologic Glossary, 1965, may be consulted.

a. Signal Communications. Any means of transmitting messages other than by direct conversation or mail. A commander uses signal communications to receive reports of hostile dispositions and activities, to receive reports of the progress and needs of subordinate and neighboring friendly units, to send orders to subordinate units, to receive orders from superior units, and to send to higher and adjacent units information necessary for the coordinated action of the whole command.

b. Means of Signal Communications. A medium, including equipment, used by a command for transmitting and receiving messages. The most important are:

- (1) Wire.
 - (a) Telephone.
 - (b) Telegraph.
 - (c) Teletypewriter.
 - (d) Facsimile.
- (2) Radio.
 - (a) Radiotelephone.
 - (b) Radiotelegraph.
 - (c) Radio teletypewriter.
 - (d) Radio facsimile.

c. Message Center. A communications facility, subordinate to and usually located within or nearby a command, having one or more of the above means of communications available. It serves as a point of origin, destination, and relay for messages within the command. Here messages are processed prior to transmission and after reception.

d. Writer. The person who actually prepares and signs the message. The writer may be the originator or his officially designated representative.

e. Originator. The command by whose authority a message is sent. A commander may delegate this authority to one or more subordinates, who originate messages as required in the commander's name.

f. Addressee. The office, headquarters, activity or individual to whom a message is directed by the originator.

g. Externals. Those elements appearing outside the body of the message placed on the message by the communications center for the purpose of routing. Examples of externals are call signs, serial numbers, precedence indicators, times of file, and special routing instructions.

h. Message Text. That portion of a message which contains the communication. It may be in plaintext or in secret writing.

1-6. (S) Secret Communications

a. Intercommunications are any means susceptible to interpretation by one of the five senses. Those most commonly used are visual or auditory. Aside from the use of simple visual and auditory signals for intercommunication over relatively short distances, military communications depend upon the act of writing (messages), speaking (telephone and radiotelephone), and projecting a picture or illustration (TV and facsimile). Of these methods, our interest lies primarily with the first, and the latter two only insofar as the transmission of messages are concerned.

b. The origins and use of secret communications are unknown, but probably began in some form with man's ability to communicate. They originated in the earliest days of organized warfare and diplomatic relations where they were soon recognized as a necessity. The earliest reliable reference to the use of secret writing occurred in 900 A.D. when Plutarch reported the ancient Spartans as using a device called Scytale, a method of secret writing in which a narrow strip of parchment was wound round a wooden baton, the message written across the adjoining edges. History records the subsequent growth of the art, but the real beginnings of systematic modern cryptology is traced back to the early 13th century. During this period the science was developed and employed extensively in the diplomatic relations of the Papal States. From this period forward, its growth, although sporadic, has been constant. Systems of greater complexity have been introduced followed by the development of methods and techniques for their analysis.

c. Speech can be secured by electronic devices that distort, substitute, or change the electrical current of telephone and radiotelephone, rendering it unintelligible to all but those provided with similar electronic devices properly arranged for the purpose. The same thing is true in the case of

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facsimile transmission (the transmission of charts, maps, illustrations, messages, etc.), and simple forms of enciphered television transmissions currently used in conjunction with "pay-TV." In both instances, lacking the proper device to decipher the signal, one would be unable to receive intelligible information.

d. Writing can be secured by two general methods. It can be made invisible or unintelligible.

(1) Invisible writing is done with certain chemicals called invisible, sympathetic, or secret inks which are invisible to the naked eye. In order to make the writing visible, the message is first processed with a suitable reagent which in effect develops the message. Invisible writing is also produced by reducing the writing to microscopic size. This method requires special photographic equipment to reduce the writing, and later enlarge the writing to make it visible.

(2) Although invisible writing finds some application in military communications, by far the most important means of producing secret writing is by a cryptographic process, a far simpler and more effective method. The writing remains visible but its secrecy is protected by its unintelligibility.

1-7. (C) Plaintext and Encrypted Text

a. Visible writing which is intelligible, i.e. conveys an understandable or sensible meaning (in the

language in which it was written) and does not intend to convey a hidden meaning is plaintext. A message in plaintext is termed a plaintext message, a cleartext message, or sometimes a message in the clear.

b. Visible writing which conveys no intelligible meaning in any recognized language is in encrypted text, and such writing is a cryptogram.

c. Visible writing may be intelligible, but the obvious meaning it conveys may not be the real meaning intended. Secret communications of this sort are impractical for field military use but are often encountered in espionage and counterespionage activities.

1-8. (C) Plain and Cipher Alphabets

a. A plain alphabet is a series of symbols constituting the speech sounds of a language, arranged in their normal sequence. A cipher alphabet is one in which the same elementary speech sounds are represented by symbols other than those used in the normal alphabet. A cipher alphabet is composed of two components, the plain component represented by a plain alphabet, and a cipher component, represented by a disarranged alphabetic sequence.

b. Basically the method of using a cipher alphabet involves finding a plaintext value in the plain component and then finding the cipher value which is substituted for it in the cipher component.

Section III. (C) CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS

1-9. (C) Codes, Ciphers, and Enciphered Codes

A general cryptographic system is the sum total of all the basic invariable rules followed in converting the plaintext of a message to ciphertext, producing a cryptogram, and the reverse, drawn up between correspondents or furnished them by higher authority. All cryptographic systems can be classed in two basic systems, or one variation, according to the treatment the plaintext undergoes in its transformation to a cryptogram. The two basic systems are cipher systems and code systems.

a. In ciphers or cipher systems, cryptograms are produced by applying the cryptographic treatment (process whereby plain writing is changed to secret writing) to individual letters, or groups of individual letters, of the plaintext message. A cryptogram produced by this method is in cipher, and is called a cipher message or a cipher. The operation is called enciphering. Changing the cipher into plaintext is called deciphering. A cipher message may be produced by several processes. A cipher table, cipher device, or cipher machine may be used for the encipherment of a message. Any of the cipher systems

involving only the use of paper and pencil are known as cipher tables. A cipher device is an apparatus or a simple machine for literal encipherment and decipherment, usually manually operated. A cipher machine is a more complex electromechanical device serving the same purpose but usually requiring an outside power source. It may be operated "off line" whereby a cryptogram is produced prior to transmission, or it may be operated "on line" whereby the process of encipherment-transmission-decipherment occurs simultaneously between correspondents.

b. In codes, or code systems, cryptograms are produced by applying the cryptographic treatment to entire words, phrases, or sentences of the plaintext message. A characteristic of codes is that the cryptographic element used as replacement of the plaintext elements is normally of constant length as opposed to the replaced plaintext element which varies in length. A cryptogram produced by means of a code system is called a code message, or more simply a code, the text being referred to as code text. Producing a cryptogram is called encoding. Breaking the code back into plaintext is called decoding. A code

message may be produced through the use of several types of code systems. Common systems include code books, code charts, and code tables. All code systems are manually operated and are composed of listings of plaintext and corresponding cipher values. The foregoing classification of code systems is based on the manner in which the values are listed.

c. The variant class of systems previously mentioned are not encountered as often as the basic types, although still important. This class contains such quasi-systems as enciphered codes, systems where code groups are enciphered; encoded ciphers, systems wherein ciphertext is encoded; and super-encipherment, systems wherein ciphertext is again enciphered in another cipher system different from that used to produce the original ciphertext. The complexity of these processes, the amount of time needed, the possibility of inducing errors, and the problematic increase of security created by these methods are factors which limit their use in most military communications.

1-10. (C) Discriminants (System Indicators) and Specific Keys

Cryptographic systems, regardless of type, normally include two elements, not part of the plaintext, to facilitate processing and handling. The elements may be a single number, a single letter, a group of letters or numbers, or a word or a phrase. The elements usually correspond in structure and external appearance to the cipher or code text in order to conceal them. However, to aid in their recognition by communications center personnel, they usually occur in a specific position within the text of a message. These two elements are the discriminant, or the system indicator, and the specific key.

a. The discriminant indicates the specific cryptographic system used to produce the cryptogram.

b. The specific key, used in conjunction with the discriminant, indicates "how" the cryptographic system was used. It may indicate the starting point in code books and manual cipher systems, the "set up" for a cipher machine or device, the manner in

which the machine is prepared for the encipherment and decipherment of a specific message. The specific key is changed frequently, after a given number of characters have been enciphered, at the end of a time period, or after a message. Exact periods of usage of a given key may be dictated by higher authority or by agreement among correspondents. Derivation of specific keys involves the use of specially prepared tables, documents, or books.

1-11. (C) Ciphers, Transposition and Substitution

The two distinct types of cipher treatment, applied to plaintext to covert it to secret text, yield two different classes of cryptograms. In the first, transposition, the elements or units of the plaintext retain their original identity and only undergo a change in their relative position. In the second, substitution, a cipher element of varying length is substituted for a plaintext value, usually of the same length. Moreover all cipher elements within a given system are normally of the same length, though there are a few exceptions.

a. A simple form of a transposition cipher may be observed in figure 1-1. As the system's name implies, ciphertext is generated simply by the disarrangement of the letters of the plaintext. But note, this disarrangement is not a random process, rather it follows specific rules. In this case the plaintext is inscribed in the cells of a matrix as one would normally write, then extracted by columns from left to right and put into groups of five letters to form ciphertext.

b. The second class of treatment by which a written plaintext message can be converted to secret text is by substitution. In substitution systems, the elements of the plaintext retain their original relative positions to one another, but are replaced by other elements which have different values or meanings, with the result that the original text becomes unintelligible. A simple example of such a substitution system is one used by General Clinton during the American Revolution:

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
51 52 53 54 55 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

Using this system, a message was enciphered by substituting two numerical values for each literal

value in the plaintext message. For example, the following message would be enciphered as shown below:

GEN B ARNOLD AT WEST POINT
615567 52 517167686554 5173 75557273 6968636773

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INSCRIPTION ROUTE

PLAIN TEXT

TRANSPOSITION CIPHER SYSTEM

①→	T	R	A	N	S
②→	P	O	S	I	T
③→	I	O	N	C	I
④→	P	H	E	R	S
⑤→	Y	S	T	E	M

TRANSCRIPTION ROUTE

CIPHER TEXT

TPIPY ROOHS ASNET NICRE STISM

①	②	③	④	⑤
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
T	R	A	N	S
P	O	S	I	T
I	O	N	C	I
P	H	E	R	S
Y	S	T	E	M

Figure 1-1 (C). Transposition systems (U).

1-12. (C) Divisions of Cipher Systems

Each of the two classes of cipher systems, transposition and substitution, are further subdivided based on the number of characters composing the textual elements of units undergoing treatment, and the number of cipher elements replacing the plaintext elements. A sharp line of demarcation cannot be drawn between systems in every case, for occasionally a given system may combine methods related to two differing systems. The descriptions given in the following paragraphs are for convenience in presenting the systems. Approved definitions may be found in NSA Basic Cryptologic Glossary.

a. *Transposition System.* A cryptographic system in which the elements of the plaintext (individual

letters, groups of letters, syllables, words, phrases, sentences, or code groups or their components), undergo some change in their relative position without a change in their identity. The three major classes of transposition systems are:

(1) *Single transposition.* Those systems wherein the plaintext undergoes only one transposition.

(2) *Polyphase transposition.* Transposition systems wherein the plaintext undergoes two or more transpositions. Of this type transposition, double transposition is most common.

(3) *Grille transposition.* A transposition system involving the use of two devices; a matrix of given size, and a grille, a thin material in which perforations have been made. Normally the plaintext message is

inscribed in the cells of the matrix, one word or letter per cell, in normal left-to-right, top-to-bottom order. The grille is then placed over the matrix, the perforations exposing portions of the plaintext. These are extracted and recorded and the grille is revolved. Again more plaintext is exposed. This process is continued until all the plaintext has been extracted from the matrix, the process transposing the relative order of the words or letters of the plaintext.

b. Substitution System. A cryptographic system which involves the replacement of the plaintext value by one or more ciphertext values with no change between their relative order of occurrence. Both or either of the plaintext and ciphertext values may be of equal or different length and form the basis of the further subclassification of the system.

(1) *Monoalphabetic substitution.* A system of substitution involving a single fixed cipher sequence from which a cipher equivalent of one or more elements is drawn in all cases to represent one plaintext unit of equal length.

(a) *Monographic substitution.* Monoalphabetic substitution system in which the plaintext units replaced are always single units, letters, or numbers; but in which the length of the cipher unit may vary.

1. *Unilateral substitution.* Monographic substitution in which single letters or numbers of the plaintext are replaced by single cipher equivalents.

2. *Multilateral substitution.* Monographic substitution in which single letters of the plaintext are replaced by cipher units of two or more characters.

(b) *Polygraphic substitution.* Substitution systems in which the plaintext units treated are groupings of more than one element of regular length, replaced by cipher elements of similar length.

(2) *Polyalphabetic substitution.* A system of substitution in which successive plaintext elements of a message are replaced by cipher elements drawn from a succession of different cipher alphabets.

(a) *Periodic polyalphabetic substitution.* A method of polyalphabetic substitution in which a series of cipher alphabets are used cyclically, also called repeating key.

(b) *Aperiodic polyalphabetic substitution.* A method of polyalphabetic substitution in which the method of substitution results in the suppression of cyclical phenomena in the cryptographic text.

c. *Application of Systems.* Transposition systems, particularly the polyphase systems, excepting double transposition, although offering a greater degree of security than some substitution systems, find little application in military communications. Complexity of operation, time required for their use, the limitations on message length, and the practical difficulties encountered in producing and distributing the material required for their use, all serve to limit their effective use.

1-13. ~~(C)~~ Code System

a. Code systems differ from cipher systems in that the substitution of values does not involve a one-to-one ratio. A group of arbitrary length, usually three to five letters, figures, or combinations, is substituted for either letters, syllables, phrases, or sentences.

b. The mechanics of a code system are such that usually some method of listing the code groups and their associated plaintext values is required. A detailed explanation of code systems and their classification is given in Part Six.

CHAPTER 2 (C)

SECURITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) GENERAL

2-1. ~~(C)~~ Practical Requirement of a Military Cryptographic System

Cryptographic systems must meet certain fundamental requirements of a practical nature for use in military communications. In order of importance, these requirements are: reliability, security, rapidity, flexibility, and applicability.

a. Reliability means that the cryptographic system, whether a code book, a cipher machine or device, or cipher table, will be on hand and in good working order, available for instant use. When used, it can be operative as long as needed. It also means that the cryptogram produced can be decrypted quickly, accurately, and without uncertainty as to meaning. Simplicity is implied in reliability; usually, the more simple the system the more reliable it is.

b. The needs for both security and rapidity in a military cryptographic system are often conflicting requirements. Security is the total protection afforded by a sound cryptographic system; rapidity is the speed of operation of the system. Maximum security at all times is the goal, but cannot always be met. Often a compromise between these differing requirements must be effected. In messages exchanged among higher headquarters, some speed may be sacrificed to attain greater security. Among lower headquarters and between units conducting active operations, security must often give way to the greater need for speed in communications.

c. Concerning flexibility, a cryptographic system should have as wide an application as possible. A system specifically adapted to a particular usage cannot serve as an all-purpose system. A code book designed for field operations can hardly serve the needs of a high headquarters, nor can a system designed for it serve the needs of small combat units.

d. The last factor concerns general application of the system.

(1) Cryptograms produced by the system must be in a form suitable for transmission by means available to the using unit.

(2) The system, especially that used at lower

echelons, should be relatively simple in its operation and should be operable under different field conditions.

(3) The system must be such that errors in the cryptographic process can be either corrected easily and quickly by the operator or be of no consequence in the decipherment process.

(4) The system, if a device or a machine, must be light in weight, rugged in construction, and simple to operate, requiring the use of only one operator.

e. In order to satisfy the conflicting requirements posed by all the foregoing factors, several cryptographic systems are available to each unit or headquarters. This procedure permits the fulfillment by each unit of its own immediate needs for a system oriented to its mission, plus it provides a secure means of communications between adjacent units and higher and lower headquarters.

2-2. ~~(C)~~ Security Requirements of a Military Cryptographic System

a. The ideal cryptographic system for military purposes is a single all-purpose system which is practical for use by the highest headquarters and by the smallest troop unit in the combat area, and which also presents such a great degree of cryptographic security that, no matter how much traffic became available all in the same key, the cryptograms composing this traffic would resist solution indefinitely. Such an ideal system, however, is beyond the realms of possibility so far as present methods of cryptographic communications are concerned. For this reason, and those discussed in the preceding paragraph, a multiplicity of systems must be employed, each designed for a specific purpose, at a given level of security.

b. The best that can be expected for each system is that the degree of security be great enough to delay solutions for such a length of time that, when the solutions are finally reached, the information obtained by the enemy has lost all its "short term," immediate, or operational value, and much of its "long term," research or historical value.

2-3. (C) Exploitation of Cryptographic Systems

In theory, all cryptographic systems are vulnerable to analysis and exploitation, given sufficient time, organization, skill, and volume of traffic. Analysis can be accomplished even if the general system and the specific keys are unknown at the start. In actual practice, however, the security of a cryptographic system, and therefore its degree of vulnerability to analysis, are correlated directly to:

a. The cryptographic soundness of the system. The degree of security of any system depends on this factor, and in turn determines the resistance to analysis which the system offers. A sound system, in the sense that the cryptographic process provides a maximum of variant values with little or no characteristic patterns subject to analytic attack, will resist analysis longer than a weak cryptographic system, all other factors being equal.

b. The adequacy and soundness of the operating instructions pertaining to a system and the extent to which the users follow these instructions. Security of a good cryptographic system can be almost completely destroyed by the users who, through carelessness or ignorance, fail to follow prescribed methods of operation or who change operating procedures in the mistaken belief that they are improving the system.

c. The volume of cryptographic text available

for study. As a rule, the greater the volume of text, the more easily and speedily a system can be solved. A single cryptogram in a given system may present an almost impossible task to the cryptanalyst, but if many cryptograms are available in the same system in the same or in closely related specific keys, the solution may be reached in a very short time.

d. The number, skill, efficiency, and organization of personnel and units assigned to the analysis of communications. This factor plays a direct part in the analysis and exploitation of a system. The simplest system may resist cryptanalytic attack if the analysts are unskilled. Even if a system is solved, the information may not be fully exploited if it lacks proper organization for this purpose.

e. The amount and character of collateral information and intelligence available. Cryptograms between correspondents about whom no information is available may pose a very difficult problem. If, however, a certain amount of information is known, a solution may be readily obtained. The more information at hand concerning a given cryptogram (including particulars of the basic system, as well as knowledge of its possible contents, i.e. proper names, stereotyped beginnings and endings, and events or subjects referenced in the message), the easier the solution.

Section II. (C) THE CRYPTANALYTIC ATTACK

2-4. (C) Communications Intelligence Operations

Communications Intelligence (COMINT) operations study enemy communications for the purpose of obtaining information and intelligence. COMINT includes the collecting, processing, evaluating, and reporting of intelligence derived from raw data. COMINT attempts to answer three questions concerning enemy communications: Who, Where, and What; who are the originators and addressees, where are they located, and what do the messages say.

a. The two steps in the series of activities whose end objective is to answer these questions are the collection of raw data, and the study and analysis of this data.

(1) *Collection.*

(a) *Intercept operations.* Intercept operations include all activities and functions directly related to the intercepting and recording of enemy radio communications. Major functions which are a part of intercept operations are the mission assignment and control, the allocation of equipment and facilities; and the assignment and direction of personnel. As an adjunct to intercept operations,

providing both support to the intercept effort and a source of information to their own right, two special collection techniques are available.

(b) *Radio fingerprinting (RFP).* RFP is the technique of identifying radio transmitters by recording on film, and later by analyzing the power and frequency variations of an on-off keyed Continuous Wave (CW) emission.

(c) *Radio direction finding (RDF).* RDF is the technique of determining the azimuth (bearing) of a transmitter from the point of interception. By establishing the bearing on a transmitter from several different points, it is possible to fix the geographic location of the emitter.

(2) *Study and analysis.* The second step in COMINT operations is the study and analysis of all data provided by the preceding intercept activities. The preliminary processing of this data normally occurs in a traffic analysis section. Traffic analysis is the study of the externals of signal communications by all means short of the cryptanalysis of the message text. Traffic analysis reconstructs radio communications networks by noting volume, direction, and routing of messages;

correlating transmission frequencies and schedules used among a network's various stations and nets; determining the location of radio stations by evaluating the results of radio direction finding; identifying radio station association by evaluating the results of radio fingerprinting; recovering the system or systems of generating, assigning, and changing radio call signs; and studying all items that constitute messages originated by operators and exchanged among themselves on a radio net.

(a) Information gleaned by the traffic analyst serves two general purposes. First, it provides a basis for further interception of the enemy's communications. Second, it produces information that is of intelligence value in itself, and also of great value to the cryptanalyst in his attack upon the message text. Traffic analysis is able not only to ascertain the geographic locations and dispositions of troop units and headquarters, but also sometimes can predict, with varying degrees of reliability, the areas and extent of immediately pending or future activities of the enemy. This can be done without reading the text of the intercepted message. Specifically, enemy plans and operations may be revealed by:

1. Movement, appearance, and disappearance of radio stations.
2. Changes in volume and routing of messages.
3. Characteristics of messages and any changes thereto.
4. Redeployment and changes in communications networks.
5. Allusion to operations in radio operator chatter.

(b) On the basis of the foregoing studies it is possible to accurately answer the first two questions, Who and Where, and, in some cases find a partial answer to the third question, What. However, the final answer to the third question can only be found with certainty in the message text itself. This is a task of the cryptanalyst.

b. Cryptanalysis is the process involved in converting encrypted messages into plaintext without initial knowledge of the system or key employed in the encryption process. The solution of practically every cryptogram under these conditions involves four fundamental operations:

- (1) The determination of the language used in the plaintext version.
- (2) The determination of the general system of cryptography used.
- (3) The reconstruction of the specific key in the case of a cipher system; or the reconstruction, partial or complete, of the code book, in the case of a code system, or both in the case of enciphered codes.

(4) The reconstruction or establishment of the plaintext.

2-5. (C) Determination of Language

a. The determination of the language employed seldom comes into question where studies are made of the cryptograms of an organized enemy. During conventional war when the enemy is known, the language employed in messages will most likely be in the enemy's native tongue. Where this is not the case, i.e. when cryptograms of unknown origin must be studied, the cryptanalyst looks for indications of the language in the cryptogram itself. Addresses, signatures, and other data in plaintext in the preamble, in the body, or in the postamble of the cryptogram may reveal the language used, as well as those external elements associated with the transmission of the message.

b. In special cases, the nature and composition of the cryptographic text may reveal the language used. For example, if the letters K and W are absent, the language may be Spanish or Portuguese, as these letters are used only to spell foreign words. The presence of special characters in the text may also indicate the language where the alphabet exceeds the Morse code equivalents. For example, KATA KANA, a Japanese syllabic writing having 72 syllabic sounds, requires 48 Morse code characters for radio transmission, creating a form of Morse code called Kana Morse code.

c. Knowledge of the language used in a given cryptogram is important in two respects. First, the frequency of occurrence and distinctive peculiarities of combining individual letters, vowels, consonants, digraphs, and trigraphs, varies with different alphabetic based languages, but individually are rather constant, a feature that becomes the basis for analysis. Second, final solution and translation of the message depends upon the ability to make valid assumptions of word usage.

d. In some cases it is possible to perform certain steps before the language of the cryptogram is known. Frequency studies may be made and certain analytic processes begun without this knowledge. Final solution, however, usually depends on the analyst knowing valid combinations of letters, syllables, and some common military terminology in that language, or having available a translator who can aid him in making necessary assumptions based upon his special knowledge of the characteristics of the language in question.

2-6. (C) Isolation of the General System

a. Determining the general system in which a given cryptogram has been enciphered is the most difficult step in its solution, except for some of the

simpler basic systems. The solution of every cryptogram involving a form of substitution depends upon its reduction to monoalphabetic terms. This is also true of combined substitution-transposition ciphers and enciphered codes. In the case of transposition ciphers, recognition of the system, followed by determination of the method of transposition is required.

b. To achieve these ends, however, a degree of prior knowledge is required; knowledge of how a given cryptographic system operates, its characteristics, and its limitations. The analyst must be able to identify the cryptogram under study as one of the basic systems. The knowledge of cryptographic systems comes from training and experience; identification of a cryptographic system is a matter of analytic determination.

c. Cryptanalysis offers few tests that may be applied to a cryptogram to determine positively to which class it belongs, particularly in the case of two systems yielding externally similar results. However, the analyst, if he can identify a system to a general class, can usually determine by trial and error the exact class to which it belongs. Sooner or later most systems can be identified, either because of blunders or carelessness on the part of the cryptographic clerks, or because the accumulation of a volume of traffic makes possible its identification by cryptanalytic and statistical studies. In the case of isolated cryptograms, identification of a system is sometimes a matter of a shrewd guess.

2-7. (C) Reconstruction of the Specific Key

Most cryptographic systems use a specific key to guide, control, or modify the processing steps of the general system. Once the system is known, the next step in the solution of a cryptogram is to determine the specific key, if used, employed to produce the cryptogram. This determination may not be required in complete detail; it may be sufficient to know the number of alphabets involved in a substitution system, or the number of columns in a transposition system, or that a code system is one-part. In other cases, a complete recovery may be desirable for use as a clue to the operation of an unsolved related system. In many cases, the reconstruction of the specific key and the recovery of the plaintext may be simultaneous operations. The primary requirement for specific key recovery in most cases is to provide the basis for the rapid solution of cryptograms enciphered in the system using the same key or similar key.

2-8. (C) Recovery of the Plaintext

a. In the case of substitution ciphers, this process involves establishing equivalency between specific

letters of the ciphertext and the plaintext, letter by letter, pair by pair, etc., depending upon the type of substitution cipher involved. In the case of transposition ciphers, the process involves rearranging the elements of the ciphertext, according to the peculiarities of the system, until the plaintext has been recovered. In the case of codes, the process is one of determining the meaning of each code group.

b. The above processes for any system are not sequential. The identification of plaintext values comes at very irregular intervals. At first, only one or two values are recovered and appear scattered throughout the ciphertext. These letters form the "skeletons" of words, upon which further work, continuing the reconstruction process and assuming words to be tested, recovers the complete text. The recovery of the plaintext is a long tedious process involving a great deal of work and analysis.

2-9. (C) Steps of Cryptanalysis

Any scheme of analysis is based upon successive elimination of alternatives, therefore the cryptanalyst can only progress as far as the extent of his own knowledge of the possible alternatives. Additionally, the general procedures and techniques of analysis will differ from one system to another due to the characteristics of each system that lends itself to analytic attack. For these reasons it is difficult to specify which exact steps will be followed in all cases. The most important steps of practical, operational cryptanalysis are listed below in outline form. These steps appear in the order in which they are usually followed, but in particular cases, some of these steps may be interchanged or omitted entirely.

- a. The study of the characteristics of the message text.
- b. The study of any available collateral information.
- c. The search for and study of indicators in the message text.
- d. The determination of the type cryptographic system used.
- e. The separation and classification of messages into common groups determined by general system or related specific keys.
- f. The search for repetition of groups, symbols within and between messages of the same system.
- g. The study of the beginnings and endings of messages for stereotypes.
- h. The preparation of statistical counts of message elements.
- i. The reduction of the encrypted text to the simplest terms.
- j. The test for probable words, stereotypes, and isologs.
- k. The recovery of the plaintext.

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Section III. (C) ANALYTIC AIDS

2-10. (C) Introduction

a. Several different statistical tests, tables, and many different data listings, are available to the analyst as analytic aids. The tests are generally used for the initial identification of a system, enabling the analyst to identify a system to its particular class, substitution or transposition, and in some cases allowing the determination of type, monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic substitution. However, the analyst should understand at the outset that the results given by these tests are not always absolutely reliable. In certain cases, the inherent characteristics of the ciphertext may be such that the test results are misleading if not totally false. The significance is that the analyst should not accept at face value the results of one test. Rather, identification should be based on several factors.

b. In the following paragraphs, the more common and immediately useful tests are introduced and

explained. In subsequent chapters where the tests have specific application, they will again be explained in terms of each case. Also in the same areas, other tests which serve a purpose only in a given set of circumstances will be explained and the techniques of their application discussed.

c. The lists of data used by the analyst in the analysis of a cryptogram, and which have general application in this context only are contained in the appendixes. As they become applicable they will be discussed and their use illustrated.

2-11. (C) Unilateral Frequency Distribution

a. The individual letters of any alphabetic-based language, when used in intelligible text, occur with greatly varying frequency. If, for example, a tabulation is made of the occurrence of the individual letters in the preceding sentence, shown in figure 2-1, the variation in frequency is strikingly demonstrated.




Figure 2-1 (U). Frequency tabulation 1 (U).

If the letters of the second sentence in the preceding paragraph are tabulated as shown in figure 2-2, the

following occurrence of individual letters will be found.




Figure 2-2 (U). Frequency tabulation 2 (U).

Although a difference in the frequency of occurrence of single letters, as reflected in peaks and troughs of each distribution, is observable in both distributions,

very little difference is observed when the frequency of occurrences of given letters in both distributions is compared.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
9	3	4	4	1	4	3	5	1	0	0	0	8	8	2	1	1	5	3	9	5	2	2	1	4	0	
9	1	6	6	2	0	5	2	4	1	0	1	5	1	2	7	2	1	8	6	3	4	2	0	1	2	0

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In both of the distributions, note that certain letters occur much more frequently than others. The letters A, E, I, N, O, R, and T occur with the greatest frequency. The letters C, G, H, L, P, and S occur less often. The letters F, J, K, Q, V, X, and Z occur infrequently, or not at all. A degree of similarity between the two distributions is greater if the two texts used in the tabulation are longer. In fact, when two different texts of 1,000 or more letters are compared, the frequencies of occurrence of individual letters show only the slightest variation. Beyond that, the practical gain in accuracy does not warrant further increase in the amount of text.

b. The standard uniliteral frequency distribution for English telegraphic plaintext, derived from a tabulation of 50,000 letters, and reduced to a base of 1,000 which may be used as a tool in the analysis of cryptograms in the English language, is given in figure 2-3.

c. The preceding figures reveal several facts of great importance to the cryptanalyst and cryptographer.

(1) The standard uniliteral frequency distribution is quite irregular, having marked peaks and troughs, points of high and low frequency.

(2) The relative position within the standard uniliteral frequency distribution of the peaks and troughs is relatively fixed, determined by the sequence

of the letters of the alphabet and their frequency of usage.

(3) The relative height and depth of the peaks and troughs are also relatively fixed, varying only slightly, and this is determined largely by the size of the sample tabulated.

(4) The most prominent crests are marked by the vowels A, E, I, and O, and the consonants N, R, S, and T. The deepest troughs are the consonants J, K, Q, X, and Z.

(5) The four vowels, A, E, I, and O, and the four consonants, N, R, S, and T, representing a combined frequency of 666 of 1,000 letters, approximately one-third of the alphabet, are used in writing two-thirds of normal plaintext messages.

d. Should an alphabet be so changed, or used in such a manner as to either change the sequence of the alphabetic values, or the frequency of usage of individual letters, the peaks and troughs would be changed accordingly, both in relative order and in total value. However, these changes, as will be shown in following paragraphs, can be directly related to the use of plaintext, as the true values must remain constant.

e. The data given above is based on English telegraphic text derived from government administrative messages. A similar distribution drawn from another source can be expected to show some

In Alphabetic Order																														
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z					
				1																										
7	1	3	4	3	2	1	3	7			3	2	7	7	2		7	6	9	2	1	1		1						
4	0	1	2	0	8	6	4	4	2	3	6	5	9	5	7	3	6	1	2	6	5	6	5	9	1					
In Relative Order of Frequency																														
E	T	N	R	O	A	I	S	D	L	H	C	F	P	U	M	Y	G	W	V	B	X	Q	K	J	Z					
1																														
3	9	7	7	7	7	7	6	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1										
0	2	9	6	5	4	4	1	2	6	4	1	8	7	6	5	9	6	6	5	0	5	3	3	2	1					
													<u>frequency</u>						<u>percent</u>									<u>percent in round numbers</u>		
Vowels:														A E I O U Y					398		39.8									40
Consonants:														High Freq D N R S T					350		35.0									35
														Med Freq B C F G H L M P V W					238		23.8									24
														Low Freq J K Q X Z					14		1.4									1
													<u>1,000</u>						<u>100</u>									<u>100</u>		

Figure 2-3 (U). Standard uniliteral frequency distribution (U).

variation, the degree of variance being dictated by the source. For example, a distribution tabulated from messages pertaining to international shipping activities is markedly different, caused by the use of words peculiar to the business. Also, a distribution of a message in a foreign language is different, due to the nature of that language's alphabet, spelling, and word usage. However, for any given set of circumstances, which remain constant, a standard uniliteral frequency distribution can be derived. Variations may occur in each, because of volume available for tabulation or subject matter, but given sufficient volume, a normal distribution can be derived which forms a basis for the initial study of a cryptogram.

2-12. (C) Use of the Standard Uniliteral Frequency Distribution

Three facts can be determined by a comparison of the standard uniliteral frequency distribution to a uniliteral frequency distribution drawn from a cipher message composed of letters. First, whether the

cipher belongs to the substitution or transposition class. Second, if substitution, whether the cipher is monoalphabetic or polyalphabetic. Third, if the cipher is monoalphabetic, whether the cipher component is a standard (direct or reversed) or a mixed sequence.

a. The difference between a transposition system and a substitution system is that in transposition, the plaintext has been rearranged, conventional values remaining the same in all cases. In substitution, the identities or values of the letters of the plaintext have been changed giving rise to the ciphertext of the message. Consequently in a transposition cipher, a count of the letters should correspond closely to the standard uniliteral frequency distribution, both in frequency of occurrence of the individual letters and in their spatial relationship, i.e. the location of the peaks and troughs.

For example, a frequency count of the following cryptograms produced by transposition ciphers appears in figure 2-4.

- Cryptogram No. 1 HAMEA EROSY ATUTS DEEET QRDRU USYDP
- Cryptogram No. 2 NPRIO IRXCC PMTIS SSLEL VCTEE
 NEEAC OOSOO ANFSE OEOYI NSIAT
 SSSYA HRARN LIRWN ATNNT OTIRN
 TIODR
- Cryptogram No. 3 VAAEI TZZMO HNEUE APDEF TOXIL
 YNTRT OORTS PLORO ARRON ECTZL
 REEEA RFAXI OUTER OTSEK JUPPE
 ZSDII IOERE QOOSJ EOLSO SYEIO
 WNILN ROFUF HTUSF TIFTS SVUOC
 XWERE LERRA DE




Figure 2-4 (C). Uniliteral frequency distribution, transposition cipher (U).

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Converted to an equal base and compared to the standard uniliteral frequency distribution, it appears in figure 2-5. On this basis one assumed with a certain degree of security that the cipher in question is a transposition system rather than a substitution system.

b. In monoalphabetic substitution ciphers, the identities of the letters are changed on a one-to-one basis, i.e. Ap may become Xc and Xp may become Ac; Ap by definition cannot be represented by more than one cipher value. Since the identities of the letters are changed, the frequency of appearance of the letters are changed. The frequency of appearance of vowels, and high-, medium-, and low-frequency consonants are quite different from what they were in the plaintext. This may be seen in figure 2-6 depicting a message enciphered in a monoalphabetic substitution system, and its accompanying uniliteral frequency distribution.




Figure 2-5 (U). Comparison, standard uniliteral frequency distribution and transposition ciphertext (U).

YHYGS UWNCP CNSCH KOUHA HAUCJ LIPCH WYWIH MCHOC HAQCN BYHYG
 GCHCN CUNCH AWIHN UWNMV SMHCJ YLZCL YGLIN ULUNN UWEMU HXCHN
 YLXCW NCIHI ZFIWM VSGCH YMUHX VIIVS NLUJM WUJNO LYXJQ CHUIM
 NUNYX NBUNN QIIHY LYACG YHNWO LLYHN FSYHA UAYXC HLYMO JJFSU
 WNCPC NCYMU HXJFU HMZIL IZZYH MCPYU WNCIH CHUOA OMNBN CMULY




Figure 2-6 (C). Uniliteral frequency distribution, monoalphabetic substitution cipher (U).

Enlarged to a base of 1,000 by multiplication and compared to a standard uniliteral frequency distribution, it appears as in figure 2-7. A comparison of the two shows that it does not correspond to the expected norm. Expected high-frequency letters appear as low-frequency letters, low-frequency letters become medium-frequency, and medium-frequency letters are both high and low. Close

inspection will show that the ciphertext still exhibits marked peaks and troughs, and a definite spatial relationship exists between them; both are characteristics of monoalphabetic substitution where only the value of the letters are changed, and consequently the frequencies of occurrence of individual letters are not suppressed. If the system is non-monoalphabetic, where the possibility exists that




Figure 2-7 (U). Comparison, standard uniliteral frequency distribution and monoalphabetic substitution cipher (U).

one plaintext letter is represented by a number of different cipher letters, the peaks and troughs are suppressed and leveled off.

c. Once it has been determined that a given cipher alphabet is monoalphabetic, represented by the text of a cryptogram, the type alphabet (direct or reversed standard, or mixed) can be identified by comparing the spatial relationships of its peaks and troughs with those of the standard uniliteral frequency distribution. For example, if the frequency distribution for the cipher shown above is moved seven places to the right, where *Uc* corresponds to *Ap*, the peaks and troughs of the two distributions can be brought into alignment. This relationship is shown more clearly in figure 2-8 where each alphabet and its associated frequency distribution is inscribed on two wheels which can be moved against one another.

d. Identification of the use of direct standard reversed cipher alphabets and mixed sequence cipher alphabets employs the same techniques of comparing the peaks and troughs of the cipher alphabets in question against those of the standard uniliteral frequency distribution. For example, compare the cipher alphabets shown below to their associated standard uniliteral frequency distributions. In figure 2-9①, note that the spatial relationships are the same, except that the one representing the ciphertext is directly reversed, indicating that the alphabetic values it represents are also reversed. In figure 2-9②, no matter how the two alphabets are placed against one another, alignment is impossible, without a rearrangement of the letters of the ciphertext. Once this is done, however, peaks and troughs can be alined.

NORMAL UNILITERAL FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION




Figure 2-8 (U). Point of coincidence, normal uniliteral frequency distribution and ciphertext (U).

2-13. (U) Variations in a Uniliteral Frequency Distribution

a. In the preceding paragraphs, identification is predicated on the fact that usually the frequency distribution of a transposition cipher is very close to that of normal plaintext, while usually in a substitution cipher they are far different, making identification of either a simple matter. This is not always the case, however, for as messages decrease in length, there may be greater and greater departure from the normal proportion of vowels, and high-, low-, and medium-consonants used. This situation will limit the use of the standard uniliteral frequency distribution for identification purposes.

b. Statistical studies show the theoretical deviation from the norm. The following charts, one for each vowel (fig. 2-10), and for high-frequency (fig. 2-11), medium-frequency (fig. 2-12), and low-frequency (fig. 2-13) consonants, illustrate expected variations in frequency of occurrence by message length. The time of occurrence is shown on the vertical line, message length on the horizontal line, and maximum and minimum occurrences indicated




Figure 2-9① (U). Comparison, standard uniliteral distribution and reversed standard cipher alphabet (U).




Figure 2-9② (U). Comparison, standard uniliteral distribution and mixed cipher alphabet (U).

by the upper and lower lines of the graph respectively. For example, in a plaintext message of 100 letters, the combined number of vowels appearing in it should fall within the range of 32 to 48 letters.

2-14. (C) The Lambda (λ) Test

a. The Lambda or blank expectation test is another means of determining whether a cipher message is monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic. It is normally used on messages of 200 letters or less, assuming that messages of greater length can be identified easier by other methods. The test is

based on the number of nonoccurrences of letters in a message. Statistical studies show that a predictable number of blanks will occur in plaintext messages, the exact number varying with the length of the message. Statistical studies also show that the theoretical numbers of blanks that will occur in a completely random assortment of letters differ from the expected number of blanks occurring in plaintext messages of equal length. From this information the blank expectation chart (fig. 2-14) has been devised which compares the expected number of blanks in plaintext and in random text, which in




Figure 2-10 (C). Expected occurrence of vowels, English plaintext (U).




Figure 2-12 (C). Expected occurrence of medium-frequency consonants, English plaintext (U).




Figure 2-11 (C). Expected occurrence of high-frequency consonants, English plaintext (U).




Figure 2-13 (C). Expected occurrence of low-frequency consonants, English plaintext (U).

effect is the same as the number of blanks expected in a cipher message based on a nonmonoalphabetic cipher.

b. Curve P in the chart indicates the number of expected blanks in a plaintext message and curve R the number of expected blanks in a random (nonmonoalphabetic cipher message) assortment of letters. To use the chart, find the number of blanks in the message under study. Locate this number on the vertical line indicating the number of expected blanks, locate the total number of letters in the message on the horizontal line, and then locate the point of intersection of these two points on the chart. Should the point of intersection fall closer to the P curve than to the R curve it is probably

either a simple substitution or a transposition cipher. If, however, the point of intersection falls closer to the R curve, the message is probably enciphered in a nonmonoalphabetic system.

c. These charts may be used to identify the class of a cipher in addition to supplementing the standard unilateral frequency distribution. If the count of a class of letters, vowels or consonants, falls within the expected range shown by the upper and lower lines, it is assumed to be a transposition cipher; if outside, it is assumed to be a substitution cipher. Basis of reasoning for these identifications is the same as used previously, i.e. transposition




Figure 2-14. (U). The Lambda (λ) test, expected number of blanks occurring in English plaintext (U).

does not change the values of the letters while substitution does. The degree of accuracy of the identification is correlated to the distance that the point of intersection of the number of letters and message-length falls from or within the delimiting maximum-minimum lines.

2-15. (C) The Phi (ϕ) Test

a. In the preceding examples, identification is based largely upon visual observation of characteristics present because sufficient depth, that is quantity of messages in a given cipher, is available.

However, depth is not always available. Often an analyst must work with an extremely small volume of traffic, in which case a frequency distribution is likely to be inaccurate, due to the insufficiency of traffic as well as the normally expected variations of occurrence. For such cases, a mathematical test has been developed which allows identification of monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic quality.

b. This test is based upon the known frequency of occurrence of the specific letters of an alphabet, and the premise that these characteristic frequencies will be repeated in certain ciphers, even though the identity of the letters involved might be changed. For example, in English the letter E is normally one of the most frequently used letters. If in a cipher the letter X was substituted for the letter E, X then would appear in the ciphertext as often as E did in the plaintext. Also given an alphabet, the frequency of random occurrence of each of its letters can be calculated by statistical means. This frequency, random occurrence, represents the number of times a letter is liable to appear through pure chance alone where the text is solely a random mixture of all letters of the alphabet. Thus, two standards are available, the plaintext frequency of occurrence, and the random frequency of occurrence, for all alphabets.

c. The ϕ test then is a comparison between the observed occurrences of the letters, of a cipher represented by ϕ_o , with the expected value of random occurrence, represented by ϕ_r , and the expected plaintext occurrence, represented by ϕ_p . The use of the ϕ test can be seen in figures 2-15 and 2-16.

OWQWZ AEDTD QHHOB AWFTZ WODEO
 TUWRQ BDQRO XHQDA GTBDH PZRDK

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
3	3	0	7	2	1	1	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	1	6	3	0	4	1	0	5	1	0	3

Figure 2-15 (C). The Phi (ϕ) test, tabulation of frequencies (F) of letters (U).

3	3	0	7	2	1	1	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	1	6	3	0	4	1	0	5	1	0	3	$\Sigma F = N$
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
			4			1							1	3		1		2								
6	6	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	6	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	$\Sigma F (F-1) = \phi_o$

N = 50
 $\phi_o = 154$

Figure 2-16 (C). The Phi (ϕ) test, calculation of ϕ_o (U).

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d. Observed values of occurrence (ϕ_o) for this distribution are calculated by applying the formula $F(F-1)$ to the frequency of occurrence (F) of each letter and then totaling the sums of all. This is expressed mathematically as $\phi_o = F(F-1)$. For example, $F(F-1)$ ϕ_o of $A=3(3-1)=3 \times 2=6$. This calculation is applied to each in turn, the individual sums then summed to derive the observed values of occurrence, ϕ_o . To determine the values of ϕ_r and ϕ_p , the formulas $\phi_r = .0385N(N-1)$ and $\phi_p = .0667N(N-1)$ are used, where N is the sum of F of the distribution. ϕ_r gives the value of expected random occurrence; ϕ_p gives the expected plaintext value for English military telegraphic text. The constants .0385 and .0667 are valid for English plaintext. The former (.0385) is the decimal equivalent of $\frac{1}{26}$, the reciprocal of the number of letters in the alphabet. The constant .0667 is the sum of the squares of the probabilities of occurrence of the individual letters in English plaintext. Where a different alphabet is involved, these constants are different, though the formulas remain the same. The calculations are:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_r &= .0385N(N-1) = .0385 \times 50 \times 49 = 94 \\ \phi_p &= .0667N(N-1) = .0667 \times 50 \times 49 = 163\end{aligned}$$

e. Once the calculations are completed, the values

for observed occurrence, random expected occurrence, and expected plaintext occurrence are compared.

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_o &= 154 \\ \phi_r &= 94 \\ \phi_p &= 163\end{aligned}$$

Since the value of ϕ_o (154) is closer to the value of ϕ_p (163) than to the value of ϕ_r (94), the cipher is probably monoalphabetic. If it were closer to ϕ_r , a nonmonoalphabetic cipher is indicated. Nonmonoalphabetic in this sense refers to the cipher being any one of the systems listed previously in paragraph 1-11 which are not monoalphabetic. If, however, the value of ϕ_o were just halfway between ϕ_r and ϕ_p no assumption would be made on the basis of this test.

f. The basis for identification whether a message is monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic is similar to the basis in preceding tests, i.e. the nonsuppression of frequencies of occurrence when monoalphabetic ciphers are used, and their suppression by nonmonoalphabetic ciphers. The value of ϕ_o approaches the value ϕ_p in cases of nonsuppression, while the value of ϕ_o approaches the value of ϕ_r where suppression occurs. The underlying reason for the latter is that nonmonoalphabetic systems tend to randomize the frequencies of observed occurrences in ciphertext.

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PART TWO (C)
TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 3 (C)
GENERAL TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) GENERAL

3-1. (C) Transposition Ciphers

All transposition ciphers are alike in several respects. First, and most important, all the elements of the original message are present in their original identities, only disarranged in sequence. Second, the individual bits into which the original plaintext message is divided by the transposition process are normally of equal length. They may be either single letters, pairs of letters, sets of letters, or in exceptional cases, whole words. Third, practically all transposition ciphers involve the use of matrices, a geometric design usually a square or a rectangle, with specific routes of inscription and transcription. The importance of these factors is the degree of constancy which they impart to cryptograms produced by transposition systems which form the basis of their analysis.

3-2. (U) Monoliteral, Polyliteral, and Word Transposition

Transposition ciphers are classified by the structure of the elements manipulated in the transposition processes. Those that deal with individual letters of the plaintext are monoliteral transposition. Those that deal with a component of two or more letters are polyliteral transposition. Those wherein the elements are word length are termed word transposition systems. It is possible to use any length element, as the length of the element does not affect the process of transposition. However, the monoliteral transposition systems are favored due to their practicality and security.

3-3. (U) Single and Double Transposition

Single and double transposition, also called monophase and polyphase, are transposition processes a plaintext message may undergo to become ciphertext. In single transposition, the elements transposed go through only one cycle: inscription into a matrix,

and transcription to ciphertext. In double transposition the elements undergo two cycles. The letters resulting from the first transposition cycle are again submitted to a transposition process. Triple and quadruple transpositions are possible but impractical for common use. Double transposition, while limited in its use due to the same practical considerations, does provide a great deal of security; often more security than that provided by certain much more complicated substitution methods.

3-4. (C) Geometric Designs

Most transposition systems use matrices for the inscription and transcription of the plaintext and ciphertext. Squares and rectangles are most commonly used, although other geometric figures, e.g. triangles, trapezoids, and other polygons, are occasionally used. The square and rectangle are far superior to the other forms, being easier to use and less subject to error in transposition, and, therefore, of more practical application. The other geometric figures provide a greater degree of security in that the relative sequence of the elements comprising the plaintext is more completely disarranged leaving little positional pattern. However, due to their own complexity, they find little use in military communications.

3-5. (C) Transposition Routes

a. Just as the size and the shape of the matrix must be predetermined by the correspondents using a transposition system, so must the method of inscribing and transcribing the plain and ciphertexts. Depending to some degree upon the configuration of the matrix used, there are two general methods that may be followed: route, or columnar method.

b. In route transposition, the plaintext message is inscribed within a matrix in the usual manner of writing, from left to right, top to bottom. Then to

<p>(1) Simple horizontal:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>ABCDEF</td><td>FEDCBA</td><td>STUVWX</td><td>XWVUTS</td></tr> <tr><td>GHIJKL</td><td>LKJIHG</td><td>MNOPQR</td><td>RQPONM</td></tr> <tr><td>MNOPQR</td><td>RQPONM</td><td>GHIJKL</td><td>LKJIHG</td></tr> <tr><td>STUVWX</td><td>XWVUTS</td><td>ABCDEF</td><td>FEDCBA</td></tr> </table> <p>(2) Alternate horizontal:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>ABCDEF</td><td>FEDCBA</td><td>XWVUTS</td><td>STUVWX</td></tr> <tr><td>LKJIHG</td><td>GHIJKL</td><td>MNOPQR</td><td>RQPONM</td></tr> <tr><td>MNOPQR</td><td>RQPONM</td><td>LKJIHG</td><td>GHIJKL</td></tr> <tr><td>XWVUTS</td><td>STUVWX</td><td>ABCDEF</td><td>FEDCBA</td></tr> </table> <p>(3) Simple diagonal:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>ABDGKO</td><td>OKGDBA</td><td>GKOSVX</td><td>XVSOKG</td></tr> <tr><td>CEHLPS</td><td>SPLHEC</td><td>DHLPTW</td><td>WTPLHD</td></tr> <tr><td>FIMQTV</td><td>VTQMIF</td><td>BEIMQU</td><td>UQMIEB</td></tr> <tr><td>JNRUWX</td><td>XWURNJ</td><td>ACFJNR</td><td>RNJFCA</td></tr> <tr><td>(5)</td><td>(6)</td><td>(7)</td><td>(8)</td></tr> <tr><td>ACFJNR</td><td>RNJFCA</td><td>JNRUWX</td><td>XWURNJ</td></tr> <tr><td>BEIMQU</td><td>UQMIEB</td><td>FIMQTV</td><td>VTQMIF</td></tr> <tr><td>DHLPTW</td><td>WTPLHD</td><td>CEHLPS</td><td>SPLHEC</td></tr> <tr><td>GKOSVX</td><td>XVSOKG</td><td>ABDGKO</td><td>OKGDBA</td></tr> </table>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	ABCDEF	FEDCBA	STUVWX	XWVUTS	GHIJKL	LKJIHG	MNOPQR	RQPONM	MNOPQR	RQPONM	GHIJKL	LKJIHG	STUVWX	XWVUTS	ABCDEF	FEDCBA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	ABCDEF	FEDCBA	XWVUTS	STUVWX	LKJIHG	GHIJKL	MNOPQR	RQPONM	MNOPQR	RQPONM	LKJIHG	GHIJKL	XWVUTS	STUVWX	ABCDEF	FEDCBA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	ABDGKO	OKGDBA	GKOSVX	XVSOKG	CEHLPS	SPLHEC	DHLPTW	WTPLHD	FIMQTV	VTQMIF	BEIMQU	UQMIEB	JNRUWX	XWURNJ	ACFJNR	RNJFCA	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	ACFJNR	RNJFCA	JNRUWX	XWURNJ	BEIMQU	UQMIEB	FIMQTV	VTQMIF	DHLPTW	WTPLHD	CEHLPS	SPLHEC	GKOSVX	XVSOKG	ABDGKO	OKGDBA	<p>(4) Alternate diagonal:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>ABFGNO</td><td>ONGFBA</td><td>GNOUVX</td><td>XVUONG</td></tr> <tr><td>CEHMPU</td><td>UPMHEC</td><td>FHMPTW</td><td>WTPMHF</td></tr> <tr><td>DILQTV</td><td>VTQLID</td><td>BEILQS</td><td>SQLIEB</td></tr> <tr><td>JKRSWX</td><td>XWSRKJ</td><td>ACDJKR</td><td>RKJDCA</td></tr> <tr><td>(5)</td><td>(6)</td><td>(7)</td><td>(8)</td></tr> <tr><td>ACDJKR</td><td>RKJDCA</td><td>JKRSWX</td><td>XWSRKJ</td></tr> <tr><td>BEILQS</td><td>SQLIEB</td><td>DILQTV</td><td>VTQLID</td></tr> <tr><td>FHMPTW</td><td>WTPMHF</td><td>CEHMPU</td><td>UPMHEC</td></tr> <tr><td>GNOUVX</td><td>XVUONG</td><td>ABFGNO</td><td>ONGFBA</td></tr> </table> <p>(5) Spiral clockwise:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>ABCDEF</td><td>LMNOPA</td><td>DEFGHI</td><td>IJKLMN</td></tr> <tr><td>PQRSTG</td><td>KVWXQB</td><td>CRSTUJ</td><td>HUVWYO</td></tr> <tr><td>OXWVUH</td><td>JUTSRC</td><td>BQXWVK</td><td>GTSRQP</td></tr> <tr><td>NMLKJI</td><td>IHGFED</td><td>APONML</td><td>FEDCBA</td></tr> </table> <p>(6) Spiral counterclockwise:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>APONML</td><td>FEDCBA</td><td>NMLKJI</td><td>IHGFED</td></tr> <tr><td>BQXWVK</td><td>GTSRQP</td><td>OXWVUH</td><td>JUTSRC</td></tr> <tr><td>CRSTUJ</td><td>HUVWYO</td><td>PQRSTG</td><td>KVWXQB</td></tr> <tr><td>DEFGHI</td><td>IJKLMN</td><td>ABCDEF</td><td>LMNOPA</td></tr> </table>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	ABFGNO	ONGFBA	GNOUVX	XVUONG	CEHMPU	UPMHEC	FHMPTW	WTPMHF	DILQTV	VTQLID	BEILQS	SQLIEB	JKRSWX	XWSRKJ	ACDJKR	RKJDCA	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	ACDJKR	RKJDCA	JKRSWX	XWSRKJ	BEILQS	SQLIEB	DILQTV	VTQLID	FHMPTW	WTPMHF	CEHMPU	UPMHEC	GNOUVX	XVUONG	ABFGNO	ONGFBA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	ABCDEF	LMNOPA	DEFGHI	IJKLMN	PQRSTG	KVWXQB	CRSTUJ	HUVWYO	OXWVUH	JUTSRC	BQXWVK	GTSRQP	NMLKJI	IHGFED	APONML	FEDCBA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	APONML	FEDCBA	NMLKJI	IHGFED	BQXWVK	GTSRQP	OXWVUH	JUTSRC	CRSTUJ	HUVWYO	PQRSTG	KVWXQB	DEFGHI	IJKLMN	ABCDEF	LMNOPA
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Figure 3-1 (C). Matrix routes (U).

form the ciphertext, the letters in the design are taken out of the matrix transcribed by following one of many different routes. Each route may have a different starting point and follow a different path through the matrix, with the only consideration being that it be orderly and fixed. Dependent upon the agreement among the correspondents, the use of routes are either fixed or varied at a given interval. A few typical routes which are used are shown in figure 3-1, and for ease in following their paths, the normal sequence of the alphabet is used.

c. Columnar transposition differs from route transposition in that the path of extraction is based upon the columns of the matrix. Again inscription is normally in the usual form of writing, although it may be varied by any route other than vertical, and then transcribed vertically from the cells of the matrix to obtain ciphertext. The sequence in which the columns are extracted from the matrix may be varied: either by following preassigned directions; top to bottom, bottom to top, etc.; or by the use

of special keys which determine columnar order; or even by a combination of the two. Two of the more common vertical routes are illustrated in figure 3-2.

d. The indication for the correspondents of the

<p>(1) Simple vertical:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>AEIMQU</td><td>UQMIEA</td><td>DHLPTX</td><td>XTPLHD</td></tr> <tr><td>BFJNRV</td><td>VRNJFB</td><td>CGKOSW</td><td>WSOKGC</td></tr> <tr><td>CGKOSW</td><td>WSOKGC</td><td>BFJNRV</td><td>VRNJFB</td></tr> <tr><td>DHLPTX</td><td>XTPLHD</td><td>AEIMQU</td><td>UQMIEA</td></tr> </table> <p>(2) Alternate vertical:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td></tr> <tr><td>AHIPQX</td><td>XQPIHA</td><td>DELMTU</td><td>UTMLED</td></tr> <tr><td>BGJORW</td><td>WROJGB</td><td>CFKNSV</td><td>VSNKFC</td></tr> <tr><td>CFKNSV</td><td>VSNKFC</td><td>BGJORW</td><td>WROJGB</td></tr> <tr><td>DELMTU</td><td>UTMLED</td><td>AHIPQX</td><td>XQPIHA</td></tr> </table>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	AEIMQU	UQMIEA	DHLPTX	XTPLHD	BFJNRV	VRNJFB	CGKOSW	WSOKGC	CGKOSW	WSOKGC	BFJNRV	VRNJFB	DHLPTX	XTPLHD	AEIMQU	UQMIEA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	AHIPQX	XQPIHA	DELMTU	UTMLED	BGJORW	WROJGB	CFKNSV	VSNKFC	CFKNSV	VSNKFC	BGJORW	WROJGB	DELMTU	UTMLED	AHIPQX	XQPIHA	
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DELMTU	UTMLED	AHIPQX	XQPIHA																																						

Figure 3-2 (C). Columnar extraction routes (U).

use of a given transposition system (single or double), the type transpositions (route or columnar), and the specific route or key used are functions of the discriminant and specific key. In most cases, the discriminant refers to the use of a given transposition system and its type, while the specific key refers to the specific route or key used in the in-

scription and transcription processes. As required, either or both may appear in the message. They usually occur at a specific point in the message text, sometimes so constructed that to the outsider they appear as a legitimate part of the text. At other times they are easily recognizable for what they are.

Section II. (C) ROUTE TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

3-6. (C) Encipherment and Decipherment

a. The encipherment and decipherment steps in route transposition are based upon the use of fixed matrices and routes; the latter process is a reversal of the former. To illustrate how the system is used, the following steps are illustrated. The system in this case, to be indicated by a discriminant, is single route transposition. The specific key indicates the following elements are required.

(1) A completely filled matrix of 5 rows and 8 columns.

(2) A route of inscription following an alternate diagonal, as shown in figure 3-1, route (4)-(3).

(3) A route of transcription following an alternate diagonal, as shown in figure 3-1, route (3)-(6).

b. Inscription of the plaintext is as follows:

ATTACK HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL
TOMORROW TWO AM
O S T I O W A M
H P T N L R T O
K A N P U T R W
T C S E O D O O
A T A B E N E M

c. Transcription to obtain ciphertext is as follows:

O S T I O W A M
H P T N L R T O
K A N P U T R W
T C S E O D O O
A T A B E N E M
MOAWT WORRO MOTLI EDUNT NOPTS
EENPO BSAHA CKTTA

d. Decipherment is merely a reversal of the preceding steps. The cipher message is inscribed in a 5 x 8 matrix following route (3)-(6), then transcribed following route (4)-(3), thus regenerating the plaintext. Using this system requires both remembering a series of rules, and following these rules explicitly. Any deviation in either process creates some difficulty in deciphering the message with the difficulty proportional to the error.

e. Of all the transposition systems, route transposition of this type probably offers the least resistance to the cryptanalyst. This remains true

despite the apparent variability afforded by changing the dimensions of the matrix, the routes of inscription and transcription, and the starting points. For example, observe the cryptogram just produced. The briefest examination would quickly reveal three words, ATTACK, HAS, and TOMORROW. In all cases the plaintext would not be so readily identifiable, but sufficient fragments would occur to enable the analyst to solve the cryptogram with little difficulty.

3-7. (C) The Use of Nulls

a. Nulls are symbols appearing in cryptographic texts which have no plaintext value. They are usually similar in appearance to the other elements of the cryptographic text. Nulls may be used to complete a matrix in transposition systems, to pad a text for purposes of security, or where service regulations require, to form groups of equal length. It is common to find that a transposition system provides a greater number of cells than letters in the message to be enciphered; or that the number of letters in the message are not divisible equally by group length. In either case nulls are often used. When nulls are used in transposition systems they must be inserted in the matrix at the same time as the plaintext, and extracted with the plaintext to form the ciphertext. Adding the nulls after the ciphertext has been generated will result in changing the sequence so that the message is either difficult or impossible to decipher.

b. As transposition ciphers are only rearranged plaintext, exhibiting all the normal frequencies of plaintext, the letters chosen for nulls are limited. Letters of very low frequency, such as J, K, Q, X, or Z in English, are normally avoided, as their overuse may make them recognizable for what they are. High- and medium-frequency letters serve best as nulls, but they are limited in their placement. To avoid the possibility of misinterpretations or errors in spelling in the text proper, nulls are generally placed in the last positions.

c. When nulls are employed solely for the purpose of making cryptanalysis more difficult, they may appear at any position within the message text. To insure the identification by concerned correspondents

nulls are usually placed in prearranged positions, although the placement may be random if the system permits. For all practical purposes, however, the use and placement of nulls concern the cryptographer more than the cryptanalyst. They add to the length of the text to be enciphered, possibly induce errors, and cause the user, whose time is of the essence, difficulty in deciphering. Increase in security by their use is questionable.

shown. Two examples are reversed writing and vertical writing; the latter in horizontal form is also known as the rail-fence cipher. Both systems are extremely simple from the cryptanalytic viewpoint, but they illustrate that a given method of encipherment may duplicate the results produced by another method. Thus, the cryptanalyst may be able to solve messages accurately, yet not have recovered the original system that produced it. Also, a solution devised for one type system may be equally valid applied to another type.

3-8. ~~(S)~~ Special Cases of Route Transposition

a. The effects of route transposition may be obtained by methods other than those previously

b. The procedures of reversed writing are illustrated in figure 3-3 by enciphering this message:

BRIDGE DESTROYED AS DIRECTED

- (1) Reversed retaining original word length.
DETCERID SA DEYORTSED EGDIRB
- (2) Regrouping the words in cipher text of five letters.
DETCE RIDSA DEYOR TSEDE GDIRB
- (3) Reversing words retaining their original length.
EGDIRB DEYORTSED SA DETCERID
- (4) Regrouping the reversed words in cipher text of five letters.
EGDIR BDEYO RTSED SADET CERID

Figure 3-3 ~~(C)~~. Reversed writing (U).

c. The ciphertext produced by method (2) above is duplicated by:

Inscription 1	B	R	I	D	G	5
2	E	D	E	S	T	4
3	R	O	Y	E	D	3
4	A	S	D	I	R	2
5	E	C	T	E	D	1

Transcription

text through the use of route transposition illustrates that, although the external appearance of the two methods differ, their products are the same.

e. During the Civil War an interesting form of reversed writing, involving the use of phonetics shown in figures 3-4 and 3-5, was employed on several occasions. The following message, allegedly sent from President Lincoln to General Burnside, is an example:

d. The method of achieving the same message

Washington, D.C.

November 25, 1862

BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia: Can Inn Ale me withe
2 oar our Ann Pas Ann me flesh ends N.V. Corn Inn
out with U cud Inn heaven day nest Wed roe Moore
Tom darkey hat Greek Why Hawk of Abbot Inn B chewed
I if.

Bates

Figure 3-4 ~~(C)~~. Reversed phonetic writing (U).

Reading the message backward with the stress on the phonetics the recipient reads the message as:

If I should be in boat off Aquia Creek at dark
tomorrow (Wednesday) evening, could you, with-
out inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour
or two with me?

A. Lincoln

Figure 3-5 ~~(C)~~. Plaintext, reversed phonetics (U).

f. A system of more practical worth, when compared to that above, is vertical writing or the rail-fence cipher. The message, "BRIDGE DESTROYED AS DIRECTED," when enciphered in these systems appears as in figure 3-6.

Variation is extended simply by increasing the length of each diagonal rail:

```

      B           S           S           D
      R           E T       A D       E
      I   · D   R   D   I   T
      D E       O E       R C
      G           Y           E
    
```

Although different groups would be generated (BSSDR ETADE etc.), the system produces the same results as route transposition and is susceptible to the same security failures.

(1) Vertical writing:	BR	BIGDS RYDSI ETRDR
	ID	EETOF ADRC E
	GE	
	DE	
	ST	
	RO	
	YE	
	DA	
	SD	
	IR	
	EC	
	TE	
	D	
(2) Rail-fence cipher:		
	B I G D S R Y D S I E T D	
	R D E E T O E A D R C E	

Figure 3-6 (C). Vertical writing (U).

Section III. (C) COLUMNAR TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

3-9. (C) General

Columnar transposition differs from route transposition in that the transcription of the plaintext from the matrix is based exclusively upon column order. One of the most common types of columnar transposition involves the use of a key to randomize the transcription of the columns. The purpose of columnar transposition is to introduce a greater degree of security than is afforded by either the route or straight sequential columnar methods. The use of a key, either numeric or alphabetic, provides a wider latitude for variation in the vertical route, yet serves as a controlling factor to coordinate the transposition process between several correspondents. Of primary interest to the analyst is that it also serves to limit the width of the matrix; the

KEYWORD	H E A D Q U A R T E R S
NUMERICAL KEY	6 4 1 3 7 12 2 8 11 5 9 10

The numerical key is derived by assigning numbers in sequential order to the letters of the keyword in their alphabetic order. Thus A is assigned the number 1, and since A is repeated in the keyword, it is assigned 2 at its next position. Alphabetically D follows A, so it is assigned the next available number, 3. The process is continued until each letter has been assigned a number, no number being repeated.

b. The method of deriving a numerical key from a literal key as shown above is only one of a number of methods, but it is the most commonly used. The same technique may be applied to phrases or to sentences so that a very long numerical key, impossible to remember ordinarily, may be generated

height then being the product of dividing the approximate message length by matrix width.

3-10. (C) Keywords and Numerical Keys

a. A numerical key is composed of a sequence of numbers, either sequential or random and is used to control certain cryptographic operations. To preclude the necessity of carrying a long sequence of random numbers in written form, cryptographers have devised a simple method of deriving such sequences from words, phrases, or sentences, which can be remembered much more easily than the sequence of numbers. This memory aid is known as a keyword or keyphrase, whichever the case may be; and from a prearranged key, a series of numbers can be derived, as shown below:

at will. So far as the cryptanalyst is concerned it is not essential to know how a key was derived in a specific case, except when this knowledge will enable him to generate additional keys for the solution of other messages. Often, as will be demonstrated in subsequent paragraphs, he may be unaware that a literal key has been used as the basis for a numerical key, or if aware of this, be unable to recreate the true literal key by analysis of available information alone.

c. Several general factors enter into the selection of literal keys which are of interest to the cryptanalyst, and which can under certain circumstances prove of value.

(1) It is usually such that it can be remembered easily.

(2) Normally it contains as few repeated letters or words as possible.

(3) It usually consists of one or more simple familiar words or phrases, which admit only one spelling and one order.

(4) It should present no direct association with the special situation in which it is used, so as not to be easily assumed.

3-11. (C) Use of Keys With Completely Filled Matrices

a. In keyed columnar transposition, where a completely filled matrix is used, the letters are written into a matrix, a square or a rectangle with nulls being added to complete the matrix or to provide the requisite number of characters to form complete groups; then transcribed vertically by following the sequence of columns as determined by the numerical key. For example, in figure 3-7, a message is enciphered by this method.

Message REPORT LOCATION OF SECOND BATTALION COMMAND POST TODAY

Keyword
Numerical Key

L I B E R T Y
4 3 1 2 5 6 7
R E P O R T L
O C A T I O N
O F S E C O N
D B A T T A L
I O N C O M M
A N D P O S T
T O D A Y D N

Cipher Text

PASAN DDO TE TCPAE CFBON OROOD
IATRI CTOOY TOOAM SDLNN LMTN

Figure 3-7 (C). Keyed columnar transposition (U).

b. To decipher such a message, a matrix of the proper size must first be constructed. In this case, since the key contains 7 numbers and the message has 49 letters, the matrix must be a 7 x 7 square if the rectangle is completely filled. After constructing the matrix, the message is inscribed in it, starting with the first group of the message and following the sequence of columns indicated by the numerical key. Once the inscription is completed, the message can be read horizontally.

c. The results produced by this method may be varied by one or a combination of changes in the keyword and in the routes of inscription and transcription. However, all things being equal, variation is most often introduced by changes in the key. A change of key on a daily basis, or for each message, is possible by preparing a whole list of keys for a given period, a different key being used in each case. It is also possible to designate the specific key to be used from a prepared list of keys through the use of an indicator in the message, inserted in a prearranged position of the message text. This last procedure has one disadvantage, however. If the indicator is erroneously transmitted, the message may be impossible to decipher, in which case the recipient must either ask that the message be re-

transmitted or ask that the key indicator be confirmed. In both cases the indicator may be revealed.

3-12. (C) Use of Keys With Incompletely Filled Matrices

a. The degree of cryptographic security of keyed columnar transposition is increased if the matrix is not completely filled, the number of cells in the matrix exceeding the total number of letters in the message. This increased security creates more difficulty for the cryptanalyst in determining the dimensions of the matrix, and the corresponding length of individual columns once width is assumed or proved. Where this system is used, cells which will be left blank must be specified.

b. Normally the system operates as shown in figure 3-8.

c. To decipher the message the cryptographer must know the key and the position where cells will be left blank. Knowing that the key contains 7 letters and the message 30 letters, he can determine the dimensions of the matrix to be 7 x 5, 35 cells, 5 more than needed. Constructing a matrix of this size, he crosses off the blank cells and inscribes the cryptogram in the remaining open cells in the order predetermined by the key.

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Message: REQUEST IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENTS
 Keyword: P R O D U C T
 Numerical Key: 4 5 3 2 7 1 6
 R E Q U E S T
 I M M E D I A
 T E R E I N F
 O R C E M E N
 T S
 Cipher Text: SINEU EEEQM RCRIT OTEME RSTAF NEDIM

Figure 3-8 (C). Keyed columnar transposition with incompletely filled matrix (U).

```

4 5 3 2 7 1 6
- - Q U - S -
- - M E - I -
- - - E - N -
- - - E - E -
- - # # # # #
  
```

compounded by the use of keys, thus making the message indecipherable. The cryptographer has two options, ask for a retransmission of the message or attempt solution by eliminating the nulls, which requires their identification first. The former case provides clues for the cryptanalyst.

d. To illustrate the importance of adding nulls in transposition systems prior to the transcription stage, figure 3-9 depicts what could occur if nulls were added after the encipherment process.

e. Note that the addition of three nulls to complete the last group results in the destruction of the orderly sequence of the reencipherment process,

KEY 4 5 3 2 7 1 6 4 5 3 2 7 1 6 4 5 3 2 7 1 6 4 5
 R E Q U E S T I M M E D I A T E R E I N F O R C E M E N T S

The letters are taken out in order, all those with the same number at the same time, in the order of their

appearance in the text.

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 etc.
 S I N E U E E E Q M R C R I T O T E M E etc.

The process results in the same text as derived from the incompletely filled matrix illustrated in figure 3-8. If the letters are extracted by decimation, i.e. every letter which occurs at a given interval, the

results are the same as straight columnar transposition, the width of the matrix equal to the interval of the decimation.

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Message: COMMAND POST LOCATED AT ROAD JUNCTION

Matrix: A L P H A B E T
 1 6 7 5 2 3 4 8
 C O M M A N D P
 O S T L O C A T
 E D A T R O A D
 J U N C T I O N

Cipher Text: COEJA ORTNC OIDA A OMLTC OSDUM TANPT DNROH

Nulls: ROH added after transcription to complete last group.

A L P H A B E T
1 6 7 5 2 3 4 8
C S A L O C A N
O D N T R O A R
E U P C T I O O
J M T O N D M H
A T D

Decipherment produces unintelligible plaintext:
CSALOCA NODN TROAR ... etc.

Figure 3-9 (C). Addition of nulls after encipherment (U).

CHAPTER 4 (C)
SOLUTION OF SINGLE TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) PRINCIPLES OF SOLUTION

4-1. (C) Review of Characteristics

a. Prior to attempting the solution of any cryptogram, the analyst reviews exactly what is known concerning the basic operation and characteristics of the system which produced that cryptogram. This general information, plus any foreknowledge of the possible contents or subject matter of the message, will determine to a great degree methodology and rapidity of solution. The general characteristics covered to this point are:

- (1) Transposition ciphers are a rearrangement of plaintext, therefore they will exhibit all the frequency characteristics of plaintext.
- (2) The process of encipherment consists of two stages, inscribing the plaintext into a matrix, and transcribing ciphertext from the matrix.
- (3) The routes of inscription and transcription are fixed, and each differs from the other.
- (4) Normally the matrix is either a square or a rectangle, and if the latter, not remarkably distorted.
- (5) The dimensions of the matrix are determined by either the message length or by the length of message divided by key length. In those cases where an incomplete matrix is used, the dimension may be slightly larger in the vertical plane.
- (6) Nulls may be inserted to complete a matrix or to even group lengths, thus usually limiting their number.
- (7) Nulls are inserted prior to the encipherment process; accordingly their identification is not, except in rare cases, critical to the solution of the message.

b. With these known characteristics, the analysis of transposition systems becomes one of initial identification, determination of the matrix dimensions, anagramming to recover the plaintext, and finally, key and route recovery.

4-2. (C) Identification

Transposition systems as a class are not difficult to identify since cryptograms produced reflect the characteristic frequencies of plaintext. The standard uniliteral frequency distribution, given in para-

graph 2-13, usually suffices to identify one composed of English letters. For other languages special frequency distributions drawn up for them would serve the same purpose. As a matter of course, one of the first things the cryptanalyst does when attempting solution of any unknown system is to make a frequency distribution or test of the cryptogram under study.

4-3. (C) Determination of Matrix Dimensions

a. Once it is established that a given cryptogram is produced by a transposition system, the second step toward solution is the determination of the matrix dimensions. Where completely filled matrices are involved this is a relatively simple matter, for the dimensions, width times height, must equal message length. The only problem incurred is to determine which factors to select.

For example, if the message contains 96 letters, possible dimensions of the matrix are: 8 x 12, 12 x 8, 6 x 16, 16 x 6, 4 x 24, 24 x 4, or 48 x 2 and 2 x 48. In actual practice, the matrix dimensions probably would be a combination of the factors 12 and 8, or 6 and 16, rather than the other possibilities. The distorted rectangles represented by combinations of 24 x 4 and 48 x 2 produce a cryptogram similar to the vertical writing or rail-fence cipher discussed previously. In most cases the final solution to this problem lies in limiting the choices, and then eliminating incorrect assumptions by trial and error.

b. Where incompletely filled matrices are used, an additional problem of determining the dimensions of the matrix is introduced. Determination may be based upon finding two factors which will equal message length plus a number, corresponding to the blank cells, which is not greater than the assumed value of matrix width. For example, note the sequence of letters, indicated by number for clarity, and the occurrence of blank cells in figure 4-1.

c. Matrix 1 contains a total of 64 cells, of which only 60 are required, leaving 4 as blanks. Matrix

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60				

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60				

Figure 4-1 (U). Letter sequence, incompletely filled matrices (U).

2 contains a total of 72 cells, a surplus of 12. Following the normal procedure for inscription, the last row and the four cells at the extreme right of the next-to-last row in matrix 2 are left blank; and the last four at the extreme bottom right of matrix 1 are left blank. In both cases, assuming the same key, the cryptograms produced from either matrix are similar in all respects to the other.

d. Therefore, in those cases where blank cells occur in a matrix, a greater variation in dimensions is expected. However, as extra rows equal to the width of the matrix are of no consequence in the encipherment process, a certain limitation does exist. For example, in the case of a message of 60 letters, matrix dimensions could be 8 x 8, 9 x 7, 7 x 9, 11 x 6, 13 x 5, 14 x 5, 16 x 4, 17 x 4, etc. In each case dimensions give an excess of 60 cells, yet the total number of blank cells does not exceed the total cells in a row. Final determination of the correct matrix is one of trial and error starting with the square and nearly-square rectangles.

4-4. (C) Anagramming

a. Having determined possible matrix dimensions and possible column length, the analyst attempts recovery of the plaintext through a process termed anagramming, which simply returns the plaintext letters to their normal position within the matrix.

b. The process of anagramming uses the following factors:

(1) The column totals times number of letters in each column is equal to message length. Therefore, if the analyst's assumption of matrix dimensions is correct, he can reconstruct the original columns

simply by dividing the message in letter length elements that are equal to the height of the matrix.

(2) All letters in a given column follow one another in an orderly fixed sequence, a result of the horizontal inscription, and thus cannot be changed without changing the length of the column. In this case, the sequence of the letters are not disturbed. Only the column in which a letter or a series of letters might appear is changed.

(3) The letters that appear in a given row, when a number of assumed columns are brought together, can be changed in only two ways. First, the letters may be changed only by a change in column length. Otherwise they must remain fixed. Second, the sequence of their appearance in a given row can be changed only by the rearrangement of the order in which the columns are juxtaposed; a change which will result in changing the sequence of the letters in all the rows.

c. As anagramming involves the spelling out of complete words from fragments and individual letters that appear at random in each row, the analyst can use the vowel-consonant ratio, a stable characteristic exhibited by all alphabetic languages. In English, this ratio is 40 to 60, 40 percent vowels to 60 percent consonants. As the plaintext is inscribed horizontally, the vowel-consonant ratio will occur in the rows of a matrix. This phenomenon then serves as a check of the accuracy of the assumed matrix dimensions. A count of vowels and consonants in each row is made and compared to the expected ratio. Should all the ratios fall well outside that expected, the rows may be changed, but only by changing the column length, until reasonable ratios

appear. It must be expected that the exact vowel-consonant ratio will not always appear, particularly where such small samples are involved; but, on the other hand, the ratios should not be extremely distorted either.

4-5. (C) Recovery of the Key

Recovery of the key is not essential to the solution of transposition systems. In fact, it is possible and is usually the case that when a given cryptogram is solved, the key recovery never proceeds further than the recovery of the numeric key. This is the literal key from which it was drawn and is either unrecognized or unrecoverable with the information available to the analyst. Where variations of a basic

key are involved, recovery becomes possible and, in terms of speeding subsequent solutions of related cryptograms, very profitable.

4-6. (C) System Identification

a. System identification is always the first step unless the basic system is known without a doubt. As a matter of course, where the identity of a system is suspect but not assured, a test is used to confirm its identity. This may take time but, when considered in relation to the time spent in attempting to solve a system with completely inappropriate methods, it is time well spent. Prior to conducting any test, any element not part of the text must be eliminated to avoid the possibility of distorting test results.

Message:

V A S C O U O U T E Q F V R M O C S W H R R E R G
S M P E T A R N T R I I E R Y E E R O N R N A M A
E S O E R E S L U R A B S Z O I E L F O R E T O N
I R P B D U O E O O T D I O M T Z H M I Q F S S D
D E E E W V A S C O

An examination of the message reveals a repeated group "VASCO" appearing in the first and last position. Although it is similar structurally to the other groups, its separate appearance and the positions in which it occurs, are indicative of a specific

key. Therefore, these groups are immediately eliminated. Using the remaining 20 groups, a uniliteral frequency distribution is made of the ciphertext, see figure 4-2.




Figure 4-2 (U). Uniliteral frequency distribution, ciphertext (U).

b. Comparing this uniliteral frequency distribution with the standard uniliteral frequency dis-

tribution (based on 100 English plaintext letters) reveals similar characteristics, see figure 4-3.




Figure 4-3 (U). Standard uniliteral frequency distribution (U).

The deviations that exist are not radical and can be accounted for by the smallness of the sample. The sample exhibits the same characteristic peaks and troughs of English plaintext, and the vowel consonant ratio appears very good. Therefore, the assumption that the cryptographic system is transposition is quite safe, unless proven contrary in the analytic stages.

4-7. (C) Recovery of Matrix Dimensions

a. Presuming the system under study is a completely filled matrix, the dimensions are easily determined. The combination of 10 x 10 is the most likely one which will provide a matrix of the proper size, though combinations of 20, 25, and 50 are possible. A matrix of 10 x 10 dictates that there be 10 columns, each containing 10 letters. Accordingly,

the message is divided into 10-letter lengths and transcribed to the vertical position, each corresponding to an assumed column. Just as the ciphertext is originally removed from the matrix by columns, this process is merely a reversal of the enciphering process. For ease in identifying the columns during later manipulation, they are numbered as they are withdrawn from the message.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
U	O	S	I	R	E	I	I	T	Q
O	C	M	I	N	S	E	R	D	F
U	S	P	E	A	L	L	P	I	S
T	W	E	R	M	U	F	B	O	S
E	H	T	Y	A	R	O	D	M	D
Q	R	A	E	E	A	R	U	T	D
F	R	R	E	S	B	E	O	Z	E
V	E	N	R	O	S	T	E	H	E
R	R	T	O	E	Z	O	O	M	E
M	G	R	N	R	O	N	O	I	W

b. At this stage, if the message is enciphered by a

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Vowels	Consonants
U	O	S	I	R	E	I	I	T	Q		6	4
O	C	M	I	N	S	E	R	D	F		3	7
U	S	P	E	A	L	L	P	I	S		3	7
T	W	E	R	M	U	F	B	O	S		3	7
E	H	T	Y	A	R	O	D	M	D		3	7
Q	R	A	E	E	A	R	U	T	D		4	6
F	R	R	E	S	B	E	O	Z	E		4	6
V	E	N	R	O	S	T	E	H	E		4	6
R	R	T	O	E	Z	O	O	M	E		5	5
M	G	R	N	R	O	N	O	I	W		3	7

These ratios, while not perfect, do not exhibit any unusual abnormalities such as rows almost exclusively composed of vowels or consonants. Further, note that the first row composed of 6 vowels and 4 consonants, a reversal of the expected norm, is followed by a number of rows where the vowel count is slightly lower than normal. This is not an unusual condition. Therefore, there being nothing to disprove the original assumption as to the dimension of the matrix at this stage, the anagramming can be started.

c. Several factors will aid the analyst in the anagramming process. Among these are the characteristic combinations of certain letters to form digraphs and trigraphs, the frequency with which they are used, and the types of terminology common to the correspondents using the cipher system. These factors will form the basis by which the anagramming process can be continued.

(1) In column 10, row 1, a letter *Q* appears, a letter of low frequency usage, but when used in

straight columnar route transposition, it could be read out of the matrix along the horizontal rows. Therefore, since it is unreadable in its present form, it is assumed that the system is keyed columnar transposition. The plaintext would then appear without first rearranging the sequence of the columns.

4-8. (C) Anagramming To Recover Plaintext

a. Before attempting to anagram, the analyst must examine the matrix he has constructed, particularly the letter values appearing in each row. If the anagramming is to be successful and plaintext is to appear, each row must exhibit a good vowel-consonant ratio. This ratio does not have to be exact; the prime requirement is that it be possible. If the ratio is unacceptable, the analyst has but one recourse, to change the dimensions of the matrix in order to change row letter values.

b. A check of the individual rows in the matrix above reveals the following vowel-consonant ratios.

English is, almost without exception, followed by a *U*. Scanning row 1 of all adjacent columns reveals a *U* in column 1. By placing these columns side by side in the order 10-1 the following digraphs are formed:

	10	1	
Row 1	Q	U	(15)
2	F	O	(40)
3	S	U	(11)
4	S	T	(63)
5	D	E	(42)
6	D	Q	(02)
7	E	F	(18)
8	E	V	(20)
9	E	R	(87)
0	W	M	(00)

Comparing the digraphs so formed against those in table A-1, Frequency Distribution of Digraphs, the frequencies shown in brackets are obtained. All with the exception of *WM*, *DQ*, and *SU* are medium to high-frequency digraphs, which gives weight to

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the juxtaposition of these columns. The occurrence of *WM* and *DQ* in particular may be explained as word endings and beginnings. Therefore, these columns may be accepted and the anagramming process continued.

(2) The *Q* appearing in row 6, column 1 can be matched to the *U* in the same row, column 8 for the same reason as the preceding match. Thus the columns appear as:

	10	1	8
1	Q	U	I
2	F	O	R
3	S	U	P
4	S	T	B
5	D	E	D
6	D	Q	U
7	E	F	O
8	E	V	E
9	E	R	O
0	W	M	O

The trigraphs formed by the addition of column 8 are not unusual. In fact, *FOR* and *EVE* are quite common, and *QUI*, *SUP*, and *ERO* offer several possibilities for good word fragments. The next step then is to scan the remaining columns for a letter or combination of letters of significance. Another low-frequency letter is the letter *Z* in row 9 column 6. It is not often used, though in military communications it is used for the word "zero." The trigraph *ERO* above could be combined with the *Z* to form the word *ZERO*. Accordingly the columns are juxtaposed.

	6	10	1	8
1	E	Q	U	I
2	S	F	O	R
3	L	S	U	P
4	U	S	T	B
5	R	D	E	D
6	A	D	Q	U
7	B	E	F	O
8	S	E	V	E
9	Z	E	R	O
0	O	W	M	O

(3) At this point, one word (*ZERO*) plus several other word fragments emerge. *SEVE* in row 8 suggests *SEVEN*; *BEFO* in row 7 may be *BEFORE*. If these initial word assumptions are valid, we need only find a column with the letter *R* and *N* in the 7th and 8th row positions respectively. Checking the remaining columns, this combination is found in column 3. An *R* also is found in the 7th position of column 2, but as an *E* appears in the 8th position, it is rejected. Column 3 is then placed in the matrix to the right of column 8.

	6	10	1	8	3
1	E	Q	U	I	S
2	S	F	O	R	M
3	L	S	U	P	P
4	U	S	T	B	E
5	R	D	E	D	T
6	A	D	Q	U	A
7	B	E	F	O	R
8	S	E	V	E	N
9	Z	E	R	O	T
0	O	W	M	O	R

(4) From this point on the solution is quite simple. Only five columns remain to be placed, and sufficient word fragments appear in the partially recovered matrix to affect this easily. For example, in row 1 the fragment *EQUIS* must be preceded by a consonant; and there are only two unplaced, the *R* in column 5 and the *T* in column 9. Column 5 then is placed before column 6.

	5	6	10	1	8	3
1	R	E	Q	U	I	S
2	N	S	F	O	R	M
3	A	L	S	U	P	P
4	M	U	S	T	B	E
5	A	R	D	E	D	T
6	E	A	D	Q	U	A
7	S	B	E	F	O	R
8	O	S	E	V	E	N
9	E	Z	E	R	O	T
0	R	O	W	M	O	R

(5) In row 1, the word fragment *REQUIS* suggests the word *REQUISITION*. A quick glance at the remaining values in row 1 of the unplaced columns reveals the letters *I*, *T*, *I*, and *O*, which combined with the *N* in column 5 row 2 completes the word. If at this point it could be determined which column, 7 or 4, containing the *I* follows column 3, the entire matrix could be written out. The word *BEFORE* in row 7 has yet to be completed, but here again the same situation is found; an *E* appears in row 7 of both columns 7 and 4. The assumed word *REQUISITION* hints at the subject of the message. Considering this, the word fragment *SUPP* in row 3 may possibly be the word *SUPPLY*, *SUPPLIES*, *SUPPLIED*, etc., all with the letter *L* following the last *P*. An *L* appears only in column 7 row 3, so it is assumed that column 7 follows column 3. If this is the case, the remaining columns must be placed in order 9—4—2 to complete the word *REQUISITION*, the *N* appearing at the first position of the second row. To confirm this assumption, the entire matrix is written out and the plaintext read off horizontally.

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5 6 10 1 8 3 7 9 4 2
 R E Q U I S I T I O
 N S F O R M E D I C
 A L S U P P L I E S
 M U S T B E F O R W
 A R D E D T O M Y H
 E A D Q U A R T E R
 S B E F O R E Z E R
 O S E V E N T H R E
 E Z E R O T O M O R
 R O W M O R N I N G

d. As illustrated above, the process of anagramming results in the recovery of the key used in extracting the cipher message from the matrix. Only in those situations where the key exhibits characteristics of being generated by some recoverable system, either through a manipulation of the key values themselves or through derivation from a literal key, is this of significance. Usually the recovery of the key is left at this point.

Section II. (C) SOLUTION OF INCOMPLETELY FILLED MATRICES

4-9. (C) General

The techniques of solution given previously represent those which are generally applicable to all columnar transposition systems. However, where the matrix is incompletely filled, a slightly different approach is required and is somewhat more involved. There are some instances where special conditions are present, and quick and convenient solutions can be reached, circumventing some of the more difficult process required for a general solution. In the following paragraphs a type of general solution is treated, followed by some of the special cases where a modified technique may be used. In all cases the basic method is based upon the characteristics of transposition systems dealt with in preceding paragraphs.

4-10. (C) A Solution for Incompletely Filled Matrices

a. When dealing with cryptograms produced by

ATTIT NCUYI ILAIE OEIIT TLNRE
 CYEGR GTRNT LDHOI OHMVM OPLSF

Were it derived from a completely filled matrix, a 5 x 10 or a 10 x 5 matrix is immediately assumed. But as an incompletely filled matrix is suspected, several assumptions leading to the dimensions are first considered. First, the product of the dimensions will exceed 50 cells. Second, nulls, if used to round out the groups, will appear in the matrix. Third, the cells left blank will not exceed matrix width. Given these generalities, the combination of 6 x 9 or 7 x 8 appears as possible dimensions. Other combinations such as 4 x 13, or 5 x 11 are not to be rejected completely. Since the former gives a more proportional rectangle, it is tried first. In any case, the final determination of the correct matrix size, unless there is prior knowledge available, is largely a matter of trial and error.

c. Assuming a dimension of 6 x 9, the message may now be broken into columns in such a manner


this method, the most critical phase is identifying the system as such. If the cryptographic text contains an odd number of letters not equally divisible, it is obvious that this system is employed. Where the text is even or equally divisible, as is most often the case considering the norm of padding out the message to obtain groups of equal length, identification is more difficult and usually comes only after attempting to solve it as a completely filled matrix. If this attempt fails, it is assumed that it is an incompletely filled matrix. But, assuming that the system has been identified, the next problem is to determine the dimensions of the matrix.

b. Wherever an incompletely filled matrix is suspected, the dimensions are assumed to be the factors of message letter length, plus a number of cells not to exceed the width of the matrix, which are evenly divisible.

For example, examine the following cryptogram which contains 50 letters.

as to fit the matrix, blank cells included. Thus, in a matrix of this dimension, there are two columns 9 letters long and four columns 8 letters long. If the extraction is determined by a key, any specific column cannot be given a definite length. General parameters can be established based on the limitations of column length present. Any column can only be 8 or 9 letters long. Using this limitation, columns of maximum-minimum length are ascertained by decimating the message at intervals as shown in figure 4-4 first by 8's, then by 9's, starting at the first letter of the message. Possible columns thus generated can be arranged in the vertical position, numbered in the order of their extraction. The columns above represent the minimum and maximum lengths of any column in that particular position of the matrix, as determined by its position in the message.

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1 2 3 4 5 6

	Y	E	E	R	O
A	I	I	C	N	H
T	I	I	Y	T	M
T	L	T	E	L	V
I	A	T	G	D	M
T	I	L	R	H	O
N	E	N	G	O	P
C	O	R	T	I	L
U	E	E	R	O	S
Y	I	C	N	H	F
	Y	T	M		
		L	V		
			M		

Figure 4-4 (C). Determination of column length (U).

For example, column 1 being in the first position of the message, must start at a known position. Thus, it can only be, at the maximum, 9 letters long. The second column may begin at the 9th or 10th letter, depending upon the length of the first column, and thus will contain 10 letters of which only 8 or 9 represent the true column length.

d. As these columns represent minimum-maximum length, a vertical movement against one another, as well as shifting of their relative order, is required to align the rows in their proper sequence. A simple way of doing this is to write each column on a strip of paper so that it may be slipped or shifted as required. The extra letters appearing at the top and bottom of the columns can then be struck off, or added as required. The surest entry into a system is usually by way of some peculiarity of the system or the message, an example being the appearance of Q's or Z's in the text. There being none in this particular message, entry is sought through an analysis of digraphs produced by column juxtaposition. Of the columns extracted, 1 and 6 contain the least number of letters. Therefore, since possible

combinations are limited, either could be used as a starting point. Selecting column 6, it is written vertically:

6
O
H
M
V
M
O
P
L
S
F

(1) Once a column has been selected as a base, the next step is to isolate possible adjacent columns. The problem consists not only of selecting the right column, but also selecting its relative vertical position in respect to the base column. In this process, the vertical relationship of the letters in any given column cannot be disturbed except by moving letters from the top of one column to the bottom of the

preceding column; or, from the bottom of one column to the top of the next succeeding column. The letter *Y* may appear in either columns 1 or 2 in the example above. If in column 1, it must follow *U*; if in column 2, it must precede *I*. Using the table of digraphic frequencies (table A-1), the possible identities of letters lying to the right of column 6 are attempted. The letters *J*, *K*, *Q*, *V*, and *Z* are noted as being rarely combined with other letters to form digraphs. Thus the *V* appearing in the columns represents either the start of a word, the end of a word, or probably a part of one of five common digraphs. If it represents the start of a word, it must still be part of the digraphs listed. Therefore, using this as an initial limitation, those letters which are most often combined with the *V* can be written to the right of it, underlining the letters most often used.

6
O
H
M
V *A* *E* *I* *O* *T*
M
O
P
L
S
F

Noting that similar limitations exist in respect to combining letters with *F* and *P* to form digraphs, these letters are also listed:

6
O
H
M
V *A* *E* *I* *O* *T*
M
O
P *A* *E* *L* *O* *P* *R*
L
S
F *E* *F* *I* *O* *T*

(2) Using these possible combinations as a base, the remaining columns are scanned for these

letters occurring at the same relative intervals. With the exception of the letters forming combinations with the letter *V*, only those high-frequency combinations are selected for letters *P* and *F*, leaving the low-frequency combinations open. In some cases, the low-frequency letters form the correct combination. However, it is better to start with the most common combinations; then, if no matches are found, check the low-frequency combinations. Column 1 is set aside immediately as it offers no good combinations. Column 2 contains an *I*, *A*, and *O* sequence in the same relative positions. Therefore, it is considered. Columns 3 and 5 offer nothing; they too, are set aside. Accordingly, columns 6 and 2 are juxtaposed.

6	2	
<i>O</i>		
<i>H</i>		
<i>M</i>	<i>Y</i>	(02)
<i>V</i>	<i>I</i>	(12)
<i>M</i>	<i>I</i>	(09)
<i>O</i>	<i>L</i>	(19)
<i>P</i>	<i>A</i>	(14)
<i>L</i>	<i>I</i>	(27)
<i>S</i>	<i>E</i>	(49)
<i>F</i>	<i>O</i>	(40)
	<i>E</i>	
	<i>I</i>	

(3) As a check, all digraphs formed by the juxtaposition of the two columns are compared with those listed in the table of digraph frequencies, and are found acceptable as a group, since none are unlikely. If possible word fragments are lacking, and if there are no particular letter combinations which suggest the next letter to be added to any of the digraphs, the next possibility is to attempt to expand the digraphs to trigraphs, using tables B-1 and B-2 as a guide. As trigraphs, with column 6 forming the first letter, only *FOR* or *FOU* appear likely. In the cryptogram, only one *U* appears. Therefore, if *FO* represents the first two letters of the trigraph *FOU*, only column 1 will fit, forming the third letter of the trigraph. Placing column 1 to the right of columns 6 and 2, the pseudo matrix appears.

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6	2	1			
O					
H					
M	Y	A			
V	I	T			
M	I	T			
O	L	I			
P	A	T			
L	I	N	ING	INE	
S	E	C	SECOND	SECRET	SECTION
F	O	U	OUR	FOUR	FOUND
E	Y				FOUL
I					

(4) Examination of the rows reveals several possible word bits—*SEC* can be expanded to *SECOND*, *SECRET*, *SECTION* and *FOU* to *FOUR*, *FOUND*, *FOUL*. Also considering the digraphs formed by columns 2 and 1, the possible trigraphs *ING* and *INE*

are suggested. These possible words and trigraphs offer a means of placing the next column. If the above assumptions are correct, the next adjacent column must contain one of the following sequence of letters, in the order shown:

G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
O	O	O	R	R	R	T	T	T	O	O	O	R	R	R	T	T	T
R	N	L	R	N	L	R	N	L	R	N	L	R	N	L	R	N	L

Checking each column in turn for any of the above sequences, only column 4 contains a proper sequence, that being *GTR*. Therefore, column 4 is placed next to column 1.

6	2	1	4
O			
H		E	
M	Y	A	C
V	I	T	Y
M	I	T	E
O	L	I	G
P	A	T	R
L	I	N	G
S	E	C	T
F	O	U	R
E	Y	N	
I		T	
			L

3	6	2	1	4	5
	O				R
	O	H			E
	E	M	Y	A	C
	I	V	I	T	Y
	I	M	I	T	E
	T	O	L	I	G
	T	P	A	T	R
	L	L	I	N	G
	N	S	E	C	T
	R	F	O	U	R
	E		E	Y	N
	C		I		T
	Y				L

(5) There being only two columns unplaced, the solution is greatly simplified; the columns must fall either in the sequence 3-6-2-1-4-5-3-6 etc., or 5-6-2-1-4-3-5-6-2-1, etc. Establishing which is the correct sequence is done quickly by placing each strip in the possible position in which it might appear, slipping it up and down against the columns previously placed, to look for plaintext. By this method, the following sequence would be quickly discovered:

(6) By rearranging columnar order, not changing the sequence, using column 4 as the starting point, and by striking off the letters duplicated at the top and bottom which were generated in establishing minimum-maximum column lengths, the matrix is reconstructed and thus completes the solution.

4	5	3	6	2	1
E	N	E	M	Y	A
C	T	I	V	I	T
Y	L	I	M	I	T
E	D	T	O	L	I
G	H	T	P	A	T
R	O	L	L	I	N
G	I	N	S	E	C
T	O	R	F	O	U
R	H	X	X	X	X

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4-11. (C) A Solution Using Literal Characteristics

a. On occasion a cryptographic text will exhibit an outgrowth of the language used, which will enable the analyst to reach a rapid solution by a less involved process. In the English language for example, the use of the letters X, Q, K, J, and Z is rather limited. Moreover, the use of any of these letters immediately suggests words common to the military.

- K Kilo Kilometer Kill KIA
- Q QU as in Request Requisition Quota
- J Juliett, June, July, Junction, Join

VAAEI TZZMO HNEUE APDEF TOXIL
 YNTRT OORTS P LORO ARRON ECTZL
 REEEA RFAXI OUTER OTSEK JVPPE
 ZSDII IOERE QOOSJ EOLSO SYEIO
 WNILN RORUF HTUSF TIFTS SVUOC
 XWEZE LERRA DE

Examination of the above text reveals a number of low-frequency letters which may be used as an entry

- X Xray, Six, Fix, Axis
- Z Zulu Zero

Depending on the service and function of the correspondents, other words of limited use could be found. Similar limitations and associated words are found in all alphabetic languages and give a rather quick entry into a system.

b. Taking one such characteristic, the analyst can move directly into the anagramming stage with reasonable certainty that as the recovery of the plaintext progresses, the matrix and its keys will fall out.

into the system. To begin, a frequency distribution is made, see figure 4-5.




Figure 4-5 (U). Transposition ciphertext, uniliteral frequency distribution (U).

(1) Any low-frequency letter may be used, but since the Q appears only once, it will be used. With the Q as a center point, a sequence of letters is withdrawn from the message, the exact number of letters depending upon a presumed approximate size for the matrix. The message contains a total of 137 letters indicating that its dimensions possibly lie in the general area of 10 x 14 to 12 x 12. This is just a guess serving only to place some limitation on the number of letters extracted, and to some degree to duplicate the determination of minimum-maximum column length by decimation. On this basis 13 letters are extracted, 6 preceding and 6 following the letter Q, and inscribed vertically to form a column.

- I
- I
- O
- E

- R
- E
- Q
- O
- O
- S
- J
- E
- O

Since there are five U's in the cryptogram, five additional columns (each centered about a U, and of equal length) are now withdrawn from the message and compared individually against column 1. Determination of which column should be paired with column 1 depends on which pair produces the most acceptable digraphs. In this particular case, additional comparative basis is provided by the J which also appears in column 1.

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>I Z</i> (02)	<i>I R</i> (27)	<i>I I</i> (00)	<i>I O</i> (41)	<i>I I</i> (00)
<i>I M</i> (09)	<i>I F</i> (10)	<i>I L</i> (28)	<i>I R</i> (27)	<i>I F</i> (10)
<i>O O</i> (06)	<i>O A</i> (07)	<i>O N</i> (77)	<i>O U</i> (37)	<i>O T</i> (19)
<i>E H</i> (07)	<i>E X</i> (07)	<i>E R</i> (87)	<i>E F</i> (17)	<i>E S</i> (54)
<i>R N</i> (07)	<i>R I</i> (30)	<i>R O</i> (28)	<i>R H</i> (30)	<i>R S</i> (31)
<i>E E</i> (42)	<i>E O</i> (12)	<i>E R</i> (87)	<i>E T</i> (37)	<i>E V</i> (20)
<i>Q U</i> (15)	<i>Q U</i> (15)	<i>Q U</i> (15)	<i>Q U</i> (15)	<i>Q U</i> (15)
<i>O E</i> (03)	<i>O T</i> (19)	<i>O F</i> (25)	<i>O S</i> (14)	<i>O O</i> (06)
<i>O A</i> (07)	<i>O E</i> (03)	<i>O H</i> (03)	<i>O F</i> (25)	<i>O C</i> (08)
<i>S P</i> (10)	<i>S R</i> (05)	<i>S T</i> (03)	<i>S T</i> (02)	<i>S X</i> (00)
<i>J D</i> (00)	<i>J O</i> (02)	<i>J U</i> (02)	<i>J I</i> (00)	<i>J W</i> (00)
<i>E E</i> (42)	<i>E T</i> (37)	<i>E S</i> (54)	<i>E F</i> (18)	<i>E E</i> (42)
<i>O F</i> (03)	<i>O S</i> (14)	<i>O F</i> (25)	<i>O T</i> (19)	<i>O Z</i> (00)

Initially combinations (1) and (5) can be rejected, as the digraphs produced by the juxtaposition of the columns produce impossibly low-frequency digraphs (frequency shown in parentheses). Combinations (2) and (4) contain a fair number of medium-frequency digraphs. Combination (4) also has the digraph *JI* with a frequency of zero. Combination (3) has several high-frequency digraphs, in addition to a number of medium-frequency digraphs. It also has one with zero frequency, but since it occurs at the top of the column it may not be a true match, not occurring in adjacent rows at all. Of all the combinations (3) offers the best possibilities, and it will be used as a base for further analysis.

(2) Assuming that the selected combination is the correct arrangement, the digraphs can be considered for possible expansion. For example, the digraph *IL* can be expanded to *HILL* or *WILL*, *QU* can be expanded to *QUE*, or *QUI*, and *JU* to *JUN* or *JUL*, all fairly common trigraphs. A column to complete these trigraphs must contain one of the following combinations of letters in rows as shown below:

1	<i>I I</i>				
2	<i>I L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>
3	<i>O N</i>				
4	<i>E R</i>				
5	<i>R O</i>				
6	<i>E R</i>				
7	<i>Q U</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>
8	<i>O F</i>				
9	<i>O H</i>				
10	<i>S T</i>				
11	<i>J U</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>L</i>
12	<i>E S</i>				
13	<i>O F</i>				

By starting with the letter which precedes each of the six L's found in the text, the following columns are pulled out quickly.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	<i>Z</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>P</i>
2	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>
3	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>O</i>
4	<i>E</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>
5	<i>E</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>O</i>
6	<i>E</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>A</i>
7	<i>A</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>R</i>
8	<i>R</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>R</i>
9	<i>F</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>O</i>
10	<i>A</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>N</i>
11	<i>X</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>E</i>
12	<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>C</i>
13	<i>O</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>

Of these possible columns, only the second sequence will complete the assumed trigraphs. Therefore, it is placed to the right of the two columns previously placed, which in turn forms a basis for additional anagramming. The placement of the columns, and possible expansions are shown below:

	<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>O</i>	
(H/W)	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	
	<i>O</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	
(Z)	<i>E</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>O</i>	
	<i>R</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>S</i>	
	<i>E</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Y</i>	
(RE)	<i>Q</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>E</i>	(ST)
	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>I</i>	
	<i>O</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>O</i>	
	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>W</i>	(O)
	<i>J</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>N</i>	(E/C/)
	<i>E</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>I</i>	
	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>L</i>	

(3) Once an entry has been made into a transposition system, the complete solution follows rapidly, and in most instances it is merely a mechanical process of making assumptions and then testing their validity by using appropriate frequency tables. Further progress is then made by expanding upon

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word fragments. Following this technique the columns shown below could be matched with little trouble.

```

X I I O F
E W I L L T
C E O N S I
T Z E R O F
Z E R O S T
L L E R Y S
R E Q U E S T
E R O F I V E
E R O H O U R
E A S T W O
A D J U N C T I O N
R E E S I X
O F L W
E
    
```

(4) In addition to the many obvious words and word fragments in the matrix above, evidence also indicates the dimensions of the matrix. Considering the letters in the top row, they can hardly be part of a word in their present sequence, and they are repeats of letters appearing in the bottom row. Therefore, true column length may start in either the first or the second row (in the first row if the repeated letter is located there, or in the second row if the repeated letter falls in the bottom row). Consider also the letter *E* which ends the column starting *XWE*, and which appears as the last letter

of the cryptogram. As it ends the cryptogram, it must be the last letter of the column in question. Note also that the *W* which ends the last column of the matrix is also the same *W* that appears in the start *XWE*. Therefore, it must belong to this column and not to the last column of the matrix, the *X* then ending this column. On this basis, there are two column lengths; one of 11 starting with *W* and ending with *E*; the other starting with *F* and ending with *X*. Thus the *F* which ends column *ILNR* must be deleted. The columns ending *WNIL* and that beginning *ILNR* share in common the letters *I* and *L*. This is impossible. If short and long columns are 11 and 12 letters or rows in length, neither column can contain both letters, as they would then be 13 letters long. Therefore, they must be shared between the two, and to preserve the sequence of letters one must end *WSI*, and the other start *LNR*.

(5) Since the cryptogram contains 137 letters, the assumption of long columns of 12 letters and short columns of 11 letters is very good. For example, $12 \times 12 = 144$, $144 - 137 = 7$, and $12 - 7 = 5$; therefore, in a matrix with 12 rows and columns in which 137 letters have been inscribed, there will be 5 long columns and 7 short. This can be confirmed by going back to the cryptogram and marking off those sequences used. Also, knowing the length of some columns will serve to isolate additional columns of the correct lengths, speeding the recovery process.

```

V A A E I T Z Z M O H N E U E A P D E F T O X I L
Y N T R T O O R T S P L O R O A R R O N E C T S L
R E E E A R F A X I O U T E R O T S E K J V P P E
Z S D I I I O E R E Q O O S J E O L S O S Y E I O
W N I L N R O R U F H T U S F T I F T S S V U O C
X W E Z E L E R R A D E
    
```

Figure 4-6 (C). Isolation of columns in ciphertext (U).

Counting the number of unused letters lying between those columns previously extracted, as underlined in figure 4-6, the following combination of column lengths can be established.

First, unused sequence of 45 letters=one 12-row column and three 11-row columns.

Second, unused sequence of 24 letters=two 12-row columns.

Third, unused sequence of one letter must be assigned to either the preceding or following column. Since it is unlikely that the preceding columns could start with *IIOE*, the *O* belongs to the following column making it 12 letters in length.

(6) The assumption as to column length seems valid, but still there are only six identified as to length, three short and three long. An additional bit

of information, which will aid in further recovery is that long columns appear on the left and short on the right. Accordingly the columns can be moved, long columns to the left and short columns to the extreme right to maintain word symmetry.

```

O F - - - - - E W I L
L T - - - - - C E O N
S I - - - - - T Z E R
O F - - - - - Z E R O
S T - - - - - L L E R
Y S - - - - - R E Q U
E S - - - - - E R O F
I V - - - - - E R O H
O U - - - - - E A S T
W O - - - - - A D J U
N C - - - - - R E E S
I X
    
```

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(7) Having established the parameters of the matrix, and having placed the columns in their correct sequence, recovery of the remaining columns becomes quite easy, using the same methods previously covered. In this case the many word fragments are readily apparent and measurably aid in the process. The completed matrix appears as follows, the keys being derived by the order in which the columns are extracted from the matrix.

	1									1	1
9	1	6	7	2	4	3	1	5	2	8	0
O	F	F	E	N	S	I	V	E	W	I	L
L	T	A	K	E	P	L	A	C	E	O	N
S	I	X	J	U	L	Y	A	T	Z	E	R
O	F	I	V	E	O	N	E	Z	E	R	O
S	T	O	P	A	R	T	I	L	L	E	R
Y	S	U	P	P	O	R	T	R	E	Q	U
E	S	T	E	D	A	T	Z	E	R	O	F
I	V	E	Z	E	R	O	Z	E	R	O	H
O	U	R	S	F	R	O	M	E	A	S	T
W	O	O	D	T	O	R	O	A	D	J	U
N	C	T	I	O	N	T	H	R	E	E	S
I	X	S	I	X							

4-12. (C) Stereotypes and Service Terminology

a. A characteristic of military cryptograms, particularly at the lower echelons, is the presence of stereotypes and characteristic terminology common to military operations. These elements may occur at any position in a message although those at the beginning and the ending are more readily identifiable. These elements may be any of the following types:

5	1	2	3	4	2	4	1	5	3
R	E	Q	U	E	R	E	Q	U	E
S	T	I	N	F	S	T	I	N	F
O	R	M	A	T	O	R	M	A	T
I	O	N	C	O	I	O	N	O	N
N	C	E	R	N	L	O	C	A	T
I	N	G	E	N	I	O	N	O	F
E	M	Y	A	C	C	O	M	M	A
T	I	V	I	T	W	O	P	O	S
Y					T				

- (1) Phonetic alphabets.
- (2) Ranks, titles, unit designations, and nicknames.
- (3) Map reference data, grid coordinates, reference lines, hill numbers, geographic place-names, etc.
- (4) Weapons, caliber, short titles, model numbers, etc.
- (5) The 24-hour time system when spelled out.
- (6) Addressee and signature lines.
- (7) Message reference components (such as part one of two parts, reference your message, etc.).

b. These elements may be either spelled out or abbreviated. The above list is not all inclusive. Once the use of specific stereotypes and certain service terminology has been identified, the analyst is provided with an invaluable aid in the solution of cryptograms, particularly in the case of transposition systems. Not only is this of importance in anagramming, but also, in certain instances, the use of stereotypes can lead to the rapid solution of a number of messages simultaneously.

4-13. (C) Special Solutions

a. On occasion, depending on the security consciousness of the correspondents, a series of messages are enciphered in a transposition system of the same width. If this is coupled with stereotyped beginnings or endings, regardless of whether or not different keys are used, the resulting ciphertext will exhibit a number of similarities which the analyst can quickly exploit. As an example of how these similarities are produced, observe the encipherment shown in figure 4-7.

Message A

<u>ETROC</u>	<u>NMIQI</u>	<u>MNEGY</u>	<u>VUNAC</u>	<u>REAIE</u>	<u>FTONN</u>	<u>CTRSO</u>	<u>INIET</u>	Y
A	B	C	D	E				

Message B

<u>QIMNC</u>	<u>NMPRS</u>	<u>OILIC</u>	<u>NTEFT</u>	<u>NTFAS</u>	<u>ETROO</u>	<u>OODUN</u>	<u>AOAOM</u>	O
B	E	D	A	C				

Figure 4-7 (C). Repeated sequences, cipher message A and B (U).

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The repeated sequences that appear in both messages, underlined above, are the result of two factors: stereotyped beginnings and matrices of the same width. Given these two factors, repetition in text will occur as a result of the enciphering process. Additionally, the number of repetitions is determined by the number of columns. The length of the repetition is determined by the number of rows occupied by the

stereotype. The sequence in which the repetitions occur in the message are the result of the order of extracting the cryptographic text from the matrix, i.e. the particular key used. Thus, matrix width (number of columns), depth (number of rows), and order of extraction (key sequence) can be found. For example, consider figure 4-8.




Figure 4-8 (C). Stereotypes as repeated sequences (U).

(1) Each cryptogram contains 8 sequences which are repeated in the other. Therefore, 8 columns can be assumed, each repetition marking the beginning of a column.

(2) Message A contains 95 letters; as $8 \times 12 = 96$, we assume a matrix depth of 12 rows containing seven columns of 12 letters and one column of 11 letters, the column beginning with IFA. Being the shortest column, it must appear at the right of the matrix.

(3) Message B contains 92 letters; as $8 \times 12 = 96$, we assume again a depth of 12 rows, four columns of 12 letters, and four columns of 11 letters.

(4) All repeated sequences, with the exception of ASOL are of the same length. As the longer columns of an incompletely filled rectangle occur on the left, the column beginning with ASOL is placed to the left.

(5) As the repeats do not appear sequential in both messages, a different key has been used in each case.

(6) The keys, which determine the order of extraction of the column from the matrix, are reflected by the order of the repeats in each message.

(7) Row sequence, i.e. the order of the letters across the matrix, are similar in both matrices for the

stereotype; therefore, a column placement of 1 in one matrix can be applied to that column exhibiting the same repeat in the other matrix.

b. With these generalities, two matrices can be constructed as follows, one for each message:

A	B
A - - - - - I	A - - - - - I
S - - - - - F	S - - - - - F
O - - - - - A	O - - - - - A
L - - - - - M	L - - - - - E
I - - - - - P	S - - - - - S
L - - - - - E	U - - - - - D
B - - - - - D	T - - - - - E
O - - - - - D	A - - - - - E
A - - - - - B	R - - - - - E
E - - - - - R	Z - - - - - Z
W - - - - - E	E - - - - - T
D - - - - -	O - - - - -

With the parameters of the matrices established, anagramming can be commenced playing the recovery of one column's placement against the placement of columns in the other matrix. The two columns of each message that start with a Q and U respectively can be withdrawn and paired:

A	B
Q U	Q U
N S	N S
I C	I C
H E	L I
U P	B E
A V	T E
O N	S H
T E	R T
L L	O R
F O	I X
M M	R O
L Y	

The digraphs formed by pairing the columns appear valid, and can be placed in the matrices. Examination of matrix B shows only 3 columns of 11 letters remaining. Therefore, the pair above for matrix B must fit in two of those three spaces. Also, message B contains only 1 remaining column of 11 letters, that beginning with the repeated sequence *EOD*, which means that these three columns must be joined. Considering the letters available, the sequence *EQUI* appears to be better than the sequence *QUEI*. As the first row, therefore, it is placed in matrix B. Since the column placement found for

one matrix can be applied to the other, the same columns that start with the same repeated letters are also placed in matrix A, producing the following matrices. At this time, key values are also assigned to each matrix in the order of its column's appearance in the message.

	A		B
1	- - - 7 4 6 5	- - - - 7 1 5 8	
A	E Q U I	A	E Q U I
S	O N S F	S	O N S F
O	D I C A	O	D I C A
L	C H E M	L	P L I E
I	S U P P	S	L B E S
L	H A V E	U	T T E D
B	C O N S	T	I S H E
O	A T E D	A	A R T E
A	I L L B	R	F O R E
E	T F O R	Z	S I X Z
W	I M M E	E	E R O T
D	E L Y	O	

c. Using familiar anagramming techniques to place one column in one matrix, and then transferring its location to the other matrix, both messages can readily be solved, resulting in the recovery of the following matrices:

	A		B
1	2 8 3 7 4 6 5	3	6 4 2 7 1 5 8
A	L L R E Q U I	A	L L R E Q U I
S	I T I O N S F	S	I T I O N S F
O	R M E D I C A	O	R M E D I C A
L	A N D C H E M	L	S U P P L I E
I	C A L S U P P	S	W I L L B E S
L	I E S H A V E	U	B M I T T E D
B	E E N C O N S	T	O T H I S H E
O	L I D A T E D	A	D Q U A R T E
A	N D W I L L B	R	S B E F O R E
E	S E N T F O R	Z	E R O S I X Z
W	A R D I M M E	E	R O Z E R O T
D	I A T E L Y	O	D A Y

d. The methods of solving cryptograms enciphered by matrices of the same width, but where the stereotypes occur in the endings of the messages, are the same as those given above. The only difference is that since the repetitions occur in the last few rows of the matrices, the analyst deals with column endings rather than the beginnings of each column. All other conditions being equal, the analyst need only anagram using the bottom row rather than the top using essentially the same techniques as given for message beginnings.

4-14. ~~(C)~~ Solution of Messages of Identical Length

a. When several messages of identical length have been enciphered using the same key, implying an equal width matrix, a solution can be obtained without recourse to stereotypes or literal patterns by using a process known as multiple anagramming. In this process, the anagramming is applied across several messages, rather than attempting to recover the individual columns of each message. This process is predicated on the premise that the letters of two or more messages which occur in the same relative

position in a given matrix will undergo exactly the same change in position.

b. Also used in this process are the characteristics of a progressive key. A progressive key is a series of numbers which correspond to the sequence in which letters can be extracted from a transposition cipher in order to read plaintext. The key may be divided into sections or sequences of numbers, each corresponding to a row of the matrix used to produce the cipher, and each bearing a definite relationship to other sequences. This relationship is exhibited by a one-digit difference between the numeric values of each sequence; the difference being minus for a preceding sequence and plus for a succeeding sequence. Figure 4-9 illustrates this concept. The matrix contains both numbers and letters, the former corresponding to the sequence of extraction, and the latter to the plaintext.

	1	4	2	5	3	6
A	R	T	I	L	L	
1	15	6	20	11	24	
E	R	Y	F	I	R	
2	16	7	21	12	25	
E	H	E	A	V	Y	
3	17	8	22	13	26	
I	N	Z	O	N	E	
4	18	9	23	14	27	
O	N	E				
5	19	10				

Figure 4-9 (U). Row sequences in a progressive key (U).

c. The cipher text extracted in normal key sequence will appear as:

A E E I O T Y E Z E L I V N R R H N N I F A O L R Y E

To reflect the sequence caused by the extraction process, the analyst could assign numerical values

to each letter of the message in its order of appearance:

A	E	E	I	O	T	Y	E	Z	E	L	I	V	N	R	R	H	N	N	I	F	A	O	L	R	Y	E
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
									0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Plaintext could be read from this sequence of letters by using the progressive key:

1-15-6-20-11-24-2-16-7-21-12-25
 3-17-8-22-13-26-4-18-9-23-14-27
 5-19-10

Note that the progressive key is only a repeat of row sequences, each section of the key corresponding to a row of the matrix. The origin of the progressive key lies in the horizontal inscription of plaintext followed by the vertical transcription to form ciphertext.

d. The relationship of each sequence of the progressive key is such that if the two letters represented by key values 15-6 could be anagrammed in one sequence, one could logically assume the juxtaposition of 16-7 and 17-8. Although a valuable tool,

this process does have some limitations. By continued generation of possible juxtaposition, one could lap over into another sequence of the progressive key. For example, a continued expansion of the key values 15-6 would soon produce the juxtaposition of values 20-11; but note that 20-11 appears in the first sequence. In this case it just happens that they, too, are juxtaposed, but quite often they are not associated in any manner. Therefore, juxtaposition by expansion is not always infallible. As anagramming progresses, changes are sometimes required. Within limits, anagramming is very useful.

e. Using this technique, the initial step in the solution of a number of messages is to superimpose the messages and assign to each column so formed, a number in the normal sequence, as follows:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
									0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	
L	P	Q	R	Y	T	T	L	P	U	A	R	R	S	I	U	E	D	E	O	E	T	S	R	E	Message A
Q	S	N	E	T	B	B	U	H	B	H	R	S	M	D	R	E	D	A	A	O	A	E	E	E	Message B
A	O	E	E	W	O	V	G	U	C	M	T	N	I	S	F	R	D	E	R	E	S	O	T	E	Message C
I	O	O	O	E	O	D	N	R	N	N	N	P	O	H	T	T	Y	G	E	T	T	W	R	A	Message D
J	N	U	O	T	E	K	U	F	R	R	C	V	A	D	O	O	N	N	I	T	A	I	F	A	Message E

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Anagramming is started using any element of any row, each representing a message; and since each is inherently similar in respect to the movement of the individual letters, the process is applied to all other letters in the same column. Consequently, selecting the *Q* and *U* columns, 1 and 8 of message B, as point of departure, they may be juxtaposed and expanded as follows, carrying along all other elements of columns:

1-8	2-9	3-10	4-11	5-12
<i>L L</i>	<i>P P</i>	<i>Q U</i>	<i>R A</i>	<i>Y R</i>
<i>Q U</i>	<i>S H</i>	<i>N B</i>	<i>E H</i>	<i>T R</i>
<i>A G</i>	<i>O U</i>	<i>E C</i>	<i>E M</i>	<i>W T</i>
<i>I N</i>	<i>O R</i>	<i>O N</i>	<i>O N</i>	<i>E N</i>
<i>J U</i>	<i>N F</i>	<i>U R</i>	<i>O R</i>	<i>T C</i>

Although the above anagrams give two doublets (*LL* and *PP*), generally they are acceptable and the process may be continued. It is at this stage that the relationship between segments of a progressive key come into play, for any column selected for a given pair should produce, by adding or subtracting one to its number, a column that can be anagrammed to the other columns. Thus, column 17 is juxtaposed to columns 1-8, columns 18, 19, 20, and 21 could be anagrammed with the pairs 2-9, 3-10, 4-11, and 5-12. The following diagram, illustrating the foregoing expansion of one sequence of a progress key, shows how it may serve as a check on the analyst's assumption.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1-8-17	2-9-18	3-10-19	4-11-20	5-12-21
<i>L L E</i>	<i>P P D</i>	<i>Q U E</i>	<i>R A O</i>	<i>Y R E</i>
<i>Q U E</i>	<i>S H D</i>	<i>N B A</i>	<i>F H A</i>	<i>T R O</i>
<i>A G R</i>	<i>O U D</i>	<i>E C E</i>	<i>E M R</i>	<i>W T E</i>
<i>I N T</i>	<i>O R Y</i>	<i>O N G</i>	<i>O N E</i>	<i>E N T</i>
<i>J U O</i>	<i>N F N</i>	<i>U R N</i>	<i>O R I</i>	<i>T C T</i>

f. Further study of the message reveals that column 19 could be anagrammed to columns 1-8; to check this assumption and to generate additional

anagrams, all segments of the key are expanded and juxtaposed:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1-8-19	2-9-20	3-10-21	4-11-22	5-12-23
<i>L L E</i>	<i>P P O</i>	<i>Q U E</i>	<i>R A T</i>	<i>Y R S</i>
<i>Q U A</i>	<i>S H A</i>	<i>N B O</i>	<i>F H A</i>	<i>T R E</i>
<i>A G E</i>	<i>O U R</i>	<i>E C E</i>	<i>E M S</i>	<i>W T O</i>
<i>I N G</i>	<i>O R E</i>	<i>O N T</i>	<i>O N T</i>	<i>E N W</i>
<i>J U N</i>	<i>N F I</i>	<i>U R T</i>	<i>O R A</i>	<i>T C I</i>

The trigraphs generated by the juxtaposition of the columns above appear to be valid, except those of the last segment, particularly the trigraphs *YRS* and *TCI*. For the moment, rather than rejecting them, it would be best to work with those showing the better combinations, in this case segments 1, 2, and 3. Note that *QU* in the first and third segments are now followed by an *A* and *E* respectively which are likely combinations. If they are valid, then because of the relationship between sequences, segment 2 must also be valid. Scanning all remaining columns in the message, including those just rejected, column 12 seems a likely candidate for matching to the sequence 1-8-19. Inscribing those columns the following combination is found:

1-8-19-12
<i>L L E R</i>
<i>Q U A R</i>

A G E T
I N G N
J U N C

By placing columns 13 and 14 to the second and third sequences, the following combinations are derived:

2-9-20-13	3-10-21-14
<i>P P O R</i>	<i>Q U E S</i>
<i>S H A S</i>	<i>N B O M</i>
<i>O U R N</i>	<i>E C E I</i>
<i>O R E P</i>	<i>O N T O</i>
<i>N F I V</i>	<i>U R T A</i>

As several word fragments are now quite plain (artillery, requested, headquarters, received, five), the recovery of all the plaintext can be affected easily, still generating additional portions of each sequence on the basis of anagramming a single column to one sequence. When completed, the

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messages and accompanying progressive key would appear as:

```

1     2 1     1 1     2 1     2 1     2 1     1 2 1     2 1
1 4 2 5 1 8 9 2 5 3 6 2 9 0 3 6 4 7 3 0 1 4 7 5 8
A R T I L L E R Y S U P P O R T R E Q U E S T E D
H E A D Q U A R T E R S H A S B E E N B O M B E D
M E S S A G E T W O F O U R N O T R E C E I V E D
N O T H I N G N E W T O R E P O R T O N T O D A Y
R O A D J U N C T I O N F I V E F O U R T A K E N
    
```

g. Nothing now remains to be done except to recover the numeric key used in extracting the columns from the matrix. Since the progressive keys reflect columnar and row order, they are used for this purpose. By setting them down to show their row and columnar sequence, the following matrix and keys can be recovered, see figure 4-10.

```

11 4 22 15 1 8 19
12 5 23 16 2 9 20
13 6 24 17 3 10 21
14 7 25 18
    
```

	4	2	7	5	1	3	6
11	4	22	15	1	8	19	
12	5	23	16	2	9	20	
13	6	24	17	3	10	21	
14	7	25	18				


Figure 4-10 (c). Recovered matrix and keys (U).

CHAPTER 6 (C)
GRILLE TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) GENERAL


6-1. (C) Cryptographic Grilles

a. Grille systems are basically transposition systems which involve the use of two elements, a thin material in which perforations have been made according to a definite pattern, and a matrix, usually of ruled paper, of the same dimensions as the grilles. The grille placed over the matrix serves to uncover its cells in a systematic order, thus providing space for the insertion or extraction of letters, groups of letters, or entire words of the plaintext, thereby generating ciphertext.




6-2. (C) Simple Grilles

a. These consist usually of a square in which perforations have been cut in prearranged positions. When the grill is superimposed upon the matrix, the apertures disclose cells of the matrix. There are eight possible positions in which the grilles may be placed upon the matrix as shown in figure 6-1.



ROTATE THRU FOUR POSITIONS (1-4)



REVERSE AND ROTATE THRU FOUR POSITIONS (5-8)

Figure 6-1 (U). Simple cryptographic grille (U).



In encrypting a message, the grille is placed upon the matrix in one of the eight possible positions. The letters of the plaintext then are inscribed in the open cells, following any prearranged route. The

grille is then removed and a ciphertext produced by transcribing the letters, again following any prearranged route.

b. If the number of letters of the plaintext exceed the capacity of the grille, the process is continued on a fresh matrix, this time the grille being placed on the matrix at its next position. Thus by repeatedly using fresh matrices and progressively repositioning the grille, the entire message is encrypted. The several sections of the cipher letter, resulting from each grille placement on successive matrices, merely follow one another in the final cryptogram. In this manner it is only necessary for the correspondents to agree upon the initial position of the grille and its successive positions or placement. The example in figure 6-2 depicts a method of using the simple grille to encipher a message.

Plain text message.

ENEMY TANK BATTALION OBSERVED MOVING SOUTH
ALONG ROUTE ONE FROM VICINITY OF BIG TIMBERS
TO RIDGE ROAD.



Encrypted Text.

TWAYK TAEBA NTHLB OOBBD SIIRM EVVNE THGSA
LRUGO HNUOG FIERM HGIIV EIHOC TOSTF IBIEI
SHYRG ORADO LGIER

Figure 6-2 (U). Use of simple cryptographic grille (U).

PART THREE (C)
MONOGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 7 (C)
UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS USING STANDARD
CIPHER ALPHABETS

Section I. (C) BASIS OF SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

7-1. (C) General

a. The methods of cryptography to be covered in this part differ from those previously presented in which the plaintext elements are transposed, but always retain their identity. In substitution systems the elements or textual units composing the original plaintext retain their relative position, one to the other, but not their identities. Cipher elements replace, or are substituted for plaintext and for this reason, these systems are called substitution. They may deal with individual letters, combinations of letters, or even words and sentences. When the cryptographic process deals with single letters, or combinations less than words and sentences, the system is termed a substitution cipher system. When the process involves primarily the treatment of whole words, phrases, and sentences, the system is known as a code system.

b. The differentiation of systems, basically similar in that a cryptogram is produced by substituting one value for another, may seem somewhat arbitrary. However, the difference in the length of the elements directly affects the manipulation process of cryptography. Generally, the smaller the element, the better it lends itself to complex manipulation. Substitution systems are also further classified by the number of alphabets involved, and by the number of elements used and manipulated from each alphabet. A detailed definition of common substitution systems is found in paragraph 1-12a.

c. A fundamental characteristic of monoalphabetic substitution, the first substitution system to be considered, is that each individual plaintext unit, one character or a number of characters, is always represented by the same cipher unit, again one or a number of characters. This rigid rule is one of the inherent weaknesses of this class of system, for

cipher units must inevitably occur with the frequency of use of the plaintext equivalents, and analysis of the system is thereby greatly simplified.

7-2. (U) Nature of Alphabets

a. In the study of cryptanalytics, the dual nature of the alphabet becomes apparent. In order to write a polysyllabic language with facility, it is necessary to establish and maintain, by common agreement or convention, a national equivalency between two sets of elements, a set of elementary sounds, and a set of elementary symbols to represent the sounds. Theoretically, in an ideal alphabet, each symbol or letter denotes only one elementary sound, and each elementary sound is invariably represented by the same symbol.

b. The English language is written by means of 26 simple symbols or letters which, taken together and considered in a sequence, constitute the alphabet of the language. The Dutch and German alphabets are similar in length, French has 25 characters, Italian has 27, and Russian has 31. Not all systems of writing are of this nature. Chinese writing is composed of about 44,000 complex characters, each representing one sense of a word. Japanese writing has a syllabary consisting of 72 syllabic sounds, which can be expressed by 48 characters, singly and in combination.

c. Written plain language consists of words, i.e. combinations and permutations of the letters of the alphabet which represent visually, and call forth vocally, the elementary speech sounds of which the spoken language is composed. In the case of polysyllabic alphabetic languages, the principles on which substitution ciphers rest may be applied in all cases. In the encipherment of the Japanese and Chinese languages, these principles cannot apply directly to the language. They first require a

conversion to other values that can be understood. This method of conversion and its implications will be demonstrated in future chapters.

7-3. (C) Normal and Cipher Alphabets

a. Good cryptography demands that there exist at all times a definite relationship between the plaintext and the cipher values. How this relationship is developed is determined by the particular system, but if it does not exist and is not constant, decryption of the message enciphered by that system is an impossibility. This relationship is brought about by the construction of a cipher alphabet. The primary difference between a cipher alphabet and a normal alphabet is that in the former the elementary speech sounds are represented by characters other than those used in the normal alphabet. There is no real limitation other than practicability on what these characters may be. They may be letters, figures, signs, symbols, or even a combination of any one of these.

b. A cipher alphabet is an ordered arrangement of the letters of a written language and the characters which replace them in the cryptographic process of substitution. It consists of two components, a plain component and a cipher component. The plain component is the normal alphabet of that language, in which the letters of the plaintext are found. The cipher component is the sequence of characters from which the cipher equivalents are drawn. For brevity and for clarity, a letter of the plain component is designated by suffixing a small "p" to it, and a letter of the cipher component

designated by suffixing a small "c" to it. Thus A_p means A of the plaintext, and X_c means X of the ciphertext. The expression $A_p = X_c$ means that A of the plaintext, or plain component, is represented by X in the ciphertext, or cipher component.

7-4. (C) Standard and Mixed Cipher Alphabets

a. The plain component of a cipher alphabet is a normal alphabetical sequence, an alphabet where letters represent their commonly associated speech sounds and which appear in their normal order. This normal sequencing of the plain component is the norm. If the plain component is omitted, it is understood to be the normal sequence. The sequence of the cipher component, which may be either standard or mixed, determines the classification of the cipher alphabet.

b. Standard cipher alphabets are those alphabets in which the cipher sequence is the same as the normal sequence. For obvious reasons, a standard cipher alphabet must either be reversed in direction or shifted from its normal point of coincidence with the plain component; otherwise, A_p would equal A_c and all succeeding letters would equal themselves.

c. Mixed cipher alphabets are those alphabets in which the cipher component no longer demonstrates the normal sequencing in part or in whole. Rather it is disarranged by either some systematic process, an example of which will be treated later, or is generated by some arbitrary and unmethodical process which results in a completely random sequence.

Section II. (C) UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION

7-5. (C) Standard Cipher Alphabets

a. If a message is enciphered, letter for letter, by using one cipher component, the resulting cryptogram is said to be enciphered by a uniliteral (one-unit) monoalphabetic (one-cipher alphabet) cipher. A standard cipher alphabet used for this purpose is of two types, a direct standard or a reversed standard.

In direct standard alphabets, both the plain and the cipher sequence are normal alphabets, i.e., letters follow one another in normal sequence and are individual from left to right. Only their points of coincidence are shifted to the right or left of the normal point of coincidence.

Example:

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
Key $A_p = V_c$.

b. Reversed standard cipher alphabets also contain normal plain and cipher sequences except the latter

sequence is inscribed backward, from right to left.

Example:

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A Z Y X W V U T S R Q P
Key $A_p = O_c$.

c. Because of the difference in the direction of the sequence in the two alphabets, the number of possible cipher alphabets produced by each method differs. Where direct standard cipher alphabets of 26 characters are moved against one another, there are only 25 combinations which are different, the 26th being a repeat of the first, i.e. $A_p = A_c$. In reverse standard cipher alphabets, the number of possible combinations equals the number of letters in the alphabet, as the direction of the sequences provides no one point of coincidence where the whole alphabets are exactly the same.

7-6. (C) Reciprocity of Standard Alphabets

a. The reversed standard cipher alphabet illus-

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C P O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A Z Y X W V U T S R Q

Juxtaposition at every second interval produces two equal identities, and juxtaposition at even intervals does not produce identities. Note also that the two identities occur at an interval of 13 letters. Both of these numbers, 2 and 13, may be recognized as the factors of the number of letters in the English alphabet (26). Other alphabets of different length also exhibit this characteristic, the points of juxtaposition producing identities and the distances between identities determined by their factors.

b. A reciprocal alphabet which provides complete

ABCDEFGHIJKLMN O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ABCDEFGHIJKLMN O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Key $N_p = A_c$
 $A_p = N_c$

c. Reciprocal alphabets are inverse alphabets, since they may serve either as enciphering or deciphering alphabets.

7-7. (C) Method of Encipherment and Decipherment

trated above is also a reciprocal alphabet, i.e. the equivalents show reciprocity and are reversible in pairs. For example, $A_p = O_c$ and $A_c = O_p$, but note also that $H_p = H_c$ and $U_p = U_c$. The reciprocity, and the identities shown, are a result of the method by which it was formed. Reciprocal alphabets may be formed by juxtaposing two alphabetic sequences which are identical, but which run in different directions. The occurrence of equal identities is dependent upon the point of juxtaposition. In the alphabet above, A_c coincides with O_p , the 15th letter of the alphabet. In the example below note that A_c is moved to a point below P_p . Further note that equal identities no longer occur.

reciprocity and no identities may be produced in one of two ways:

(1) By arbitrarily constructing a reciprocal alphabet by the random assignment of values in pairs. For example, A_p is made to equal K_c ; then K_p is made to equal A_c . In such an alphabet, the two components thus constructed cannot be slid against one another to produce additional reciprocal alphabets.

(2) By juxtaposing a sequence of an even number of characters against the same sequence shifted exactly halfway to the right or left as below.

a. When a message is enciphered using a uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution system, one plaintext value is replaced by one ciphertext value. For example, using the cipher alphabet of paragraph 7-5a, the following message can be enciphered (fig. 7-1):

Message: LISTENING POSTS REPORT TANK MOVEMENT

Enciphering alphabet: Ap - Vc

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U

Letter for letter encipherment:

LISTENING POSTS REPORT TANK MOVEMENT
 GDNOZIDIB KJNON MZKJMO OVIF HJQZHZIO

Cipher text rearranged into five-letter groups, indicator and nulls added:

ZYZZY GDNOZ IDIBK JNONM ZKJMO OVIFH JQZHZ 10XXX

Figure 7-1 (C). Monoalphabetic encipherment (U).

b. The procedure for decipherment is the reverse of encipherment. Using the indicator, the cryptographer constructs the cipher alphabet, and since it

is nonreciprocal, he rearranges it on the cipher sequence for ease in deciphering.

Deciphering alphabet:

C	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
P	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E

The message deciphered:

GDNOZ IDIBK JNONM ZKJMO OVIFH JQZHZ IO
 LISTENING POSTS REPORT TANK MOVEMENT

Message rewritten into word length:

LISTENING POSTS REPORT TANK MOVEMENT

7-8. (C) Use of Monoalphabetic Ciphers

a. Because of the extreme simplicity of uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution in general, and direct or reversed standard cipher alphabet in particular, its use for practical purposes is quite limited. Solution of these systems is generally very easy, involving two basic methods of analysis, one based entirely upon a frequency distribution and the other based upon a quicker mechanical process. The analysis and solution of messages enciphered by mixed-cipher sequences may be somewhat involved and

tedious, but not impossible. Again, the practical use of this type monoalphabetic substitution is also limited.

b. For the cryptanalyst, the study of these systems is important not from the likelihood that he will encounter them in use, but from the basic techniques and skills he will acquire. Moreover, the basic principles of the operation of the system, and the method of its analysis, are incorporated and expanded in the more advanced and complicated manual systems he may encounter.

Section III. (C) SOLUTION OF UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC CIPHERS USING STANDARD CIPHER ALPHABETS

7-9. (C) Basis for Solution Using a Uniliteral Frequency Distribution

a. The solution of uniliteral monoalphabetic ciphers where standard alphabets are used follows directly from two factors.

(1) The fundamental characteristic is the one-for-one substitution.

(2) The sequence of the letters of the cipher component is merely displaced if it is a direct standard or, if it is a reversed standard, it is reversed and displaced. Because of this, a uniliteral frequency distribution of a cryptogram produced by standard cipher components will show crests and troughs whose relative spatial position and vertical

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dimensions will be the same as a uniliteral frequency distribution for the plaintext of that cryptogram.

b. If the cryptogram was enciphered by a reversed standard alphabet there will be one exception to the exact spatial correspondence between the two frequency distributions. That is, the pro-

gression of the successive peaks and troughs will be in opposite directions. To observe this, note the plaintext messages and their accompanying cipher alphabets, cryptograms, and uniliteral frequency distributions in figures 7-2 and 7-3.

(1) Encipherment by a direct standard cipher alphabet.

Message:

ENEMY ATTACKING ALONG ROUTE ONE WITH ESTIMATED INFANTRY
BATTALION SUPPORTED BY TANKS FORWARD POSITIONS OVERRUN
REQUEST IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT


Direct standard cipher alphabet: Ap = Tc

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S

Ciphertext:

X G X F R T M M T V D B G Z T E H G Z K H N M X H G X P B M
A X L M B F T M X W B G Y T G M K R U T M M T E B H G L N I
I H K M X W U R M T G D L Y H K P T K W I H L B M B H G L H
O X K K N G K X J N X L M B F F X W B T M X K X B G Y H K V
X F X G M

Uniliteral frequency distribution - plaintext:



Uniliteral frequency distribution - ciphertext:




Figure 7-2 (C). Encipherment by a direct standard cipher alphabet (U).

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(2) Encipherment by a reversed standard cipher alphabet.

Message:

TANK COMPANY MOVING UP IN SUPPORT HOLD THE PRESENT POSITION
AFTER ONE SIX ZERO ZERO DISENGAGE AND FALL BACK ON BLOCKING
POSITION AS SITUATION PERMITS


Reversed standard cipher alphabet: Ap = Mc

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N


Ciphertext:

TMZCK YAXMZ OAYRE ZGSXE ZUSXX YVTFY BJTFI
XVIUI ZTXYU ETEYZ MHTIV YZIU E PNIVY NIVYJ
EUIZG MGIMZ JHMBB LMKCY ZLBYK CEZGX YUETE
YZMUU ETSMT EYZXI VAETU

Unilateral frequency distribution - plaintext:



Unilateral frequency distribution - ciphertext:



Point of coincidence

Figure 7-3 (C). Encipherment by a reversed standard alphabet (U).

c. In the preceding examples, several points should be noted. The spatial relationship of peaks and troughs within either cipher component remains constant, differing in the points of coincidence and the different directions in which the order of their progression may lie, relative to the plain components. These differences are purely mechanical, due only to the point at which the alphabets are juxtaposed

and the direction of their inscription. Another difference, which will be shown only when the frequency distribution of the ciphertext is compared to an expected normal unilateral frequency distribution, is that a variation in the order of the high-frequency letters occurs. This is a result of the construction of the plaintext and in no way invalidates the frequency distribution or its use.

7-10. (C) System Identification and Recovery of The Cipher Alphabet

a. In practice, the identification of a given cryptographic system as being uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution, based on a direct standard cipher alphabet and the recovery of the plaintext values of the cipher sequence of that alphabet, involves one and the same process, based upon the characteristics of standard cipher alphabets and the normal uniliteral frequency distribution. A frequency distribution made of a cryptogram produced by this type system will show the characteristic peaks and troughs of a normal uniliteral frequency distribution for the plaintext, except peaks and troughs will not correspond and the direction of progression of the sequence may be reversed. Identification of this system's use, and the recovery of the plaintext values of the cipher sequence, lie in fitting the uniliteral frequency distribution of the ciphertext to a normal uniliteral frequency distribution. This is known as "fitting the distribution to the normal."

b. Identification and recovery of the plaintext is then simply a matter of identifying the plaintext value of two or more cipher letters and the use of these values to determine the direction of progression of the cipher sequence relative to the plain sequence. The identification of a cipher letter, determining its associated plaintext value, is based upon its frequency of occurrence relative to all other letters of the cipher sequence. For example, the value of a high-frequency cipher letter immediately is suspected as one of the normal high-frequency letters (E, T, N, R, O, A, I, S). By assuming the values of several high-frequency cipher letters, a base can be established to correlate the peaks and the troughs of the ciphertext distribution to those of a normal uniliteral frequency distribution.

c. In fitting the actual distribution of the ciphertext to the expected norm, two functions must be

considered. First, correspondence of values will not necessarily be exact regarding frequencies of occurrence. For example, the normal order of occurrence for the high-frequency plaintext letters is E, T, N, R, O, A, I, S. But, note that the frequency of these same letters in the cryptogram in paragraph 7-9b(2), in their order of occurrence, is O, N, I, E, T, A, S, R. Second, although frequency of occurrence may vary, the spatial relationship between the high-frequency letters, and all letters, will remain constant. Because of the former fact, the point of coincidence of the two sequences may be in question. However, this can always be resolved by considering the spatial relationship of peaks and troughs. Considered as a group, their correspondence of frequency between sequences should always be relatively close.

d. In the final analysis, the accuracy of identification and recovery of the cipher alphabet hinges on the consistent substitution of the plaintext values for the cipher character in the cryptogram resulting in intelligible plaintext. If this is not the case, no matter how close the approximation between actual and expected frequencies, or how well the fit is, only two possibilities exist. First, the closeness of the fit is pure coincidence and another equally good fit can be obtained from the same data. Second, the cryptogram involves something more than simple monoalphabetic substitution by means of single standard cipher alphabet.

7-11. (C) Solution Using a Uniliteral Frequency Distribution

a. Essentially, the method of solution is an attempt to fit the distribution of the ciphertext to the expected normal distribution. Accordingly, the first step is to prepare a uniliteral frequency distribution of its ciphertext. Using the message in figure 7-4, the distribution can be derived.

YJCAK UBANY XACNJ BCNAW BUXYN BXOYA
XBYNL CQRUU VRWHM JWM LX ENANM KHBCA
XWPYX RWCBW NJALA NBCDO




Figure 7-4 (C). Uniliteral frequency distribution, substitution ciphertext (U).

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(1) If there is any question as to the system involved in the production of this cryptogram, the uniliteral frequency distribution above should serve to resolve it. First, substitution, rather than transposition is indicated by the fact that normal low and medium-frequency letters in this distribution are high in occurrence. Were it transposition, where values are unchanged, there would not be this reversal of frequency characteristics. Second, uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution is suggested by the peaks and troughs, shown by the distribution, which do not correspond to their normal positions relative to the alphabet. This further suggests a displacement of the points of coincidence between the plain and cipher sequence. If nonmonoalphabetic substitutions are involved, the peaks and troughs are suppressed.



Figure 7-5 (C). Identification of ciphertext values by comparison (U).

b. Solution of this type system depends upon assuming the plaintext value of one or more cipher letters, establishing the direction of progression, and attempting to produce intelligible plaintext as the final text. Comparing this distribution to a normal distribution, certain similarities and dissimilarities are observed as shown in figure 7-5.

(1) Note that the pattern of peaks and troughs in the normal distribution have a specific spatial relationship, the highest crest over the letters A, E, I, N, R, S, O, and the troughs marked by T, B, G, J, K, P, Q, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z. Note also that the letters R, S, T, and U combined, form a plateau, as does L, M, N, and O. In horizontal distances, A is separated from E by three letters, E from I by three letters, I from N by four letters, and N from T by five letters.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
C	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	

(4) As this alphabet is not reciprocal, i.e. $A_p = J_c$ but A_c does not equal J_p ; the values must be inverted to form a deciphering alphabet. That is, the cipher

(2) Examination of the distribution prepared from the ciphertext reveals a similar spatial pattern, but one which is located above different letters. Note that a peak located at J is followed by another at N, separated by three spaces; another is located at R, again a three space interval; U also represents a peak, at an interval of two spaces, and is followed by a plateau at W, X, and Z.

(3) Considering the cyclic nature of the alphabet, Z followed by A, and assuming that the progression of the pattern in the ciphertext's distribution is to the right, the two patterns can be alined by shifting the cipher sequence to the left until J cipher coincides with A plain.

For example:

C	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
P	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q

component placed in alphabetic order with the plain component below it.

(5) Using the above deciphering alphabet, the cryptogram can now be deciphered, success indicating that all previous assumptions are correct.

If failure results, the analyst reexamines the distribution attempting to determine the correct point of coincidence between the two alphabets.

Y J C A X U B A N Y X A C N J B C N A W B U X Y N B X O Y A
 P A T R O L S R E P O R T E A S T E R N S L O P E S O F P R
 X B Y N L C Q R U U V R W N M J W M L X E N A N M K H B C A
 O S P E C T H I L L M I N E D A N D C O V E R E D B Y S T R
 X W P Y X R W C B W N J A L A N B C D O
 O N G P O I N T S N E A R C R E S T U F
 P A T R O L S R E P O R T E A S T E R N S L O P E S O F P R O S P E C T H I L L M I N E D
 A N D C O V E R E D B Y S T R O N G P O I N T S N E A R C R E S T

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c. In the example above, a direct standard cipher alphabet is used in enciphering the plaintext. Had the cipher alphabet been a reversed standard, the same methods of analysis would have been fully applicable, the only difference being that the progression of the relationships of peaks and troughs in a distribution of the ciphertext would be in reverse order as well as offset. To align this distribution to the normal, it is then inscribed in reverse order after determination of the point of coincidence. Further, a slight variation exists in the final deciphering text. As reversed standard cipher alphabets are partly reciprocal, the construction of a deciphering alphabet is not always required.

7-12. (C) Solution by Completing the Plain Component

a. The foregoing method of solution involves the

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	X	W	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I

(1) Note again that the cipher alphabet was produced by juxtaposing two normal alphabets, the lower or cipher sequence being displaced 9 letters to the left until $A_p = J_c$. This relative degree of shift is equal in all cases as long as the sequence of the letters in the alphabets are not disarranged. For example, note that there is a 9-letter difference between B_c and K_c , C_p and L_p , etc. As a direct standard cipher alphabet is being dealt with, there are only 25 possible positions in which the two alphabets may be juxtaposed to produce a cipher

construction and study of a frequency distribution as a means of recovering the plaintext. There is another method, applicable to direct standard alphabets and to reversed standard alphabets with a slight variation, which is much more rapid. As this system is purely mechanical, it does not involve the construction of a frequency distribution. The principle underlying this method of analysis is based upon the inherent characteristics of uniliteral monoalphabetic cipher alphabets, where direct standard or reversed standard alphabets are used as the cipher sequence. The key element in both cases is an orderly sequence of values present in both the plain and cipher sequences.

b. The significance of this characteristic is seen in the following cipher alphabet.

alphabet. The 26th position, $A_p = A_c$, clearly gives only plaintext. Where this system is used then, only one of the 25 possible positions can be correct.

(2) The alphabet above could be slipped through all 25 possible positions, from $A_p = B_c$ to $A_p = Z_c$, checking each for its ability to decipher a message. This is time consuming. Instead, the sequence of the letters themselves can be used. Note the encipherment of the following plaintext, first by the cipher alphabet above, and then by a similar alphabet where $A_p = K_c$.

CONTACT MADE WITH ENEMY Plaintext
 LXWCJLC VJMN FRCQ NWNVH Cipher $A_p = J_c$
 MYXDKMD WKN O GSDR OXOWI Cipher $A_p = K_c$

(3) In the example above, the sequence of letters in the columns is formed by superimposing the ciphertext progress, following each progressive displacement of point of coincidence. Therefore, given the cryptogram, a solution can be obtained simply

by inscribing alphabets vertically in sequential order, using as the starting point each letter of the ciphertext as demonstrated in figure 7-6. In effect, this process duplicates the possible ciphertext derived from all 25 positions.

Example:

GXKGA	TJKXS	UXZGX	LOXKD	Cipher text
HYLHB	UKLYT	VYAHY	MPYLE	
IZMIC	VLMZU	WZBIZ	NQZMF	
JANJD	WMNAV	XACJA	ORANG	
KBOKE	XNOBW	YBOKB	PSBOH	
LCPLF	YOPCX	ZCELC	QTCPI	
MDQMG	ZPQDY	ADFM	RUDQJ	
NERNH	AQREZ	BEGNE	SVERK	
OFSOI	BRSFA	CFHOF	TWESL	
PGTPJ	CSTGB	DGIPG	UXGTM	
QHUQK	DTUHC	EHJQH	VYHUN	
RIVRL	EUVID	FIKRI	WZIVO	
SJWSM	FWWJE	GJLSJ	XAJWP	
TKXTN	GWKXF	HKMTK	YBKXQ	
ULYUO	HYLGG	ILNUL	ZCLYR	
VMZVP	IZZMH	JMOVH	ADMZS	
WNAWQ	JZANI	KNPWN	BENAT	
XOBXR	KABOJ	LOQXO	CFOBU	
YPCYS	LBCPK	MPRYP	DGPCV	
ZQDZI	MCDQL	NQSZQ	EHQLW	
AREAU	NDERM	ORTAR	FIPEX	Plain text
<u>BSFBV</u>	<u>OEFNS</u>	<u>PSUBS</u>	<u>GJSFY</u>	
CTGCW	PEGTO	QTVCT	HKTGZ	
DUHDX	QGHUP	RUWDU	ILUHA	
EVIEY	RHIVQ	SVXEV	JMVIB	
FWJFZ	SIJWR	TWYFW	KHWJC	

Figure 7-8 (C). Solution by completing the plain component, direct standard cipher alphabet (U).

c. In those cases where a reversed standard cipher alphabet is used, a preliminary step is required to form the base for the projection of the vertical alphabetical sequences. This is required because, although a sequence is present in the ciphertext, the

mechanics of the system are reversed. For example, with the following message, a base can be established as shown in figure 7-7. Then each column can be completed to recover the plaintext.

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Message: X R S W X T S A D Y H P D S E I U L P Y

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	Plain
Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Cipher

C I H D C G H Z W B S K W H V R F O K B

CIHDC	GHZWB	SKWHV	RFOKB	Cipher text
DJIED	HIAXC	TLXIW	SGPLC	
EKJFE	IJBYD	UMYJX	THQMD	
FLKGF	JKCZE	VNZKY	UIRNE	
GMLHG	KLDAF	WOALZ	VJSOF	
HNMIH	LMEBG	XPBMA	WKTPG	
IONJI	MNFCH	YQCNB	XLUQH	
JPOKJ	NOGDI	ZRDOC	YMVRI	
KQPLK	OPHEJ	ASEPD	ZNWSJ	
LRQML	PQIFK	BTFQE	AOXTK	
MSRNM	QRJGL	CUGRF	BPYUL	
NTSON	RSKHM	DVHSG	CQZVM	
OUTPO	STLIN	EWITH	DRAWII	Plain text
<u>PVUQP</u>	<u>TUMJO</u>	<u>FXJUI</u>	<u>FSBXO</u>	
QWVRQ	UVNKP	GYKVJ	FTCYP	
RXWSR	VWOLQ	HZLWK	GUDZQ	
SYXTS	WXPMR	IAMXL	HVEAR	
TZYUT	XYQNS	JBNYM	IWFBS	
UAZVU	YZROT	KCOZN	JXGCT	
VBAWV	ZASPU	LDBAO	KYHDU	
WCBXW	ABTQV	MEQBP	LZIEV	
XDCYX	BCURW	NERCQ	MAJFW	
YEDZY	CDVSX	OGSDR	NBKGX	
ZFEAZ	DEWTY	PHTES	OCLHY	
AGFBA	EFXUZ	QIUFT	PDMIZ	
BHGCB	FGYVA	RJVGU	QENJA	

Figure 7-7 (7). Solution by completing the plain component, reversed standard cipher alphabet (U).

d. Using the foregoing method, when the letters of a cipher alphabet are known sequences, considerable time and effort can be saved. In some cases this prior knowledge is the only possible means of solving very short cryptograms that might otherwise be unsolvable. The essential point in any case is that the sequence of the letters used must be established. Even mixed sequences can be handled in exactly the same way. If, however, the sequence

is unknown, methods to be covered later must be used. Generally, since this method is so easy, it should be a first step in those cases where the cryptogram is obviously a substitution cipher in monoalphabetic terms. First a direct standard alphabet should be tried, and then a reversed standard alphabet should be tried. If both fail, a logical assumption is that the cryptogram in question involves a mixed cipher alphabet.

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CHAPTER 8 (C)

UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS USING MIXED CIPHER ALPHABETS

Section I (C) GENERATION AND USE OF MIXED CIPHER ALPHABETS

8-1. (C) Mixed Cipher Alphabets

a. Mixed cipher alphabets differ from standard cipher alphabets in that one or both of the sequences is a mixed sequence. A mixed sequence is a series of letters that does not correspond to normal sequential order of the alphabet used. As a general rule, a mixed cipher alphabet will consist of one of the following mixes.

- (1) The plain component is a standard sequence; cipher component is a mixed sequence.
- (2) The plain component is a mixed sequence; the cipher component is a standard sequence.
- (3) Both components are the same mixed sequence with displaced points of coincidence.
- (4) Both components are different mixed sequences.
- (5) Both components are the same mixed sequence but one reversed.

b. Two main types of mixed alphabetic sequences are randomly mixed and systematically mixed sequences. The latter type because it is based upon a scheme that by its nature is systematic, is useful because it makes possible the derivation of one or more mixed sequences from easily remembered words, phrases, or similar keys. Additionally, it does not require written documentation. A disadvantage in producing a mixed sequence through a systematic disarrangement is that the possibility

Example:

Keyword: CRYPTOGRAPHIC
Repeated letters dropped: CRYPTOGAHI
Letters not appearing in keyword added in their normal sequence: CRYPTOGAHIBDEFJKLMNQSUVWXX

b. This type sequence, when paired with a sequence other than a reversal of itself is nonreciprocal. When positioned against a double inscription of itself it is nonreciprocal, except at one juxtaposition. Therefore, for convenience in enciphering and deciphering, two alphabets are constructed, an en-

of its analysis is always present. As practical considerations set a limit to the complexities that can be introduced by systematically mixing an alphabet, where greater security is required, randomly mixed alphabets are used.

c. Randomly mixed alphabets give more cryptographic security than do the less complicated systematically mixed alphabets because they give no clues to the position of letters. Whenever the laws of chance operate in the construction of a mixed alphabet, a thorough disarrangement is likely to be produced. The primary disadvantage of random alphabets is that they are not susceptible to local generation. They must be reduced to writing and distributed to all interested correspondents with explicit instructions pertaining to their use.

8-2. (C) Keyword Mixed Cipher Alphabet

a. One of the simplest types of systematically mixed sequences that is used in a cipher alphabet is the keyword mixed alphabet. In this type, the disarrangement is achieved through the use of a keyword to establish the framework of the sequence. The sequence begins with the keyword. Any letter repeated in the keyword is used only once, at its first appearance. Thereafter it is dropped. These letters are then followed by all other unused letters of the alphabet in their normal sequence.

ciphering alphabet in which the letter of the plain component coincides with the normal sequence, and a deciphering alphabet in which the sequence of letters in the cipher component coincides with the normal.

Example:

Enciphering alphabet

P	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C	C R Y P T O G A H I B D E F J K L M N Q S U V W X Z

Deciphering alphabet

C	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
P	H K A L M N G I J O P Q R S F D T B U F V W X Y C Z

c. The keyword or phrase used need not consist of any definite number of letters, although those which most thoroughly disarrange the normal sequence are most appropriate. The reasons for this can be seen in the enciphering alphabet above. Note that the two distinct segments of the cipher sequence are obvious, the keyword and the remaining alphabetic sequence. Note also that in the deciphering alphabet, neither is completely apparent though there is evidence of sequencing shown underlined. The importance of the former characteristic is that it provides the analyst with a means whereby the solution of a cryptogram is hastened. The analyst needs only to reconstruct the cipher alphabet in terms of an enciphering alphabet, as analysis of the message progresses, using each value as it is recovered. Once a partial recovery passes a certain point, it may be possible to recover the alphabet using pattern alone.

(3) Route transposition (alternate vertical):

V E H I C U L A R
B D F G J K M N O
P Q S T W X W Z
V B P Q D E H F S T G I C J W X K U L M Y Z N A R O

b. The systems of disarrangement above produce certain patterns as a result of the mechanical process involved, and due to the alphabet selected for disarrangement, which will provide the analyst with a means of recovery. Note that the keyword appears in the first row and that the succeeding rows contain the remaining alphabetic sequence. The last row, an incomplete row, contains some portion of the sequence *UVWXYZ*. These last letters then are scattered at specific intervals through the cipher alphabet by the process of columnar extraction. If the extraction is straight columnar, the letters appear at an interval equal to the number of rows of the matrix, in sequential order left to right. If the extraction process is numerically keyed, the letters appear in key number order, again at intervals equal to the number of rows. In the case of route transposition, patterns also exist but they are usually not so pronounced. One such pattern is the pairing of the terminal letters. Note that *WX* and *YZ* are paired in the alphabet above.

8-3. (C) Transposition Mixed Cipher Alphabets

a. It is possible to disarrange the sequence of an alphabet even more thoroughly by applying any one of the transposition methods treated previously as cipher systems. The alphabet to which the transposition process is applied may be either a standard alphabet, a keyword mixed alphabet, or even a random alphabet. In a random alphabet, little is gained by disarranging the sequence. Some of the possibilities offered by this method are illustrated below:

(1) Simple columnar transposition using keyword mixed alphabet:

Q U A D R N G L E
B C F H I J K M O
P S T V W X Y Z
Q B P U C S A F T D H V R I W N J X G K Y L M Z E O

(2) Numerically keyed columnar transposition:

8 5 3 4 7 2 6 1
U N I L T E R A
B C D F G H J K
M O P Q S V W X
Y Z
A K X E H V I D P L F Q N C O Z R J W T G S U B M Y

8-4. (C) Decimation Mixed Cipher Alphabets

a. In this method of deriving a systematically mixed sequence, an alphabet, either a normal or a keyword mixed sequence, is counted off, letter by letter, using a predetermined interval. As each letter is decimated, or counted off, it is eliminated from the basic sequence and set aside. The count continues around the alphabet until all letters are eliminated. As the letters are eliminated, they are set down in the order of their elimination to form a new sequence. An example of this method is depicted in figure 8-1.

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Basic alphabet (keyword mixed sequence):
TELGRAPHBCDFIJKMNOQSUVWXYZ

Decimated at an interval of 6:
TELGRAPHBCDFIJKMNOQSUVWXYZ

12345612345612345612345612

A F O X

34561 23456 12345 61234 56

G D Q Z

123 4 5612 34561 2345 6

H M Y

123 4 5 61 234 5 6123

B S

456 1 2 3 456 1 234

L K

56 1 2 3 45 6 123

E N

4 5 6 1 23 456

P W

1 2 3 45 61

U

2 3 4 56 1

J

2 3 4 5 6

V

1 2 3 4

5 6 1 2

R

3 4 5

6 1 2

T

AFOXGDQZHZMYBSLKENPWUJVRTC

As C is not eliminated in the decimation process, it accordingly appears as the last letter of the sequence.

Figure 8-1 (C). Derivation of mixed sequence by decimation (U).

b. Another method of decimating an alphabet, which is at once simpler but also limited, is to use each letter in the count whether or not it has been used before. For example, in figure 8-2 the standard alphabet is decimated at an interval of five.

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

12345123451234512345123451

E J O T Y

23451234512345 - etc.

D I N

EJOTYDINSXCHMRWBGLQVAFKPUZ

Figure 8-2 (C). Decimation, reuse of letters in count (U).

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The limitation of the method is that the interval must be an odd number, as even numbers will cause repeated letters. For example, in figure 8-3 a standard alphabet is shown decimated at an interval of four.

ABCDEFGHIJKLMN O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
12341234123412341234123412
34123412341234123412341234
12341234

DHLPTXBFJNRVZDH

Repeated letters.

Figure 8-3 (C). Repetitions in decimation as a result of even numbers as interval (U).

Section II. (C) RECOVERY OF MIXED CIPHER ALPHABETS

8-5. (C) General

a. The analyst should always attempt the recovery of the method used in generating the cipher alphabet simultaneously with the analysis of the cryptogram. This effort is to be distinguished from the normal reconstruction of the cipher alphabet which occurs as a matter of course with the analysis of a cryptogram. The purpose of recovering the method of generation of a cipher alphabet is to enable the analyst to recover the cipher alphabet in its entirety and thereby aid in the solution of the cryptogram. If sufficient cipher-to-plain values can be obtained by reconstruction as a by-product of analysis of the message, the possibility exists that they may be used to determine the method of generating the cipher alphabet. Where this can be achieved early in the solution of the message, a great deal of effort can be saved and, in some cases, transform the process of cryptanalysis to one of decipherment.

b. Cipher alphabets should be reconstructed in the form of enciphering alphabets, the plain component in alphabetic sequence. This is important

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	S		Z		V					T	H					D	F	G	I							

b. A keyword mixed sequence can be divided arbitrarily into two segments, that composed of the keyword and that composed of the remaining alphabetic sequence. Having previous knowledge of what constitutes the normal alphabet and its sequence, the analyst can use this with a minimum of recovered values to recover the keyword segment, the unknown. Examination of the cipher sequence above reveals the possible position of the two segments divided by the letter Z. It is possible that Z is part of the keyword but not very likely. If the keyword starts at this point, it runs to some point to the right. The cipher sequence DFGI is natural, a good alphabetic sequence possibly marking the resumption of the alphabetic sequence and therefore the end of the keyword, except that the E and H are missing. The H is noted preceding the sequence

for two reasons. First, if the sequence of the cipher component has an observed pattern, decimation, keyword, etc., it will appear in this arrangement. Thus any evidence of system in its construction, however slight, may serve to collaborate identifications already made, and may yield the clues necessary for complete identification of the method used and total recovery of the alphabet. Second, once a method of cipher alphabet generation has been determined, it affords an insight into the general method, keys, and keywords used and may be of assistance in subsequent studies of similar messages.

8-6. (C) Recovery of Keyword Mixed Sequences

a. Recovery of keyword mixed sequences, when used as the cipher component with a standard sequence as the plain component, presents little or no difficulty. The primary problem likely to be encountered is one of recognizing the keyword given only a few values. However, even here a few rules apply that will aid the analyst. For example, the partially reconstructed enciphering alphabet below was derived through the analysis of a message.

DFGI in the keyword segment. The E, a high-frequency letter, is safely assumed to be a part of the keyword also.

(1) The object now is to determine those letters of the alphabetic segment. By so doing, certain letters can be eliminated which must then be part of the keyword. The space between the S and Z provides for only three letters. In the alphabetic sequence, six letters appear. But of the six, V and T are already placed leaving four letters, UWX^Y. Also the space between the TH and the D provides two spaces for the letters ABC. Of these possibilities, it is far more likely that the placement is UXY^Y and BC, though the former may also be UWX. Accepting the combination UXY^Y, the alphabet is now shown as follows:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	S	U	X	Y	Z			V		T	H	B	C	D	F	H	I									

(2) At this point, the assumed value is checked against the cryptogram by attempting further decipherment, success confirming the assumptions. Further analysis of the sequence depends upon the discovery of new values as a result of confirming the assumed value, i.e., the whole process is like a series of building blocks. The assumption of one letter may aid in completing a word in a cryptogram or may suggest another letter which in turn provides

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C S U X Y Z L A V O R T H B C D F G I J K

(3) On this basis, *Jc* is equated to *Vp* by position alone and so placed in the sequence. The placement of *M*, *N*, *P*, and *Q* is now quite easy. Three of the four must be associated with *X*, *Y*, and *Z* of the plain sequence. *Zp*, a low-frequency letter, lends itself admirably to this association. The analyst

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C S U X Y Z L A V O R T H B C D F G I J K Q

(4) The letters now remaining to be placed are *E*, *M*, *N*, *P*, and *W*, opening two possibilities. The keyword is assumed, if evidence warrants. Each value is checked by decipherment or by using the frequency distribution. The plaintext value is assumed and then checked by decipherment. In any event, a solution is soon reached.

8-7. (C) Recovery of Transposition Mixed Cipher Alphabets

a. The recovery of transposition mixed cipher

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C R A M E B P C D Q O F V N G W S H X T J Y U K Z I L

(1) The cipher component is not a keyword mixed sequence. A keyword may have been used to prepare a base alphabet, but on appearance this base appears to have been systematically disarranged. This could have been done in one of two primary ways, transposition or decimation. Assuming then that the alphabet was produced by some means of transposition, the analyst scans the sequence for some pattern. The *V*, *W*, *X*, *Y*, and *Z* appear at an interval of 3, suggesting columnar transposition. Decimation is not considered, as all these letters appear in sequence past the midpoint of the cipher sequence. The significance of this will be dealt with later. Using the *VWXYZ* cluster as a base, a fragmentary matrix is constructed.

O N S T U
F G H J K
V W X Y Z

(2) The second and third rows show good sequential order, while the first suggests a keyword

the basis for the assumption of yet another value. This value then is checked against both the alphabet and the frequency distribution of the ciphertext. This in turn enables the analyst to expand the cryptogram and the cipher sequence. For example, assume that in the process of confirming the letters assumed previously, the analyst finds that the letters *Hp=Ac*, *Lp=Oe*, and *Wp=Kc*. The alphabet now appears:

need only check his distribution for one of the letters *M*, *N*, *P*, or *Q* which either does not appear, or appears rarely. For example, finding no occurrence of a *Qc* he at once equates it to *Zp*, because it is the only letter which immediately precedes the *S*.

alphabets involves essentially the same processes as the cryptanalysis of transposition ciphers. In the latter, the analytic attacks are based upon the inherent characteristics of the system with initially little or no knowledge of the plaintext other than any characteristics which may have appeared in the ciphertext. In the case of transposition mixed cipher alphabets however, the analyst is dealing with several known factors. For example, examine the enciphering alphabet below.

fragment. Accepting this keyword fragment, the next step is to continue to expand the sequential pattern of the second and third rows. Two clusters, *CDQ* and *EBP*, show a sequential relation in the second and third characters and are added.

E C O N S T U
B D F G H J K
P Q V W X Y Z

(3) Again the sequence in the second and third rows is good. Missing letters, except the *I* and *R*, already appear in the first row. Both the *I* and *R*, with their associated letters *RAM* and *IL*, are placed using the sequential pattern of their associated letters. *RAM* is placed at the left, as *A* and *M* precedes *B* and *P*; and *IL* is placed to the right as the *L* follows a *K*. Note that in the case of the *IL*, this cluster consists of only two letters, a characteristic of the extreme right of an incompletely-filled matrix. Thus the matrix now appears fully recovered:

R E C O N S T U I
A B D F G H J K L
M P Q V W X Y Z

b. Note that this solution differs from the first in that a complete cipher sequence is studied, and no correlation of its values to a cipher message is required. Given a complete sequence, it is always easier to recover the system of generating it than to work with only fragments of a sequence. However in so doing, some of the value of recovery is lost, i.e. it does not aid in the analysis of a message. The recovery of a cipher sequence from fragments is more difficult but far more rewarding in terms of actual use.

is then determined by noting the order in which the columns of the matrix appear in the alphabetic sequence. For example, observe the relationship between the columns of the matrix in figure 8-4 and the order of their appearance in the alphabetic sequence.

	6	2	1	5	4	7	8	9	3
R	E	C	O	N	S	T	U	I	
A	B	D	F	G	H	J	K	L	
M	P	Q	V	W	X	Y	Z		

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CDQ EBP IL NGW OFV RAM SHX TJY UKZ

Figure 8-4 (C). Relation of column order to sequence order (U).

8-8. (C) Derivation of a Numeric Key

a. In those cases where a cipher alphabet is generated by keyed columnar transposition, the same techniques given above are applicable to the recovery of the matrix. The numeric key involved

b. When compared to the straight columnar sequence, a difference in the location of the *UVWXYZ* cluster is seen as shown in figure 8-5.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<u>C D Q</u>	<u>E B P</u>	<u>I L N</u>	<u>G W O</u>	<u>F V R</u>	<u>A M S</u>	<u>H X T</u>	<u>J Y U</u>	<u>K Z</u>
<u>R A M</u>	<u>E B P</u>	<u>C D Q</u>	<u>O F V</u>	<u>N G W</u>	<u>S H X</u>	<u>T J Y</u>	<u>U K Z</u>	<u>I L</u>
6	2	1	5	4	7	8	9	3

Figure 8-5 (C). Comparison of sequences (U).

Note that the sequence is now somewhat disturbed, but also that the interval between each of the letters is still 3. Therefore, by starting the column above the base cluster *VWXYZ*, the same result is obtained. The bottom two rows show alphabetic sequence, less those letters appearing in the top row as part of the keyword.

(1) Where a cipher sequence is derived by a count where all letters are used, none excluded, a constant interval of its multiple occurs between the letters that are adjacent in the base alphabet. For example, in the alphabet below, note that the interval is 5 between the letters *E-J*, *O-T*, and *Y-D*. Note also that the interval of 5 is constant in reverse, *B to A* and *C to D*, indicating that these letters were taken out of the alphabet in reverse order and after other letters normally preceding them. Using the characteristics, the alphabet is easily recovered by counting off the letters, thus placing them in their original sequence. Spaces between the letters are filled by letters in sequence as the count is continued.

8-9. (C) Recovery of Decimated Sequences

a. The characteristic which provides the basis of analysis and recovery of decimated sequences is the cyclic permutations of the letters of the sequence imparted to them by the decimation process. The characteristic is seen in the examples below.

Example:

E	J	O	T	Y	D	I	N	S	X	C	H	M	R	W	B	G	L	Q	V	A	F	K	P	U	Z
-	-	-	-	E	-	-	-	-	J	-	-	-	-	O	-	-	-	-	T	-	-	-	-	Y	
1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1
-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-	I	-	-	-	-	N	-	-	-	-	S	-	-	-	-	X	
2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4		1	2
-	-	C	etc.																						
3	4																								

After all the letters of the cipher sequence are counted off, the cycles are compressed into one to

reform the basic alphabet.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

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(2) In the case where the cipher sequence is derived by a count which excluded letters once they were used, the same counting system as above is used, but the count does not include letters pre-

viously placed, in effect duplicating the generation process. For example using the alphabet below, the count appears:

<u>C</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>
-	-	C	-	-	F	-	-	I	-	-	L	-	-	O	-	-	R	-	-	U	-	-	X	-	-
1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2
A	-	-	E	-	-	J	-	-	N	-	-	S	-	-	W	-	-								
3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2								
B																									
3																									

The count is continued until the basic alphabet is recovered.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

b. In both examples above, solution is predicated on the ability of the analyst to determine the proper intervals. In both instances, since a direct standard alphabet is used, this interval is easily determined, being found as the distance between adjacent letters of the base sequence. Where a keyword mixed

alphabet is used as the base, it may be somewhat more difficult to determine the correct interval, but not an impossibility. Note the characteristics of the two segments of the keyword mixed alphabet in figure 8-6.

Keyword: ABSTRACTION




Figure 8-6 (C). Keyword and alphabetic segments, keyword mixed alphabet (U).

(1) In the sequence above, the normal alphabetic progression still remains, even though it may be missing some of its component letters. The UVWXYZ cluster is unchanged. These two elements, particularly the cluster, provide a basis for

the analyst to determine the interval in the decimation process. If the alphabet above is decimated at an interval of 4, used letters not recounted, it appears as:

T O F K Q X B I G M W S D L Y C J Z E V N A U R P H

(2) This sequence contains certain patterns which are normally different from a decimation of a direct standard alphabet. Taking out the first three elements of the two decimated alphabets shown underlined, which end with a letter of the VWXYZ cluster, this pattern can be seen.

Keyword mixed sequence decimated at an interval of 4:

T O F K Q X
B I G M W
S D L Y

Direct standard sequence decimated at an interval of 3:

C F I L O R U X
A E J N S W
B H P V

(3) In the first set, the alphabetic progression is constant at an interval of 3 (C--F--I--L etc.). In the second set, the alphabet progression is not constant nor is it at the same interval.

T O F - - - - K - - - - Q

The absence of a constant interval between the letters and the lack of alphabetic progression within the individual elements indicates that the sequence is derived from a mixed alphabet base.

(4) Since the recovery of the base alphabet depends on determining the decimation interval, some means must be used to find this. The simplest method is through the use of the UVWXYZ cluster letters. Note that in the second decimation process illustrated above, the X, W, and Y each mark one run-through of the alphabet, i.e. letters are ex-

tracted at a given interval, in this case 4. The first letter to be extracted is T, then O, then K, then Q, then X. Then the process starts again around the alphabet. The sequence T to X contains six letters. Six divides into 26, 4 times with a remainder of 2. Therefore, the interval is 4.

(5) If the assumption of 4 as the interval is correct, when applied to a similar cipher sequence it produces a keyword mixed alphabet. To illustrate the procedure, note the recovery shown in figure 8-7.





Figure 8-7 (C). Recovery of a decimated alphabet (U).

Note that the count above did not include letters once placed. If they are included, the sequence

appears incorrectly as illustrated below:



The count continued, as in the first example above, results in the following alphabet:

S T A N D R I Z O B C E F G H J K L M P Q U V W X Y
Keyword: STANDARDIZATION

Section III. (C) SOLUTION OF UNILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC MIXED ALPHABET CIPHERS

8-10. (C) System Identification

a. The first step of cryptanalysis is the identification of the system to which a given cryptogram or series of cryptograms belong. Determination is based on certain characteristics imparted to the ciphertext by the method of encipherment. In the case of uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution,

identification is usually easy, based on the spatial relationship of peaks and troughs of the normal and the cipher distributions. Where they cannot be matched, the logical assumption is that a mixed cipher alphabet is used. For example, the frequency distribution of the ciphertext of the following message appears as:

AAAAQ	QFFQU	PKRTT	SWZRG	QFNWD	AERLN	WDANW
DAFAO	ADDAK	OADGR	GZRGJ	RURGR	FMAXU	DAEED
AQVEE	WJWGE	RLEWJ	WGEFA	HMAID	DWZRO	WGFKR
TTEHW	QDGWQ	VQFFQ	UPEFA	HVRJR	ERAGU	AQQG
VAXXA	IDFCV	RJRER	AGKRT	TSWOA	JWVXD	AQUDA
EEDAQ	VEFCD	WWNWD	AFCDW	WFADA	QVYIG	UFRAG
WRZCF	EWJWG	ERLEF	AHAGW	AGWDW	ZRONG	FREVR
JRERA	GDWEW	DJWXY	AAAAQ			

(1) Note that in compiling the frequency distribution, the first and last groups of the text are not used, as they are system indicators.




Figure 8-8 (U). Uniliteral frequency distribution, mixed monoalphabetic substitution (U).

(2) The pronounced peaks and troughs of the distribution shown in figure 8-8 are characteristic of uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution. If it is nonmonoalphabetic, it appears flattened. Further, the difference in spatial relationship of the peaks and troughs between this distribution and a normal distribution indicates that a mixed cipher sequence is used.

b. In this particular example, visual examination suffices to show that the system in use is probably monoalphabetic and uniliteral. This is caused by repeated occurrences of plaintext values which are duplicated in the ciphertext, only in different terms and easily revealed by the frequency distribution. This phenomenon is not always so evident. When such evidence is not at hand, the analyst must use other statistical tools to aid in the identification of a system. Moreover, the analyst may use these tools to further substantiate his identification made by visual inspection.

8-11. (C) Statistical Identification

a. Several statistical tests are available for the identification of a system where the uniliteral frequency distribution does not reveal significant characteristics, either because of the shortness of the message, or because of the lack of internal characteristics in the plaintext. For short messages, in particular less than 200 letters, the expected frequency table will aid in the classification of a cryptogram as either substitution or transposition, and the Lambda (λ) or blank expectation test provides a means of identifying a substitution system as either monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic. These tests given as tables are contained in paragraph 2-12 and their use explained in detail.

b. In addition to the tests above, the Phi (ϕ) test is also used to determine whether a given cipher is monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic. The Phi test is a test of the observed occurrence of a given letter as contrasted to its expected random occurrence and its expected plaintext, or normal occurrence. The details of operation of the test are contained in paragraph 2-15.

c. An alternate way of testing whether a cryptogram is monoalphabetic is by determining the Phi Index of Coincidence (ϕ I.C.). The ϕ I.C. is the ratio of the number of observed occurrences (ϕ_o) to the number of expected random occurrences (ϕ_r). Shown in formula the ϕ I.C. appears as:

$$\phi \text{ I.C.} = \frac{\phi_o}{\phi_r}$$

Actually this method used the same values as the Phi text, only expressing their relationships somewhat differently. That is, the ϕ I.C. gives, in terms of a ratio, the nearness of ϕ_o to ϕ_r . For example, the values given in paragraph 2-15 for ϕ_o , ϕ_r , and ϕ_p are:

Observed occurrence	$\phi_o = 154$
Expected random	$\phi_r = 94$
Expected plain	$\phi_p = 164$

In terms of the ϕ I.C. the ratio of ϕ_o to ϕ_p is:

$$\phi \text{ I.C.} = \frac{154}{94} = 1.64$$

The greater the value of the ϕ I.C. the stronger the indications of monoalphabeticity are. To illustrate this, consider the case where ϕ_o and ϕ_r are equal:

$$\phi_o = 100 \quad \phi \text{ I.C.} = \frac{100}{100} = 1.00$$

d. The theoretical ϕ I.C. of English plaintext is $\frac{.0667}{.0385}$ equaling 1.73, and the I.C. of random text is $\frac{.0385}{.0385}$ equaling 1.00. These values are determined

by the fact that .0385 and .0667 are respectively the random constant and the plain constant of English in decimal terms. As uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution does not change the relative value of occurrence of letters of the plaintext but only their alphabetic identification, the ϕ I.C. can be used for determining the monoalphabetic or nonmonoalphabetic nature of the system. Thus, the ϕ I.C.

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of the cryptogram being examined, 1.64, can be compared to the ϕ I.C. of plaintext, 1.73, and random, 1.00. As it approximates the ϕ I.C. of English plaintext, the system is assumed to be monoalphabetic. If the ϕ I.C. of a cryptogram closely approaches the ϕ I.C. of random text, we assume that the system is nonmonoalphabetic. The degree of approach is a matter of the cryptanalyst's judgment.

8-12. (C) Preparation for Analysis

a. As a preliminary step to analysis of any cryptogram, the analyst should organize his work. Given a cryptogram to analyze, a work sheet is prepared. This need not be elaborate, but is in a format that lends itself to study and one which can be kept and used as a record of the solution, the actual work being performed on similar sheets. Also as an adjunct to the work sheet, the analyst keeps a technical summary of the solution explaining in some detail the steps followed and their success in obtaining a final solution. This is especially

important in the case of solutions of new systems, and in those instances where another analyst is expected to use the result produced. Although there is no specific format for either the example given below and those in following paragraphs, they serve as models.

b. The cryptogram for analysis is copied on a work sheet of $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch cross-section paper. If copied by hand, the writing is in ink and each letter is in accordance with the standard military printing system. In the case of monoalphabetic uniliteral ciphers, the message is copied as individual letters, regardless of the groupings of the message text, one letter to a cell with a space between each. To aid in the references to a particular letter, row and column coordinates may be assigned. Horizontal lines may be identified by capital letters and vertical rows by numbers. Thus, A1 equates to the first letter of the cryptogram, row A, column 1. This format is shown in figure 8-9.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A	Q	F	F	Q	U	P	K	R	T	T	S	W	Z	R	G	Q	F	H	W	D
B	A	E	R	L	N	W	D	A	N	W	D	A	F	A	O	A	D	D	A	K
C	O	A	D	G	R	G	Z	R	G	J	R	U	R	G	R	F	M	A	X	U
D	D	A	E	E	D	A	Q	V	E	E	W	J	W	G	E	R	L	E	W	J
E	W	G	E	F	A	H	M	A	I	D	D	W	Z	R	O	W	G	F	K	R
F	T	T	E	H	W	Q	D	G	W	Q	V	Q	F	F	Q	U	P	E	F	A
G	H	V	R	J	R	E	R	A	G	U	A	O	O	Q	G	V	A	X	X	A
H	I	D	F	C	V	R	J	R	E	R	A	G	K	R	T	T	S	W	O	A
I	J	W	V	X	D	A	O	U	D	A	E	E	D	A	Q	V	E	F	C	D
J	W	W	N	W	D	A	F	C	D	W	W	F	A	D	A	Q	V	Y	I	G
K	U	F	R	A	G	W	R	Z	C	F	E	W	J	W	G	E	R	L	E	F
L	A	H	A	G	W	A	G	W	D	W	Z	R	O	N	G	F	R	E	V	R
M	J	R	E	R	A	G	D	W	E	W	D	J	W	X	Y					

Figure 8-9 (C). Ciphertext work sheet (U).

c. After the work sheet is prepared, the text is closely examined for repetitions within the text. Such repetitions, a characteristic of monoalphabetic substitution, are indications of identical words or expressions in the underlying plaintext and prove to be extremely useful in the assumption of letters and whole words. The search normally begins for digraphic and trigraphic repetitions, these being

easiest to locate. They are further examined for possible extension of repetitions of greater length. In the search, note any reversible repetitions. As the repetitions are found, underscore them indicating the direction of progression of reversible digraphs by an arrowhead. Properly marked, the work sheet appears as in figure 8-10.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A	<u>Q</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>
B	<u>A</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>K</u>
C	<u>O</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>U</u>
D	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>J</u>
E	<u>W</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>R</u>
F	<u>T</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>A</u>
G	<u>H</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
H	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>A</u>
I	<u>J</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>
J	<u>W</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>G</u>
K	<u>U</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>
L	<u>A</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>R</u>
M	<u>J</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>Y</u>					

Figure 8-10 (C). Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U).

8-13. (C) Biliteral and Triliteral Frequency Distribution

a. In order to study and make use of the repeated patterns underscored, a frequency distribution of digraphs and trigraphs may be made. Properly compiled, this data provides a base for comparison of repeats in the ciphertext against similar digraphs and trigraphs which occur in English plaintext, and which also aids in the identification of vowels and consonants. Basically there are three methods of compiling this data.

(1) Each letter of the ciphertext may be shown with its two preceding letters, a triliteral distribution with two prefixes.

(2) Each letter may be shown with its two succeeding letters, a triliteral distribution with two suffixes.

(3) Each letter may be shown with its preceding and succeeding letters, a triliteral distribution with one prefix and one suffix.

b. For the study of monoalphabetic ciphers, the last method is most satisfactory and will be used here. In its construction, it is quite simple. Across the bottom of a sheet of cross section paper, a cipher alphabet is inscribed in its normal order. Above each letter, arranged in columns, the letters which precede and succeed it in the ciphertext are entered. The paired letters then represent the prefix and suffix, in that order, of the letter they are inscribed above. Below the horizontal alphabet in parentheses is the frequency value of that letter, the same values that appear in the uniliteral frequency distribution. An example of this method of constructing a triliteral frequency distribution using the ciphertext is shown in figure 8-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

(30)	(0)	(4)	(22)	(21)	(18)	(19)	(4)	(3)	(9)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(5)	(8)	(2)	(11)	(26)	(2)	(6)	(7)	(9)	(30)	(6)	(1)	(5)
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
DE		FV	WA	AR	QF	RQ	AM	AD	GR	PR	RE	FA	FW	AA	UK	-F	KT	TW	RT	QP	QE	SZ	AU	VI	WR
			WA								RN					FU	ZG				ND				
DN		FD	WA	AE	FQ	DR	EW	AD	WW	AO	RE	HA	LW	KA	UE	GF	EL	TW	TS	RP	QQ	WL	AX		GR
DF					QH								AW								HR	AV			
FO		FD	AD	ED	AA	RZ	AV	YG	WW	FR			WW	RW		AV				RT	XD	GA	ND	XA	WR
																	GG								
OD		ZF	DA	VE	RM	RJ	AA		RR	GR			OG	AO		WD	ZG		TE	QP	CR	JG	VD		RC
DK																						GD			
OD			AG	EW	EA	RR			RR					OG		WV	JU		RT	GA	WX	EJ	WY		WR
																	UG					OG			
MX			UA	GR	GK	WE			AW					WA		VF	GF		TS	OD	QE	JG	X-		
DE			EA	LW	QF	WE			WW					AU		FU	EL			GF	QY	DZ			
DQ			ID	GF	FQ	WF			RR					RN		OG	ZO				ER	OG			
FH			DW	TH	EA	DW			DW							AV	KT					HQ			
MI			QG	PF	DC	AU										AV	VJ					GQ			
FH			IF	RR	EC	QV											JE					SO			
RG			XA	RR	AC	AK											EA					JV			
UO			UA	AE	WA	IU											VJ					DW			
VX			EA	ED	UR	AW											JE					WN			
XI			CW	VF	CE	WE											EA					ND			
RG			WA	FW	EA	AW											KT					DW			
OJ			CW	GR	GR	AW											FA					WF			
DO			AA	LG													WZ					AV			
DE			WW	RV		WF											EL					GR			
DQ			GW	RR		AD											ZO					EJ			
DF			WJ	WW													FE					JG			
FD																	VJ					GA			
DQ																	JE					GD			
RG																	EA					DZ			
FH																						DE			
HG																						OG			
WG																						ED			
RG																						JX			

Figure 8-11 (9). Trilateral frequency distribution (U).

c. The method used in figure 8-11 constructing the trilateral frequency distribution provides a complete list of all trigraphs and all digraphs in the cryptogram. Using the table, repeated trigraphs and digraphs can be quickly isolated. In studying the digraphs, it is immaterial whether prefix and base letter, or base letter and suffix, is used, as long as the same pair is used consistently. For example, the digraphs DA, RA, and FA are found using prefix and base letter A; the same digraph can be found when base letter D, R, and F are combined with their suffixes.

d. From the trilateral frequency distribution, figure 8-11, the analyst can extract a listing of those elements most frequently repeated in order to develop a condensed table of repetitions. This table should

also include word-length repeats found in the initial examination of the text. The purpose of making a condensed table of repetitions is to limit the study to those items of the greatest probable importance. Therefore in this table, as an arbitrary rule for messages of average length, digraphs and trigraphs which occur less than four and three times respectively need not be listed. At the option of the analyst, digraphs of repeated letters, regardless of number of repetitions, may be listed. Following each item listed, the frequency of its occurrence should also be included. Figure 8-12 following, is an example of a condensed table of repetitions drawn from the trilateral frequency distribution above and the message text.

DIGRAPHS

DA-11	WD-6	RE-4	EF-4	AG-6
FA-5		EE-3	FF-2	WG-5
RA-4				
OO-1	AQ-3	ER-6	TT-3	DW-5
		ZR-4		JW-5
				EW-4
				NW-4
				GW-4

TRIGRAPHS

RAG-4	WDA-4	RER-3	RTT-3	WJW-3
FAH-3	ERA-3	ERL-3	AGW-3	NWD-4
DAQ-3	JRE-3	KRT-3	WGE-3	EWJ-3
DAE-3	VRJ-3	EFA-3	RJR-3	AQV-3

POLYGRAPHS

VRJREPAG-3	QFFQUP-2	NWDA-4
WJWGE-3	DAQV-3	

Figure 8-12 (C). Condensed table of repetitions (U).

8-14. (C) Analysis of Vowel-Consonant Relationship

a. By applying certain known characteristics to the elements previously isolated, it is possible to classify the high-frequency cipher letters into two groups, probable consonants and probable vowels. This classification in turn permits the assumption of plaintext values for those elements, values which then can be substituted for ciphertext in the cryptogram. The basis for this classification is quite simple. The manner in which vowels and consonants combine with each other and among themselves is different in each case, and they combine with characteristic frequency. An example of these characteristic frequencies is seen in the tables of digraphic frequencies in appendix A. Examination shows that the 18 digraphs representing 25 percent of all digraphs are composed of the letters:

E T N R O A I S D H V

With the exception of the H and the V, the normal high-frequency vowels and consonants will account for approximately two-thirds of the cryptogram above although they represent only a little more than one-third of the alphabet.

b. Further examination reveals that of the 18 digraphs, 9 contain an E, three of which are reversed.

ED EN ER ES
NE RE SE TE VE

Of the remaining nine digraphs, five contain an N, four contain a T, four are a consonant combination, and none are combinations of vowels.

AN ST
IN TH
ON TO
ND OR
NT

Of the vowels, E combines most readily, and then with the N, R, S, T, D, and V in that order. N combines most readily with the vowels, specifically with E, O, I, and A, in that order. The consonant T combines most readily with other consonants, the N, H, and S, in that order. Therefore, if several high-frequency cipher letters are observed combining with one letter, the assumed value of Ep, they may be assumed to be the equivalents of N, R, S, and T. D and V would be low-frequency combinations. Those cipher letters assumed to be consonants should be observed in combination with another group of high-frequency cipher letters representing the vowels, A, I, and O. Generally vowel combinations are limited and should not be observed in combination with any great frequency. But certain diphthongs may appear in the text, and since the digraphs are drawn from the ciphertext in sequential order, any one may represent a word bridge thereby forming a vowel combination. For example, the

following phrase enciphered, results in an EO combination:

SHIFT FIRE ON SCHEDULE

EO Digraph

c. To apply the foregoing principles, the analyst will use the uniliteral frequency distribution, the trilateral frequency distribution, and the condensed table of repetitions. Only after all the high-frequency cipher letters and combinations contained therein are studied will any deduced values be applied to the cryptogram. The first step then is to list the high-frequency cipher letters of the cryptogram using the uniliteral frequency distribution previously prepared.

A	W	R	D	E	G	F	Q	J	V
3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	9	9
0	0	6	2	1	9	8	1		

By their frequency of occurrence, the cipher letters probably represent the plaintext letters:

E T N R O A I S D H

On the basis of frequency, both *Ac* and *Wc* are equally good choices for *Ep*. By using the trilateral frequency distribution, the combinations of these letters can be written out for consideration, using the following format depicted in figure 8-13 which shows both combinations and frequencies.




Figure 8-13 (C). Vowel consonant relationships (U).

Of the two sets of combinations, that of *Wc* with *Dc*, *Ec*, *Gc*, and *Jc* seems more suggestive of *Ep* combining with *Np*, *Rp*, *Sp*, and *Tp* to form the reversible digraphs noted in preceding paragraphs than does the possible combinations exhibited by *Ac*. For this reason, the choice of *Wc* as *Ep* is assumed. If in the course of further study this assumption proves incorrect, the *Ac* value will be assumed to be *Ep* and the data studied in that light.

d. If *Wc* is *Ep*, it follows that *Dc*, *Ec*, *Gc*, and *Jc*

represent consonants. And, if this is correct, they should be found in combination with other high-frequency letters which represent the vowels A, I, O, and U. Using the condensed table of repetitions, these letters are seen as combining readily with *Ac* and *Rc* and less readily with the cipher letters *Nc*, *Fc*, and *Oc*. The cipher letters *A* and *R* probably represent the cipher equivalents for two of the plaintext vowels A, I, O, and U. The letters *Nc*, *Fc*, and *Qc* probably represent consonants.

	Vowels	Consonants	Possible Consonants
cipher	WAR	DEGJ	NFQ
assumed plain	(E)		

(1) Further identification of vowels can be made on the basis of the occurrence of diphthongs. The table of digraphs shows that the most frequently used diphthongs are:

diphthongs:	IO	OU	EA	EI	AI	IE	AU	EO	AY	UE
frequency:	41	37	35	27	17	13	13	12	12	11

Referring to figure 8-12, the digraph *RAc* appears quite frequently. *Ac* and *Rc* being assumed vowels, the *RA* combination should represent a diphthong, and by frequency of occurrence the diphthong IO is suggested. The frequencies of the individual letters, *Rc* and *Ac* are such that they correspond to

the expected frequency of *Ip* and *Op*. Thus the plaintext values of I and O are assigned to *Rc* and *Ac* respectively.

(2) Returning to the suspect consonants, it is noted that the cipher letters *D*, *E*, *G*, and *J* combine well with the assumed *Ep* (*Wc*) suggesting that they

represent four of the plain consonants N, R, S, T, and V. The frequency of combination of those letters is as follows:

RE (98)	ER (87)
TE (7)	ET (37)
NE (57)	EN (111)
VE (57)	EV (20)
SE (49)	ES (54)

Study of prior tabulations reveals that *Wc* (*Ep*) combines with *D*, *E*, *G*, and *J* cipher as shown in figure 8-14.

Prefix:	≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡	AA	3
<i>Wc</i> (<i>Ep</i>)	D E G J	EE	42
	≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡	II	-
Suffix:		OO	6
		UU	-
		YY	-

Figure 8-14 (C). Analysis of *Wc* as *Ep* (*U*).

Dc, as the most frequent combination with *Wc*, is accepted tentatively as *Rp*. The *Ec* combination is noncommittal but the *Gc* also shows a good reversal pattern, similar to the *NE-EN* reversal. Further, the trigraph *RAG* is noted on the condensed table of repetitions as being of relatively high frequency. By previously assumed values, this trigraph equates to *ION* if *Gc=Np*. Referring to figure 8-12, the *RAGc* is seen as a word ending occurring three times, each time preceded by *Ec*. The plaintext trigraph *ION* is one of the most common trigraphs and is usually preceded by *T* or *S*, the *T* being more common. Thus *Ec* likely represents either *T* or *S* plain-

$Ec = Sp$ and $Fc = Tp$		$Ec = Tp$ and $Fc = Sp$
thus $EFc = STp =$	or thus	$EFc =$ TSp
$FFc = TTp$		$FFc =$ SSp
$EEc = SSp$		$EEc =$ TTp

Faced with this choice where the frequency of occurrence within the cryptogram is equal, one other possibility is open for use in identifying the correct plain-to-cipher equation. This is done by checking the relative plaintext occurrences of the digraphs *ST* and *TS*. The digraphic frequency table figure 8-1, shows that *TS* has a frequency

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C				W					R					G	A			D	E	F						

The analyst could, using the same techniques described, continue the identification of single letters by combining the recovered values of cipher letters with unrecovered cipher letters, playing the resultant frequency of the digraphs against those listed in the appropriate frequency tables. However, there

text. The preceding table of combinations shows that the value of combinations of *E* with *S* and *T* are almost equal. Both are equally good doublets, i.e. *TT* or *SS*. Therefore, since the evidence is inconclusive for the moment, the *Ec* is not considered further.

e. The cipher letter *F* is the next to be examined. In the condensed table it is observed as appearing in combination with *Ec*, either *Sp* or *Tp* as *EFc*, and in combination with itself as a doublet *FFc*. Although the *F* has a high frequency (18) the latter appearance casts doubt on its being a vowel. Vowels as doublets have the following frequencies:

The assumed cipher values for *Ap* and *Ep* exclude two possibilities, and the expected frequency of the *OO* doublet is so low that it would hardly fit the number of occurrences of the doublet *FFc*. Therefore *Fc* is assumed to be a consonant. The high-frequency consonants appear as doublets with a frequency of:

TT 19	SS 19	VV 0
NN 8	DD 8	
RR 11	HH 0	

Considering the foregoing frequencies, it is obvious that *Fc* can also equal *Sp* or *Tp*, giving rise to several possible combinations with *Ec*, which also can be either *Sp* or *Tp*.

value of 19 while the value of *ST* is 63. Therefore, the first combination above, where $EFc = STp$, and where $Ec = Sp$ and $Fc = Tp$ may be accepted.

8-15. (C) Analysis of Word Pattern

a. To this point the following values have been assumed:

is another method of establishing the identification of individual letters. This is through the use of word patterns and the probable word method.

b. In foregoing paragraphs, stereotypes in military communications are mentioned. These are certain words, phrases, and abbreviations occurring with

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regularity. Not only do certain words appear with a greater frequency than others, but also certain words exhibit specific characteristics of pattern and letter usage which are useful to the analyst. Consider the following words:

OCCUPY BATTALION DEFENSE
LOSSES COMMANDING

Each is composed of certain letters which occur in

A A	A B B A	A A B A
O <u>CC</u> UPY	B <u>ATTA</u> LION	L O <u>SSES</u>
<u>A B A C D A</u>	<u>A A B C D E C</u>	
D <u>E F E N S E</u>	C O <u>M M A N D I N G</u>	

Note that the letters A, B, C, D, E, etc. are assigned beginning with the first repeated letter of the word. Each time the word letter is repeated, the same pattern letter is also repeated. As can be observed in the foregoing examples, patterns span repeated letters in the word.

c. The same system of classification is applied to cipher repeats that occur in monoalphabetic substitution. For example, the polygraphs contained in the condensed table of repetitions are classified into the following idiomorphic classes:

A B A C A	A B B A	A B C D
V R J R E R A S	Q F F Q U P	N W D A
A B A	A B C D	
W J W G E	D A Q U	

There are two general ways that these word patterns are used:

(1) In those cases where no cipher-to-plain values have been recovered, the analyst assumes

Idiomorphic class:	A B A C A	A B B A
Cipher:	V R J R E R A G	Q F F Q U P
Plaintext:	- I - I S I O N	- T T - -

(3) The analyst, by referring to the listing of idiomorphic word patterns in appendix D-3, can search the appropriate class for words which contain the correct plaintext elements. In doing this, remember that the elements dealt with here are word patterns and not lengths. The pattern derived from an examination of the ciphertext may represent either a complete word, a word fragment, or even parts of two adjacent words used in the plaintext. Scanning the word list of idiomorphic pattern ABACA, only one word is found within this class that contains the correct plaintext values.

patterned regularly, certain letters being repeated. This phenomenon, called idiomorphism, provides a means whereby certain words are readily identified and their plain letter values assumed. As a means of deciphering idiomorphic patterns and classifying them, a literal symbol is assigned to the first letter of a distinctive pattern and to each succeeding different letter. For example, the words above are classified as:

that a specific pattern is a given word. This process is in reality only a form of guessing, the correctness of the guess being directly related to the analyst's familiarity with the general circumstances surrounding the message and the general nature of its contents. The use of this method may or may not be helpful. Where a word is assumed, values can be assumed which can be applied to other probable words, each in turn generating new values. In some cases however, this method involves more time and effort than a straightforward analytic approach.

(2) The second case involves the use of this method in conjunction with other normal analytic approaches. Specifically, the values derived from a study of vowel-consonant relationships are applied, in most cases, to word patterns thus providing a firmer base for the assumption of probable words. For example, the cipher polygraphs preceding are reduced to partial plaintext as follows:

C	V R J R E R - A G
P	- I - I S I O N
	D I V I S I O N

In the case of the idiomorphic pattern ABBA, several possible words which conform to the requirements are found.

C	Q F F Q U P
P	T T
	A T T A C H
	A T T A C K

Although each word is different, they both contain the repeated A. Therefore Qc can be equated to Ap.

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d. By transferring the new plaintext values with their associated cipher values, the enciphering

sequence is now expanded to:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
C	Q		V	W				R						G	A		D	E	F		J						

At this point, the analyst may choose one of four possible routes toward a final solution, or may use any combination of these routes.

- (1) Continue a study of word patterns.
- (2) Revert to a study of digraphs.
- (3) Attempt to reconstruct the alphabet above using its obvious sequences to assume letter values and then checking them by (1) and (2) above.
- (4) Begin substituting the plaintext values now recovered for the appropriate ciphertext values in the message and then attempting to find additional values by reading out valid plaintext.

8-16. (C) Substituting Deduced Values

a. Thus far the values accepted as being correct are almost purely hypothetical. They have been tested against one another in combinations divorced from their context in the message. No matter how valid any of the values may seem to be, the final test of their validity lies in their consistent application to the ciphertext to produce intelligible plaintext. As an aid, the analyst may rearrange the cipher-to-plaintext relationship to produce a deciphering alphabet to decipher the message. This, and the partially recovered plaintext is shown in figure 8-15.

	C	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
	P	O		R	S	T	N		V								A	I		D	E						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20						
A	Q	F	F	Q	U	P	K	R	T	T	S	W	Z	R	G	Q	F	N	W	D							
	A	T	T	A			I						E		I	N	A	T		E	R						
B	A	E	R	L	N	W	D	A	N	W	D	A	F	A	O	A	D	D	A	K							
	O	S	I		E	R	O	E	R	O	T	O		O	R	R	O										
C	O	A	D	G	R	G	Z	R	G	J	R	U	R	G	R	F	M	A	X	U							
	O	R	N	I	N	I	N	V	I		I	N	I	T		O											
D	D	A	E	E	D	A	Q	V	E	E	W	J	W	G	E	R	L	E	W	J							
	R	O	S	S	R	O	A	D	S	S	E	V	E	N	S	I		S	E	V							
E	W	G	E	F	A	H	M	A	I	D	D	W	Z	R	O	W	G	F	K	R							
	E	N	S	T	O		O	R	R	E		I		E	N	T		I									
F	T	T	E	H	W	Q	D	G	W	Q	V	Q	F	F	Q	U	P	E	F	A							
		S	E	A	R	E	A	D	A	T	T	A			S	T	O										
G	H	V	R	J	R	E	R	A	G	U	A	O	O	Q	G	V	A	X	X	A							
		D	I	V	I	S	I	O	N		O			A	N	D	O										
H	I	D	E	C	V	R	J	R	E	R	A	G	L	R	T	T	S	W	O	A							
	R	T		D	I	V	I	S	I	O	N		I														
I	J	W	V	X	D	A	O	U	D	A	E	E	D	A	Q	V	E	F	C	D							
	V	E	D		R	O		R	O	S	S	R	O	A	D	S	T										
J	W	W	N	W	D	A	F	C	D	W	W	F	A	D	A	Q	V	Y	I	G							
	E	E		E	R	O	T	R	E	E	T	O	R	O	A	D											
K	U	F	R	A	G	W	R	Z	C	F	E	W	J	W	G	E	R	L	E	F							
		T	I	O	N	E	I		T	S	E	V	E	N	S	I		S	T								
L	A	H	A	G	W	A	G	W	D	W	Z	R	O	W	G	F	R	E	V	R							
	O		O	N	E	O	N	E	R	E		I		E	N	T	I	S	D	I							
M	J	R	E	R	A	G	D	W	E	W	D	J	W	X	Y												
	V	I	S	I	O	N	R	E	S	E	P	V	E														

Figure 8-15 (C). Partially recovered plaintext (U).

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b. Examination of the partially recovered plain-text now reveals several sequences which, although incomplete, contain a sufficient number of key letters to make the identification of the others relatively

simple. These newly assumed letters may then be substituted for other cipher letters. For example, the sequence A1 through C17 probably reads:

“ATTACK WILL BEGIN AT ZERO SIX ZERO ZERO TOMORROW MORNING”

From this sequence the cipher-to-plain value can be drawn:

C U P K T S Z N E O
P C K W L B G Z X M

The deciphering alphabet now appears as:

C A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
P O R S T N P W X Z M K A I B L C E G

Using the alphabet for further decipherment, again assuming letters, the message can be deciphered to read:

“ATTACK WILL BEGIN AT ZERO SIX ZERO ZERO TOMORROW MORNING IN VICINITY OF CROSSROADS SEVEN SIX SEVEN STOP YOUR REGIMENT WILL SPEARHEAD ATTACK STOP DIVISION COMMAND OF FOURTH DIVISION WILL BE MOVED FROM CROSSROADS THREE ZERO THREE TO ROAD JUNCTION EIGHT SEVEN SIX STOP ONE ONE REGIMENT IS DIVISION RESERVE”

The cipher alphabet used is:

C A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
P O Q H R S T N P U V W X Y Z M K A I B L C D E F J G

By rearranging the values of the two sequences, the enciphering alphabet can be derived and the keyword found.

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C Q S U V W X Z C R Y P T O G A H B D E F I J K L M N

Keyword: CRYPTOGRAPHY

Hp = Cc

c. The example presented in the preceding paragraphs, being an artificial illustration set up to demonstrate general principles, is relatively easy to solve. This is so because the frequencies of the various elements analyzed: letters, digraphs, trigraphs, and word patterns, correspond well with that expected. This is not always the case. The principles illustrated are general in nature and application, and depend upon the formulation of assumptions. Recognize that any assumption may be incorrect as well as correct, the best means of determination being to test each, casting out those that prove incorrect. The analyst will find it most profitable to vary the analytic approach thus providing a source of additional assumptions. In some cases, a single approach may suffice to solve a simple cryptogram, but in the long run, the more varied the techniques employed the surer the solution.

8-17. (C) The Consonant Line Method

a. Another method for the determination of vowel and consonant equivalents, which is extremely useful in difficult cases of monoalphabetic substitution, is the consonant line method. This method makes use of the positions of letters in the ciphertext relative to the occurrence of adjacent letters and is based upon the tendency for low-frequency consonants to be flanked on one or both sides by vowels. If a distribution is made of the contacts of the low-frequency ciphertext letters of a monoalphabetic cryptogram, vowel-equivalents can be distinguished from consonants in that they are usually represented by a combination of the following characteristics:

- (1) They are usually high-frequency letters.
- (2) They have a variety of contacts.
- (3) They combine readily with low-frequency letters.

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(4) They do not combine readily with one another and less so with themselves.

b. The identification of possible vowels using the foregoing characteristics is simplified by the con-

struction of a consonant line diagram, an enlarged T. For example, construct a trilateral frequency distribution, see figure 8-16.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
US	SZ	-Y	QY			ZU	QP	UQ	ZR	QD	QR	KV		QS	ZX	EU	CE	ZY	HC	NS	QE	QX	EZ	YH		
DQ	LQ	SE	VZ			PQ	JQ	SE	SN	EQ		XQ		IH	XC	YS	ED	RW	RJ	UQ	QH	XQ	ER	DQ		
	ZD	ES	ER			JQ	EZ	QJ	US					SY	DP	HZ	PE	XP	SJ	QF	TX	ZR	TE	RT		
	DC	SR	VS			WR	HZ	JH						XR	JW	KJ	RJ		XU	SJ	JX	WS	FR	IK		
	ZD	WY	WF			QE	RH	UI						TQ	EI	YS	QU		RS	QF	JF	SU	PZ	YX		
	DX	JQ	FQ			SI	QE	RE							HJ	XT	RK		SK	HQ	SD	QY	XZ	IH		
	SE	YI				ZR	QS	RQ							HS	HI	VP		QS			DZ	RS	FD		
	WE	JQ				IQ		SY							IW	MJ	XX		XZ			ZR	JS	YD		
		YI				RZ		ZW							EF	XE	EH					GR		XX		
		JQ				SV		VR							VH	XY	YJ					SP		YJ		
		HS				QE		SJ							HV	EU	YD					WZ		XE		
		RL				QE		QW							CM	PQ	UU					RU		HQ		
		DR						JS							JX	FH	KX					ZT		UX		
		IY													LQ	JX	UV					SH				
		ZF													QX		FX									
		HS													RI		IH									
		HQ													ZU		EJ									
		D-													PV		JW									
															NI											
															EJ											
															FH											
															VH											

Figure 8-16 (C). Trilateral frequency distribution (U).

Using the trilateral distribution of figure 8-16, a consonant line diagram is constructed as in figure 8-17. Above the crossbar, all low-frequency letters of the distribution (C, K, L, M, N, P, T, V, F, W) are inscribed horizontally, repeated on the right and

the left. Below the crossbar, the letters used as prefixes are inscribed to the left of the vertical part, under the letters they precede. Those letters used as suffixes are inscribed to the right, under the letter they follow.

CONSONANT LINE




Figure 8-17 (C). Consonant line diagram (U).

c. Considering both the number of contacts and their variety shown in the diagram, it is likely that the cipher letters Q, S, and R are vowel equivalents. The cipher letters X, Z, and E also appear possible as does Y. However, they represent a total of seven letters where there are only six vowels. The normal frequency of Up and Yp is less than the high-frequency consonants. Therefore, the last four cipher letters probably contain one or more consonant equivalents. Having isolated three vowel equivalents with some certainty and four other letters as probably representing several vowel equivalents, the analyst has several options.

(1) With the most likely vowel equivalents,

the procedures given in the study of vowel-consonant relationship may be followed to determine the identity of each vowel and associated high-frequency consonants.

(2) A study of each vowel's contacts can be made in order to classify additional consonant equivalents. For this, a vowel line is constructed (fig. 8-18), for those most likely vowel equivalents. This line may be constructed like the consonant line, or as a simplified form given below. In either case, the intent is to tabulate the contacts of the vowel equivalents, having in mind the characteristic of a vowel contacting a consonant more often than it contacts another vowel, or itself.




Figure 8-18 (C). Vowel equivalent line (U).

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d. Examination of the *Qc* vowel-equivalent line reveals that *Hc*, *Ic*, *Jc*, *Vc*, and *Xc* are probably consonant equivalents. The *Sc* line tends to confirm the *Jc* and *Xc* consonant-equivalent assumption, and also indicates that the *Ec* may also be a consonant equivalent. The *Rc* line confirms *Ec*, *Hc*, *Jc*, and *Xc* as probable consonant equivalents, and also indicates that *Yc* may also be a consonant equivalent. Thus far then, the following assumptions appear logical:

Vowel Equivalents: *Qc*, *Sc*, *Rc*

Consonant Equivalents: *Ec*, *Hc*, *Ic*, *Jc*, *Vc*, *Xc*,
and *Yc*

If the above assumptions are valid, only the *Zc* of the questionable vowel equivalent is actually a vowel equivalent. At this point, the analyst resorts to a study of the characteristics of vowels and consonants in combination and relation to one another to discover the correct plaintext equivalent for each cipher value.

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CHAPTER 9 (C)

MULTILITERAL MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) CHARACTERISTICS AND TYPES

9-1. (C) Introduction

a. Monoalphabetic substitution is classified into either uniliteral or multiliteral. In the former, there is a strict one-to-one character relationship between the units of the plaintext and the units of the ciphertext. A multiliteral monoalphabetic substitution cipher, on the other hand, is a cryptographic system that produces ciphertext units of two or more characters for each equivalent character of the plaintext.

b. The term multiliteral is used in cryptography in its broadest sense. It is applied to those systems which exhibit a constant relationship between one ciphertext unit and one plaintext unit, regardless of whether the system employs letters, numbers, or special symbols as the ciphertext character. For specific reference, multiliteral systems are classified by the number and type of ciphertext characters used to replace each plaintext unit.

- (1) Biliteral refers to systems involving the use of two-letter ciphertext units.
- (2) Triliteral refers to systems involving the use of three-letter ciphertext units.
- (3) Dinomic refers to those systems involving the use of two-figure ciphertext units.
- (4) Trinomic refers to those systems involving the use of three-figure ciphertext units.

c. Multiliteral systems in general represent an attempt to offer greater security than the simple uniliteral cipher systems. Once the principle of solving uniliteral substitution systems by the analysis of the plaintext characteristics reflected in the ciphertext became known, the cryptographer, sought methods that would either disguise, suppress, or eliminate these characteristic frequencies or patterns in the ciphertext. Among the multiliteral systems developed are simple biliteral systems, biliteral systems using variants, and multinomic systems.

9-2. (C) Simple Biliteral Substitution

a. In simple biliteral substitution systems, figure 9-1, the ciphertext unit to plaintext unit ratio is a constant 2 to 1. The ciphertext unit is either a letter or number, with its identity having little or no effect upon either the cryptographic process or the cryptanalysis of the ciphertext produced. Generally, these systems are based upon a matrix which contains the plain component alphabet. Row and column coordinates form the ciphertext units which are substituted for each plaintext value. Note that to fit the alphabets to the dimensions of the matrices, the I and J are combined into a single cell in the first; the I and J, U and V are combined in the second matrix.

	R	I	D	G	E
C	A	B	C	D	E
R	F	G	H	I	K
E	L	M	N	O	P
S	Q	R	S	T	U
T	V	W	X	Y	Z

CRc = Ap

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3	A	D	G	K	N	Q	T	X
2	B	E	H	L	O	R	V	Y
1	C	F	I	M	P	S	W	Z

31c = Ap

Figure 9-1 (C). Simple biliteral substitution systems (U).

b. In figure 9-1, the plaintext component is limited to 25 and 24 characters respectively by combining certain values which could be used interchangeably without causing a loss of intelligibility. Encryption in either of the systems is the same. The plaintext

S E N D R E I N F O R C E M E N T S X X
S D C E E D C G S I C E R G E D R R E G S I C D C E E I C E E D S G S D T D T D
S D C E E D C G S I C E R G E D R R E G S I C D C E E I C E E D S G S D T D T D

or

SEND REINFORCEMENTS XX
16223532 2622133512252611221422353716 3838
16223 53226 22133 51225 26112 21422 35371 63838

c. The process of decipherment is the reverse of the process of encipherment. The cryptographer breaks the ciphertext into digraphs or dinomes and, using these as coordinates, locates their equivalent plaintext value. Note that in these particular systems, the order of selecting the row and column coordinates as ciphertext values must be predetermined as row and column or as column and row. Normally the former system, similar to reading map coordinates, is used.

d. The biliteral and dinomic alphabet produced by the system illustrated above is also termed bipartite, as each cipher element can be divided into two distinct parts, each having a clearly defined function as row or column coordinates. On occasion, the systems illustrated are termed bipartite systems due to the nature of the cipher alphabet produced.

e. It is obvious to the analyst that these particular systems offer little or no difficulty. Essentially, the process does not effectively disguise either letter frequency or word pattern. Further, the bipartite nature of the alphabets produced by these systems is one of their weaknesses, making them easy to recognize by the analyst. In effect, the foregoing system does nothing more than double the length of the ciphertext, offering little more security than the uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution system. To circumvent these weaknesses, multiliteral systems employing variants were developed.

9-3. (S) Biliteral Systems With Variants

a. In a basic biliteral system, a given plaintext value is always replaced by one constant ciphertext element. Each time that letter is used again, the same ciphertext element appears. The biliteral system with variants is an attempt to provide variant ciphertext values for each plaintext value, thus suppressing the appearance of letter frequency and word patterns in the ciphertext. There are two basic methods whereby these variant values are introduced. The first, using subterfuge, results in a

equivalent is located within the matrix, and the row and column coordinates indicate its position in its ciphertext value. For example, the message below could be enciphered as shown:

pseudovariant which only camouflages the true biliteral nature of the alphabet.

(1) One such method is to construct the matrix, including row and column coordinates, in such a manner that the resulting cryptogram resembles other systems. For example, using the matrix in figure 9-2, messages could be enciphered, and when the ciphertext is divided into five-letter groups, it gives the appearance of code groups.

	B	C	D	F	G
A	A	B	C	D	E
E	F	G	H	I	K
I	L	M	N	O	P
O	Q	R	S	T	U
U	V	W	X	Y	Z

R A I D S
OC AB EF AF OD

Figure 9-2 (S). Artificial code language matrix (U).

(2) Another method is to add additional digits, thereby disguising the bipartite nature of the alphabet. For example, where the ciphertext is composed of dinomic elements, a "sum-checking" digit which is the noncarrying sum of the two digits of the element may be used. The cryptogram produced by the dinomic system previously illustrated could be changed to appear as a trinomic system by the following operation.

CIPHERTEXT
16223 53226 22133 51225 26112 21422 35371 63838
1+6=7 167, 2+2=4 224, 3+5=8 358, etc.
CIPHERTEXT AFTER SUMMING DINOMES
16722 43583 25268 22413 43581 23257 26811 22241
45224 35837 01673 81381

(3) Even a set of randomly selected characters may be used, inserted following each digraph or dinome solely for the purpose of confusing the

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analyst. But here, as in the two preceding examples, little is gained. In the first case, the limitations in the values used soon reveal the system as simple multilateral, and the bipartite nature of its alphabet makes analysis easy. This is also true with the second case, and additionally, this particular method results in one plaintext element being replaced with

three ciphertext characters—an inordinate increase of message length for security gain.

b. By far the simplest practical method of introducing variants into a multilateral substitution system is by the use of additional row and column indicators. Figure 9-3 illustrates some of the possibilities whereby this can be accomplished.




Figure 9-3 (5). Multilateral systems with variants (U).

c. The matrices in figure 9-3 represent some of the simpler means of accomplishing biliteral substitution with variants. Each is disguised by one or more characteristics representative of bilaterals with variants.

(1) Note that example 1 provides six possible variant cipher elements for each plaintext unit. Ap could be represented by any one of the cipher digraphs KV, KQ, FV, FQ, AV, or AQ.

(2) Example 2, which is an extension of the pseudovariant system shown in paragraph 9b(1), now provides four variants for each plaintext element.

(3) Example 3 illustrates a method of providing a number of variants approximately equal to the normal frequency of occurrence of a given plaintext

letter. Thus Ep may be replaced by 25 different cipher equivalents, while the Kp is replaced by only two.

(4) Example 4 illustrates that a biliteral alphabet need not be a bipartite. No single element exclusively indicates row or column, i.e. the digit 1 indicates two rows of one column.

(5) Example 5 illustrates a method of providing for the normal frequency of usage of the plaintext letter, this time based upon a key word composed of high-frequency letters. It also provides for the use of digits rather than requiring that they be spelled out.

(6) Note that encipherment using matrices 1 and 2 are commutative; the coordinates can be read in any direction and the same plaintext letter is

always found. For example, in matrix number 2, *BAC* and *ABc* both equate to *Ap*. All other matrices illustrated are noncommutative; therefore, the method of indicating and reading out the plaintext letters must be agreed upon in advance. For example, in matrix 3 the cipher element *BD* may indicate *Fp* or *Cp* depending on whether the order is row-column, or column-row.

9-4. (C) Security of Multiliteral Monoalphabetic Substitution

The obvious disadvantage of all such methods discussed in the preceding paragraph is that the crypto-

graphic text is exactly twice as long as the original plaintext. Moreover, there is no great compensating advantage from the standpoint of security in most cases. It is possible that the number of variants is so extensive that the system's overall security could be improved, but any such scheme would entail the risk of error in the encryption process. It has been shown through experience that when given a number of choices of variant values, the cryptographer will, over a period of time, tend to use only a very few of those available. Thus the provision of variant values by the system can be largely forfeited.

Section II. (C) ANALYSIS OF MULTILITERAL SYSTEMS

9-5. (C) Introduction

a. The analysis of simple multiliteral systems and multiliteral systems with variants, whether dinomic or biliteral, involve certain similar techniques and methods. Although the more complicated variant systems may require the use of techniques particular to their case, the underlying principles are similar. Accordingly, those general principles will be explained and demonstrated in this section. Those special techniques applicable to specific cases will be developed in the succeeding section.

b. The analysis of all multiliteral systems may take one of two general courses. One method which

can easily be employed in the case of a simple multiliteral system, and which under certain circumstances can be used in the case of multilaterals with variants, is the solution of the literal values as though they were monographic. This is done by using the same approach as for the analysis of uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution. To demonstrate the basis for this particular approach, examine the cryptogram given below. Herein, it can be seen that the ciphertext, produced by the system illustrated in paragraph 9-2, exhibits the same pattern repeats and letter frequencies as does the plaintext. The only difference is that the ciphertext exhibits this pattern digraphically rather than monographically.

Message

ATTACK TO BEGIN AT ZERO SIX ZERO ZERO HOURS TOMORROW XX

Ciphertext

CRSGS GCRCD RESGE GCICE RIRGE DCRSG
TECES IEGSD RGTDT ECESI EGTEC ESIEG
RDEGS ESISD SGEGE IEGSI SIEGT ITDTD

c. When the message above is reduced to uniliteral terms, the word patterns of the underlying plaintext seem to leap out.

A B B A
CR SG SG CR CD RE SG EG CI CE RI RG ED CR SG
A B C D A B C D A B C D
TE CE SI EG SD RG TD TE CE SI EG TE CE SI EG
A B A C C A
RD EG SE SI SD SG EG EI EG SI SI IE GTI TD TD

d. The second general approach involves the simultaneous analysis of the ciphertext for plaintext values and the recovery of the matrix. This approach may be used for either the simple biliteral or the bilaterals with variants. It is more appropriate in the case of the latter system, for all variant forms of each cipher element must be identified prior to

the reduction of the cipher elements to uniliteral terms.

e. Prior to the start of any analysis, however, a system must be identified as to general class and wherever possible to the specific type within that class. In the following paragraph, methods of identifying multiliteral systems are treated in detail.

9-6. (ϕ) Identification

a. The identification of a biliteral system is much easier than the identification of some uniliteral substitution systems. This is particularly so in the case of the simpler forms of the biliteral system. Normally, the initial basis of identification lies in the recognition of the textual limitation imposed by

<i>AHARE</i>	<i>SSEER</i>	<i>ARCSC</i>	<i>RSHSS</i>	<i>CHCHS</i>	<i>SASPH</i>
<i>ARAOO</i>	<i>SAECH</i>	<i>ARAEP</i>	<i>OSSCO</i>	<i>SEASP</i>	<i>HAOSE</i>
<i>SSASP</i>	<i>ESSAE</i>	<i>CRSEA</i>	<i>ESSCR</i>	<i>SECHA</i>	<i>RCOCS</i>
<i>AEAEA</i>	<i>RCRCH</i>	<i>SSCHC</i>	<i>HSSSO</i>	<i>PSJJJ</i>	

The briefest examination reveals that aside from the three J's appearing at the end of the message, these probably being nulls, there are only eight different letters used, the letters *A, H, R, E, S, C, P,* and *O* respectively. If the message is divided into digraphs and another count is made, a definite positional limitation would be observed. The letters *A, E, S, C,* and *P* would be found in the first position and the letters *H, R, S, E,* and *O* would be noted in the last position. On the basis of these limitations, the analyst could safely assume that the message represents a case of multiliteral encipherment.

b. A close examination of the message reveals several other features which are characteristics of multiliteral systems in general and which may also be used for identification purposes.

(1) The number of the letters or digits in the message, excluding nulls if they are added after encipherment of the plaintext, is a multiple of the cipher element. In the example above, there are 112 letters, or 56 digraphs. Conversely, the length of the cipher element can sometimes be derived from message length, for example, a dinomic system using sum checks. In any event, the analyst immediately explores this possibility.

(2) The number of letters or digits in repeated series are the same in each case and are a multiple of total message and cipher element length. For example, in the message above, two repeats occur: *RSHSS CHCHS SASPH* and *SSCHC HSSSO*, which are equal in length, 8 letters or 4 digraphs long.

(3) The number of letters between repeated sequences, between the beginning of the message and occurrence of first repeat, and between the end of the last repeat and the end of the message, are all multiples of two. For example, there are 18 letters before the first repeat. The repeat contains 8 letters. Following it, there are 74 intervening letters, again the 8 letters are repeated, then 4 letters to the end of the message. Each interval is a multiple of 2; hence, this is the cipher element's size.

the number of characters used as row and column indicators and their manner of use. Where the indicators are limited in number and are bipartite in nature, identification of the system is quite easy. For example, a uniliteral frequency distribution of the following cryptogram would hardly be necessary, as the limitation in the number of letters used is obvious.

9-7. (ϕ) Statistical Tests

a. Just as the Phi (ϕ) and the Index of Coincidence (I.C.) tests can be applied to a cryptogram to determine whether it is monoalphabetic, so also can variations of these same tests be applied to the digraphic distribution of a cryptogram to determine whether the cryptogram in question is monoalphabetic when considered as a multiliteral cipher. The basis for the application of these tests lies in the uniliteral nature of simple multiliteral substitution and the limitations inherent in a multiliteral with variants which make it susceptible to these tests.

b. In foregoing chapters, both the ϕ and the I.C. tests are explained in terms of their application to uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution. The general form of the tests when applied to digraphic distributions remains unchanged though the values are now different. The plain and random constants and the "N" in the formulas now pertain to the number of digraphs under consideration instead of the number of single letters. The formulas are shown below:

(1) Digraphic Phi test, (2ϕ).

$$2\phi_o = \sum f(f-1)$$

$$2\phi_p = .0069N(N-1)$$

$$2\phi_r = .0015N(N-1)$$

f = Number of occurrences of each digraph
N = Number of occurrences of all digraphs (Σ*F*)

(2) Digraphic 2ϕI.C. test.

$$I.C. = \frac{\sum C - (f-1)}{N(N-1)}$$

C = The number of possible digraphs, i.e. the number of letters in the alphabet squared. For English *C* = 26x26 = 676.
N = Number of occurrences of all digraphs.
f = Total number of occurrences of each digraph.

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(3) The digraphic I.C. can also be determined by comparing the value of observed occurrences to the value of expected random occurrences, with the I.C. being expressed in terms of a ratio between the two values. The formula for this test may be expressed as:

$$\text{I.C.} = \frac{2\phi_o}{2\phi_r}$$

In the case of digraphs, the I.C. for English plaintext is 4.66 and the I.C. for digraphic English random text is 1.00.

c. These foregoing tests, as all statistical tests,

WMTST	SWMIM	BOIST	SWMWU	WUEMT	MHMTE	EMIU E							
MHUTE	TMEMW	OEMIU	ISTOW	EEMEU	TUIST	OTSTO							
TUIUI	SHSEM	WSESE	MISTS	WMHSH	UTUHS	ISESE							
UEUTU	HSTST	STUHM	HSEMW	MIMIO	WUTOI	UEMXX							
	WM	WU	WO	WE	WS	TS	TM	TE	TO	TU	IU	IS	IM
f	5	3	1	1	1	7	2	2	4	5	4	6	2
f(f-1)	20	6	0	0	0	42	2	2	12	20	12	30	2
	EO	EM	EU	ES	HS	HM	HU						
	1	10	3	2	5	2	2	Σf=N=69					
	0	90	6	2	20	2	2	Σf(f-1)=270					

(1) Using the values determined above, the values of the 2φ test may be computed as follows:

$$2\phi_o = \Sigma f(f-1) = 270$$

$$2\phi_p = .0069N(N-1) = .0069 \times 69 \times 68 = 31.5478$$

$$2\phi_r = .0015N(N-1) = .0015 \times 69 \times 68 = 7.0380$$

(2) The 2φ I.C. may be computed as follows:

$$\frac{C f(f-1)}{N(N-1)} = \frac{676 \times 270}{68 \times 69} = \frac{182520}{4692} = 38.9$$

(3) And the second method of determining a digraphic I.C. may be computed as follows:

$$2 \text{ I.C.} = \frac{2\phi_o}{2\phi_r} = \frac{270}{7} = 38$$

e. Note that in the case of the computation of 2 I.C. above, the value derived is in the value range of 31 to 43. In the case of the biliteral system the expected values for a simple biliteral fall in the range of 20 to 40, and the expected values for a biliteral with variants is 6 to 20. The extremely high difference in value computed for the digraphic Phi test lies in the fact that the test involves a comparison between an expected occurrence based on the possibility of

are subject to a degree of error, depending upon the makeup of the cryptographic test being studied. Specifically, in the case of multilateral systems the presence of repeated groups, the limitations in the number of different digraphs present, and the size of the sample itself all tend to distort the test results. Therefore, they must always be used with caution, with the preferential method being to employ them in conjunction with other evidence for identification purposes.

d. The first step in using any of the test steps is to tabulate the frequencies of all digraphs comprising the message, and to determine the individual value of f(f-1). This may be done as follows:

676 different digraphs used in plaintext, against the actual occurrence of only 69.

9-8. (C) Analysis of Biliteral Systems

a. Once the system has been satisfactorily identified, the analysis of the system may commence. The analysis may include the simultaneous attempt to recover the matrix and the establishment of plaintext values for the cipher elements.

(1) In the first case, use is made of the number and positional limitations of the cipher elements. For example, a tabulation of the letter comprising the foregoing message reveals that only nine different letters (W, M, T, S, I, E, O, H, and U respectively) were used. Further examination quickly reveals that there is a definite positional limitation involved. The letters W, T, I, E, and H occur in the first position and the letters M, S, O, U, and E appear in the last position. The number of the letters involved and their positional limitation immediately suggests a 5 x 5 matrix of 5 cells by 5 cells with these letters as row and column indicators. Accordingly, a matrix of this configuration figure 9-4 is set up:

	M	S	O	U	E
W					
T					
I					
E					
H					

Figure 9-4 (C). Preliminary matrix with row and column indicators (U).

(2) Note that the dimension of the assumed matrix is determined by the composition of the cipher elements. This step presupposes the correct identification of the cipher unit and correct interpretation of their positional significance. At this particular point it matters little if the row and

WE WM WO WS WU TS TM TE TO TU IU IS IM IO
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
 EO EM EU ES HS HM HU
 O P Q R S T U

This process results in a pseudoplain text which reflects all the underlying characteristics of the true plaintext. Inasmuch as the same characteristics are exhibited by the ciphertext elements, there may be some question as to the need of this step. The reason for this is twofold; first, it permits the differentiation of the row and column indicators and the plaintext letter they represent (useful in the reconstruction of the matrix), and second it provides a suitable element for manipulation in applying the technique of solving monoalphabetic substitution systems. While this factor is not of any great importance in relatively short cryptograms, it is very helpful where many cipher elements are under study.

c. With the digraphs reduced to uniliteral terms and having an assumed matrix, the recovery of the plaintext may begin. In this step the frequency distribution of the pseudoplain values may be studied individually and fitted to the normal to recover their true plaintext values; or the message text may be scanned for word patterns and then compared to the frequency distribution for identification of plaintext letter values. In all cases, when a plaintext value has been recovered, it may be inserted in the matrix at the point of intersection

column indicators are reversed, for a simple turn of 90° will correctly realine the indicators.

b. After identifying the row and column indicators and determining the matrix dimensions, the next step is to insert values into the cells of the matrix. It is at this point that use is made of the uniliteral nature of simple multiliteral substitution by reducing the digraphs to uniliteral terms. This may be done very easily by substituting a letter for each different digraph appearing in the cryptogram. If not more than 36 different combinations are present in the cryptogram, the extra values above 26 may be represented by digits. As a general rule, where less than 26 different cipher elements are encountered, it is advisable to reduce them to uniliteral terms. This permits the construction of a trilateral frequency distribution, and use of all other studies associated with the analysis of monoalphabetic substitution.

(1) For this purpose the tabulation of digraphs previously made may be used. Using this tabulation, one letter is assigned to each different cipher element.

of its cipher row and column indicators. This permits the simultaneous reconstruction of the matrix, and if it shows any symmetrical pattern, allows the placement of additional plaintext values, thus hastening the final solution. The cryptogram, reproduced in terms of the arbitrary uniliteral values previously assigned, now appears in figure 9-5 with significant repeats underlined.

B F F B M O L F B E E P G T H P K P
U H G P C P K L I A P Q J L I F I J
K L S P D R P L F B S U J S L R Q Q
J S F F J T S P B M N E I K P

Figure 9-5 (C). Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U).

(1) The patterns .BB. -- and .BA. -- for the sequence BFFBM and PKPUH are suggestive of the words ATTACK and ENEMY respectively. Accepting these assumptions for the moment, the plaintext values are inscribed in the matrix using the appropriate cipher digraphs as row and column indication.

P	A	T	T	A	C	K						E	N	E	M	Y
P-P	B	F	F	B	M	O						P	K	P	U	H
C	WM	TS	TS	WM	IM	EO						EM	IU	EM	HU	TE
						M	S	O	U	E						
					W	A										
					T		T			Y						
					I	C				N						
					E	E				K						
					H					M						

(2) Analysis continues in the same vein as above, i.e. by attacking the characteristics of the ciphertext itself. However, in this case, sufficient evidence is at hand to attempt recovery of the matrix. Note that the first column in the matrix contains the first and terminal letters of the first five letters of the alphabet (ABCDE), suggesting the C and D are the correct values for the blank cells. If this is the case, presuming the letters to be inscribed in alphabetic order, the sequence of the row indicators are out of order; E, as EMc=Ep must be last, and T and H of the row indicators must then lie in either the second and fourth, or fourth and second positions respectively. Assuming the latter, the word WHITE is noted; therefore, the matrix is rearranged accordingly (fig. 9-6) and B and C plain are inscribed.

	M	S	O	U	E
W	A				
H	B			M	
I	C			N	
T	D	T			Y
E	E		K		

Figure 9-6 (C). Insertion of plaintext values (U).

(3) Examination of the columns shows a good alphabetic pattern downward. However, they are not in order sequentially; the row containing the T follows the A-E row when it should appear as the next to last row. Thus the columns can be recorded as follows and missing values assumed (fig. 9-7).

	M	O	U	S	E
W	A	F	L	Q	V
H	B	G	M	R	W
I	C	H	N	S	X
T	D	I	O	T	Y
E	E	K	P	U	Z

Figure 9-7 (C). Solution of matrix (U).

(4) Using this matrix the message is now deciphered logically, proving all past assumptions.

**ATTACK HAS BEEN STALLED BY
ENEMY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
REQUEST ARMOR SUPPORT TO
BREACH LINE.**

d. The foregoing solution represents an example of attacking the message through the system which produced it. This is possible only because the system was simple; no variants were used. The keywords were common and could easily be assumed, and a recognizable route of inscribing the plaintext into the matrix was apparent from the first. While this method for solution is quicker than an analysis of word patterns, use of frequency distributions, etc., it is not always possible. In such cases, once a multilateral cipher has been reduced to uniliteral terms, the most difficult multilateral ciphers may be successfully solved by the monoalphabetic analytic techniques given previously.

Section III. (C) ANALYSIS OF MULTILITERAL WITH VARIANTS

9-9. (C) General

a. In the final analysis, the simple biliteral system offers no more security than a uniliteral substitution system. To circumvent this obvious weakness, variant multilateral systems are used. The systems provide for additional row and column indicators or for variant internal values. These enable the substitution of several different cipher elements for each plaintext element. The ratio of cipher elements to

plaintext elements may now be two or more to one, instead of the one to one ratio of a simple multilateral system.

b. An example of a multilateral system with external variants is shown in paragraph 9-3c. Cryptographically, the method of operation of these systems is similar to that of the simple multilateral system, with the exception that the cryptographer now has a choice of several values for each plaintext value.

Using the first and second examples shown in paragraph 9-3c, Ap is represented by the cipher elements shown below:

- Example 1. *KQ, KV, FQ, FV, AQ, AV* = Ap
- Example 2. *TA, NA, HB, BA* = Ap

To a great extent, the actual number of variant cipher elements for a given plaintext letter occurring in a cryptogram is dependent upon the cryptographer; often the actual number used is limited by failure to make use of all values provided.

c. Identification of multilateral with variants is basically the same as that for a simple multilateral system. The cryptographic text will generally exhibit the same characteristics, though perhaps not as pronounced. These characteristics are:

- (1) A unilateral frequency distribution may show a limitation on number of letters used, depending upon the total number of row and column indicators used.
- (2) Some positional limitations will usually be present with certain letters or numbers appearing only as row or column indicators.
- (3) Message length, repeats, and distance between repeats will be divisible by the length of the cipher element.
- (4) Repeats are likely to be short and fragmentary, and are often composed of several different values.
- (5) The 2 ϕ I.C.'s produced by the statistical tests will be lower (6-20) than for a simple bilateral system. Generally, the shorter the message or the less repeats it contains, the lower the 2 ϕ I.C. will be.

d. Once the variant values of a multilateral with variants system can be equated to specific letters, the course of analysis is in all respects similar to that employed in the case of the analysis of a simple multilateral system. The cipher units are reduced to unilateral terms; then frequencies, repeated sequences,

and word patterns are studied for the substitution of plaintext values. It is in the former area, the matching of the variant values, that different techniques are employed. In one technique, the structures and frequencies of occurrence of the cipher units are studied to identify variant values having the same plaintext value. In another technique, the approach lies in the study of isomorphic repetitions of text for the determination of like variant values. Both techniques are amplified in succeeding paragraphs.

9-10. ~~(S)~~ Frequency Matching of Variants

a. In the case of a variant system, where the total number of variants is limited, matching of variant values becomes possible through a study of their frequency distribution. This method of matching is predicated on the assumption that in a message of moderate length, all variant cipher values for a given plaintext letter will be used. Further, it assumes that each variant will be used with approximately equal frequency. Thus, the variant row and column indicators for any given letter will appear equal in combination with one another. For example, the variant values for Ap given in the example in paragraph 9-9b can be expected to appear equally often. The total number of occurrences of a set of variant cipher values will approximate the frequency of the plaintext letter they represent. Thus, a definite pattern is imparted to the cipher elements which can be observed when a digraphic frequency count is made in the form of a matrix. Therein, the rows and columns correspond to the variant values which exhibit profiles equating to the frequency of combination of these letters. Where a number of rows or columns have a similar profile, a common plaintext value for their indicators may be assumed. A digraphic frequency count of the message in figure 9-8① will appear as shown in figure 9-8②.

ALNPI	CNDED	EGKDO	CATNT	FGAPF	DOQBM
IGECB	UOUNQ	FLBQB	TIDAT	NLRPE	HILAQ
AGETB	HBPSQ	BGICF	GFCBT	EGIHO	PRGAP
EPOQK	UFP AH	ALAMN	PKDAU	IHAGS	MAQFM
NQSUB	UEDOP	ATICO	DBH KC	AUBUF	CSHID
BGBPK	GOQBD	KHBT F	DFUAT	KQAGO	MOUED
NPEUA	HKCNC	BQECF	HBHBL	IGBMA	UFGIP
BGKDO	CIHNQ	SGAPF	QSM SL		

Divided into digraphic elements:

AL	NP	IC	ND	ED	EG	KD	OC	AT	NT	FG	AP	FD
OQ	BM	IG	EC	BU	OU	NQ	FL	BQ	BT	ID	AT	NL
RP	EH	IL	AQ	AG	ET	BH	BP	SQ	BG	IC	FG	FC
BT	EG	IH	OP	RG	AP	EP	OQ	KU	FP	AH	AL	AM
NP	KD	AU	IH	AG	SM	AQ	FM	NQ	SU	BU	ED	OP
AT	IC	OD	BH	KC	AU	BU	FC	SH	ID	BG	BP	KG
OQ	BD	KH	BT	FD	FU	AT	KQ	AG	OM	OU	ED	NP
EU	AH	KC	NC	BQ	EC	FH	BH	BL	IG	BM	AU	FG
IP	BG	KD	OC	IH	NQ	SG	AP	FQ	SM	SL		

Figure 9-8① (C). Preparation of ciphertext for digraphic frequency distribution (U).

	L	P	C	D	G	T	H	M	U	Q
A	—	≡			≡	≡	—	—	≡	—
N	—	≡	—	—		—				≡
I	—	—	≡	—	—		≡			
E		—	—	≡	—	—	—		—	
K			—	≡	—		—		—	—
O		—	—	—				—	—	≡
F	—	—	—	—	≡		—	—	—	—
B	—	—		—	≡	≡	≡	—	≡	—
R		—			—					
S					—		—	—	—	—

Figure 9-8② (C). Digraphic frequency distribution (U).

b. A study of the frequency profile may begin with either the rows or columns. In either case, it is usually better to start with the one which has the most pronounced profile, seek a match for it, and then move on to the least pronounced. By this process of elimination, even the least characteristic profile can usually be matched. Note, however, that the digraphic frequency distribution represents the original enciphering matrix in an expanded form because its row and column indicators are dis-

associated and disarranged and do not have internal plaintext values. Thus, the process of matching the profiles will result in the construction of the matrix to its original dimension and the reassociation of the variant values. In this process, the analyst should be alert to the possibility that some system may have been used in assigning the row and column indicators. If this is the case, a short cut can hasten the final solution.

(1) Examination of the digraphic frequency distribution shows four rows which have pronounced profiles; they are rows A, B, E, and F. At first glance rows B and F appear similar, but a closer examination shows a discrepancy between the frequencies for FT, FH, FM, FU, FQ, and BT, BH, BM, BU, and BQ. Therefore, this match is rejected. Considering a match between rows A and B, a much closer correspondence in frequencies is noted, thus they may be accepted as a match (fig. 9-9).

	L	P	C	D	T	T	H	M	U	Q
A										
B										

Figure 9-9 (C). Match of rows A and B (U).

(2) Because the affinity of rows E to F is not particularly negatively or positively pronounced, they may be momentarily dropped from consideration. Scanning the rows again, it is quoted that O

exhibits an affinity for columns, *P, C, D*, and again for *M, U, Q*. Excluding rows *A, B* as previously matched, the only other row indicators shown in combination are the column indicators *Q, N, K, F*, and *S*. *S* can be rejected due to its low profile; *K* has a similar but weaker affinity for *U* and *Q*, so it, too, may be rejected. This leaves *F* and *N* for possible matches to *O*. Of the two, *N* seems the most logical as both *N* and *O* are combined frequently with *P* and *Q*, while *F* has no high-frequency combination in common with *O*. The matrix now appears as shown in figure 9-10.

	L	P	C	D	G	T	H	M	U	Q
A B										
N O										

Figure 9-10 (C). Matching rows *N* and *O* inserted (*U*).

c. The rows above are relatively easy to match. Rows *A* and *B* are matched because of their pronounced profile, and *N* and *O* because of similar affinities to specific column indicators. Another method of determining a match involves computing a separate value for each trial match of a row or column against the remaining rows and columns. The value of each match is derived by multiplying the two values contained in adjacent cells of each arbitrary match, and summing their products. The match having the highest value may be presumed to be correct. For example, *E* row can be compared to the following three possible matches, as shown in figure 9-11.

	L	P	C	D	G	T	H	M	U	Q	
E	0	1	2	3	2	1	1	0	1	0	
F	0	1	2	2	4	0	1	1	1	1	
	0	1	4	6	8	0	1	0	1	0	= 21
E	0	1	2	3	2	1	1	0	1	0	
K	0	0	2	3	1	0	1	0	1	0	
	0	0	4	9	2	0	1	0	1	0	= 17
E	0	1	2	3	2	1	1	0	1	0	
I	1	1	3	2	2	0	3	0	0	0	
	0	1	6	6	4	0	3	0	0	0	= 20

Figure 9-11 (C). Possible matches of row *E* (*U*).

(1) While all matches are fairly close, the match of rows *E* and *F* may be tried first. This test, however, as all tests, is susceptible to error. Notice how in the above a small difference in combinations could result in *E* being almost equally well matched to *K* or *I*.

(2) By a process of elimination, with only four unmatched rows left, further matching is quite simple. *R* and *S*, both with extremely low profiles, are obvious matches, leaving *I* and *K* to be matched. At this point the matrix appears as in figure 9-12.

	L	P	C	D	G	T	H	M	U	Q
A B										
E F										
I K										
N O										
R S										

Figure 9-12 (C). Completion of row matches (*U*).

d. The column indicators could be matched by the same process used for matching the row indicators. This, however, should not be necessary. Notice the pattern of the row variants: i.e. *AB* follows sequentially as does *E* and *F*, with a space for two letters between. This space is possibly for *C* and *D*, which appear as column variants. Thus, *C* and *D* may represent a match. This possibility is quickly confirmed when the column profiles of the two are inspected. Assuming a consistent pattern, the matrix can be recovered as seen in figure 9-13.

	C	G	I	P	T
	D	H	K	Q	U
A B					
E F					
I K					
N O					
R S					

Figure 9-13 (C). Matrix with both rows and columns matched (*U*).

e. Analysis of the cryptogram beyond this point follows the same techniques as those used in the case of simple multilateral systems. The digraphic variants are reduced to uniliteral terms by inserting an arbitrary plain sequence in the matrix. A distribution is made, and a study of the frequencies of letters and repetitions of patterns in the pseudo-plaintext begins.

9-11. (C) Isomorphic Characteristics in Determination of Equivalents

a. A characteristic of encipherment by multiliteral systems with variants is the disruption of isomorphic

Simple multiliteral encipherment:

R	E	C	O	M	M	E	N	D	E	D
S I	C E	C D	E G	E I	E J	C E	E D	C G	C E	C G
	A	B	C	D	D	A	E	F	A	F

Multiliteral with variant encipherment:

R	E	C	O	M	M	E	N	D	E	D
KK	J A	D B	C A	I C	D L	M J	A G	I F	J A	D J

b. For all practical purposes, the isomorphic pattern of the plaintext word clearly reproduced in the first encipherment is completely extinguished by the second method of encipherment. If the text of a given variant system is scarce, and if all possible variant values are fully used and wholly independent of one another, the solution can become exceedingly difficult. However, in practice this situation is rarely encountered, as practical military communications are such that a sufficient volume of text is usually available to provide a basis for establishing equivalent values. To illustrate the possibilities of determining equivalent values by a study of isomorphic repeats, consider the example below, each set being a series of different numeric ciphertext values of one underlying plaintext word or sequence of letters. Note that although these repeats are useful for analysis they first must be isolated from the text as representing a probable word or phrase. Usually this occurs in the cases where stereotyped beginnings or endings are used. In this case, the examples are arbitrarily selected for the purpose of illustration.

Set A

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
12	37	02	79	68	13	03	37	77
82	69	02	79	13	68	23	37	35
82	69	51	16	13	13	78	05	35
91	05	02	01	68	42	78	37	77

Set B

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
71	12	02	51	23	05	77
11	82	51	02	03	05	35
11	91	02	02	23	37	35
97	12	51	02	78	69	77

c. Examination of individual cipher sequences in each set shows no isomorphic pattern other than a few scattered repeats. However, inspection of the columns formed by the superpositioning of the cipher sequence reveals that in columns (3) and (4) of set B,

patterns in the plaintext. This disruption may be seen in the encipherment of the word RECOMMENDED by the two systems illustrated in paragraph 9-2 (fig. 9-1) and example 3 in paragraph 9-3c (fig. 1-3).

the dinomes 51 and 02 are used exclusively and interchangeably. In column (3) of set A, the dinomes 51 and 02 are also used interchangeably, but in column (4) different dinomes appear. A close study of each column leads to the acceptance of the following groupings as possible equal cipher equivalents:

12	37	02	79	68	03	77	71
82	69	51	16	13	23	35	11
91	05		01	42	78		97

d. The equivalent values derived above may be assigned arbitrary values to reduce them to uniliteral terms. Thereafter, these equivalencies may be used to find additional sets of equivalent values in the ciphertext. The analyst may recover plaintext letters, by applying the method of the analysis of probable words and word patterns, and then proceed to analyze the uniliteral terms in that light. For example, the sets of cipher equivalents could be reduced to the following word pattern:

Set A

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
12	37	02	79	68	13	03	37	77
82	69	02	79	13	68	23	37	35
82	69	51	16	13	13	78	05	35
91	05	02	01	68	42	78	37	77
	A	B	C	D	D	E	A	

Set B

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
71	12	02	51	23	05	77
11	82	51	02	03	05	35
11	91	02	02	23	37	35
97	12	51	02	78	69	77
	A	A				

e. Besides the isomorphic pattern of the words themselves, the indication that certain letters are the same is of value in determining the exact words these patterns represent. The fact that the dinomes of column (3) in set A and those of columns (3) and

(4) in set B are similar was previously mentioned. An examination of the grouping of possible cipher equivalents also shows that the last three letters of both words have the same plaintext value. Using the

- A B C D D E A - - - A A - - -
A R T I L L E R Y B A T T E R Y

f. The determination of equivalencies may appear to be an easy matter, as is their extension to probable words. However, it may be very difficult, as the cryptanalyst can never be certain that a set of cipher sequences showing what appears to be the use of variant values to encipher the same plaintext word or phrase is correct. There is always the possibility that they are parts of different plaintext sequences. For example, the cipher sequence on the surface represents the same word with two variants appearing in the first position.

17 82 31 82 14 63
27 82 40 82 13 63

However, it could as easily represent the different words MANAGE and DAMAGE or other similarly constructed words.

9-12. (C) Analysis of Isologs

a. Occasionally in military communications, a situation occurs where one plaintext message is enciphered in either two different systems or variations of the same system. The cryptogram thus produced, differing in ciphertext but having the same underlying plaintext, is termed an isolog. Isologs, no matter how produced, are among the most important means available to the cryptanalyst in solving a cryptogram. In some instances, isologs are the only practical means of entering systems which offer no other clues. Such an entry proves useful in multilateral systems employing variants where conditions preclude the application of techniques previously discussed.

b. Normally an isolog is recognized by equality, or near equality, of length of two or more messages. An isolog may be suspected where this similarity of message length is noted. However, before accepting this condition as fact, a confirmation in similarities is sought in those elements pertaining to handling and transmission of the message, such as, serial numbers, originators, etc. Also, if the isolog is generated by the use of variations of the same system, a few scattered repeats may be noted throughout the message. It is an isolog of this nature that provides a means of solving multilaterals with variants.

c. Regarding the analysis of isologs and isologous

word patterns and the expected similarity of letters, a word pattern list can be scanned for words which conform to these conditions, resulting in the discovery of the words:

segments of multilaterals with variants, the technique employed is only an extension of the methods used in the determination of equivalent values by a study of isomorphic characteristics. The only difference is that in this case the whole message as an isolog, or large portions of it as isologous segments, are studied. Moreover, the study of word patterns and the derivation of probable words may involve whole phrases rather than individual words.

d. Given two messages suspected of being isologs, a digraphic distribution is made for each in figure 9-14① and 9-14② and examined for any characteristics which might aid in the analysis of the cryptogram. The messages and their respective distributions follow.

Message A

A	82265	63103	74839	69842
	32529	70115	80277	89106
B	94000	13828	54082	40065
	63629	33918	43158	81048
C	26458	45039	81713	62538
	73309	20749	61752	16476
D	38728	91147	99926	41468
	13365	33881	89697	93816
E	51750	57074	11804	43255
	28120	27730	31199	79962
F	27865	60653	90870	40867
	46594	19855	10822	22987
G	46729	36245		

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅

1	2	1	1	1	2	1	-	1	1	2
2	1	1	-	1	1	2	2	2	1	-
3	2	2	-	-	1	1	-	5	2	2
4	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	-
5	1	1	2	1	2	2	-	-	1	1
6	1	3	1	2	1	-	1	1	1	-
7	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
8	2	2	1	1	-	1	2	1	2	2
9	1	2	2	1	-	1	2	2	2	1
∅	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	-	2

Figure 9-14① (∅). Digraphic frequency distribution, message A (U).

Message B

	5	10	15	20
A'	30150	87497	14511	97360
	49676	50106	45647	99181
B'	69672	53889	41563	25203
	90628	77536	20351	10570
C'	89277	75011	35199	90138
	99974	50232	04115	89216
D'	38463	17547	14648	00646
	85864	53898	26121	83878
E'	94889	33728	11272	20504
	06484	32103	98715	42662
F'	80760	89880	44105	52900
	59728	22855	87300	70893
G'	57682	46253		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	∅
1	4	1	-	2	1	1	-	1	2	1
2	1	1	-	1	1	2	2	2	1	1
3	1	2	-	-	2	1	1	5	-	2
4	1	-	1	1	3	2	1	1	1	-
5	1	1	1	1	2	1	-	1	2	1
6	-	3	-	2	1	-	2	1	1	1
7	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
8	1	1	-	-	1	1	2	1	2	3
9	1	1	2	1	-	-	2	3	2	1
∅	2	1	2	2	2	3	1	3	-	1

Figure 9-14 (C). Digraphic frequency distribution, message B (U).

e. As both dinomic distributions reveal a random scattering of frequencies with no single pronounced pattern in either row or column, multilateral systems with variants may be assumed for each. Further, although the distributions are flat, they are very similar in respect to the location of both blanks and points of high frequency. It may, therefore, be tentatively assumed that the two messages are variations of one system. An examination of each message reveals no single outstanding characteristic which indicates the underlying plaintext or system of encryption. Therefore, the messages may be compared to each other to determine if any such pattern exists, and to further their identification as isologs. This is done by inscribing one above the other, assigning row and column coordinates for reference purposes. Because the system involved is multilateral, the text is arranged in dinomic elements, as shown in figure 9-15.

	5	10	15	20
A	82 26 56 31 03 74 83 96 98 42 32 52 97 01 15 80 27 78 91 06			
A'	30 15 08 74 97 14 51 19 75 00 49 07 05 01 16 45 64 79 91 81			
B	94 00 01 38 28 54 08 24 00 00 04 02 93 39 18 43 15 88 10 48			
B'	69 67 25 38 89 41 56 32 52 08 02 02 87 75 36 20 35 11 05 70			
C	26 45 84 50 39 81 71 35 25 38 73 30 92 07 49 61 75 21 64 76			
C'	89 27 77 50 11 35 19 99 01 33 33 07 45 02 32 04 11 58 92 16			
D	38 72 89 11 47 99 92 64 14 08 13 30 53 38 81 89 69 73 38 10			
D'	38 46 31 75 47 14 64 80 06 40 00 80 45 38 98 20 12 18 38 78			
E	51 75 05 70 74 11 80 44 32 05 28 12 02 77 30 31 19 97 99 62			
E'	34 88 93 37 28 11 27 22 05 04 00 48 43 21 03 98 71 54 26 62			
F	27 86 56 06 53 90 87 04 08 07 40 50 41 98 55 10 82 22 29 87			
F'	80 76 08 98 80 44 10 55 29 00 00 72 82 28 55 87 30 07 08 33			
G	46 72 93 62 45			
G'	57 68 24 62 53			

Figure 9-15 (C). Superimposition of messages A and B (U).

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f. When the paired digraphs formed by the superimposed messages are scanned closely, several digraphs are repeated at the same position in each message. Some of the repeats are:

	(14)	(19)		(6)	(20)
A	01	91		E	11 62
A'	01	91		E'	11 62
	(4)	(12)		(15)	
B	38	62		F	55
B'	38	62		F'	55
	(4)	(10)		(4)	
C	50	38		G	62
C'	50	38		G'	62
	(1)	(5)	(14)	(19)	
D	38	47	38	38	
D'	38	47	38	38	

The repeated occurrence of the same dinomes in both messages at the same relative position, always paired and also coupled with the similarities in the frequency distribution, is strongly indicative that the messages are produced from the same enciphering system. The fact that certain values are paired while the intervening dinomes between appear random may be explained by the assumption that the system provides a number of variants for high-frequency letters and few or none for low-frequency letters. Thus, the plaintext value for the dinomes paired in both messages could be low-frequency letters. Further, if this is the case, the dinomes appearing in both messages between a set of pairs must then represent the use of variant values to encipher the same plaintext sequence.

g. Using the foregoing assumption as a base, it is possible to form a chain of possible equivalent values by equating dinomes to each other. For example, the first six sets of dinomes of each message may be written vertically as follows:

Message A	A'
82	30
26	15
56	08
31	74
03	97
74	14

As it has been assumed that these dinomes are equal values for the same plaintext letters, it then follows that if any one of these are found paired with another dinome then it too must represent the same value. For example, in position A A' (4) and (6) the paired dinomes 31 74 and 74 14 are found. If 74 is related as equal in plaintext value to 31, 14 must also be equal in value to 31 and 74. Thus a sequence of 31 74 14 may be desired. By continuing the same chaining process on a reciprocal basis (possible

because both messages are enciphered by the same matrix), the following chain of equal values, figure 9-16, is derived, arranged in order of length.

06	14	15	26	28	31	35	73	74	81	83	98	99
02	07	20	22	43	44	63	90					
12	37	48	51	63	70	83	94					
03	30	41	54	65	82	97						
05	10	24	32	49	87	93						
16	18	36	76	78	79	80						
27	45	53	64	80	92							
11	39	75	88									
21	58	77	84									
46	59	68	72									
00	52	67										
04	55	61										
08	29	56										
19	71	96										
01	25											
13	85											
42	60											
38												
47												
50												
62												
91												

Figure 9-16 (C). Chain of equal values (U).

h. The equivalent values produced by the chaining process can now be assigned arbitrary letters to reduce them to uniliteral terms, and each message can now be studied on these terms. Not only will word patterns come to light when the uniliteral terms are substituted for the dinomes, but also since the system apparently made provision for high-frequency letters, they in turn can be identified by the number of their variant values. For example, the first chain above probably equates to E of the plaintext. Using the assumed E value and the list of equivalent values, a sequence of word patterns and their partial plaintext values is easily derived. For example:

A	82	26	56	31	03	74	83	96	98	42	32	52	97	01
A'	30	15	08	74	97	14	51	19	73	60	49	67	65	01
P	-	E	-	E	-	E	-	-	E	-	-	-	-	-
	A	B	C	B	A	B	D	E	B	F	G	H	A	

Then, comparing this to a list of word patterns, all the other plaintext values could be determined. For example, the first eight letters of the pattern probably mark a whole word. A similar pattern which contains an E in the appropriate positions is the word REFERENCE which can easily be expanded to REFERENCE YOUR for the whole isologous sequence. With a few known values for the arbitrary uniliteral term, the solution of the remainder of the message poses no

particular difficulty, and the enciphering matrix could be recovered as shown in figure 9-17. A word of caution though, this method is not always 100 percent certain. In some cases mistakes made in transmitting or copying the message and also the lack of values may prevent the chaining process from being carried through.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	∅
1	D	N	H	E	E	A	-	A	C	O
2	I	T	-	O	M	E	S	E	F	T
3	E	O	-	-	E	A	N	B	D	R
4	R	Y	T	T	S	L	V	N	O	-
5	N	U	S	R	P	F	-	I	L	X
6	P	W	T	S	R	-	U	L	N	Y
7	C	L	E	E	D	A	I	A	A	N
8	E	R	N	I	H	A	O	D	E	S
9	G	S	O	N	-	C	R	E	E	T
∅	M	T	R	P	O	E	T	F	-	U

Figure 9-17 (C). Reconstructed matrix (U).

By manipulating the rows and columns, a diagonal arrangement of the plaintext values can be obtained as shown in figure 9-18.

	6	8	9	1	5	4	3	7	2	∅
7	A	A	A	C	D	E	E	I	L	N
1	A	A	C	D	E	E	H	K	N	O
3	A	B	D	E	E	H	J	N	O	R
8	A	D	E	E	H	I	N	O	R	S
9	C	E	E	G	I	N	O	R	S	T
2	E	E	F	I	M	O	Q	S	T	T
∅	E	F	I	M	O	P	R	T	T	U
5	F	I	L	N	P	R	S	T	U	X
6	I	L	N	P	R	S	T	U	W	Y
4	L	N	O	R	S	T	T	V	Y	Z

Figure 9-18 (C). Recovered matrix (U).

Section IV. (C) MULTINOMIC SYSTEMS

9-13. (C) General

a. Analytically, any distinction between multilateral and multinomic systems, because of the use of alphabetic or numeric values as row and column indicators, is generally inappropriate. Multilateral systems of the type previously covered employ the same principles of cryptography, independent of the nature of their row and column indicators. Thus, being cryptographically similar, they are susceptible to the same analytical techniques of their identification, analysis, and final solution.

b. There are several systems, though multilateral with variants, which are sufficiently different to warrant additional study. These systems use numeric values exclusively for the cipher elements, and the manner of deriving the cipher element is somewhat different from that normally associated with multilateral systems. The systems can be classified as

multinomies, and the techniques of analysis employed are slightly different.

c. Cryptographic systems which may be grouped within this class are the columnar numerical, the monome-dinome, and the monome-dinome-trinome systems.

9-14. (C) Columnar Numeric System

a. One of the most simple of the dinomic systems from both a cryptographic and a cryptanalytic point of view is a columnar numeric system. This is a multilateral system because the cipher element to plain element ratio is commonly 2 to 1, but it is unlike the previous systems because the cipher element is not derived from row and column coordinates. Each plaintext value is assigned several cipher values arranged in a columnar matrix as depicted in figure 9-19.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	
35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	
69	70	71	72	73	74	75	51	52	35	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	
87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	

Key: TRHP

Figure 9-19 (C). Columnar numeric system (U).

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b. The number of rows of dinomic cipher values may vary as may the system of inscription. Note that in the above example, each row of 26 sequential letters begins at a letter corresponding to a letter of the keyword and is inscribed in its normal progressive order. The overall security of the system is easily improved by randomly assigning the dinomes in each row. However, this entails the loss of its

primary advantages which are a limited number of dinomic strips, each sequential and juxtaposed on a keyword that is easy to remember and duplicate.

c. A message is enciphered by substituting for each plaintext value one of its dinomic cipher equivalents. For example, a message can be enciphered with this system as shown in figure 9-20. Decipherment is just the reversal of encipherment.

A	I	R	R	E	C	O	N	N	A	I	S	S	A	N	C	E	I	N	D	I	C	A	T	
08	16	26	24	12	10	48	47	56	35	43	27	61	87	47	37	12	52	56	38	52	71	69	28	
E	S	E	N	E	M	Y	A	R	T	I	L	L	E	R	Y	U	N	I	T	S				
73	27	91	99	39	46	85	69	60	62	52	45	54	39	60	67	29	56	16	01	25				
A	R	E	B	E	I	N	G	D	I	S	P	L	A	C	E	D	T	O	F	A	R			
35	26	39	70	73	95	56	75	72	43	61	58	45	87	71	39	72	28	57	92	35	26			
B	A	N	K	O	F	S	O	U	T	H	R	I	V	E	R	S	T	O	P					
36	08	99	44	48	74	61	21	29	80	15	60	16	64	12	60	27	62	48	22					
N	O	O	T	H	E	R	I	N	D	I	C	A	T	O	R	S	O	F						
47	57	21	28	42	73	60	95	47	38	52	10	35	62	21	24	79	57	40						
E	N	E	M	Y	W	I	T	H	D	R	A	W	A	L	O	B	S	E	R	V	E	D	X	
39	56	12	98	33	04	43	62	51	11	60	87	31	08	45	21	36	27	39	60	03	73	90	66	
08162	62412	10484	75635	43276	18747	37125	25638																	
52716	92873	27919	93946	85696	06252	45543	96067																	
29561	60125	35263	97073	95567	57243	61584	58771																	
39722	85792	35263	60899	44487	46121	29801	56016																	
64126	02762	48224	75721	28427	36095	47385	21035																	
62212	47957	40395	61298	33044	36251	11608	73108																	
45213	62739	60037	39066																					

Figure 9-20 (C). Encipherment using the columnar numeric system (U).

d. Analysis generally involves the same techniques as the analysis of uniliteral monoalphabetic ciphers, with provision made for the fact that a number of dinomic sequences are involved. Assuming that the dinomes of the system have been inscribed sequen-

tially, a four-part dinomic frequency distribution can be made with each part corresponding to 25 or 26 progression numbers. For example, such a frequency distribution of the message above would appear as in figure 9-21.

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


Figure 9-21 (U). Four-part dinomic frequency distribution (U).

e. Each sequence above represents a simple mono-alphabetic frequency distribution. This fact, once realized, should immediately lead to the next step of fitting the distribution to the normal. Note that the second and third sequences have the most pronounced peaks and troughs, and therefore would be the sequences to begin with. Once they have been fitted to the norm, the remaining sequences fall into place as each sequence represents a part of a whole.

Without referring back to the original cryptographic system, the analyst should be able to equate three of these sequences to the norm by visual inspection alone. For example, starting with the third sequence and mentally matching an alphabetic sequence to the peaks and troughs, it is clear that 51c=Hp. The same type examination of the second sequence shows that 35c=Ap. These two may be inscribed thusly:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	
69	70	71	72	73	74	75	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	

f. The placement of the first and fourth sequences would be a little more difficult under ordinary circumstances. However, this is not necessary. The sequence recovered represents 50 percent of the total system; therefore, one-half the text could be recovered, thus permitting the assumption of plaintext values for the cipher dinomes of the two remaining strips. Moreover, since each sequence is progressive, the valid assumption of only one cipher value inevitably leads to the placement of all others.

multilateral systems, differs from others in that it replaces constant-length plaintext units with cipher elements of variable lengths. The ratios of cipher element to plain element may be 1 to 1 or 2 to 1. The variation in the ratio is brought about by omitting one row coordinate. Thus, some plaintext letters are represented by a two-digit cipher element, composed of both row and column indicators, while others are indicated by a column indicator only. Figure 9-22 illustrates the structure of the system, and its application in enciphering a message.

9-15. (Q) Monome-Dinome Systems

a. This type system, one of the more important

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	∅
4	A	1	B	2	C	3	D	4	E	5
6	F	6	G	7	H	8	I	9	J	∅
-	K	.	L	-	M	-	N	-	O	P
8	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z

M O V E R E S E R V E B A T T A L I O N
 5 9 86 49 82 49 83 49 82 86 49 43 41 84 84 41 3 67 9 7

T O B L O C K I N G P O S I T I O N
 84 9 43 3 9 45 1 67 7 63 ∅ 9 83 67 84 67 9 7

Figure 9-22 (Q). Monome-dinome system (U).

Note that in the matrix, blanks appear where the blank row intersects columns having as coordinates a value used as row indicators. Thus a blank appears in columns 4, 6, and 8 above (as 4, 6, and 8 were used as row indicators) to preclude confusion in decipherment. For example, if a value (A) did appear at the intersection of a blank row and column 4, its value would be 4. Since 44c also represents 2p, the deciphering clerk would have to decide which was the correct value, two A's or the digit 2.

	5	10	15	20	25
A	74231	59202	35723	27201	58955
B	76762	35820	73555	82373	17676
C	55572	47757	73775	87915	87272
D	23732	35778	55592	38777	85595
E	57757	78789	77878	29788	23229
F	55997	75123	85823	81581	07758
G	20735	55823	73775	81991	22567
H	85557	51199	17655	77577	89582
I	35724	97450			

b. Examination of the ciphertext produced above reveals two important facts. First, there is a constant relationship between cipher and plaintext values with no variants. Thus, Ep is always equal to 49c. Second, the use of monomials does nothing more than confuse identification of this constant relationship. For example, the text above divided into 5-figure groups would appear thusly:

59864 98249 83498 28649 43418 48441 36797
 84943 39451 67763 09836 78467 97

On the surface, the text shows no evidence of which dinome or monome represents what plaintext value, as the individual identities of the dinomes and monomes are lost in the formation of the ciphertext. Moreover, because there is a constant relationship between a given dinome or monome and a plaintext value, it follows that solution of this system lies first in isolating the monomes from the dinomes and then in identifying each. Thereafter, a solution is primarily a matter of reducing the text to uniliteral terms and solving it accordingly.

c. Identification of a monome-dinome system is based on the following characteristics:

- (1) The length of the cryptogram may be either odd or even.
- (2) Repeats are consistent in length and structure within a message and may or may not be divisible by a constant factor.
- (3) Interval between repeats may or may not be divisible by a constant factor.
- (4) A monomic frequency distribution may reveal two or three digits with a high frequency.

d. Considering the message and its monomic frequency distribution in figure 9-23, the above characteristics may be noted.

Monome Frequency Distribution

1	(12)
2	(27)
3	(19)
4	(4)
5	(45)
6	(6)
7	(51)
8	(24)
9	(17)
0	(5)

Figure 9-23 (C). Ciphertext and monomic frequency distribution (U).

(1) The disparity between the frequencies of each digit in the monomic distribution is obvious and indicates that 2, 5, and 7 probably represent row coordinates. If this is correct, a matrix similar to the following can be drawn up containing a blank row with blank cells beneath the column indicators 2, 5, and 7

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
-		-			-		-			
2										
5										
7										

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(2) Using the cipher elements that can be derived from this matrix, the cryptogram can now be rendered to its correct elemental construction as depicted below:

74-23-1-59-20-23-57-23-27-20-1-58-9-55-76-76
 23-58-20-73-55-58-23-73-1-76-76-55-57-24-77-57-73-77
 58-79-1-58-72-72-23-73-23-57-78-55-59-23-8-77-78-55
 9-55-77-57-78-78-9-77-8-78-29-78-8-23-22-9-55-9-9-77
 51-23-8-58-23-8-1-58-1-9-77-58-20-73-55-58-23-73-77
 58-1-9-9-1-22-56-78-55-57-51-1-9-9-1-76-55-77-57
 78-9-58-23-57-24-9-74-50

(3) From this point on, if monomes and dinomes have been identified correctly, the solution is essentially the same as that used for uniliteral monoalphabetic ciphers, as a direct relationship exists between one plaintext element and one cipher-text element, regardless of the latter's configuration. As a matrix is involved, the analyst has an additional advantage. As the plain values are recovered, they may be inserted into the matrix. Assuming that a systematic method of inscription is followed with a normal alphabetic sequence, the route often can be assumed, permitting the placement of all values. These must later be proved by actual decipherment of the cryptogram.

e. A facet of both above matrices is the marked difference in the number of rows and columns; in both, the ratio is 4 to 10. This made possible the distinction between row and column indicators through the use of a monomic frequency distribution. Were the matrix to have an equal number of rows and columns, for example 6 each, it would produce a generally flatter frequency distribution. The occurrence of digits with any great frequency would be due to the encipherment of high-frequency letters rather than the repeated use of a few row coordinates. Thus, the identification of a monome-dinome system is more difficult. In such cases, identification sometimes can be based upon the internal characteristic of the text. For example, consider figure 9-24 containing a message produced by this type cipher and its monomic frequency distribution.

	5	10	15	20	25
A	57357	29418	28464	71715	82946
B	16482	58257	57482	84549	16436
C	47364	84946	36471	71616	49159
D	<u>55827</u>	45646	<u>26384</u>		

Monome Frequency Distribution

1	(9)
2	(8)
3	(5)
4	(18)
5	(11)
6	(13)
7	(10)
8	(10)
9	(6)
0	

Figure 9-24 (C). Cipher message and monomic frequency distribution (U).

(1) Upon initial examination, the cryptogram appears to be digraphic. The primary clues that it is not are the absence of the zero in the distribution, and the fact that the repeated groups, although even digits in length, lie at uneven distances from the beginning and end of the message and from each other. With nine digits as row and column coordinates, there could only be a matrix of 20 cells with 4 rows x 5 columns or reverse, unless one blank row indicator is used. A blank row indicator would provide for a 5 x 5 matrix of 25 cells which is suitable for an alphabet when assuming the I and J, or U and V are combined. It is possible to repeat a digit as both row and column indicators, but this would be reflected in the frequency distribution by that digit occurring more often. Also the 0 probably would have been used first before one of the other digits were repeated.

(2) Having tentatively identified the system, the analyst may now attempt the recovery of the matrix coordinates. The approach in this case, assuming no like-digits were used as row and column indicators, is to locate all doublets. Repeated digits, assuming the limitation above, are probably the repeated occurrence of a dinome derived from the intersection of a blank row and a numbered column. Searching the text, the doublet 55 is noted. Thus, on the basis of the reasoning above, 5 is accepted as a possible column indicator (fig. 9-25).

Figure 9-25 (U). Initial placement on column indicator (U).

(3) A 9 is noted as immediately preceding the doublet 55, which is also preceded by a 5. If 5 is indeed a column indicator the correct spacing of the cipher sequence must be 5 95 5. Thus 9 can be tentatively accepted as a row indicator. If so, then 9 will appear only in conjunction with other digits which are column indicators. Searching the text, the dinomes 91 and 94 are found; thus 1 and 4 can also be accepted as column indicators. The process results in the expansion of the matrix as shown in figure 9-26.

	1			4	5	
9						

Figure 9-26 (U). Expansion of matrix (U).

(4) Searching the text again for further patterns, the first group 57357 is noted. As 5 is accepted as a column coordinate, the 7 which follows the 5 above must be a row indicator. Thus 73 is a dinome row and a dinome column indicator respectively. Again, a search is made for combinations of 7, and 73, 72, 71, 75, and 74 are found. The assumed can now be inscribed (fig. 9-27).

	1	2	3	4	5
-					
7					
9					

Figure 9-27 (U). Second expansion of row and column indicators (U).

(5) By a continued inspection of the text, working backwards, i.e. finding a digit which precedes an assumed column indicator, all row indicators can be isolated quickly producing a matrix similar to that shown in figure 9-28.

	1	2	3	4	5
-					
6					
7					
8					
9					

Figure 9-28 (U). Final reconstructed form (U).

With this matrix, the cryptogram can be fractured to its individual cipher elements, reduced to uniliteral terms, and solved by a method similar to that of the preceding example.

9-16. (Z) Monome-Dinome-Trinome System

a. A monome-dinome-trinome system is essentially the same as a monome-dinome system with, as the name implies, a trinomic element. This element is included as shown in the matrix and cryptogram in figure 9-29.

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
-	A	F	G	L	-	Q	R	W	-	-
5	B	E	H	K	M	P	S	V	X	.
90	C	D	I	J	N	O	T	U	Y	Z

E N E M Y A T T A C K I N G Z
52 905 52 55 909 1 907 907 1 901 54 903 905 3 900

52905 52559 09190 79071 90154 90390 53900

Figure 9-29 (U). Example of monome-dinome-trinome system (U).

b. The solution of this system is basically the same as that for the first preceding example of a monome-dinome system. Identification, again, is usually made through the use of a monomic frequency distribution which will reflect a high frequency of use for those digits used as row indicators. Normally, an examination of the text will reveal two of these high-frequency digits combined in most cases in the cryptographic text. Once the row and column indicators have been isolated, solution again is merely a matter of fractioning the text into its component cipher elements, reduction to uniliteral terms, and establishing the plain-to-cipher values. As an aid, the matrix can be reconstructed simultaneously.

is the trinomic system in which a constant length cipher element of three digits replaces a constant length plaintext element, usually of one letter. Structurally, the systems are similar in that both employ a matrix with row and column coordinates and an alphabet inscribed therein. The primary difference is that in the trinomic system one set of indicators is dinomic and the other is monomic. The dinomic element may appear either as row or column indicators usually limited to one position, but it is possible to mix them between the two. Further, it is possible to use alphabetic values in this system rather than numeric values. An example of the normal configuration of the system using numeric values is shown in figure 9-30.

9-17. (U) Trinomic System

a. A variant form of the basic multiliteral system

	1	2	3	4	5
16	A	B	C	D	E
72	K	I	H	G	F
38	L	M	N	O	P
94	U	T	S	R	Q
50	V	W	X	Y	Z

A D V A N C E T O P H A S E L I N E
161 164 501 161 383 163 165 942 384 385 723 161 943 165 381 722 383 165

16116 45011 61383 16316 59423 84385 723161 94316 53817 22383 165

Figure 9-30 (U). Trinomic system (U).

b. Cryptographically, the system offers little. As can be seen in the encipherment above, there is still the one-to-one relationship between the plain and the cipher element. In effect, the system only increases a message length by threefold with little increase in security.

c. Recognition of a trinomic system is possible through its basic characteristics. They are:

- (1) Message length, discounting nulls, is divisible by three.
- (2) Repeats are divisible by three.
- (3) Intervals between repeats are divisible by three.
- (4) Positional limitation of the dinome and monome indicators make up the trinome.

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(5) Little frequency deviation is shown on a monomic frequency distribution.

d. An analysis of the characteristic above usually suffices to identify a trinomic system and to separate it into its component cipher elements. For example, observe the message below.

```

56712 79059 05125 78990 57853
43565 34756 11257 85567 90178
15673 47785 90578 13431 29901
78734 75671 27905 90512 53439
01567 56734 77859 00000
    
```

(1) Each repeat, each interval between repeats, each interval between repeats and end of message, and the overall message length except for three zeros used as nulls, is evenly divisible by three. Further, a close study of the group reveals the trinomic grouping. For example, the first two lines of text can be divided as follows:

```

567 127 905 905 125 789 905 785 343
565 347 561 125 785 567 901 781 567
347 785 905 781 343 129 901 787 347
567 127 905 905 125 343 901 567 567
347 785 900 000
    
```

(2) Having reduced the ciphertext to its elemental parts, the matrix now can be recovered. This is a simple task due to the positional limitation inherent to the system. Note each of the trinomes

listed above. A close study reveals that each is composed of two units: a dinome and a monome. Further study also shows that the dinome is limited to 12, 34, 56, 78, and 90, and the monome to 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 respectively. Using these values a matrix can be reconstructed as in figure 9-31.

	1	3	5	7	9
12					
34					
56					
78					
90					

Figure 9-31 (U). Reconstructed matrix (U).

(3) With the ciphertext in its elemental parts, where the one-to-one ratio exists and with the matrix defined, solution of the message is rapid. It would be studied and analyzed exactly as a uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution cipher using all techniques associated with the solution of that type system.

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PART FOUR (C)

POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 10 (C)

CHARACTERISTICS OF POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) CHARACTERISTICS OF POLYGRAPHIC ENCIPHERMENT

10-1. (C) General

a. The substitution systems dealt with thus far, with the exception of the syllabary square and code charts, have involved plaintext units of single elements. This part deals with substitution systems involving plaintext units composed of more than one letter, such systems being termed polygraphic. Perhaps the reader has noticed the distinction between the use of the suffix "literal" and "graphic." Terms involving literal refer to the composition of the ciphertext, as in multilateral systems; terms involving graphic refer to the composition of the plaintext elements treated. Within this broad classification there are distinct systems classified by the number of plaintext elements involved in the encipherment process, the most common of these being the digraphic system, which involves a double element cipher unit.

b. A major characteristic of the digraphic system is that both the cipher and the plaintext elements are composed of two units, and the two units of the latter jointly determine the composition of the cipher element. In these systems, since the plaintext units jointly determine the composition of cipher elements, it cannot be said that any single plaintext letter has any one particular cipher equivalent. For example, in certain digraphic systems ABp can be enciphered as XPc while ACp becomes NRc . Thus the change in identity of but one of the plaintext letters acts to change the identity of both letters of the cipher digraph. The method by which this change is brought about will be explained in detail in subsequent paragraphs. This joint characteristic of determination is indicated by overscoring the digraphs involved, thus $\overline{XPc} = \overline{ACp}$.

c. The primary purpose of polygraphic systems is to provide a means of eliminating, or at least suppressing, the frequency characteristic of plaintext letters. In the preceding cipher system, the impor-

tance of this phenomenon as an "in" to the analyst is amply demonstrated. In the case of uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution where a direct one-to-one ratio is obtained, it was shown that it could be solved quickly by a simple tabulation, applying the principles of frequency and laws of probability. So it was too in the case of multilateral substitution systems, where several, though constant, cipher values could be reduced to uniliteral terms. The important point here is that security is not necessarily a factor of the ratio of cipher element to a plain element, nor to the complexity of the system, but to the total number of variations for each possible value of the system as a whole.

d. In polygraphic substitution, variations are introduced into the system through both the cipher and the plain components. The fact that encipherment can be accomplished by combining letters serves to decrease drastically the opportunity for application of the laws of probability and principles of frequency. For example, in a message of 100 characters enciphered by a uniliteral monoalphabetic substitution system, there are only 26 different possible letters that require identification. In a digraphic system based upon an alphabet of 26 letters, there are 676 possible combinations, and a message of the same length in a digraphic system would only represent 50, at the very most, of these possible combinations. Thus the laws of probability and frequency characteristics have a restricted range in which to operate.

10-2. (C) Polygraphic Substitution Using Tables

a. The simplest method of polygraphic substitution involves the use of a table similar to that shown in figure 10-1. The operation of the system is based upon row and column coordinates as the plaintext values, which are replaced by the cipher value found at their intersection. Thus \overline{AGp} becomes

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FBc. In those cases where a single letter occurs, as for example at the end of a message, encipherment as a digraph is obtained by adding a null, preferably a high-frequency letter. Words are enciphered by dividing the word into digraphic elements, then using the plain digraphs as row and column coordinates to locate the equivalent cipher digraph. For example:

DEFACED
X DE FA CE D
YA NZ CY

		P ₂													
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	X	Y	Z
P ₁	A	FX	CH	XE	YY	ZA	YG	FB	CD	EF	XJ	ZX	EA	DJ	FH
	B	NY	DC	NB	ZI	XX	DX								
C				AH				AB						ND	
D			BB		YA						AY		BF		
E	AX					AI									
F		AG			NZ			AZ					AA		
N			BC		CY									BA	FE
X					AC						AJ		BE		
Y	DE						AF							AD	
Z	AE									BD			AK		

Figure 10-1 (C). Reciprocal cipher table (U).

b. The analyst may have noted that the cipher in figure 10-1 is reciprocal, i.e. $\overline{AGp} = \overline{FBc}$ and $\overline{FBc} = \overline{AGp}$. This particular cipher is deliberately constructed in this manner for ease of use, being capable of use in both the enciphering and the deciphering process. Reciprocity is not an essential factor, and for purposes of security is usually avoided. The overall security of the system above, where only one cipher equivalent is available for each plaintext digraph, is directly dependent upon its use. The security of a cryptogram produced through its use is relatively good until such time as its overuse permits the isolation and identification of the more frequently used digraphs.

c. A similar system is illustrated in figure 10-2. Encipherment of plaintext values is again by the use of row and column coordinates. Thus \overline{ABp} becomes \overline{EEc} . Note, however, in this case the values are nonreciprocal, i.e. $\overline{EEp} = \overline{OAc}$ rather than \overline{ABc} . To decipher a message, the cryptographer looks outward from the cipher digraph to row and column coordinates, thus locating its equivalent plaintext digraph.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
A	WG	EE	SN	TR	IA	NL	GC	HT	OI	UO	AM	RP	BY	KB	CD	DF	FH	JJ	LK	MQ	PS	QU	VV	XW	YX	ZZ
B	EG	SE	TN	IR	NA	GL	HC	OT	UI	AO	RM	BP	KY	CB	DD	FF	JH	LJ	MK	PQ	QS	VU	XV	YW	ZX	WZ
C	SG	TE	IN	NR	GA	HL	OC	UT	AI	RO	BM	KP	CY	DB	FD	JF	LH	MJ	PK	QQ	VS	XU	YV	ZW	WX	EZ
D	TG	IE	NN	GR	HA	OL	UC	AT	RI	BO	KM	CP	DY	FB	JD	LF	MH	PJ	QK	VQ	XS	YU	ZV	WW	EX	SZ
E	IG	NE	GN	HR	OA	UL	AC	RT	BI	KO	CM	DP	FY	JB	LD	MF	PH	QJ	VK	XQ	YS	ZU	WV	EW	SX	TZ
F	NG	GE	HN	OR	UA	AL	RC	BT	KI	CO	DM	FP	JY	LB	MD	PF	QH	VJ	XK	YQ	ZS	WU	EV	SW	TX	IZ
G	GG	HE	ON	UR	AA	RL	BC	KT	CI	DO	FM	JP	LY	MB	PD	QF	VH	XJ	YK	ZQ	WS	EU	SV	TW	IX	NZ
H	HG	OE	UN	AR	RA	BL	KC	CT	DI	FO	JM	LP	MY	PB	QD	VF	XH	YJ	ZK	WQ	ES	SU	TV	IW	NX	GZ
I	OG	UE	AN	RR	BA	KL	CC	DT	EI	JO	LM	MP	PY	QB	VD	XF	YH	ZJ	WK	EQ	SS	TU	IV	NW	GX	HZ
J	UG	AE	RN	BR	KA	CL	DC	FT	JI	LO	MM	PP	QY	VB	XD	YF	ZH	WJ	EK	SQ	TS	IU	NV	GW	HZ	OZ
K	AG	RE	BN	KR	CA	DL	FC	JT	LI	MO	PM	QP	VY	XB	YD	ZF	WH	EJ	SK	TQ	IS	NU	GV	HW	OX	UZ
L	RG	BE	KN	CR	DA	FL	JC	LT	MI	PO	QM	VP	XY	YB	ZD	WF	EH	SJ	TK	IQ	NS	GU	HV	OW	UX	AZ
M	BG	KE	CN	DR	FA	JL	LC	MT	PI	QO	VM	XP	YY	ZB	WD	EF	SH	TJ	IK	NQ	GS	HU	OV	UW	AX	RZ
N	KG	CE	DN	FR	JA	LL	MC	PT	QI	VO	XM	YP	ZY	WB	ED	SF	TH	IJ	NK	GQ	HS	OU	UV	AW	RX	BZ
O	CG	DE	FN	JR	LA	ML	PC	QT	VI	XO	YM	ZP	WY	EB	SD	TF	IH	NJ	GK	HQ	OS	UU	AV	RW	BX	KZ
P	DG	FE	JN	LR	MA	PL	QC	VT	XI	YO	ZM	WP	EY	SB	TD	IF	NH	GJ	HK	OQ	US	AU	RV	BW	KX	CZ
Q	FG	JE	LN	MR	PA	QL	VC	XT	YI	ZO	WM	EP	SY	TB	ID	NF	GH	HJ	OK	UQ	AS	RU	BV	KW	CX	DZ
R	JG	LE	MN	PR	QA	VL	XC	YT	ZI	WO	EM	SP	TY	IB	ND	GF	HH	OJ	UK	AQ	RS	BU	KV	CW	DX	FZ
S	LG	ME	PN	QR	VA	XL	YC	ZT	WI	EO	SM	TP	IY	NB	GD	HF	OH	UJ	AK	RQ	BS	KU	CV	DW	FX	JZ
T	MG	PE	QN	VR	XA	YL	ZC	WT	EI	SO	TM	IP	NY	GB	HD	OF	UH	AJ	RK	BQ	KS	CU	DV	FW	JX	LZ
U	PG	QE	VN	XR	YA	ZL	WC	ET	SI	TO	IM	NP	GY	HB	OD	UF	AH	RJ	BK	KQ	CS	DU	FV	JW	LX	MZ
V	QG	VE	XN	YR	ZA	WL	EC	ST	TI	IO	NM	GP	HY	OB	UD	AF	RH	BJ	KK	CQ	DS	FU	JV	LW	MX	PZ
W	VG	XE	YN	ZR	WA	EL	SC	TT	II	NO	GM	HP	OY	UB	AD	RF	BH	KJ	CK	DQ	FS	JU	LV	MW	PX	QZ
X	XG	YE	ZN	WR	EA	SL	TC	IT	NI	GO	HM	OP	UY	AB	RD	BF	KH	CJ	DK	FQ	JS	LU	MV	PQ	QX	VZ
Y	YG	ZE	WN	ER	SA	TL	IC	NT	GI	HO	OM	UP	AY	RB	BD	KF	GH	DJ	FK	JQ	LS	MU	PV	QW	VX	XZ
Z	ZG	WE	EN	SR	TA	IL	NC	GT	HI	OO	UM	AP	RY	BB	KD	CF	DH	FJ	JK	LQ	MS	PU	QV	VW	XX	YZ

Figure 10-2 (C). Nonreciprocal cipher table (U).

d. Although the table above is nonreciprocal, a close examination reveals a certain symmetry of values in the inscription of the cipher elements. The result is that, unlike the former table, the encipherment is not truly digraphic in character. Note that in the case where the second digit of the plain digraph remains constant, the second digit of the cipher digraph also remains constant. Thus $\overline{AAP} = \overline{WGC}$, $\overline{BAp} = \overline{EGc}$, $\overline{CAp} = \overline{SGc}$, etc.; $\overline{AAp} = \overline{WGC}$, $\overline{ABp} = \overline{EEc}$ and $\overline{ACp} = \overline{SNc}$. The total result is that the encipherment of the first character of the digraph is always polyalphabetic, while the encipherment of the last character of the digraphs is monoalphabetic in vertical encipherment.

e. Generally, digraphic substitution using tables such as those previously illustrated are impractical for military use. This is not due primarily to their security faults, as this can be corrected, but because of their physical limitations. The relatively large size of the tables, the inconvenience of their production, change, distribution, and handling make their use impractical. Moreover, the same, or better cryptographic results can be obtained by the use of matrices.

10-3. (G) Polygraphic Substitution Using Matrices

a. A simple method for obtaining digraphic substitution is through the use of a four-square matrix. This is a matrix which contains four components, two cipher and two plain, each inscribed in a 5 x 5 square. The components are 25-letter alphabets in which two letters are combined, normally the I and the J (only the I being shown), and inscribed in the square by some predetermined order. Figure 10-3 depicts a normal four-square matrix.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	O	U	R	T	
	F	G	H	I/J	K	L	M	P	Q	E	
P1	L	M	N	O	P	K	Y	Z	S	N	C1
	Q	R	S	T	U	I/J	X	W	V	A	
	V	W	X	Y	Z	H	G	D	C	B	
	T	H	I/J	R	E	A	B	C	D	E	
	O	P	Q	S	N	F	G	H	I/J	K	
C2	M	Y	Z	U	A	L	M	N	O	P	P2
	L	X	W	V	B	Q	R	S	T	U	
	K	G	F	D	C	V	W	X	Y	Z	

Figure 10-3 (G). Four-square matrix (U).

(1) Digraphic encipherment is accomplished by locating the first character of the plain digraph in

section P1 and the second in section P2. The substitution cipher values are found in section C1 and C2 respectively at the opposite corners of an imaginary square or rectangle. Thus \overline{ZAp} becomes \overline{HEc} . This is demonstrated in figure 10-4(1).




Figure 10-4(1) (G). Enciphering operation, four-square matrix (U).

(2) Decipherment is exactly the reverse of the enciphering process as shown in figure 10-4(2). The units of the cipher digraphs are located in section C1 and C2 respectively, and their equivalent plaintext values are found at the intersection of an imaginary square or rectangle in section P1 and P2. For example $\overline{XEc} = \overline{UBp}$.




Figure 10-4(2) (G). Deciphering operation four-square matrix (U).

(3) Note that with each successive plain-cipher digraphic relationship, a new enciphering rectangle is created and outlined. Thus, what was previously mentioned as the ideal of polygraphic substitution now occurs. No individual letter by itself has any attached specific value. Rather its value only occurs as a result of its combination with another letter, and for each combination, different values result. Thus in figure 10-4(2) $\overline{AFp} = \overline{FOc}$, $\overline{AHp} = \overline{UOc}$, and $\overline{FHp} = \overline{POc}$.

b. It is possible to effect the same type of encipherment by using a two-square matrix and a modification in the method of finding equivalents. One such two-square arrangement, a horizontal two-square, is illustrated in figure 10-5.

P1 C2	M	A	N	U	F	A	U	T	O	M	P2 C1
	C	T	R	I	G	B	I	L	E	S	
	B	D	E	H	K	C	D	F	G	H	
	L	O	P	Q	S	K	N	P	Q	R	
	V	W	X	Y	Z	V	W	X	Y	Z	

Figure 10-5 (C). Horizontal two-square matrix (U).

Basically the method of encipherment is identical with that of the four-square method, the equivalent cipher values for P1 and P2 being found at the opposite corners of an imaginary rectangle in section C1 and C2 respectively. Thus $\overline{MPp} = \overline{TLc}$. The exception to this rule is when the two plaintext letters appear on the same horizontal row. In these cases, the cipher digraph produced is a reversal of the plaintext digraphs. For example, the cipher equivalent for \overline{TEp} is \overline{ETc} . Observe that in both cases the first cipher letter is in the same column as the second plaintext letter.

c. Digraphic substitution of the same sort may also be effected by the use of a vertical two-square matrix as illustrated in figure 10-6.

P1	M	A	N	U	F	C1
	C	T	R	I	G	
	B	D	E	H	K	
	L	O	P	Q	S	
	V	W	X	Y	Z	

P2	A	U	T	O	M	C2
	B	I	L	E	S	
	C	D	F	G	H	
	K	N	P	Q	R	
	V	W	X	Y	Z	

Figure 10-6 (C). Vertical two-square matrix (U).

(1) The principle of encipherment and decipherment is once again the same as in the preceding example. The ciphertext values are found at the opposite corners of an imaginary rectangle, delineated by the position of the first and second digits of the plaintext digraphs. For example \overline{MOp} becomes \overline{UAc} . In this matrix where the two plaintext letters are found in the same column, the cipher digraphs are identical. Thus \overline{MAp} becomes \overline{MAc} . Note that unlike the horizontal two-square, the cipher equivalent is not a reversal of the same letter but the same letters in the same sequence as the plaintext.

(2) In both the vertical and the horizontal two-square systems shown above, the encipherment of a single letter can be accomplished only by adding

a null to form a plaintext digraph. Usually, for reasons of security, the null chosen is a high-frequency letter.

d. A third method of digraphic encipherment using matrices is the Playfair cipher which involves only the use of one 5 x 5 square. The use of a single matrix is possible by yet another modification of the system of finding cipher equivalents, which results in a greater degree of security. A typical Playfair cipher is illustrated below:

A	Q	P	O	N
B	R	Y	X	M
C	S	Z	W	L
D	T	U	V	K
E	F	G	H	I

Encipherment and decipherment are considered in light of four categories of plaintext placement.

(1) When the members of the plaintext pair are at the opposite ends of a diagonal of an imaginary rectangle, the replacement cipher members are at the opposite ends of the other diagonal. Thus $\overline{AHp} = \overline{OEc}$. Note that cipher 1 always is selected from the same row in which plain 1 appears; thus $\overline{ZEp} = \overline{CGc}$, and $\overline{BZp} = \overline{YCc}$.

(2) When the members of the plaintext pair lie in the same row, the letters immediately to their right form the cipher pair. Thus $\overline{APp} = \overline{QOc}$, $\overline{POp} = \overline{ONc}$, and $\overline{ONp} = \overline{NAc}$.

(3) When the members of the plaintext pair lie in the same column, the letters immediately below them form the cipher pairs. Thus $\overline{ADp} = \overline{BEc}$, $\overline{CEp} = \overline{DAc}$, and $\overline{EBp} = \overline{ACc}$. In both this case and that above, the rows and columns form continuous circles.

(4) When the members of the plaintext pairs are repeated letters, they must be separated by inserting a null, in this case usually a low-frequency letter such as Q or X, and then be enciphered by one of the three methods above. For example, the word BATTLES is enciphered as:

B	A	T	Q	T	L	E	S
C	B	F	R	K	S	F	C

A Playfair square is automatically reciprocal so far as encipherment by method (1) above is concerned. Thus $\overline{AYp} = \overline{PBc}$, and $\overline{PBp} = \overline{AYc}$. This reciprocity does not occur in method (2) and (3) above. Decipherment takes the exact reverse pattern of those methods outlined for encipherment.

10-4. (C) Variant Forms of Polygraphic Encipherment

a. In the foregoing paragraphs, polygraphic encipherment is totally limited to its digraphic forms for which table and matrices are used. It is important

that the same basic system is so constructed as to provide trigraphic and tetragraphic encipherment and even combinations of these. In effect, the systems operate on the same general cryptographic principles with some variation to fit the specific case.

b. One possible variation of a Playfair square is shown below. This illustrates that matrices need not always be square, though this is the most common form.

W	A	S	H	I	N
G	T	O	B	C	D
E	F	J	K	A	K
K	O	K	U	L	M
R	U	V	X	Y	Z

c. Encipherment of a message by the system results in the introduction of an occasional trigraph or tetragraph in addition to the normally expected digraphs. Thus $\overline{AMp} = \overline{HKUc}$ and $\overline{EPp} = \overline{KEKOc}$. Also a number of variant values may be introduced, as \overline{CKp} could equally be represented by \overline{BKEc} , \overline{KEPc} , \overline{DKEc} , \overline{GPc} , and \overline{TPc} . Insofar as deciphering the possible variants shown above, the deciphering clerk would merely ignore any letters following the K when obtained in the process of decipherment. Thus \overline{CKOp} would be read as CK.

d. A numeric variation of the four-square system shown earlier which permits a trinomic substitution of digraphic plaintext elements is illustrated in figure 10-7.

	A	B	C	D	E	000	025	050	075	100	
	F	G	H	I	K	125	150	175	200	225	
P1	L	M	N	O	P	250	275	300	325	350	C1
	Q	R	S	T	U	375	400	425	450	475	
	V	W	X	Y	Z	500	525	550	575	600	
	1	2	3	4	5	V	Q	L	F	A	
	6	7	8	9	10	W	R	M	G	B	
C2	11	12	13	14	15	X	S	N	H	C	P2
	16	17	18	19	20	Y	T	O	I	D	
	21	22	23	24	25	Z	U	P	K	E	

Figure 10-7 (C). Numeric variation, four-square matrix (U).

(1) Encipherment of a message proceeds as normal for a four-square system, but the numeric values are added rather than used as tetranomes or pentanomes.

PR	OC	EE	DI	NG
275	350	100	075	325
9	13	24	18	7
<hr/>				
284	363	124	093	332

(2) Decipherment is accomplished by determining the greatest multiple of 25 contained in a given trigraph and then subtracting that multiple from the trigraph to derive C1 and C2.

$$284 = 275 \quad 284 = 275 + 9 \quad \overline{275c - 9c} = \overline{PRp}$$

e. The clumsiness of the two preceding systems explains why they are not often encountered in actual operations. As stated previously, one of the important requirements of a cryptographic system is that it be practical for common usage. While the systems do provide a degree of extra security, the amount gained is hardly worth the effort.

Section II. (C) RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION OF POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION

10-5. (C) Recognition of Polygraphic Substitution

a. The methods of determining whether a given message represents a case of polygraphic substitution are rather simple. Usually a close inspection of certain of its physical characteristics suffices. When the techniques do not give clear-cut answers or when the lack of volume of text to study makes its use inappropriate, the analyst still has recourse to statistical tests and identification tables.

b. Digraphic substitution systems generally exhibit one or more of the following characteristics.

(1) Excluding nulls and indicators, message length, textual repeats, and internal distances will be multiples of two.

(2) When the ciphertext is composed entirely of letters, all are present, except one, usually the J, the U, or the V.

(3) If the ciphertext is composed of numbers when divided into trinomes, a limitation of range occurs, usually 001-676.

(4) Repeats usually begin on the odd letters and end on the even letters.

(5) The cryptogram does not yield to a multi-literal solution. Thus because of its digraphic characteristics, it most likely is digraphic.

c. In those cases where the ciphertext under study is trigraphic, similar general rules apply.

(1) Message length, repetitions, and intervening distance are usually multiples of three.

(2) Repetition usually begins with the first letter and ends with the third letter of the trigraphic ciphertext.

(3) If the cryptogram does not yield to solution of trilateral ciphers, it can be assumed to be trigraphic because of its characteristics discussed above.

d. Should the above listed characteristics prove inconclusive, initial identification may be made through the use of the statistical test and table which is covered in the following paragraph.

10-6. (Q) The Digraphic Lambda (λ) Test

a. The digraphic blank expectation test, in all respects, except the form of the element treated, is the same as that for the monographic blank expectation test. Both rest on the theory that, given a certain length of plaintext and a predictable number of blanks, the nonusage of a letter will occur. The occurrences refer both to that expected for plaintext and random text, and in this test are based on digraphic elements rather than individual letters, as was the case of the former test. Again 200 elements, in this case digraphs, set the limit of messages which may be tested. Tests of messages greater than 200 elements in length are inconclusive. The digraphic test is given in chart form below in figure 10-8.




Figure 10-8 (U). Digraphic Lambda (λ) test (U).

b. Using this chart, identification is based upon the number of blanks, where a blank is a nonoccurrence of a digraph, occurring in a cipher message not exceeding 200 digraphs in length, in respect to the number of blanks, expected in plaintext and random messages of the same length. As can be

seen, the chart contains two curves; curve P refers to expected blanks for plaintext and curve R refers to expected blanks for random text. In using the chart, plot the point of intersection of the vertical line (corresponding to the total number of digraphs in a given message) with the horizontal line which corresponds to the total number of blanks occurring in that message. If this point of intersection falls closer to curve P than it does to curve R, it indicates that the cryptogram is digraphic. If it falls closer to curve R than curve P, a nondigraphic substitution cipher is indicated.

c. A cipher which is polyalphabetic and which involves only two cipher components gives essentially the same results as a cipher which is truly digraphic. For this reason this test should not be used exclusively for the identification of a digraphic system, but rather to substantiate other evidence.

d. Where it becomes necessary to distinguish between a digraphic cipher and a polyalphabetic cipher using two cipher components, a digraphic frequency distribution could be made "off the cut," i.e. made of those ciphertext digraphs which are found by omitting the first letter of text, then dividing the remaining text into groups of two letters. If the system is digraphic, a distribution exhibits a poor $2\phi\phi$; if, on the other hand, it is polyalphabetic, the $2\phi\phi$ is as satisfactory as that of a distribution made "on the cut."

10-7. (Q) The Digraphic Phi Test ($2\phi\phi$)

a. The computation of the value of $2\phi\phi$, $2\phi p$, and $2\phi r$ for this test is the same as that given in paragraph 9-7 preceding. The difference lies in its use for the identification of digraphic systems and the interpretation of its resultant values. In digraphic systems involving substitution where all the letters of the alphabet are used, except the limitation imposed by a 25-cell matrix, the value computed for $2\phi\phi$ approaches that of $2\phi p$ for English plaintext which is 4.66.

b. Note again that the results of digraphic tests are subject to much wider variation than similar tests for monographic systems. Factors which contribute to this are the limited number of digraphs, of a possible 625, which may be required to encipher the text, and the presence of repeated digraphs in the text which further reduce the total number of digraphs. The end result is that statistical results must be used with caution.

10-8. (Q) Identification of the Specific System

a. Once the initial recognition of a cipher message as a polygraphic cipher has been accomplished, the next step preparatory to analysis is the identification of the specific system to which it belongs. This

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identification can frequently be made on the basis of certain characteristics of the ciphertext which result from the method of encipherment. These individual characteristics are listed below.

(1) *Four-square ciphers*. The identification of a cipher message as the product of this system rests generally on a process of eliminating other digraphic systems as possibilities. This is not to mean that the text itself does not exhibit characteristics of its own. It does, but the identification of these characteristics are not as readily apparent and involve detailed study, while the characteristics of the other systems can often be noted by a visual inspection alone.

(2) *Two-square system*. Two-square systems are identified by the presence of plaintext digraphs in the ciphertext. Under normal circumstances approximately 20 percent of all digraphs produced by this system will be plaintext. In the specific case of a horizontal two-square system, the digraphs will be reversed. In the case of vertical two-square encipherment, the plaintext digraphs will occur in their original sequence.

(3) *Playfair ciphers*. A cipher produced by this system is generally identified by the complete absence of digraphs containing repeated letters. The reason for the absence of repeated letters as digraphs is a consequence of the fourth rule of the encipherment given in paragraph 10-3d(4).

(4) *Large tables*. Because of the systematic arrangement of the internal cipher values in tables such as that illustrated in figure 10-2 preceding, identification is made by a simple uniliteral frequency distribution of the letters of the cipher digraphs. For example, note that any plaintext digraph ending in A contains Gc as the last letter of the cipher digraph; thus AAp=WGc, BAp=EGc, etc. Other arrangements which are symmetrical would give similar results.

b. The above examples often allow identification by visual inspection alone. Where this is not possible, the analyst must study a given cipher in detail using procedures which are covered in succeeding paragraphs.

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CHAPTER 11 (C)
SOLUTION OF POLYGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) ANALYSIS OF DIGRAPHIC CIPHERS

11-1. (C) Introduction

a. The fundamental purpose of polygraphic substitution is the suppression or total elimination of the frequency characteristics of ordinary plaintext, for it is these frequency characteristics which lead, sooner or later, to the solution of practically all substitution ciphers. The analysis of cryptograms which are the result of polygraphic substitution rests upon the basis of the frequency of the units concerned. If the substitution is digraphic, the units studied are pairs of letters and the normal frequencies of plaintext pairs become of primary concern. If the system is trigraphic, the units are sets of three letters, etc.

b. Although analysis is chiefly a case of studying frequencies, additional aid is provided by certain digraphic idiomorphs, which are the result of the particular method of digraphic encipherment used.

XQ VO ZI LK AP OL ZX PV CK IK OL UK AT
 ND IN NT RE NT NO
HN LK VL BN OZ BZ DY TY LE GI
 IN SI ON TO

d. With a little imagination, the partially recovered plaintext could be expanded to "SECOND INFANTRY REGIMENT." Moreover, if $\overline{CKc} = \overline{GIp}$ then possibly $\overline{GIC} = \overline{CKp}$, the last portion of the message subject "ATTACK." On this basis the sequence might be:

"SECOND INFANTRY REGIMENT NOT YET IN POSITION TO ATTACK."

Although these values rest on an assumption only, their validity could soon be verified; first, by attempting additional decipherment, and second, by fitting the values into the matrix which originally produced them.

e. In a manner similar to uniliteral systems, the placement of repeated digraphs at once aids and limits the choice of probable words. For example, the following repetition extracted from a message appears possible as a whole word.

Additionally, any knowledge available to the analyst in respect to the subject, possible contents, and the circumstances surrounding a given message are always invaluable in reaching a final solution. In any case, when a digraph is used regularly, sufficient messages soon accumulate to the point of solution by principles of frequency. In this respect note that the "sufficient quantity" varies. In some cases, where digraphic idiomorphism is pronounced, and when a number of repetitions are available, solution may be practical with only a few messages.

c. In digraphic systems in particular, the identification of only a few cipher digraphs is usually sufficient to read out longer portions of the messages. This is due to the limitation placed on the value that can be inserted between those high-frequency values normally first recovered. For example, consider the following, a portion of digraphic ciphertext with its recovered plaintext values.

VI FW HM AZ FF FW RO

In terms of digraphic idiomorphs it would be assigned the pattern

- AB - - - AB -

This pattern compared to those listed in appendix D (table D-4) reveals several possible words which could be used to form a base for further development of the text, by trying the set of values derived from each, in turn.

11-2. (C) Identification of Four-Square Ciphers

a. The general steps and techniques involved in the analysis and solution of a four-square cipher system are demonstrated below. Admittedly, the situation given represents a special case in that the solution is based on one message. However, the methodology remains the same for most cases,

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only slight variation being required to fit it to any given set of circumstances. The first step in any analytic attack is system identification. The follow-

ing messages illustrate identification techniques employed in the case of four-square ciphers and subsequent analysis.

UNONY	TPKKM	JKZDK	JJSGR	TGLWR	AEMY P
RCJCP	YDEBC	DFHMR	MKGZA	PKPSK	MUNON
YTUFE	UUFUE	FAYVD	AMTDM	UDPEY	PPYEM
YPRCJ	CPYDE	BCDFP	SYKNE	TJSZO	UDRJG
HMUNE	MRUAS	SAPSK	MRLHS	BROUN	EETUO
JNNSA	RKDEM	REFGP	EHMDE	AMKAJ	GEMQJ
PTUDB	BDGLM	FAPSF	JPTFF	BMDCG	TSGPS
KMTGJ	GTJUN	BFNJO	NUNNT		

b. As a preliminary step, the cipher is tested for monoalphabetic qualities by using standard alphabets and by completing the plain component as shown in paragraph 7-12. As negative results are

obtained, a uniliteral frequency distribution is made as shown in figure 11-1 to determine if a mixed alphabet is involved.




Figure 11-1 (U). Uniliteral frequency distribution, four-square cipher (U).

Although the uniliteral frequency distribution appears rough enough to warrant an initial monoalphabetic assumption, closer inspection reveals that except for three letters there is really little frequency variation, less than might be expected for a message of this length. A ϕ test could be made if further identification is required, but considering the size of the sample and its apparent flatness, it is hardly

warranted.

c. Having rejected monoalphabetic substitution, there is no need to consider transposition, as the message is not rearranged plaintext. Digraphic substitution is the next logical consideration. For this, the ciphertext is divided into digraphic units. Repeats are underlined and inspected for idiomorphic characteristics as shown in figure 11-2①.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A	<u>UN</u>	<u>ON</u>	<u>YT</u>	<u>PK</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>JK</u>	<u>ZD</u>	<u>KJ</u>	<u>JS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>TG</u>	<u>LW</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>YP</u>
B	<u>RC</u>	<u>JC</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>BC</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>HM</u>	<u>RM</u>	<u>KG</u>	<u>ZA</u>	<u>PK</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>ON</u>
C	<u>YT</u>	<u>UF</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>UF</u>	<u>UE</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>YV</u>	<u>DA</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>DM</u>	<u>UD</u>	<u>PE</u>	<u>YP</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>EM</u>
D	<u>YP</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>JC</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>BC</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>YK</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>TJ</u>	<u>SZ</u>	<u>OU</u>	<u>DR</u>	<u>JG</u>
E	<u>HM</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>RU</u>	<u>AS</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>RL</u>	<u>HS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>OU</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>ET</u>	<u>UO</u>
F	<u>JN</u>	<u>NS</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>KD</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>RE</u>	<u>FG</u>	<u>PE</u>	<u>HM</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>KA</u>	<u>JG</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>QJ</u>
G	<u>PT</u>	<u>UD</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>DG</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>FJ</u>	<u>PT</u>	<u>FF</u>	<u>BM</u>	<u>DC</u>	<u>GT</u>	<u>SG</u>	<u>PS</u>
H	<u>KM</u>	<u>TG</u>	<u>JG</u>	<u>TJ</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>BF</u>	<u>NJ</u>	<u>ON</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>NT</u>					

Figure 11-2① (C). Cipher text prepared for analysis (U).

d. On the strength of the digraphic patterns exhibited by the text, divisible by two, and repetitions consisting of digraphs, it can be assumed to

be a digraphic cipher. Confirmation of this assumption can be obtained by constructing a digraphic frequency distribution as shown in figure 11-2②.

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	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
A													—						—	—							3
B		—	≡			—							—						—								6
C																											
D	—		—		≡	≡	—						—														10
E													≠								—	—					7
F	≡					—	—			—																	5
G																			—	—							2
H													≡									—					4
I																											
J			≡				≡			—			—									—					8
K	—		—			—			—				≡														8
L													—										—				2
M																					—						1
N					≡				—											—	—						5
O															≡							≡					5
P					≡					≡										≠	—				≡		14
Q									—																		1
R	—		≡		—						—	—										—					7
S	—						—																			—	3
T							≡		≡																		4
U			—	≡	≡								≠	—													11
V																											
W																											
X																											
Y										—					≡					≡	—						7
Z	—		—																								2
	7	1	7	2	10	6	9	0	0	6	4	1	17	9	1	3	0	4	9	8	4	1	1	0	4	0	
	6	1	4	2	5	4	6			5	3	1	8	3	1	1	0	4	5	6	3	1	1		4	74	
F(F-1)	2		6		12	4	8			2	2		38	20	6	6			20	2	2				6	136	

Figure 11-2② (ϕ). Digraphic frequency distribution (U).

e. The appearance of this distribution shows some characteristics of digraphic substitution. Given an alphabet of 26 letters, there are 676 possible digraphic combinations. For an alphabet of 25 letters, there are 625 possible combinations. Of these, only about 300 are used in normal plaintext. In the message above, only 74 different digraphs are used, 602 total blanks assumed. For a message of 74 digraphs, the normally expected number of blanks given by the digraphic Lambda table falls within

the range 617 for plaintext and 606 for random text. With such a small sample as this, the expected pattern is liable to be distorted. However, considering the number of repeated sequences in such a short message and the obvious absence of several letters, the nearness of observed blanks to expected blanks for random text may be explained in part. Furthermore, a digraphic ϕ test reflects the same condition with the observed digraphic Phi value (2ϕ₀) of 136 surpassing that expected for plain

(2φp) 106.95, the expected random value (2φ) being 23.25. Note that when a digraph frequency table is used, as in figure 11-2② the value of F is found in each cell. For example, in the first column 2 is found for the digraph FA, thus $F(C-1) = 2 \times 1 = 2$ for this column. To find the total, the total values of each column are then added.

11-3. (C) Analysis of Four-Square Ciphers

a. Accepting the system as digraphic, reexamination of the text reveals a doublet, the digraph FF; therefore, a Playfair cipher can be discounted. In two-square ciphers 20 percent of the total text would be plaintext, normal in the case of a vertical arrangement and reversed if the arrangement of the matrices were horizontal. Failing to note any great number of obvious plaintext digraphs, normal or reversed, the analyst can assume that a four-square system is represented. Accordingly, a matrix can be constructed as shown in figure 11-3. Direct standard alphabets are used for 12p, as this is the normal arrangement, the I and J are combined because of the absence of the former in the digraphic frequency distribution.

P1	A	B	C	D	E						C1
	F	G	H	J	K						
	L	M	N	O	P						
	Q	R	S	T	U						
	V	W	X	Y	Z						
C2						A	B	C	D	E	P2
						F	G	H	J	K	
						L	M	N	O	P	
						Q	R	S	T	U	
						V	W	X	Y	Z	

Figure 11-3 (C). Assumed plain component, four-square matrix (U).

(1) Referring back to the ciphertext, the repeat PS KM appears three times at rather regular intervals in the text. By position it seems to be a sentence separator and being of four letters the word STOP is immediately assumed. Thus PSc is assumed to be STp and KMc is OPp. These values are accordingly inserted in the matrix, figure 11-4.

P1	A	B	C	D	E						C1
	F	G	H	J	K						
	L	M	N	O	P					K	
	Q	R	S	T	U					P	
	V	W	X	Y	Z						
C2						A	B	C	D	E	P2
						F	G	H	J	K	
				M		L	M	N	O	P	
		S				Q	R	S	T	U	
						V	W	X	Y	Z	

Figure 11-4 (C). Insertion of cipher values (U).

(2) The placement of these cipher equivalents allows the assumption of fourth placement by position alone. Generally the cipher component can be a standard sequence, a mixed sequence, or a random sequence. Further it may be inscribed into the matrix by a number of different routes. If the alphabet is standard, or keyword mixed, it is very likely that the last letters, the V-W-X-Y-Z cluster is undisturbed in respect to sequence, and if so will fall at the end of the inscription route. If the route of inscription can be determined, these letters can be placed with a certain degree of certainty. The direction of a route may sometimes be determined by the placement of the cluster letters. For example, the relative position of Kc and Pc in sequence C1 can be considered in a former light. Normally, four letters separate K and P (K L M N O P); if normal horizontal inscription is assumed for this square, three blank cells are found where four are required. Therefore it can be one of the following conditions.

- (a) The route of inscription is something other than normal horizontal.
- (b) That portion of the cipher component containing K and P is either mixed or has a letter missing, the letter being used in the keyword.
- (c) Both (1) and (2) are in effect.

The first option is disproved by a simple count. The third cannot yet be disproved. In counting, however, it is observed that K appears in the 15th position when normally it occurs at the 11th. This means that four letters normally following it must now precede it. If this is so, a missing letter between K and P would account for only the three cells present. Furthermore, P which normally occurs at the 16th

position is so located to provide space for only six following letters, indicating that four letters normally following it now come before. Thus, four of the letters shown below must precede the *K*:

K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 1 missing 4 missing

(3) Considering which letters can be missing in the light of their normal frequency of use may prove useful. Between *K* and *P*, *O* is probably that missing letter since it may be part of a keyword. From *P* to *Z*: *RSTU* or perhaps, *QU* and two of the cluster *RST* may be missing. The choice here with more letters, is more difficult. One aspect, however, is that the missing letters are probably not *VWXYZ*. On this basis, placements may be assumed as follows:

C1
 K
L *M* *N* *P*
V *W* *X* *Y* *Z*

(4) By applying the same line of reasoning to the placement of cipher elements in the *C2* square, the additional placements may also be assumed,

giving a partially completed matrix as seen in figure 11-5.




Figure 11-5 (B). Placement of cipher values by assumption of sequence (U).

(5) To this point, assumption has been added to assumption, a sometimes dangerous practice but one which can be rectified quickly by checking the assumptions against the ciphertext, figure 11-6.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A	<u>UN</u>	<u>ON</u>	<u>YT</u>	<u>PK</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>JK</u>	<u>ZD</u>	<u>KJ</u>	<u>JS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>TG</u>	<u>LW</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>YP</u>
			YT		OP									RV	
B	<u>RC</u>	<u>JC</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>BC</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>HM</u>	<u>RM</u>	<u>KG</u>	<u>ZA</u>	<u>PK</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>ON</u>
			TY									RO	ST	OP	
C	<u>YT</u>	<u>UF</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>UF</u>	<u>UE</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>YV</u>	<u>DA</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>DM</u>	<u>UD</u>	<u>PE</u>	<u>YP</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>EM</u>
	YT						VY		TR					TY	
D	<u>YP</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>JC</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>BC</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>YK</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>TJ</u>	<u>SZ</u>	<u>OU</u>	<u>DR</u>	<u>JG</u>
				TY				ST							
E	<u>HM</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>RU</u>	<u>AS</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>RL</u>	<u>HS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>OU</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>ET</u>	<u>UO</u>
								ST	OP						
F	<u>JN</u>	<u>NS</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>KD</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>RE</u>	<u>FG</u>	<u>PE</u>	<u>HM</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>KA</u>	<u>JG</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>QJ</u>
														SS	
G	<u>PT</u>	<u>UD</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>DG</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>FJ</u>	<u>PT</u>	<u>FF</u>	<u>BM</u>	<u>DC</u>	<u>GT</u>	<u>SG</u>	<u>PS</u>
								ST		TT					ST
H	<u>KM</u>	<u>TG</u>	<u>JG</u>	<u>TJ</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>BF</u>	<u>NJ</u>	<u>ON</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>NT</u>					
											TS				

Figure 11-6 (C). First partial reconstruction of plaintext (U).

b. No impossible combinations have occurred to disprove the assumptions relative to the placement of letters in the matrix. However, little insight has been gained into the message text. The next step then is to build on the digraphs recovered, attempting to assume additional values. This can be done easily if the positional limitation placed on one member of a cipher pair by the other member is considered. For example, consider the cipher digraphs *PK KM* located at positions A4 and 5. The positional limi-

tations in this case are such that \overline{PKc} must equal some combination of the row *QRSTU* of the *P1* matrix and columns *D J O T Y* of the *P2* matrix. The location of \overline{PKc} in the ciphertext and the recovered values for \overline{YTc} and \overline{KMc} which flank it, plus self-limitation imposed by impressible combinations, *QD*, *QT*, etc., limits the choice. If a plain value of *ROP* was accepted for \overline{PKc} , the word *TROOP* would be completed as a possibility. Thus *K* can be placed in matrix *C2*.

Assuming the placement of the \overline{Jc} to be correct as shown below, on the basis of the word $\overline{TJc} = \overline{REp}$ above, and assuming that TT in each case represents a doublet rather than a word bridge, additional values can be derived. For example, inspection of the matrix with the J inscribed in its assumed position of the C2 square reveals that \overline{QJc} and \overline{FJc} must equal plaintext digraphs that contain, A, B, C, D, or E in the second positions. If Fc is placed in the first cell of square C1 \overline{FJc} would equal \overline{BAp} . This in combination with TT, (BATT) would in turn suggest a possible word, BATTALION.

(2) To complete the word, the plaintext digraphs of AL and IO and N- must be supplied. Note that the prior placement of $\overline{FFc} = \overline{Alp}$, and $\overline{BMc} = \overline{IOp}$ which tend to confirm the former assumption, leaving \overline{DCc} to equal $\overline{N-p}$. By placing the $\overline{D-c}$ on line three of square C1, it is aligned properly for the $\overline{N-p}$ value. However, as there are four possible cells in which it may fit, it cannot be exactly placed. But since it falls on that line, the last cell of the second line must contain a C, the letter immediately preceding the D alphabetically, figure 11-9.

	A	B	C	D	E	(F)	O	U		
P1	F	G	H	J	K			E	B	(C)
	L	M	N	O	P					K
	Q	R	S	T	U	L	M	N	P	T
	V	W	X	Y	Z	V	W	X	Y	Z
	(J)					A	B	C	D	E
						F	G	H	J	K
	(F)	K	L	M	N	L	M	N	O	P
			S	T	U	Q	R	S	T	U
C2	V	W	X	Y	Z	V	W	X	Y	Z

Figure 11-9 (f). Insertion of cipher values through analysis (U).

(3) Referring back to the partial sequence shown below and comparing the plaintext values shown with the partially recovered matrix, another possibility is apparent, the word ATTACK. Note the plain equivalent for \overline{QJc} must end with A, B, C, D, or E plain, and that the plain equivalent for \overline{UDc} must begin with A, B, C, D, or E plain, thus placing an A on either side of the double T.

$EM Q J P T U D B B$
 $IN TT$

(4) Referring back to the sequence $\overline{EM Q J}$
 \overline{IN}

$\overline{PT UD}$ and considering possible equivalent values, \overline{TT}

another word is suggested. Note that the plain equivalent for \overline{QJc} must end with A, B, C, D, or E. Similarly, the equivalent for \overline{UDc} must begin with the same letter. Thus an A may be placed to either side of the doublet (ATTA) suggesting ATTACK. Inspection of the matrix shows that the required values of \overline{ACp} for \overline{UDc} can be made by placing D in cell one, row one of square C2. The \overline{Qc} can then be placed in cell one of either the second or third row, square C1. In order to derive a K plain, the cipher digraph \overline{BBc} must equal $\overline{K-p}$. Note that the positions of the $\overline{B-c}$ and $\overline{K-p}$ are such that \overline{Bc} must appear in the last cell of rows one and two of square C2.

e. At this point the analysis can take one or a combination of three courses, all involving techniques previously discussed. The analyst can attempt a recovery of the keyword alphabet used in the C1 and C2 squares. He may continue the process above, patiently reconstructing plaintext by examining patterns, assuming possible words, then checking their possibility against the matrix. The last method is simply one of attempting to decipher additional bits of the message as recovery of the matrix progresses. For example, using the matrix shown in figure 11-10(1) which incorporates values previously found, the message can now be deciphered in part, figure 11-10(2), to read as shown.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	O	U		
P1	F	G	H	J	K	(Q)		E	B	C
	L	M	N	O	P	(Q)				K
	Q	R	S	T	U	L	M	N	P	T
	V	W	X	Y	Z	V	W	X	Y	Z
	D	J			(B)	A	B	C	D	E
					(B)	F	G	H	J	K
	F	K	(L)	M	N	L	M	N	O	P
			S	T	U	Q	R	S	T	U
C2	V	W	X	Y	Z	V	W	X	Y	Z

Figure 11-10(1) (f). Partially recovered four-square matrix (U).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12-13	14	15	
A	UN	ON	YT	PK	KM	JK	LD	KJ	JS	GR	TG	LW	RA	EM	YP
	EN	EM	YT	RO	OP(MO)	VE	ME(NT)			RV		IN			
B	RC	JC	PY	DE	BC	DF	HM	RM	KG	ZA	PK	PS	KM	UN	OH
		TY							(ZE)	FO	ST	OP	EN	EM	
C	YT	UF	EU	UF	UE	FA	YV	DA	MT	DM	UD	PE	YP	PY	EM
	YT	AN	KS	AN		VY	TR		AC			TY	IN		
D	YP	RC	JC	PY	DE	BC	DF	PS	YK	NE	TJ	SZ	OU	DR	JG
			TY					ST	WO(TH)	RE(LZ)	ER(O)				
E	HM	UN	EM	RU	AS	SA	PS	KM	RL	HS	BR	OU	NE	ET	UO
	EN	IN					ST	OP				ER	IS		
F	JN	NS	AR	KD	EM	RE	FG	PE	HM	DE	AM	KA	JG	EM	QJ
															G
		SS		LE	IN									IN	MA
G	PT	UD	BB	DC	LM	FA	PS	FJ	PT	FF	BM	DC	GT	SG	PS
	TT	AC	KI	(NA)	TL	(EA)	ST	BA	TT	AL	IO				ST
H	KM	TG	JG	TJ	UN	BF	NJ	ON	UN	NT					
	OP	(SE	ND)	RE	EN	FO	RC	EM	EN	TS					

Figure 11-10 (C). Partially recovered plaintext (U).

As several more words are now obvious (shown in parentheses) additional values could be recovered quickly using the techniques previously shown, the solution becoming a mechanical process.

Section II. (C) ANALYSIS OF TWO-SQUARE CIPHERS

11-4. (C) General

a. The initial identification and subsequent analysis of two-square systems is contingent upon the recognition of their one primary characteristic, that 20 percent of all cipher digraphs are in fact transparencies, i.e. the same as the underlying plaintext. In the case of vertical two-square systems, these transparencies will be identical with the plaintext they represent; while in the case of a horizontal two-square, the transparencies will be reversed. Thus, if the examination of one or more cryptograms results in the consistent observation of digraphs which form good plaintext digraphs they may be assumed to be the result of encipherment by a two-square cipher system.

b. The preliminary steps covered in the preceding section, that is, the assumption and rejection of the system being monographic and uniliteral encipherment, are followed as a matter of course. After these rejections, the ciphertext is examined closely for those characteristics given for digraphic cipher systems. The normal digraphic tests are conducted as required in order to aid in ascertaining whether the system is digraphic. Once this has been accomplished, the analyst is again faced with determining which specific system was used.

c. It is usually possible to make a final determination as to whether a cipher represents a two-square horizontal, or a two-square vertical, by a visual examination of the text. Sometimes the structure of the system is such that skeletons of words or whole phrases are readily apparent. However, this is the exception to the rule. Without some kind of a formal test, it is difficult to specify what constitutes a "good amount" of plaintext digraphs for identification. Such a test is illustrated in the succeeding paragraph.

11-5. (C) Two-Square Test

a. The test to be described is based upon an evaluation of the observed frequency of a given ciphertext digraph in terms of its expected frequency as a plaintext digraph. Any such correlation as might exist between a given plaintext digraph and its occurrence as a cipher digraph produced by a four-square, a Playfair, or a large-table system, is accidental. But in the case of a two-square system, the correlation is the result of the mechanics of the enciphering system. Thus, if a ciphertext digraph exhibits only the random expected occurrence, considered as direct and reversed transparencies, then that ciphertext may be assumed to be the product of a digraphic system other than a two-square. If however, the number of occurrences exceeds that random expected value, the ciphertext may be the product of a two-square system. Of course the mode, as direct or reversed transparencies, in which this greater value occurs, indicates the particular system used.

b. To illustrate the procedures involved in this text, and the techniques of subsequent analysis, the following ciphertext, figure 11-11, prepared for study, will be used.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A	BO	DL	EM	QB	EP	EL	QH	HO	RQ	DO	AQ	GL	IL	MU	OI
B	PH	TA	NB	TB	AM	MA	OI	DC	SE	NL	PC	GE	NI	AM	TA
C	NN	BE	GE	HL	CK	TC	SE	PH	RI	OD	HI	UC	OI	IH	HC
D	DE	FC	PP	EM	ME	YA	IP	EY	RA	HM	QC	TI	SE	SN	QB
E	GR	SP	PB	SS	AB	LF	HL	OR	AH	OP	AI	QN	HL	PO	KI
F	OS	AH	PH	SI	NB	TB	AM	MA	OI	QH	NE	NO	NN	ES	MI
G	SP	BB	EM	LN	TA	SE	SN	YD	RK	EB	NG	AM	NN	AM	DE
H	NO	HL	OR	AH	OP	AM	QN	AM	IP	EV	RA	HM	QC	TI	SE
I	SN	HL	PO	QB	LH	RI	ME	SY	EB	SS	HC	DF	OZ	TA	NN
J	BF	AM	KQ	SH	QN	NO	ER	UQ	OI	UT					

Figure 11-11 (C). Ciphertext for analysis (U).

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(1) Preliminary to a study of the digraphs as "direct" or reversed transparencies, the frequency of the digraphs is tabulated using the normal digraphic frequency matrix shown in figure 11-12.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
A		—						≡					≡≡				—										15
B		—			—	—									—												4
C											—																1
D			—		≡							—			—												6
E		≡										—	≡			—		—	—			≡					11
F			—																								1
G		—			—							—							—								4
H			≡									≡	≡														10
I								—				—					≡										4
J																											0
K													—					—									2
L						—		—						—													3
M	≡				≡				—		—											—					7
N		≡			—				≡				≡	≡													13
O				—					≡							≡		≡	—							—	1
P			—			≡									≡	—											6
Q	≡	≡				≡							≡														10
R	—	—						—	≡		—							—									7
S					≡			—	—				≡		≡				≡							—	15
T	≡	≡	—						≡																		9
U			—														—			—							3
V																											-
W																											-
X																											-
Y	—			—																							2
Z																											-
	8	13	9	2	13	2	0	11	5	8	2	11	16	11	8	8	4	4	4	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	

Figure 11-12 (U). Digraphic frequency matrix (U).

(2) Once the digraphs have been tabulated, the individual digraphs may be listed in alphabetic order and tested for their probability as direct or reversed transparencies. The format of the test is shown in figure 11-13. Column identity is:

- Column 1 Ciphertext digraph
- Column 2 Frequency of digraph in text from digraphic frequency distribution

Column 3 Logarithm of expected frequency of digraph as direct plaintext

Column 4 Product of Column 2 x 3

Column 5 Logarithm of expected frequency of digraph as reversed plaintext

Column 6 Product of Column 2 x 5

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AB	1	.45	.45	.38	.38	NE	1	.87	.87	.99	.99
AH	3	.25	.75	.67	2.01	NJ	2	.13	.26	.0	.0
AM	1	.61	.61	.78	.78	NN	4	.51	2.04	.51	2.04
AQ	1	0	0	0	0	NO	4	.66	2.64	.92	3.68
BB	1	0	0	0	0	OE	1	.33	.33	.58	.58
BE	1	.66	.66	.38	.38	OI	5	.13	.65	.25	1.25
BF	1	.0	.0	.0	.0	OP	2	.72	1.44	.64	1.28
BO	1	.38	.38	.38	.38	OR	2	.89	1.78	.74	1.48
CK	1	.38	.38	.13	.13	OS	1	.61	.61	.62	.62
DC	1	.38	.38	.13	.13	OZ	1	.0	.0	.0	.0
DE	3	.77	2.31	.88	2.64	PC	1	.13	.13	.0	.0
DL	1	.33	.33	.53	.53	PH	2	.33	.66	.13	.26
DO	1	.63	.63	.58	.58	PO	2	.64	1.28	.72	1.44
EB	2	.38	.76	.66	1.32	PP	1	.56	.56	.56	.56
EL	1	.74	.74	.79	.79	QB	3	.0	.0	.0	.0
EM	3	.61	1.83	.72	2.16	QC	2	.0	.0	.0	.0
EP	1	.67	.67	.70	.70	QH	2	.0	.0	.13	.26
ER	1	.94	.94	.96	.96	QM	3	.13	.39	.0	.0
ES	1	.86	.86	.84	.84	RA	1	.80	.80	.82	.82
EV	2	.67	1.34	.87	1.74	RB	1	.25	.25	.25	.25
FC	1	.25	.25	.13	.13	RH	1	.33	.33	.64	.64
GB	1	.0	.0	.0	.0	RI	2	.75	1.50	.73	1.46
GE	1	.61	.61	.38	.38	RK	1	.13	.13	.0	.0
GL	1	.25	.25	.13	.13	RQ	1	.0	.0	.13	.13
GR	1	.42	.42	.48	.48	SE	5	.84	4.20	.86	4.30
HC	2	.33	.66	.61	1.22	SH	1	.72	.72	.38	.38
HL	6	.13	.78	.13	.78	SI	1	.77	.77	.78	.78
HM	2	.25	.50	.13	.26	SN	3	.38	1.14	.71	2.13
IH	1	.0	.0	.77	.77	SP	2	.55	1.10	.45	.90
IL	1	.70	.70	.67	.67	SS	2	.67	1.34	.67	1.34
IP	2	.48	.96	.45	.90	SX	1	.0	.0	.13	.13
KM	1	.0	.0	.0	.0	TA	4	.74	2.96	.83	3.32
KQ	1	.0	.0	.0	.0	TB	2	.33	.66	.13	.26
LF	1	.33	.33	.25	.25	TC	1	.45	.45	.61	.61
LH	1	.13	.13	.13	.13	TI	2	.82	1.64	.73	1.46
LN	1	.13	.13	.42	.42	UC	1	.33	.33	.38	.38
MA	2	.78	1.56	.61	1.22	YA	1	.45	.45	.58	.58
ME	2	.72	1.44	.61	1.22	YD	1	.53	.53	.13	.13
MI	1	.0	.0	.0	.0				56.42		60.52
ML	1	.0	.0	.25	.25						
MU	1	.25	.25	.42	.42						
NB	2	.25	.50	.0	.0						

Figure 11-18 (U). Test for probability of transparencies (U).

(3) As the total value of all digraphs as reversed transparencies (the sum of column six) is greater than that for the digraphs as direct transparencies (column five) it can be assumed then that the system involved is a horizontal two-square. If the value of direct transparencies had been greater, the assumption would be for a vertical two-square system. Under normal circumstances, a horizontal two-square

produces $N \times 0.3388$ reversed transparencies, while a vertical two-square produces $N \times .3610$ direct transparencies. (N in both cases refers to the number of digraphs.) In this case, the theoretical value of expected reversed transparencies is 4.9126 ($145 \times .3388$) which compares favorably with 4.15, the value observed as difference between columns five and six.

11-6. (C) Analysis of Two-Square Systems

a. The solution of both the vertical and horizontal two-square systems involves the same general principles and techniques. Only a slight modification in the reconstruction matrix is required to orient it vertically or horizontally as the case may require. The first step in either case, is to set up the reconstruction matrix, and to examine the text closely for significant characteristics. Where two-square systems are dealt with, an obvious quick entry into the cipher is by way of the transparencies. If entry can be made by this route, other more laborious and time-consuming methods, similar to those illustrated in the case of a four-square system, may be avoided. With this in mind, the text is inspected for possible transparencies.

(1) The following possible transparencies (fig. 11-14①) are noted. Although at first glance they appear unlikely, consider what occurs when one or more digraphs of each are reversed, as in figure 11-14②.

- PH TA
- PH SI
- HL PO
- EM ME YA
- NO ER UQ OI UT

Figure 11-14① (C). Possible transparencies from ciphertext (U).

- PH AT THAT
- PH IS THIS
- HL OP STOP
- EM EM YA ENEMY
- ON REQU OI UT ON REQUEST

Figure 11-14② (C). Possible transparencies reversed (U).

The rearrangement of each digraph makes obvious a possible word, shown to the right above. Using these assumed values, a reconstruction matrix can be set up.

(2) The matrix used should be of sufficient size in height and width to allow the free movement

of the letters and to avoid the establishment of false relationships. A dividing line, horizontal or vertical as required, will provide for the separation of the letters. The placement of the letters within the matrix can be determined by their use, i.e. in a horizontal two-square transparency they will lie on the same row; in a vertical two-square transparency they will lie in the same column. Thus the letters *T* and *A* must lie in one row, and *I* and *S* must lie in another row; and as they appear as reversed transparencies, *A* and *I* would appear in square P1 C2, and *T* and *S* in P2 C1. All values are checked and inscribed in a working matrix and appear as shown in figure 11-15.

P1 C2											P2 C1									
										A	T									
										I				S						
									E					M						
									O						N	P				
									Q										U	
									R										E	

Figure 11-15 (C). Preliminary reconstruction matrix (U).

(3) With some values assumed in the rows of the matrix, the next step is to attempt rearrangement to obtain columnar order. To illustrate, HL PO is assumed to be the cipher value of ST OP; thus, encipherment of the first plaintext digraph must have occurred in one of the following positions; figure 11-16.




Figure 11-16 (C). Analysis of cipher-plain value location (U).

Either method of encipherment demonstrates that *T* and *H* lie in the same column of square P2 C1, and *S* and *L* in P1 C2. As both *T* and *S* have been placed, *H* and *L* can be placed in their respective rows, figure 11-17. Note that care must be exercised not to place a letter in the same row or column with another unless some evidence exists to support this placement.

P1-C2

P2-C1

L						A	T							
					I			S						
				E					M					
			O							N	P			
	Q												U	
	R													E
S							H							

Figure 11-17 (C). First expansion of reconstruction matrix (U).

(4) With *T* and *H* in the same row, the digraph pairs \overline{PHc} , \overline{TAc} , and $\overline{PHc} \overline{STc}$ can be checked. Assuming \overline{PHc} to be \overline{THp} , encipherment is possible by:

P1-C2	P2-C1	P1-C2	P2-C1
<u>T</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>H</u>
or			
<u>H</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>P</u>

In either case it is found that *T* and *P* and *H* and *H* appear in the same rows; that *T* and *H* and *H* and *P* lie in the same column. By incorporating this relationship with that previously established, the matrix will now appear as shown in figure 11-18.

P1-C2

P2-C1

L						A	T							
					I			S						
				E					M					
	T		O				P			N				
			Q										U	
		R												E
S	H						H							

Figure 11-18 (C). Second expansion of reconstruction matrix (U).

Position E7-13 *HL OR AH OP AM QN HL PO*
 ST RO (NG) PO (IN)(TS) ST OP
 D7-13 *IP EV RA HM QC TI SE SN*
 -P (OS)(IT) IO (NS)
 G1-7 *SP BB EM LN TA SE SN*
 EN AT IO (NS)

(1) In the first sequence above, a possible word in STRONG POINT is easily visible. In the second and third cases, no word is apparent, except possibly POSITION in the second. However, note the

(5) The assumed ENEMY for the cipher digraphs $\overline{EM} \overline{ME} \overline{YA}$ provides a further clue. Note that \overline{EMc} , \overline{Ec} , and \overline{Mc} lie at opposite corners of a rectangle. Thus Ep and Mp must lie at the diagonally opposite corners. Mp in P1-C2 represents a new placement falling below *E*. *Ec* of P2-C1, however, has been previously placed, thus when it is moved up to its proper position to the opposite diagonal corner, *R* or P1-C2 of the same row must also be brought up. The matrix, rearranged to show this relationship is shown in figure 11-19

						A	T								C1
P1	L										S				
												O	M	E	P2
C2			R								P			N	
		T													
				Q										U	
	S	H													
										Y					
											H				
														Y	

Figure 11-19 (C). Rearrangement and expansion of reconstruction matrix (U).

b. Further analysis of the ciphertext follows essentially the same route, with additional values being provided by the letters already inscribed in the matrix. For example, using the matrix above it is possible to find the following sequence of partial plaintext in the message:

similarity in the endings. If \overline{TIc} and \overline{SNc} are reversed transparencies, the endings produced will be similar "TIONS." The possibility of this being correct can be checked by referring to the preceding

tabulation of expected occurrences of the cipher digraph and appendix D (table D-4). Here we find the expected occurrences to be:

\overline{TIC} 82	\overline{SNC} 38
\overline{ITC} 73	\overline{NSc} 71

(2) Obviously the results are inconclusive in the case of the reversal of \overline{TIC} ; however, when considered with \overline{IOp} and \overline{NSp} , the \overline{ITC} combination seems to outweigh its negative value. Moreover, an additional test, which is always to be preferred, is to try it in the system. Using all values assumed in the first case and those above, the matrix now can be expanded as illustrated in figure 11-20.

P1	1	L		I	A	T		A	P2
	2		N			S			
C2	3		R	E		O	M	E	C1
	4		T	O	M	Q	P	N	U
	5	S	H				H		G
	6				Y			Y	

Figure 11-20 (C). Third expansion of reconstruction matrix (U).

c. As analysis continues, the process becomes more and more mechanical. The only problem likely to be encountered is in reducing the matrix to its original dimensions, the danger being that false relationships may be established by an arbitrary telescoping. In respect to reducing the size of the matrix, it is possible to shift rows and columns to put the matrix in its correct order, but in so doing the individual letters must not be disturbed. For this purpose a partially recovered matrix as above usually exhibits sufficient characteristics to permit this. For example, assuming that a mixed alphabet of some type is used in each square, an inspection of the letters of the matrix allows the following observation.

(1) Row three R - E - / - O M E contains letters so far out of sequence as to suggest a keyword, these letters possibly being part of the keyword. Thus it may be the first row.

(2) Row one L - - - I A / T - - - - A exhibits some alphabeticity if the P1-C2 values are A I L. Further, since the A appears in this row, as well as I and L, it may be possible to represent that part of the alphabet immediately following the keyword, or perhaps part of the keyword. In either case it may be the second row.

(3) Row six, containing the Y in both squares, can be the last row. Row four, if the T and U are

not part of the keyword, must precede row six to maintain alphabeticity. Row 5, since it contains S and H in the first square, must represent a portion of the keyword. On the basis of the foregoing assumptions the matrix can now be drawn up as in figure 11-21.

P1		R	E		O	M	E		C1
	L			I	A	T		A	
C2	S	H				H		G	P2
		T	O	M	Q	P	N	U	
		N				S			
				Y				Y	

Figure 11-21 (C). Initial construction of two-square matrix (U).

d. The same shifting in respect to columns is possible. Again, however, individual letters cannot be disturbed. In rows three and four of square P2-C1 the letters H - - - - G and P - - N seem to be reversed in respect to their normal alphabetic order. If these letters are juxtaposed according to their normal sequence (considering the O to be used in the keyword, and maintaining columnar order), this square would appear as in figure 11-22.

P1-C2						E	M	O		P2-C1
							A	T		
							G	H		
						N		P	U	
								S		
									Y	

Figure 11-22 (C). Rearrangement of square P2-C1 (U).

(1) A similar inspection of the square P1-C2 shows less in the way of alphabetic patterns that can be directly interpreted. However, consideration of other factors can provide assistance. Having assumed a keyword is being used, it can further be assumed that the letters VWXYZ probably are not used; thus they are the last line. Y then would appear in the second column and consequently so would A and Q. They begin the same column. Note that in row three, O and M are reversed. Thus the square can be put in the order shown in figure 11-23.

P1-C2	R		E							P2-C1
	L		I		A					
	S	H								
			M	O	Q	O				
		N								
		T								
				Y	(Z)					

Figure 11-23 (C). Rearrangement of square P1-C2 (U).

(2) The two squares in matrix form appear in figure 11-24.

P1		R		E					P2
C2		L		I		A			C1
		S	H						
			T	M	O	Q			
			N						
							Y	(Z)	

Figure 11-24 (C). Partially recovered horizontal two-square matrix (U).

e. Matrix reorganization and recovery can be continued or the analysis of the ciphertext can be resumed. Sometimes recovery aids in the final solution as it provides a true framework for the insertion of additional values as they are found, thus avoiding the possibility of establishing false

relationship. On the other hand, the paucity of values recovered in an initial entry and the use of a random alphabet may prevent matrix recovery until the message itself is deciphered. In any case, both matrix recovery and analysis of the text follows the same techniques just explained.

Section III. (C) ANALYSIS OF PLAYFAIR CIPHERS

11-7. (C) Rules of Encipherment

a. In the analysis of Playfair cipher messages, the reconstruction of the enciphering matrix and the recovery of the plaintext are simultaneous and inseparable operations. This is due to the cryptographic nature of the system where both the cipher and plain values occur in the same matrix, being differentiated only by the rules of encipherment, and this differently in each specific case of digraphic encipherment. The rules of encipherment dictate the possible manner and combinations of placement of plaintext equivalencies in a given situation. Further, their specific placement determines their equivalencies in other combinations. Thus the two processes should be conducted as one.

process of recovery of the ciphertext is illustrated using the matrix shown in figure 11-25.

A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	K
L	M	N	O	P
Q	R	S	T	U
V	W	X	Y	Z

Figure 11-25 (U). Example Playfair square (U).

b. The relationship of the rules of encipherment upon the plain to cipher equivalencies, and their effect upon establishing the same values in the

(1) Where substitution involves letters at opposite ends of a rectangle, the following relationships exist as shown in figure 11-26.

	$\overline{AZp} = \overline{Evc}$
RECIPROCAL	$\overline{EVp} = \overline{AZc}$
	$\overline{ZAp} = \overline{VEc}$
	$\overline{VEp} = \overline{ZAc}$
REVERSIBLE	$\overline{AZp} = \overline{Evc}$
	$\overline{ZAp} = \overline{VEc}$
	$\overline{EVp} = \overline{AZc}$
	$\overline{VEp} = \overline{ZAc}$
	$\overline{GOp} = \overline{IMc}$
	$\overline{OGp} = \overline{MIc}$
	$\overline{IMp} = \overline{GOc}$
	$\overline{MIp} = \overline{OGc}$

Figure 11-26 (C). Reciprocal reversible relationships (U).

If the letters are assigned numbers as the possible combination shown here:

$$\begin{array}{c} 12=34 \\ \overline{AZp} = \overline{Evc} \end{array}$$

They may be expressed as an equation. Thus:

Reciprocal	12=34	Reversible
	21=43	
Reciprocal	34=12	Reversible
	43=21	

(2) Where substitution involves letters of the same row or column these relationships may occur:

$$\begin{array}{cc} 12 & 34 \\ \overline{BCp} = \overline{CDc} & \\ \overline{CBp} = \overline{DCc} & \\ 21 & 43 \end{array}$$

Note that in this case, only reversibility occurs and not reciprocity. That is:

$$\begin{array}{l} \overline{CDc} \text{ does not equal } \overline{BCp} \text{ nor does} \\ \overline{DCc} \text{ equal } \overline{CBp} \end{array}$$

(3) From the above it can be seen that in all cases, column, row, or rectangle (where 12=34), 21=43. But only when 1 and 2 form appropriate diagonal corners of a rectangle does 34=12 and 43=21.

c. The position that a letter occupies in the Playfair matrix coupled with the method of encipherment determines its limitation in combination with other letters, and consequently its equivalent value. Any given letter can be represented by eight other letters, the four occupying the same row and the four occupying the same column.

(1) Thus, where encipherment occurs along a row or column, a given letter can be combined with only eight other letters, which can be further limited to four if the direction of encipherment is known.

(2) In the case of encipherment involving a rectangle, the same letter can be combined with 16 other letters, 8 of its own row and column plus the 8 of the other letter forming the diagonally opposite corner. Where encipherment is along a row or column the letter may be combined with 8 other letters, 4 for the row and 4 for the column. Of the 24 possible equations that can be formed by a given letter, as either the initial or final letters of a digraph, five will indicate a corresponding repetition of a given plaintext letter.

d. The effect of the above observation is such to allow the formulation of certain rules in respect to the identification of digraphs produced by a Playfair cipher. These rules are:

- (1) *Rule 1.* In all cases if $1.2=3.4$
 then $2.1=4.3$
 In case of rectangle if $1.2=3.4$
 then $2.1=4.3$
 then $3.4=1.2$
 then $4.3=2.1$

(2) *Rule 2.* Where $1.2p=3.4c$, for example $\overline{ENp} = \overline{CPc}$, there is a minimum probability of one in five that any other cipher digraph beginning with Cc has Ep as the initial letter of its corresponding plain digraph. Also, any cipher digraph which ends in Pc has the same probability of Np as the last letter of the corresponding plain digraph.

(3) *Rule 3.* In those equations where $1.2p=3.4c$, 1 and 3 can never be identical, nor can 2 and 4 ever be identical.

(4) *Rule 4.* In those equations $1.2p=3.4c$ where 2 and 3 are identical, the letters are all in the same row or column, and in the relative order 1-2-4, 2 and 3 in this case being synonymous. For example; in the matrix above, $\overline{BCp} = \overline{CDc}$. There are five cyclic permutations which will produce the proper sequence. They are:

$$\begin{array}{l} B C D - - \\ - B C D - \\ - - B C D \\ D - - B C \\ C D - - B \end{array}$$

(5) *Rule 5.* In an equation where $1.2p=3.4c$ and 1 and 4 are identical, the letters are again in the row or column but in the order 2-4-3. For example in the matrix above $\overline{DCp}=\overline{EDc}$; thus the order is CDE. The five possible cyclic permutations of this absolute order are:

- CDE - -
- DE - - C
- E - - CD
- - CDE
- CDE -

e. The importance of these rules are that they will allow the formulation of an assumption concerning the arrangement of values within the cipher matrix and the elimination of equivalencies in the cryptogram.

Example:

(1) Rule 1, where $1.2=3.4$ and $2.1=4.3$, gives rise to digraphic idiomorphs which may be used in the assumption of probable words. Thus the word ATTACK can be enciphered by the matrix in figure 11-25:

	<u>AB</u>	<u>BA</u>		
P	AT	TA	CK	
C	<u>DQ</u>	<u>QD</u>	<u>EH</u>	<u>ATp=DQc</u>
				<u>TAp=QDc</u>

(2) Rule 2, where the probability of similarity exists, indicates that once each common combination as ERp, ORp, and ENp have been assumed or determined, the rules can be used in discovering additional digraphs and partial words.

(3) Rule 3, where 1 and 3, and 2 and 4 can never be identical, aids in the elimination of possibilities when a specific message is being studied.

(4) Rules 4 and 5 permit the establishment of values and their correct sequencing in the recovery of the matrix.

11-8. (C) Analysis of Playfair Cipher

a. To illustrate the steps and process involved in the solution of a Playfair cipher, the following example will be used. Assume that the analyst has previously identified the message as the product of a Playfair cipher on the basis that it contains an even number of letters, that repeats and spacings are multiples of two, that no doublets occur, that several letters are missing, and finally the discovery of what appears to be Playfair idiomorphs in the repeated sequence. Moreover, for the purpose of this illustration, it is assumed that the analyst has divided the plaintext into its digraphic units, prepared a frequency distribution, and tabulated significant repeated sequences, figure 11-27① and 11-27②. With the preliminary studies completed, analysis may commence.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A	<u>EC</u>	<u>OG</u>	<u>EC</u>	UR	RO	VQ	AD	ZB	FG	MG	AW	CE	WO	DY	AO
B	<u>EQ</u>	<u>QM</u>	<u>CT</u>	<u>MG</u>	<u>KN</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>IQ</u>	<u>MG</u>	RB	IR	IK	NM	<u>KB</u>	<u>CY</u>
C	<u>AR</u>	<u>IQ</u>	<u>MG</u>	<u>YF</u>	<u>UY</u>	<u>UY</u>	BT	LG	UP	EP	ME	FK	BR	AC	<u>KR</u>
D	<u>CY</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AH</u>	<u>RA</u>	WA	EM	CI	EC	AW	CE	SW	CE	<u>QE</u>	<u>PO</u>	<u>ME</u>
E	<u>EM</u>	<u>VO</u>	<u>ME</u>	LD	CU	<u>QA</u>	<u>PQ</u>	RE	LQ	UY	<u>GT</u>	<u>TV</u>	PB	KC	<u>QP</u>
F	EA	YF	UY	BN	GO	NC	LD	PK	RF	LZ	CI	DT	KR	EA	QI
G	<u>GT</u>	<u>TV</u>	EC	LF	OR	LR	<u>QA</u>	<u>PQ</u>	AR	BD	LG	QL	OZ	QI	BN
H	CF	TG	FK	DN	CR	FK	GR	PZ	ZA	AE	GF	DQ	RG	CY	EQ
I	CW	QU	QF	AL	EC	BS	CI	EM	LU	PC					

Figure 11-27① (C). Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U).

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	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
A			—		—			—				—			==			≡					==			
B				—										==				—	—	—						
C					≡	—			≡												—			≡		
D															—		—			—				—		—
E	—		≡										≡			—	==									
F							—				≡															
G						—									—			—		==	—					
H																										
I										—								==	—							
J											—															
K		—													—											
L				==		—	—											—	—			—				
M					≡	≡	≡																			
N			—											—												
O							—												—							—
P		—	—							—																—
Q	==				—	—			==			—	—				—					—				
R	==	—			—	—	—								—											
S																										—
T																							==			
U							—										—	—							≡	
V																										
W	—																									
X			—																							
Y					==																					
Z	—	—																								

Figure 11-27② (C). Digraphic frequency distribution Playfair cipher (U).

b. A close examination of the text reveals the following repeated sequences:

- Line B5 *KN RA AR IQ MG*
- B14-C3 *KB CY AR IQ MG*
- C15-D4 *KR CY AR AH RA*
- D14-E3 *PO ME EM VO ME*
- E6-G8 *QA PQ*
- E11-G1 *GT TV*

(1). The first sequence, with its ABBA pattern suggests the word BATTALION digraphically divided as:

+ B AT TA LI ON
KN RA AR IQ MG

If these values are correct, the second listed repeats may also be the same words, enciphered with an X between the TT doublet, divided as:

BA TX TA LI ON
KB CY AR IQ MG

By using the values assumed in the first two sequences, the third sequence equals:

TX TA AT
KR CY AR AH AR

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It is obvious that this sequence can hardly be "BATTALION," but another common word in which the TT doublet occurs is "ATTACK." If this is the correct word for the sequence, the $\overline{CKp} = \overline{AHc}$ and $\overline{-Ap} = \overline{KRc}$.

(2) The repeats *QAPQ*, and *GT.TV* are suggestive of the word STOP. However, at this point, the assignment of plaintext values to either would be sheer guess work; therefore, for the moment they are bypassed. The values that have been assumed may now be inserted in the text and again studied for further exploitable patterns. On line B, immediately preceding the assumed word "BATTALION," the digraph \overline{MGc} is noted, which equals \overline{ONp} . Aware that "BATTALION" is often preceded by a number, the possible \overline{ONp} is suggestive of SECOND. The acceptance of this would permit the expansion of the sequence to:

QM CT MG KN RA AR IQ MG
-S E C O N D B A T T A L I O N

If BATTALION in the first instance is preceded by a number, it is very likely to be the case in the second instance as well. From the fact that there normally are only three battalions to a regiment, the analyst may infer that either "FIRST" or "THIRD" probably is the second number. In dealing with numbers, one tends to keep them in order. Therefore, the word THIRD would be assumed. This sequence then can be expanded to:

IR IK NM KB CY AR IQ MG
-T H I R D B A T X T A L I O N

Thus the remaining digraphs *RB IR*, may equate to the word "AND," as

RB IR
AN DT

c. Once a few values have been tentatively established, the analyst can, using the rules of encipherment discussed in the previous chapter, expand the values recovered. First a tabulation of all assumed values is made and, using rule 1 where $1.2=3.4$ then $2.1=4.3$, the reversals are shown in figure 11-28.

Assumed Values

Rule 1 Reversal

$$\overline{-Sp} = \overline{QMc}$$

$$\overline{ESp} = \overline{MQc}$$

$$\overline{ECp} = \overline{CTc}$$

$$\overline{CEp} = \overline{TCc}$$

$$\overline{ONp} = \overline{MGc}$$

$$\overline{NOP} = \overline{GMc}$$

$$\overline{DBp} = \overline{KNc}$$

$$\overline{BDp} = \overline{NKc}$$

$$\overline{ATp} = \overline{RAc}$$

$$\overline{TAp} = \overline{ARc}$$

$$\overline{LIp} = \overline{IQc}$$

$$\overline{ILp} = \overline{QIc}$$

$$\overline{ANp} = \overline{RBc}$$

$$\overline{NAp} = \overline{BRc}$$

$$\overline{DTp} = \overline{TRc}$$

$$\overline{TDp} = \overline{RTc}$$

$$\overline{HIp} = \overline{IKc}$$

$$\overline{IHp} = \overline{KIc}$$

$$\overline{RDp} = \overline{NMc}$$

$$\overline{DRp} = \overline{MNc}$$

$$\overline{BAp} = \overline{KBc}$$

$$\overline{ABp} = \overline{BKc}$$

$$\overline{TXp} = \overline{CYc}$$

$$\overline{XTp} = \overline{YCc}$$

$$\overline{-Ap} = \overline{KRc}$$

$$\overline{A-p} = \overline{RKc}$$

$$\overline{CKp} = \overline{AHc}$$

$$\overline{KCp} = \overline{HAc}$$

Figure 11-28 (C). Use of rule 1 to determine plaintext values (U).

(1) The next step is to apply rules 4 and 5 to the above equations in order to recover possible row and column sequences of the enciphering matrix. Both lists are examined for equation of $1.2=3.4$ where 2 and 3, and 1 and 4 are identical. The following equations are noted.

$$\overline{ECp} = \overline{CTc}$$

$$\overline{BAp} = \overline{KBc}$$

$$\overline{TAp} = \overline{ARc}$$

$$\overline{LIp} = \overline{IQc}$$

$$\overline{HIp} = \overline{IKc}$$

Rule 4 states that in the equation 1.2=3.4 where 2 and 3 are identical, the relative order from left to right or top to bottom is 1-2-4. Thus the equations shown become:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{ECp} + \overline{CTc} &= ECT \\ \overline{TAp} + \overline{ARc} &= TAR \\ \overline{LIp} + \overline{IQc} &= LIQ \\ \overline{HIp} + \overline{TKc} &= HIK \end{aligned}$$

Rule 5 states that in an equation 1.2=3.4 where 1 and 4 are identical, the relative order is 2-4-3 from left to right or top to bottom. Then the equation $\overline{BAp} = \overline{KBc}$ becomes ABK.

(2) Note that only the assumed values are used. The values obtained by rule 1 could have been used equally as much. However, the results would have only been the reversal of what has been established. As a rule, in the beginning stages it is not wise to mix the two, as it tends to introduce too many possibilities of deriving the same value. Moreover, note that only the absolute order of a sequence is being used, not all of its permutations. At this stage, their introduction would again only result in confusion. As analysis continues, and if the accepted absolute permutation is not consistent with the matrix dimensions and enciphering process observed, the other permutations can be used.

(3) Examination of the sequences, noting their common letters, indicates that they can be chained, figure 11-29, to form a pseudo-matrix.

ECT	E	C	T	A	R	or	E			
TAR			L	B			C		H	
LIQ		H	I	K			T	L	I	Q
HIK			Q				A	B	K	
ABK							R			

Figure 11-29 (ϕ). Construction of preliminary matrix (U).

C-15 KR CY AR AH RA WA EM CI EC AW CE SW CE QE
 A TX TA CK AT R- TH RE ER ER -T
 F-13 KR EA QI GT TV EC LF OR LR QA PQ
 -A RT IL RE NT ST
 G-9 AR BD LG QL OZ QI BN
 TA NK IT IL LB

(1) In each of the passages above, sufficient plaintext values are at hand to lend substance to good assumptions. The first phrase is obviously a time reference relating to the time of the planned attack. The plaintext bit THREE can only be a part of the word "THREE." The digraph \overline{AWc} preceding

Note that in each case the values that can be obtained are the same and that the sequential order of each sequence is maintained. Only their arrangement differs.

(4) Using the pseudo-matrix the analyst can now scan the list of assumed values above in figure 11-27 and add values to the pseudo-matrix, where required, to complete an equation. For example $\overline{ANp} = \overline{RBc}$ is noted, as well as its reversal $\overline{NAp} = \overline{BRc}$. With this the N can be placed as shown below. By continuing the same process, the equations $\overline{DTp} = \overline{IRc}$, $\overline{DBp} = \overline{KNc}$, and $\overline{RDp} = \overline{NMc}$ are located in the list and, once fitted, permit the expansion of the matrix as shown in figure 11-30.

E	C	T	A	R
		L	B	N
	H	I	K	D
		Q		M
	X	Y		

Figure 11-30 (ϕ). First expansion of matrix (U).

d. With a partially recovered matrix which will logically produce all the assumed values listed, it is now possible to return to the text and attempt to break out further portions. With so few values it is not expected to produce any degree of intelligibility other than bits and parts. These again will be the basis of further assumptions and consequent expansion of the matrix. Following the partial decipherment of the message, the following significant passages are observed.

\overline{ERp} is likely to be EZ to form ZERO. Logically expanding, the phrase shown below can be developed "ATTACK AT ZERO THREE ZERO ZERO." With this phrase, the following equations, figure 11-31, can be developed and the matrix expanded as shown.

$$\overline{ZE_p} = \overline{WAc}$$

$$\overline{RO_p} = \overline{EMc}$$

$$\overline{TH_p} = \overline{CIc}$$

$$\overline{EZ_p} = \overline{AWc}$$

$$\overline{OZ_p} = \overline{SWc}$$

$$\overline{OT_p} = \overline{QEc}$$

E	C	T	A	R
		L	B	N
	H	I	K	D
O		Q	S	M
W	X	Y	Z	

Figure 11-31 (C). Second expansion of matrix (U).

(2) The second phrase obviously consists of the words ARTILLERY REGIMENT, probably

followed by STOP.

For example:

F13 KR EA QI GT TV EC LF OR LR QA PQ
 -A RT IL (LE)(RY) RE (GI)(ME) NT ST (OP)

On this basis, the following equations can be produced, figure 11-32, and the matrix expanded again.

$$\overline{LE_p} = \overline{GTC}$$

$$\overline{RY_p} = \overline{TVc}$$

$$\overline{GI_p} = \overline{LFC}$$

$$\overline{ST_p} = \overline{QAc}$$

$$\overline{OP_p} = \overline{PQc}$$

E	C	T	A	R
G		L	B	N
F	H	I	K	D
O	P	Q	S	M
W	X	Y	Z	V

Figure 11-32 (C). Third expansion of matrix (U).

(3) The third phrase TANK UNITS WILL, where $\overline{UN_p} = \overline{LGC}$ provides the one additional value. Thus, the matrix is completed as shown in figure 11-33. It is now a simple matter to decipher the cryptogram.

E	C	T	A	R
G	U	L	B	N
F	H	I	K	D
O	P	Q	S	M
W	X	Y	Z	V

Figure 11-33 (C). Reconstructed Playfair matrix (U).

11-9. (C) Completion of the matrix

a. In the preceding example, the proposition that recovery of the text and reconstruction of the matrix proceeds simultaneously is shown. The question yet to be answered is whether it is the correct matrix. The fact that a message can be deciphered does not prove its correctness. This condition arises out of the fact that for each specific matrix there are 24 additional cyclic permutations which will give exactly the same results. The importance of the recovery of the original matrix lies in the possibility of predicting future matrix values given the knowledge of current matrix arrangement.

b. In the case of a keyword mixed sequence as the Playfair matrix, recovery of the permutation of the square presents little difficulty, using as a base the UVWXYZ cluster which rarely forms a part of the keyword. To observe this, examine again the matrix in figure 11-34, just previously recovered.

E	C	T	A	R
G	U	L	B	N
F	H	I	K	D
O	P	Q	S	M
W	X	Y	Z	V

Figure 11-34 (C). Playfair matrix reconstructed (U).

The last three rows are obviously out of sequence, *V* should precede the *W*, *M* should precede the *O*, and *D* should precede the *F*. By a simple shift of the last column to the first position, the matrix is reordered and now in its correct sequence. This can be noted in the appearance of the keyword RECTANGULAR. This is a simplified example, but it serves to illustrate the point that in keyword mixed sequences, the alphabetic sequence of that part of the alphabet outside the keyword sequence serves to reorder the matrix. Other cases are more complicated, but the basic principles remain the same.

c. In the case of Playfair matrices based on a transposition mixed sequence, the recovery of the original presents a different problem for which different procedures must be used. Essentially the process lies in the recognition of patterns in one of the original matrix's permutations and, using this as a base, reconstructing the original. The following illustrates this process.

(1) Given an original matrix, shown in figure 11-35, recovery of a transposition mixed sequence and the keyword follows the same procedures as previously given for transposition ciphers.

A	G	W	C	Q
E	T	F	M	Z
H	S	I	N	L
D	V	P	B	U
R	O	Y	K	X

Figure 11-35 (Q). Playfair matrix (U).

By scanning the rows of the matrix, which correspond to the columns of the keyword matrix, several bits which exhibit alphabetic progression can be found. They are: *AGW*, *LDV*, *FMZ*, *PBU*, and *YKX*. Set on end as columns and juxtaposed in alphabetic sequence by last letter, they form the order:

P L A Y F
B D G K M
U V W X Z

With this, the beginning of the keyword should be obvious, leading to a rapid solution. But if it was not, by shifting to the second row and building further on its sequential pattern, the following sequence would be produced, as shown in figure 11-36.

8 7 1 0 4 6 9 2 5 3

P L A Y F I R C H E
B D G K M N O Q S T
U V W X Z

Figure 11-36 (C). Recovery of mixed keyword sequence (U).

(2) Where the analyst works from a permutation of the original enciphering matrix, a modification in this procedure is required as a preliminary step. He must first find some one permutation which shows the sequence characteristics on which he can base the recovery of the keyword. For example, given the matrix permutation of figure 11-37, recovery of the keyword would be difficult, as its rows do not exhibit columnar order of the transposition matrix to the required degree.

F	X	R	M	Y
T	G	A	N	C
Q	I	K	Z	H
W	O	S	L	E
B	U	D	V	P

Figure 11-37 (Q). Matrix permutation (U).

Since a permutation of the rows does not affect keyword recovery, the analyst need only permute the columns. This can be done by constructing a 5 x 9 matrix of repeated columns, as illustrated in figure 11-38.

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
F	X	R	M	Y	F	X	R	M
T	G	A	N	C	T	G	A	N
Q	I	K	Z	H	Q	I	K	Z
W	O	S	L	E	W	O	S	L
B	U	D	V	P	B	U	D	V

Figure 11-38 (Q). Repetition of column permutations (U).

(3) Testing each five by five combination, the analyst will soon find a permutation containing the appropriate sequence. In this case, it is the fifth, shown in figure 11-39.

R	M	<u>Y</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>X</u>
A	N	C	T	<u>G</u>
<u>K</u>	<u>Z</u>	H	Q	I
S	<u>L</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	O
<u>D</u>	<u>V</u>	P	<u>B</u>	<u>U</u>

Figure 11-39 (C). Selection of correct permutation (U).

From this permutation using the underlined sequences, the original keyword and matrix can be recovered as illustrated in figure 11-40.

8 7 6 0 3 9 1 4 5 2
 P O L Y G R A H I C
 B D E F K M N Q S T
 U V W X Z

A	N	C	T	G
K	Z	H	Q	I
S	L	E	W	O
D	V	P	B	U
R	M	Y	F	X

Keyword: POLYGRAPHIC

Figure 11-40 (C). Recovery of keyword mixed sequence and original enciphering matrix (U).

PART FIVE (C)
POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS
CHAPTER 12 (C)
PERIODIC POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION

Section I. (C) INTRODUCTION

12-1. (C) Mono- and Polyalphabetic Cipher Systems

a. In previous paragraphs, the cipher systems presented used one basic alphabet for the encipherment of messages. Thus they are classified as monoalphabetic ciphers. It is true that certain of those systems provide for variant values, yet they are not classified as polyalphabetic. The essential difference between monoalphabetic and polyalphabetic substitution lies in the primary objective of the system.

(1) In those monoalphabetic substitution systems having variant values, the object is to suppress so far as possible the characteristic frequency of letters and resultant word patterns. Several methods are shown, some which provide several different cipher values as equivalents for all the plaintext letters, and others which provide only variant values as cipher equivalents for the high-frequency letters. In each system there are conditions inherent in the method of encipherment itself, conditions that produce, in the cryptogram, certain definite clues that lead to the establishment of the equivalencies for one plaintext value.

(2) Moreover, each of those systems derives its security from the care with which the cryptographer performs his task. Given the free choice of using variant values, or if he was hurried or slipshod and used the same variant value consistently, he would materially detract from the security of the system.

(3) In either case, the end result is that cryptograms are produced whose true security lies in the

minimum use of the system. Given a number of cryptograms from the same system, or a few combined with poor encryption procedures, solution is relatively easy.

b. In the case of true polyalphabetic substitution systems, the object is to establish a definite procedure for the automatic shifting or changing of a number of cipher alphabets employed in the encipherment of a single message during its encipherment, thus producing variant values. Furthermore, this method, within certain limits, is beyond the whim of the cryptographer. The total result of such a system is to greatly increase the degree of difficulty in establishing the cipher equivalencies of a given plaintext value. There are a number of true polyalphabetic cipher systems, although for military their number is limited for reasons of practicality. All true polyalphabetic systems will exhibit following essential characteristics.

(1) Each plaintext letter is represented by two or more cipher equivalents, their exact identities being determined by the position they occupy in the plaintext.

(2) One and the same cipher letter represents two or more different plaintext letters, the exact equivalencies being determined by the system itself.

12-2. (C) Example of Polyalphabetic Substitution

a. Polyalphabetic substitution is illustrated in figure 12-1.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
C2	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
C3	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
C4	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
C5	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
C6	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q

Key:

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5
 E N E M Y R E E N F O R C E M E N T S S E E N
 G V T T C I G M C M S I E M B L R K U A T L R

6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
 I N V I C I N I T Y O F H I L L O N E
 Z P D X J M E K B N V J Y K T A V R V

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2
 Z E R O Z E R O N I N E P O S S I B L E
 B M G V D V T W C P R V R W H Z M S N M

3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5
 A T T A C K I N D I C A T E D
 P A X R E S X U H Z E I I L H

G V T T C I G M C M S I E M B L R K U A T L R Z P
 D X J M E K B N V J Y K T A V R V B M G V D V T W
 C P R V R W H Z M S N M P A X R E S X U H Z E I I
 L H X X X

Figure 12-1 (C). Example, polyalphabetic substitution (U).

b. In the system above, the cipher equivalent for the first plaintext value is drawn from the first cipher component (Ep=Gc), the second from the second (Np=Vc), and so forth until the sixth cipher component is reached. At this point, the seventh letter of the message, the first cipher component, is used once again as the source of the cipher equivalency. Thus the frequency of the plaintext letter and any charac-

teristic pattern that might occur in the plaintext are suppressed.

c. The method of encipherment demonstrated above can be duplicated with a simple strip arrangement and a numeric key which corresponds to the different juxtaposition of the cipher and plain sequence above. For example, the alphabet could be reproduced as follows:

P ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
 C ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRS etc.

(1) In figure 12-1, the successive juxtapositions of the plain to cipher are Ap=Cc1, Ic2, Pc3, Hc4, Ec5, and Rc6. These juxtapositions can be indicated by the assignment of numeric values to each. Thus, they may be indicated as 3-9-16-8-5-18, where 3 indicates the third letter of the cipher sequence (c), 9 indicates the ninth letter in the cipher sequence (1), and so forth. These numbers indicating the sequential position of the letters are the cyclic setting of the strip.

(2) To encipher the message given above, the keys can be written out horizontally and the message inscribed in column beneath the key. The strip alphabet is set at its first key setting (3), where Ap=Cc and all letters below this key are enciphered. The setting is then changed to the next key, 9, when Ap=Ic and all letters below this key are enciphered. The same process is continued until the entire message is enciphered; then it is transferred to five-

letter groups. A partial example is shown below in figure 12-2 using the same data as in figure 12-1.

3	9	16	8	5	18
E	N	E	M	Y	R
<u>G</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>I</u>
E	E	N	F	O	R
<u>G</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>I</u>
C	E	M	E	N	T
<u>E</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>K</u>
S	S	E	E	N	I
<u>U</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>Z</u>

Ciphertext : *GVTTC IGMCM SIEMB LRKUA TLRZ. ... etc.*

Figure 12-2 (C). Columnar encipherment duplicating key period (U).

12-3. (C) Classification of Polyalphabetic Substitution Systems

a. Polyalphabetic substitution ciphers can be classed into two distinct types, periodic systems and aperiodic systems. The periodic systems include those whose cryptographic treatment results in the production of cyclic phenomena in the cryptographic text. Note, for example, the columnar encryption process just demonstrated. Therein, the cyclic nature of periodic polyalphabetic substitution can be seen in the repetition of constant plain to cipher equivalencies in each column, i.e. in the first column $E_p=Gc$, in the second, $E_p=Mc$, in the third $E_p=Tc$, and in the fourth $E_p=Lc$. The cryptographic process of aperiodic systems on the other hand is designed to eliminate this cyclic phenomena. The specifics of this system and its analysis are treated in chapter 14.

b. The cyclic phenomena inherent to a periodic system may be exhibited externally, as in the system above. In these cases, the phenomena is said to be patent. In some ciphers the cyclic phenomena is not exhibited in the cryptographic text, in which case they are said to be latent. The periodicity of the cipher under these conditions must be uncovered by a step to be explained, preliminary to analysis.

(1) The periodicity of a given system may be quite definite, determinable with mathematical preciseness, in which case the periodicity is said to be fixed. The example above fits this definition, the period there being fixed at six.

(2) In other instances, the periodicity may be more or less flexible, depending upon the system, but subject to definite limits imposed by that system. In such a case the periodicity is said to be flexible.

c. A primary classification of periodic systems is by the number and method of usage of the cipher alphabets. All periodic systems are considered to be either a repeating key or a progressive alphabet system.

(1) In a repeating key system, only a few of a whole possible set of cipher alphabets are used in enciphering a given message. These alphabets used in a fixed sequence determined by the key are employed repeatedly until the message is enciphered. Possibly the same key may be used to encipher a second message, or a new key may be used for each message. The key itself may be a secret word, a phrase, or a number. In any case, it determines the numbers, identity, and sequence of use of the cipher alphabets.

(2) In a progressive alphabet system, all the cipher alphabets comprising the complete set for the system are used one after the other, in turn, for the encipherment of a message. When the last alphabet is used, the sequence of use is begun anew.

12-4. (C) Classification of Cipher Alphabets

a. The substitution process in polyalphabetic ciphers involves the use of a number of alphabets which can be derived by a number of methods. The exact nature of their preparation, which determines their characteristics, plays an important role in the solution of polyalphabetic ciphers. Cipher alphabets for polyalphabetic substitution are classified as independent and derived.

(1) Independent or unrelated cipher alphabets contain separate and distinct plain and cipher sequences having no relationship to one another. Such sequences can be derived by any of the methods previously discussed, i.e. they may be keyword mixed columnar, keyed columnar mixed, or decimated alphabets. The solution of cryptograms produced with independent alphabets is made more difficult by the very reason that no relationship exists between them. For this reason, in the course of analysis, values are not transferable. However, since their production and handling in the cryptographic process poses problems affecting their practicability, they are not as favored as interrelated cipher alphabets. Hence, they are not as often encountered.

(2) Derived or interrelated alphabets, as the names imply, are produced by the interaction of two primary components which, when juxtaposed at various points, yield a number of secondary alphabets. The number of secondary alphabets, given two constant primary components, is equal to the number of different points of coincidence. In effect then, what is brought about is either a strip system, such as the one shown in paragraph 12-2c, or a

cipher alphabet, also shown in paragraph 12-2a, which has one plain component and several cipher sequences, all of like structure, joined together at varying points of coincidence. The cipher sequences generated by the juxtaposition are termed secondary alphabets.

b. For the purpose of cryptanalysis, some of the more common configurations of the primary components and secondary alphabets derived therefrom are given in the following:

(1) *Case I.* The primary components are both normal sequences.

(a) The sequences proceed in the same direction; the secondary alphabets produced are direct standard alphabets offset at points of juxtaposition.

(b) The sequences proceed in opposite directions; the secondary alphabets are reversed standard alphabets and are reciprocal with the same limitations as discussed in paragraph 7-6a.

(2) *Case II.* The primary components are not both normal alphabets.

(a) The plain component is a standard alphabet and the cipher component is a mixed sequence; the secondary alphabets are then mixed alphabets.

(b) The plain component is a mixed alphabet and the cipher component is a normal alphabet; the secondary alphabets are again mixed alphabets.

(3) *Case III.* Both components are mixed sequences.

(a) Components are identical mixed sequences proceeding in the same direction; the secondary alphabets are also mixed sequences.

(b) Components are identical mixed sequences proceeding in opposite directions; the secondary alphabets are mixed sequences and also are reciprocal, again with the limitations discussed in paragraph 7-6a.

(c) Components are different mixed sequences either proceeding in the same or opposite directions; the secondary alphabets are mixed alphabets.

12-5. (C) Repeating Key

a. It is the use of a repeating key which imparts the cyclic pattern, or periodicity, to periodic poly-alphabetic substitution. Repeating keys are used to indicate the number, identity, and the sequence of the cipher alphabets used. The key itself, as shown in preceding examples, can be expressed in terms of numbers or letters, both derived from the other, and the letters usually spelling out a word. The literal key may be a word, a phrase, or even a sentence, usually being easily recalled.

b. In the key proper, its total number of elements determine the number of alphabets to be used. The identity of each element determines the specific cipher alphabet used, and its relative order in the key determines the sequence of the cipher alphabets. The total number of cipher alphabets available for use in a given system may be unlimited, except for practical purposes. However, where alphabets are reproduced by sliding two primary alphabets against one another, only 25 cipher alphabets, in the case of English alphabets, are possible. The key then, in some respects, is unlimited as to length. However, in most cases it will be found to correspond to a word, phrase, or sentence, usually one that is easily remembered.

c. To use a key in finding equivalents with sliding primary components, four elements must be known. They are the key letter (k), the index letter (i), the plaintext letter (p), and the cipher letter (c).

(1) The key letter and the index letters indicate the point of coincidence of the cipher and plain component. For example:

$$O_k = A_i$$

	(i)
P	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN OP QRSTUVWXYZ
C	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN OP QRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMN OP QRSTUVWXYZ
	(k)

(2) The meanings associated previously with c and p remain unchanged, c indicating the cipher value and p the plaintext value. Thus to find one value, an equation using these elements may be written as:

$$O_k = A_i; E_p = S_c$$

(3) Note that in the above, two tacit assumptions are involved. First it is accepted that the index letter (i) is found in the plain component and that it is the letter A, and second that the key letter (k)

is found in the cipher component. Normally this is the case. However, it need not be so. The index letter used, and the relative location of k, i, p, and c can be easily changed, only a fixed agreement between the correspondents being required. Thus in a key and equivalency equation, the key and index letter must be specified and the relative location of all elements shown. This can be accomplished very simply, merely by adding a number (1) for the plain component, and (2) for the cipher component to the

equation given above. Thus the conventional method of finding an equivalency is shown as:

$$Ok/2 = Ai/1; Ep/1 = Sc/2$$

(4) As mentioned previously, the normal method

of finding equivalencies need not always be followed. In fact, employing 2 sliding components and the 4-element equation, 12 possible combinations result. However, as the method above is most widely used, only it will be given.

Section II. (X) THEORY OF SOLUTION OF PERIODIC POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION

12-6. (X) The Three Steps of Analysis

a. The cryptography of periodic polyalphabetic substitution, as illustrated previously, is such that its solution may be effected by the completion of three steps in succession. These steps are:

(1) *Determining the period.* The analyst attempts to determine the length of the key which imparts the cyclic periodicity to the system. This is done through the isolation and analysis of groups found repeated in the message. The repeats used in this approach must not be accidental repeats, but repeats which have resulted through a cyclic juxtaposition of similar sequences in the plaintext and similar sequential periods of key usage. In effect, the determination of the period identifies the number of alphabets used in the system as the cyclic periodicity is a result of the use of a number of alphabets.

(2) *Reduction to monoalphabetic terms.* In this step, once the period has been identified, the analyst can divide the text into a number of segments equal to the number of alphabets involved, each of these segments representing that portion of the ciphertext produced by one of the cipher sequences. Thus a polyalphabetic text is reduced to its monoalphabetic bits and is susceptible to analysis on those terms.

(3) *Identification of ciphertext values.* The third step is that of analyzing each of the monoalphabetic ciphertext distributions produced by the second step in order to determine their respective plaintext values. In this step, essentially the same techniques are used as for the analysis of any monoalphabetic cipher.

b. The foregoing steps comprise the general outline of solution for any periodic polyalphabetic substitution cipher systems, regardless of the kind of cipher alphabets involved. There is, of course, some modification required for each particular case.

c. As a matter of course, prior to the analysis, any cryptosystem must first be identified. Identification, in the case of periodic polyalphabetic substitution cipher systems, rests upon the two characteristics of the system, its polyalphabeticity which imparts a relative flatness to the frequency distribution, and the cyclic phenomena within the text. Statistically, computations will indicate that the

message text is random. The cyclic use of a number of alphabets will result in cyclic phenomena indicated by one or more of the following conditions:

(1) Length of message and repeats will not be divisible by a constant factor.

(2) Distance between repeats will be a factor of the period length.

(3) Small cyclic periods, particularly those of even numbers, are apt to produce significantly higher than random digraphic indexes of coincidence.

(4) Statistical computation of each monoalphabetic sequence, the result of step two, usually indicates plaintext, though this is subject to variation due to relative numbers of letters enciphered by each sequence.

12-7. (X) Basis for Determining the Period

a. The external phenomena on which the determination of a system's periodicity is based, is a result of the encipherment of an identical plaintext letter by the same cipher sequence, several times. The repetitions so produced are called casual repetitions since their cause is a direct result of the use of a periodically repeating key. It also happens that different plaintext letters, enciphered by a different cipher sequence, will produce identical cipher letters in the ciphertext. In this case, since the repetitions are produced by the accidental juxtaposition of different values, they are termed accidental repetitions.

b. As the determination of the period length depends upon the analysis of repetition which occurs in the ciphertext, it is obvious that a distinction must be made between causal and accidental repetitions. In the case of single letters, this becomes very difficult as accidental repetitions can occur as frequently as causal repetitions. Thus no basis for distinguishing one from the other is provided. However, in the case of digraphs and polygraphs, the chances of a number of different plaintext letters and cipher sequences coinciding sequentially several times to produce accidental repetitions of ciphertext is greatly reduced. Statistically, the chances of repetitions of varying length occurring in a given number of letters of random text can be computed. Thus the repetitive phenomenon which may be

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expected as a result of pure chance can be duplicated, and provides a means of evaluating the significance of repetitions observed in a ciphertext. If the observed repetitions are no more than would be expected by chance, generally they would not be considered significant. However, if the repetitions exceed the value of chance repetitions, they would

be open to interpretation and exploitation as causal repetitions.

c. A summary of the expected number of appearances of digraphs, trigraphs, tetragraphs, and pentagraphs in samples of random text of 100 to 1000 letters, in increments of 100 is shown in figure 12-3.

Number of letters	Expected number of digraphs occurring exactly x times								
	E(2)	E(3)	E(4)	E(5)	E(6)	E(7)	E(8)	E(9)	E(10)
100	6.21	0.298	0.011						
200	21.8	2.12	0.154	0.009					
300	42.5	6.23	0.683	0.060	0.004				
400	65.3	12.8	1.87	0.220	0.022	0.002			
500	88.1	21.6	3.97	0.582	0.071	0.008			
600	110	32.3	7.11	1.25	0.184	0.023	0.003		
700	129	44.3	11.4	2.35	0.403	0.059	0.008	0.001	
800	145	57.1	16.8	3.96	0.777	0.130	0.019	0.003	
900	158	70.1	23.2	6.16	1.36	0.257	0.043	0.006	0.001
1000	169	83.0	30.6	9.03	2.21	0.466	0.085	0.014	0.002

Number of letters	Exp. number of trigraphs			Number of letters	Tetragraphs		Number of letters	Penta-graphs
	E(2)	E(3)	E(4)		E(2)	E(3)		E(2)
100	0.269	0.001		100	0.010		100	
200	1.10	0.004		200	0.043		200	0.002
300	2.48	0.014		300	0.096		300	0.004
400	4.40	0.033		400	0.171		400	0.007
500	6.85	0.064		500	0.270		500	0.011
600	9.81	0.111	0.001	600	0.389		600	0.015
700	13.3	0.175	0.002	700	0.530		700	0.021
800	17.3	0.261	0.003	800	0.693		800	0.027
900	21.8	0.371	0.005	900	0.877		900	0.034
1000	26.8	0.505	0.008	1000	1.08	0.001	1000	0.042

Figure 12-3 (C). Table of expected polygraphs (U).

The numbers in columns E(2), E(3), etc., refer to the numbers of times a given number of digraphs can be expected to occur by chance in the sampling of letters given in the column at the left margin. Thus in a sample of 300 letters of random text, i.e. periodic polyalphabetic substitution, 43 digraphs can be expected to appear twice, 6 digraphs can be expected to appear 3 times, and 1 digraph can be expected to appear 4 times. The decimal fractions that follow in the succeeding columns of the same row may be interpreted as follows: the value 0.683 under column E(4) means that in 100 samples of 300 letters each, about 68 of them will have a digraph which occurs 4 times; 0.060 under column E(5) indicates

that in 100 samples of 300 random letters, 6 samples will contain a digraph occurring 5 times. Thus in the tables, the number within the brackets indicates the number of polygraphs, and the number in each column below that symbol indicates the number of times of their occurrence in a message or messages.

12-8. (C) Determining Periodicity

a. Using the statistical information contained in the foregoing table, the determination of periodicity of a cryptogram is a relatively simple matter. As an illustration, the following cryptogram shown in figure 12-4 with repeated groups underlined, will be used.

	5	10	15	20	25
A	<u>USYES</u>	<u>ECPMP</u>	<u>LCCLN</u>	<u>XBWCS</u>	<u>OXUVD</u>
D	<u>SCRHT</u>	<u>HXIPL</u>	<u>IBCIJ</u>	<u>USYEE</u>	<u>GURDP</u>
C	<u>AYBCX</u>	<u>OFFJW</u>	<u>JEMGP</u>	<u>XVEUE</u>	<u>LEJYQ</u>
D	<u>MUSCX</u>	<u>JYMSG</u>	<u>LLETA</u>	<u>LEDEC</u>	<u>GBMFI</u>

Figure 12-4 (C). Ciphertext with evidence of periodicity (U).

b. In the message above, the observed repetitions are far in excess of those normally expected. For example, 7 digraphs are observed being repeated twice (EC, PL, SC, BC, JY, US, and CX), about the expected values for a message of 100 letters. However, note that 2 other digraphs (LE and US) are repeated 3 times, a rate of repetition expected in the case of a message of 200 letters. Finally, the repeat of the tetragraph (USYE), statistically

expected in a random text message of 1000 letters, establishes almost beyond any doubt that the repeats are causal rather than accidental. The only explanation is that the plaintext value for USYE must fall in exactly the same relative position to the key in both instances.

12-9. (C) Factoring To Determine Length of the Period

a. Since periodicity, as reflected in causal repetitions, is a result of enciphering identical letters by identical cipher sequences, it follows that the length of the period can be ascertained by determining the constant interval between repeated occurrences of the same digraph or polygraph. For example, by counting the letters intervening between each repeat, the count to include the letters of the first but not the second appearance of the repeat, the following intervals and factors will be found (fig. 12-5).

Repetition	Interval	Factors
1st <u>USYE</u> to 2d <u>USYE</u> -----	40	2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 20
1st <u>BC</u> to 2d <u>BC</u> -----	16	2, 4, 8
1st <u>CX</u> to 2d <u>CX</u> -----	25	5
1st <u>EC</u> to 2d <u>EC</u> -----	88	2, 4, 11, 22, 44
1st <u>LE</u> to 2d <u>LE</u> -----	16	2, 4, 8
2d <u>LE</u> to 3d <u>LE</u> -----	4	2
1st <u>LE</u> to 3d <u>LE</u> -----	20	2, 4, 5, 10
1st <u>JY</u> to 2d <u>JY</u> -----	8	2, 4
1st <u>PL</u> to 2d <u>PL</u> -----	24	2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12
1st <u>SC</u> to 2d <u>SC</u> -----	52	2, 4, 13, 26
(1st <u>SY</u> to 2d <u>SY</u> , already included in <u>USYE</u> .)		
(1st <u>US</u> to 2d <u>US</u> , already included in <u>USYE</u> .)		
2d <u>US</u> to 3d <u>US</u> -----	36	2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 18
1st <u>US</u> to 3d <u>US</u> -----	76	2, 4, 19, 38
(1st <u>YE</u> to 2d <u>YE</u> , already included in <u>USYE</u> .)		

Figure 12-5 (C). List of repetitions and factors (U).

b. After determining the interval between all repetitions, each in turn is factored, the object here being to locate one factor which is common to all. Recall that a given key length, synonymous with the number of cipher sequences, determines the periodicity of a system. Further, note that any given causal repetition occurs as the result of the encipherment of a group of identical letters by the same key sequence. Now this may occur at the first, second, third, etc., cycle of key usage. In any case, it must be a permutation of a fixed number, the key length. Therefore, factoring the intervals should reveal the true key length. Similarly, if one or more

intervals are found which cannot be factored by some number as the majority of the intervals, they can be assumed to be accidental repetitions. With this in mind, examine the factors given in figure 12-5.

c. It will be noted that with the exception of CX, all the repetitions can be factored by either 2 or 4. In the case of CX, since its factor is both different and isolated, its repetition can be ascribed to accidental rather than causal reasons and can, therefore, be dropped from further study. Thus only the factors 2 and 4 are left for consideration. Since these factors are common to all intervals between

repetitions and since the repetitions have been determined to be causal rather than accidental, the key length, or number of cipher alphabets, must be one or the other of these numbers.

d. In this particular case, the final choice for the key length cannot be resolved except by reducing the ciphertext to its monoalphabetic components. However, on the basis of practicability, it can be assumed that the key length is four rather than two. In cases of multiples it is better to assume the larger number initially.

12-10. (C) Reduction to Monoalphabetic Terms

a. In foregoing paragraphs, the inherent monoalphabeticity of segments of a periodic polyalphabetic cipher are demonstrated. As this monoalpha-

USYE SECP MPLC CLNX BWCS OXUV DSCR
HTHX IPLI BCIJ USYE EGUR DPAY BCXO
FPJW JEMG PXVE UELE JYQM USCX JYMS
GLLE TALE DECG BMFI

b. Each group above represents the periodic cycle of the cipher sequence. Thus all first letters of each group are produced by the first cipher alphabet, the second letter by the second alphabet, and so forth. With the monoalphabetic segment of the ciphertext now isolated, a separate uniliteral frequency distribution is made for each. Theoretically, if each distribution is great enough, and contains no abnormal variation from common usage, each frequency distribution should result in the charac-

teristic peaks and troughs of monoalphabetic substitution. Under normal circumstances, where the correct period has been determined, this occurs and seems to prove the correctness of the assumption of period lengths. However in more difficult cases, where the sample is small, and contains an insufficient number of polygraphic repetitions, or where a clear cut choice between two possible factors of periods cannot be made, other monoalphabetic substitution tests may be used.

Section III. (C) STATISTICAL TEST FOR DETERMINING PERIODICITY

12-11. (C) The Phi (φ) Test

a. The monoalphabetic φ test, previously discussed in paragraph 2-15, may be applied to the distribution of periodic polyalphabetic ciphers to confirm the monoalphabeticity of the distribution made on the assumption of a given period. This test is particularly applicable in difficult cases where each distribution is noncommittal in respect to peaks and troughs, as where the factoring process results in the choice of two possible period lengths. When the correct period is assumed, then the φ test of each distribution should approach fairly closely and consistently the values for φp. On the other hand, if an incorrect period is assumed, the calculated φo should approximate the value of φr rather than φp.

b. To illustrate this process, φo of the distributions made of the example cryptogram is calculated in figure 12-6 using the formula φo = Σf(f-1).

																										N-25	
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z		
0	12	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0		
													φp = .0667N(N-1) = 40.02														φo = Σf(f-1) = 36
													φr = .0385N(N-1) = 23.10														
																										N-25	
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z		
0	0	2	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	12	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	2	2	0		
													φp = .0667N(N-1) = 40.02														φo = Σf(f-1) = 44
													φr = .0385N(N-1) = 23.10														
																										N-25	
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z		
0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	
													φp = .0667N(N-1) = 40.02														φo = Σf(f-1) = 46
													φr = .0385N(N-1) = 23.10														
																										N-25	
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	f(f-1)	
0	0	0	0	30	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	6	0	0			
													φp = .0667N(N-1) = 40.02														φo = Σf(f-1) = 44
													φr = .0385N(N-1) = 23.10														

Figure 12-6 (C). The φ test for factored periods (U).

c. In this case, the results of the ϕ test are indications that each alphabet represents a case of monoalphabetic substitution, which in turn proves the validity of the original determination of the cipher's period. Note that in some cases a ϕ test conducted on the multiple of a true period will result in the appearance of monoalphabeticity. An example occurs in this particular case where, if eight was assumed, the resultant distribution and their ϕ tests indicate monoalphabeticity. However, an inspection of the distribution reveals that on the basis of similar characteristics distributions 1 and 5, 2 and 6, 3 and 7, and 4 and 8, could be combined into 4. Whatever the method used, the result is the same, the reduction of the ciphertext to monoalphabetic terms.

12-12. (C) The Index of Coincidence (I.C.)

a. Another method of proving the apparent validity of the factoring process is through the use of the index of coincidence. The I.C. was previously defined as the ratio of ϕ_0 to ϕ_r , expressed in formula as $I.C. = \frac{\phi_0}{\phi_r}$. The monographic I.C. of English plaintext is 1.73 as compared with the I.C. of 1.00 for random text. Using this text, the individual distributions, if the factoring process is correct, will tend to conform more closely to the expected I.C. of plaintext than to the I.C. of random text.

b. To demonstrate the operation of the formula and show its results for comparison with those obtained by the ϕ test, the foregoing distributions and the calculated values of ϕ_0 and ϕ_r will be used (fig. 12-7).

IC for Distribution No. 1	1.00	IC of English Random Text
$\frac{\phi_0}{\phi_r} = IC \text{ or } \frac{36}{23} =$	1.56	IC of English Plain Text
	1.73	
IC for Distribution No. 2	1.00	IC of English Random Text
$\frac{\phi_0}{\phi_r} = IC \text{ or } \frac{44}{23.1} =$	1.91	IC of English Plain Text
	1.73	
IC for Distribution No. 3	1.00	IC of English Random Text
$\frac{\phi_0}{\phi_r} = IC \text{ or } \frac{46}{23.1} =$	1.99	IC of English Plain Text
	1.73	
IC for Distribution No. 4	1.00	IC of English Random Text
$\frac{\phi_0}{\phi_r} = IC \text{ or } \frac{44}{23.10} =$	1.91	IC of English Plain Text
	1.73	

Figure 12-7 (C). Index of coincidence for factored periods (U).

c. In all four cases above, it can be seen that the I.C. calculated for each distribution more closely approximates the I.C. of plaintext than that of random text. Thus, as in the case of the ϕ test, the results, i.e. the monoalphabeticity of each distribution is indicated, further indicate that the initial assumption of a period of four is correct.

12-13. (C) Table of Expected Values

As an aid in the calculation of either monographic I.C. or ϕ values, a table of the expected values of ϕ_r and ϕ_p for sample sizes from 11 to 100 is given below in figure 12-8. To use the table (fig. 12-8), only the value of N, the total number of letters occurring in a given distribution, need be tabulated and the values of ϕ_0 determined.

N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p
11	4.23	7.34	29	31	54	47	83	144	65	160	277	83	262	454
12	5.08	8.80	30	33	58	48	87	150	66	165	286	84	268	465
13	6.00	10.4	31	36	62	49	90	157	67	170	295	85	275	476
14	7.00	12.1	32	38	66	50	94	163	68	175	304	86	281	488
15	8.08	14.0	33	41	70	51	98	170	69	180	313	87	288	499
16	9.23	16.0	34	43	75	52	102	177	70	186	322	88	294	511
17	10.5	18.1	35	46	79	53	106	184	71	191	331	89	301	522
18	11.8	20.4	36	48	84	54	110	191	72	197	341	90	308	534
19	13.2	22.8	37	51	89	55	114	198	73	202	351	91	315	546
20	14.6	25.3	38	54	94	56	118	205	74	208	360	92	322	558
21	16.2	28.5	39	57	99	57	123	213	75	213	370	93	329	571
22	17.8	30.8	40	60	104	58	127	221	76	219	380	94	336	583
23	19.5	33.8	41	63	109	59	132	228	77	225	390	95	343	596
24	21.2	36.8	42	66	115	60	136	236	78	231	401	96	351	608
25	23.1	40.0	43	69	120	61	141	244	79	237	411	97	358	621
26	25.0	43.4	44	73	126	62	145	252	80	243	422	98	366	634
27	27.0	46.8	45	76	132	63	150	261	81	249	432	99	373	647
28	29.1	50.4	46	80	138	64	155	269	82	255	443	100	381	660

Figure 12-8 (C). Expected values of ϕ_r and ϕ_p (U).

12-14. (C) Statistical Tests to Determine Periodicity

a. A variation of the ϕ test may be used for the initial determination of periodicity, as opposed to proving a prior assumption as illustrated above. This particular method is quite useful in those cases where the length of the period is long as compared to ciphertext length, and where there is no pronounced repetition pattern in the text itself. For example,




Figure 12-9 (ϕ). Computation of ϕ for long periodic key (U).

(2) To compute the ϕ , the normal formula is used, i.e. $\phi = \sum f(f-1)$. Note that in the diagram above, there are 2 columnar lengths; one of 8 letters (2 columns) and the other of 7 letters (38 columns), which must be kept separate. This data contained in the diagram is then tabulated as shown below. The column labeled ϕ is the observed value of ϕ from the table above. The column labeled x is the number of times the particular ϕ value occurred, and ϕx is the product of the two columns ϕ and x.

Columns N=8			Columns N=7		
ϕ	x	ϕx	ϕ	x	ϕx
0	1	0	0	17	0
2	1	2	2	19	38
			4	1	4
			6	1	1
2 2			38 43		

(3) Having derived the ϕx value by tabulating the data as shown above, it then can be used to determine the average value of ϕ (symbolized by $\bar{\phi}$, which is read as Phi Bar). This is done using the formula $\bar{\phi} = \frac{\phi x}{x}$ for each N value. The average value

given the cryptogram below where the length of the key is between 40 and 50, it can be treated as shown.

(1) First, an arbitrary key length is selected and the cryptogram is written out horizontally to conform to that width. Selecting a key width of 40, the ciphertext is inscribed as follows in figure 12-9 and the $\phi \sum f(f-1)$, of each column is computed, using only repeated letters.

of $\bar{\phi}$ is derived by adding up all the ϕx values for a given column length, and then dividing by the number of occurrences of columns of that length. Thus $\bar{\phi}$ for the above are:

$$\bar{\phi} = \frac{\phi x}{x} = \frac{2}{2} = 1 \qquad \bar{\phi} = \frac{\phi x}{x} = \frac{43}{38} = 1.16$$

$\bar{\phi} = 1 \qquad \qquad \bar{\phi} = 1.16$

(4) For comparison purposes, the value of ϕp and ϕr must be computed using the formulas:

$$\begin{aligned} \phi p &= 0.0667N(N-1) \quad \text{or} \quad 0.0667 \times 8 \times 7 = 3.73 \\ \phi r &= 0.0385N(N-1) \quad \text{or} \quad 0.0385 \times 8 \times 7 = 2.15 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \phi p &= 0.0667N(N-1) \quad \text{or} \quad 0.0667 \times 7 \times 6 = 2.80 \\ \phi r &= 0.0385N(N-1) \quad \text{or} \quad 0.0385 \times 7 \times 6 = 1.61 \end{aligned}$$

The information now is set up in a table for comparison purposes as shown below:

	N=8	N=7
Observed	ϕ 1.00	ϕ 1.16
Expected plain	ϕp 3.73	ϕp 2.80
Expected random	ϕr 2.15	ϕr 1.61

(5) On the basis of the comparison above, a key width of 40 is rejected. The next step then is to assume another key length, reinscribe the message to that width, and recompute all values again. This same process is repeated until a good match is attained. In this specific case the process would

be repeated until a width of 43 was reached. The computation at this point would appear as shown

in figure 12-10.

H S K U S P M F H D U J J I X M S P T P O I P C I W K Z V U Y P P N E U S A I G B O O
 G A O P G P R H B O U C S H P V G H Q X Z S A C K R K V B G H M V S F R Y T T K H K V
 W Z X V L I J H W A R L K F I J S L T M H K A H Q T U V T X S M E C F C S K T G O O Y
 B X Z V L I J R Y A C D W E J M S C A F P I E A X O K A Q D W E X P Y P Q H D N O J I
 X N Z J G N U D O A R F U E R J O Y B D O K E I K D U V T D V E V L E T D O A F R O U
 N Y N B D V Q O B E G G S H Q H X O P U Z C O C U K K Z L T P H K R T C C O A S B Z U
 G B U B B U N O V T P O V M I Z D E P Q F V K Z

2 0 2 4 4 4 2 4 2 6 4 0 2 4 2 4 6 0 4 0 4 4 4 6 2 0 4 8 2 2 0 4 2 0 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 6 2

Figure 12-10 (S). ϕ long periodic key computation (U).

(6) Again the average value of ϕ ($\bar{\phi}$) is computed, as are ϕ_r and ϕ_p , using the formulas previously

given, and the derived data is set forth in tabular form as below:

<p>Columns N=7</p> <table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td>ϕ</td><td>x</td><td>ϕx</td></tr> <tr><td>0</td><td>4</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2</td><td>6</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>4</td><td>11</td><td>44</td></tr> <tr><td>6</td><td>3</td><td>18</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>24</td><td>74</td></tr> </table>	ϕ	x	ϕx	0	4	0	2	6	12	4	11	44	6	3	18		24	74	$\bar{\phi} = \frac{\phi x}{x} = \frac{74}{24} = 3.08$	<p>Columns N=6</p> <table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td>ϕ</td><td>x</td><td>ϕx</td></tr> <tr><td>0</td><td>3</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2</td><td>9</td><td>18</td></tr> <tr><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr><td>6</td><td>1</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>8</td><td>1</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>14</td><td>1</td><td>14</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>19</td><td>62</td></tr> </table>	ϕ	x	ϕx	0	3	0	2	9	18	4	4	16	6	1	6	8	1	8	14	1	14		19	62	$\bar{\phi} = \frac{\phi x}{x} = \frac{62}{19} = 3.26$
ϕ	x	ϕx																																											
0	4	0																																											
2	6	12																																											
4	11	44																																											
6	3	18																																											
	24	74																																											
ϕ	x	ϕx																																											
0	3	0																																											
2	9	18																																											
4	4	16																																											
6	1	6																																											
8	1	8																																											
14	1	14																																											
	19	62																																											
<p>Observed</p>	<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td>$\bar{\phi}$</td><td>3.08</td><td></td><td>3.26</td></tr> </table>	$\bar{\phi}$	3.08		3.26	<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>					<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>																																		
$\bar{\phi}$	3.08		3.26																																										
<p>Expected plain</p>	<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td>ϕ_p</td><td>2.80</td><td></td><td>2.00</td></tr> </table>	ϕ_p	2.80		2.00	<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>					<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>																																		
ϕ_p	2.80		2.00																																										
<p>Expected random</p>	<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td>ϕ_r</td><td>1.66</td><td></td><td>1.15</td></tr> </table>	ϕ_r	1.66		1.15	<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>					<table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100px; text-align: center;"> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>																																		
ϕ_r	1.66		1.15																																										

b. The results of the last test leave little doubt that the key length of the cipher is 43. Consequently, analysis is based on that assumption. Obviously this process is rather involved in terms of repeated

application of the same test. However, in those cases where the key is long, or where no repeats occur in the text to indicate key length, it is an effective tool.

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CHAPTER 13 (C)

SOLUTION OF PERIODIC POLYALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) SYSTEMS USING STANDARD CIPHER ALPHABETS

13-1. (C) Determination of Type Cipher Alphabet

a. Once a given periodic polyalphabetic cipher has been reduced to monoalphabetic terms, the question arises as to what type cipher alphabet is involved. This should be determined in the initial stage of analysis as it directly affects the techniques employed, and moreover, determines the relative difficulty of the task of recovering plaintext values.

b. In practice, the type cipher alphabet used in a given system may be one of the forms given in paragraph 12-4 preceding. As the cipher letters, of themselves, give no hint of the exact form used, the analyst must determine this. As in the case of normal monoalphabetic substitution ciphers, a uniliteral frequency distribution may be used for this determination. Such a frequency distribution made of each factored segment, given sufficient depth for each, will usually indicate whether the cipher alphabets involved are standard (direct or reversed) or mixed.

c. In some cases only two or three distributions are necessary for the initial determination of the type cipher alphabet involved. However, for subsequent analysis a distribution must be made for each. Additionally, if the alphabet appears to be a mixed cipher alphabet, then it is helpful for subsequent analysis to prepare trilateral frequency distributions for each. Note that because of the reduced size of the distribution, the characteristics which permit the identification of the type alphabet may not be as pronounced as those given in previous examples. However, if one takes into consideration the reduced size of the sample, identification can usually be made.

d. Once the identification of the alphabets involved has been made, an analysis of each to determine their plaintext values can begin. Basically the techniques involved are similar to those previously explained for the analysis of monoalphabetic substitution ciphers. There is one difference which arises out of the use of several cipher alphabets which may or may not be related, and which therefore

permits the use of an additional method. Generally, although the actual analysis may be more involved, it is difficult only in those cases where a reduced depth of material is encountered. The difficulty stems from the lack of data, not from its complexity. However, where messages are long, or where several messages have been enciphered in the same key, each distribution should contain sufficient elements to permit a ready identification of ciphertext values.

13-2. (C) Preliminary Identification and Factoring

a. Using the principles for analysis set forth in the preceding chapter, a cryptogram is prepared in the normal manner as illustrated in figure 13-1.

	5	10	15	20	25
A	<u>A U K H Y</u>	<u>J A M K I</u>	<u>Z Y M W M</u>	<u>J H I G K</u>	<u>N F M L X</u>
B	<u>E T I M I</u>	<u>Z H B H R</u>	<u>A Y M Z M</u>	<u>I L V H E</u>	<u>J K U T G</u>
C	<u>D P V X K</u>	<u>Q U K H Q</u>	<u>L H V R M</u>	<u>J A Z H G</u>	<u>G Z V X E</u>
D	<u>N L U F M</u>	<u>P Z J N V</u>	<u>C H U A S</u>	<u>H K Q G K</u>	<u>I P L W P</u>
E	<u>A J Z X I</u>	<u>G U N T V</u>	<u>D P T E J</u>	<u>E C M Y S</u>	<u>Q Y B A V</u>
F	<u>A L A H Y</u>	<u>P O I X W</u>	<u>P V N Y E</u>	<u>E Y X E E</u>	<u>U D P X R</u>
G	<u>B V Z V I</u>	<u>Z I I V O</u>	<u>S P T E G</u>	<u>K U B B R</u>	<u>Q L L X P</u>
H	<u>W F Q G K</u>	<u>N L L L E</u>	<u>P T I X W</u>	<u>D J Z X I</u>	<u>G O I O I</u>
J	<u>Z L A M V</u>	<u>K F M W F</u>	<u>N P L Z I</u>	<u>O V V F M</u>	<u>Z K T X G</u>
K	<u>N L M D F</u>	<u>A A E X I</u>	<u>J L U F M</u>	<u>P Z J N V</u>	<u>C A I G I</u>
L	<u>U A W P R</u>	<u>N V I W E</u>	<u>J K Z A S</u>	<u>Z L A F M</u>	<u>H S</u>

Figure 13-1 (C). Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U).

b. After the cryptogram is set down, it is inspected for repeated sequences, and those found are underlined as shown. In this particular case where a number of trigraphs and polygraphs are repeated, it is not necessary to bother with the digraphs. The reason for this can be understood if reference is made to the table of expectancy in paragraph 12-7c. In this message of 271 groups, five trigraphs are observed occurring twice each, better than twice that expected. Moreover, the odds for the observed recurrence of

the pentagraph is on the order of 1 in 50. The point is that these repetitions would almost certainly be causal rather than accidental and therefore could be used for factoring to determine the period of the key.


c. On this basis the repetitions may be set down in tabular form with their locations, interval, and factors for study as shown below.

Repetition	Location	Interval	Factors
LUFMPZJNV	D2, K12	160	2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, 20, 32, 40, 80
JZXIG	E2, H17	90	2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 18, 30, 45
EJK	B20, L10	215	5, 43
PTE	E12, G12	50	2, 5, 10, 25


Repetition	Location	Interval	Factors
QGK	D18, H3	85	5, 17
UKH	A2, C7	55	5, 11
ZLA	J1, L16	65	5, 13

d. Only the briefest inspection of the list of factors is required to reach the assumption that the period length is five. This being the case, a uniliteral frequency distribution is made of the text at an interval of five. Note that it is not necessary to retranscribe the text when group length, or its multiple, corresponds to assumed key length. Accordingly, the following distributions would be produced (fig. 13-2).


(1) Distribution 1.




(2) Distribution 2.



(3) Distribution 3.



(4) Distribution 4.



(5) Distribution 5.




Figure 13-2 (C). Uniliteral frequency distribution of ciphertext on period of five (U).

13-3. (C) Fitting the Distribution to the Normal

a. The statistical tests completed show that each distribution is apparently plaintext, exhibiting the expected characteristics of monoalphabetic substitution and thereby proving the assumption of a period of five. This being the case, the next logical step is to determine if a mixed or standard sequence was used. If the latter, the solution would be greatly simplified by a determination of the point of coincidence between the plain and cipher sequences which would establish all equivalent values. Although the peaks and troughs of the above distribu-

tion are suppressed, a closer inspection reveals their presence, and shows that they are distributed linearly rather than being bunched; an indication that the sequences are standard rather than mixed. With this in mind, an attempt can be made to fit them to the normal by the usual process of locating high frequency equivalencies.

b. By noting the relative distances between the peaks and troughs and their trend, i.e. direct or reversed of distribution 1, it appears that $Wc = Ap$. Note that at this point of coincidence the normally expected high frequency plaintext letters conform to the high frequency cipher letters thusly:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V

Continuing the same process of comparison of the peaks and troughs of each cipher sequence with that expected for plaintext, it becomes apparent that the remaining points of coincidence are:

Distribution 2 $Ap = Hc$

Distribution 3 $Ap = Ic$

Distribution 4 $Ap = Tc$

Distribution 5 $Ap = Ec$

c. At this point it is obvious that the KEY is WHITE and that the arrangement of the several sequences is as shown in figure 13-3.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
C2	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
C3	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
C4	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
C5	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D

Figure 13-3 (C). Recovered enciphering matrix (U).

The text then may be deciphered to read:

ENCOUNTERED RED INFANTRY ESTIMATED AT ONE
REGIMENT AND MACHINE GUN COMPANY IN TRUCKS
NEAR EMMITSBURG(.) AM HOLDING MIDDLECREEK NEAR
HILL FIVE FOUR THREE SOUTHWEST OF FAIRPLAY(.)
WHEN FORCED BACK WILL CONTINUE DELAYING REDS
AT MARSH CREEK(.) HAVE DESTROYED BRIDGES ON
MIDDLECREEK BETWEEN EMMITSBURG TANEYTOWN
ROAD AND RHODES MILL(.)

13-4. (C) Completing the Plain Component

a. As in the case of monoalphabetic substitution where direct standard sequences are used, so too can periodic polyalphabetic substitution systems, if using direct standard sequences, be solved by completing the plain component. The underlying principle in the latter case is the same, i.e. the cipher sequences are nothing more than direct standard sequences offset as numbers of positions. Thus by simply inscribing a direct standard sequence vertically below each cipher letter using it as a point of origin, a columnar matrix is developed in which one line of plaintext appears. Note that as in the case of simple monoalphabetic substitution, but using either a reversed standard cipher sequence or a known mixed

cipher sequence, solution is also possible, but slightly different techniques are required.

b. In respect to the solution of periodic polyalphabetic ciphers by this method, there is one difference based upon the number of generatrices. In monoalphabetic, only one generatrix, that is, the cipher sequence, was used constantly throughout. In the case of periodic polyalphabetic systems there are of course several generatrices involved, each used at a constant interval in a fixed sequential order determined by the period of the key. Thus a slightly different approach is required. If for example the former method was used it would be quite difficult to pick out the individual generatrices. This is shown in figure 13-4 below, where the plain component was

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A U K H Y J A M K I Z Y M W M J M I G X N F M L X
 B V L I Z K B N L J A Z N X N K N J H Y O G N M Y
 C W M J A L C O M K B A O Y O L O K I Z P H O N Z
 D X N K B M D P N L C B P Z P M P L J A Q I P O A
 E Y O L C N E Q O M D C Q A Q N Q M K B R J Q P B
 F Z P M D O F R P N E D R B R O R N L C S K R Q C
 G A Q N E P G S Q O F E S C S P S O M D T L S R D
 H B R O F Q H T R P G F T D T Q T P N E U M T S E
 I C S P G R I U S Q H G U E U R U Q O F V N U T F
 J D T Q H S J V T R I H V F V S V R P G W O V U G
 K E U R I T K W U S J I W G W T W S Q H X P W V H
 L F V S J U L X V T K J X H X U X T R I Y Q X W I
 M G W T K V M Y W U L K Y I Y V Y U S J Z R Y X J
 N H X U L W N Z X V M L Z J Z W Z V T K A S Z Y K
 O I Y V M X O A Y W N M A K A X A W U L B T A Z L
 P J Z W N Y P B Z X O N B L B Y B X V M C U B A M
 Q K A X O Z Q C A Y P O C M C Z C Y W N D V C B N
 R L B Y P A R D B Z Q P D N D A D Z X O E W D C O
 S M C Z Q B S E C A R Q E O E B E A Y P F X E D P
 T N D A R C T F D B S R F P F C F B Z Q G Y F E Q
 U O E B S D U G E C T S G Q G D G C A R H Z G F R
 V P F C T E V H F D U T H R H E H D B S I A H G S
 W Q G D U F V H I G E V U I S I F I E C T J B I H T
 X R H E V G X J H F W V J T J G J F D U K C J I U
 Y S I F W H Y K I G X W K U K H K G E V L D K J V
 Z T J G X I Z L J H Y X L V L I L H F W M E L K W

completed for the first 25 letters of the foregoing cryptogram.

c. With the prior knowledge of the period (5), and the plaintext, it is possible to pick out plaintext from the matrix above, but even so it would be a difficult task. Where the period or plaintext were not known it would be practically impossible. Thus it is necessary to first separate the ciphertext into its individual generatrices. Now this will of course result in the factoring of the plaintext at a constant interval, that of the period length. So the question of how plaintext would be recognized is posed. The answer to this lies in the association of high-frequency letters normal to plaintext. Each correct generatrix will normally contain a greater and better assortment of high-frequency letters than the other generatrices and thus is distinguishable. To reconstitute the plaintext, the selected generatrices are reordered according to their order of appearance in the ciphertext. To show this process, the example cryptograms will again be used. In this instance the first 50 letters, decimated at the period of five, is set down in columnar form, each column conforming to the use of one cipher alphabet as shown in figure 13-5.

Figure 13-4 (d). Completion of the plain component (U).

Gen.	Alphabet 1	Alphabet 2	Alphabet 3	Alphabet 4	Alphabet 5
1	AJZJNEZAIJ	UAYMFTHYLK	KMMIMIBMWU	HKWGLMHZMT	YIMXXIRMEG
2	BKAKOFABJK	VBZNGUIZML	LNNJNJCNWV	ILXHMNIANU	ZJNYYSNFH
3	CLBLPGBCKL	WCAOHVJANM	MOOKOKDOXW	JMYINOJBOV	AKOZZKTOGI
4	DMCMQHCCLM	XDBPIWKBON	NPPLPLEPYX	KNZJOPKCPW	BLPAALUPHJ
5	ENDNRIDEMN	YECQJXLCPO	OQQMQMFQZY	LOAKPQLDQX	CMQBBIWQIK
6	FOEOSJEFNO	ZFDRKYMDQP	PRRNRNGRAZ	MPBLQRMERY	DNRCCNWRJL
7	GFPTKFGOP	AGESLZNERQ	QSSOSOHSBA	NQCMRSNFSZ	EOSDDOXSKM
8	HQGQULGHPQ	BHFTMAOFSR	RTTPTPITCB	ORDNSTOGTA	FPTEEPYTLN
9	IRHRVMHIQR	CIGUNBPGTS	SUUQUQJUDC	PSEOTUPHUB	GQUFFQZUMO
10	JSISWNIJRS	DJHVOCQHUT	TVVRVRKVED	QTFPUVQIVC	HRVGGRAVNP
11	KTJTXOJKST	EKIWPDRIVU	UWWSWSLWFE	RUGQVWRJWD	ISWHHSBWOQ
12	LUKUYPKLTU	FLJXQESJWV	VXXTXTMXGF	SVHRWXSXKE	JTXIITCXPR
13	MVLVZQLMUV	GMKYRFTKXW	WYYUYUNYHG	TWISXYTLYF	KUYJJJUDYQS
14	NWMWARMNVW	HNLZSGULYX	XZZVZVOZIH	UXJTYZUMZG	LVZKKVEZRT
15	OXNXBSNOWX	IOMATHVMZY	YAAWAWPAJI	VYKUZAVNAH	MWALLWFASU
16	PYOYCTOPXY	JPNBUIWNAZ	ZBBXBXQBKJ	WZLVABWOBI	NXBIMXGBTV
17	QZPZDUPQYZ	KQOCVJXOBA	ACCYCYRCLK	XAMWBCXPCJ	OYCNNYHCWU
18	RAQAEVQRZA	LRPDWKYPCB	BDDZDZSDML	YBNXCDYQDK	PZDOOZIDVX
19	SBRBFWRSAB	MSQEXLZQDC	CEEAEATENM	ZCOYDEZREL	QAEPPAJEWY
20	TCSCGXSTBC	NTRFYMARED	DFFBFBUFON	ADPZEFASFM	RBFQQBKFXZ
21	UDTDHYTUCD	OUSGZNBSEF	EGGCGCVGPO	BEQAFGBTGN	SCGRRCLGYA
22	VEUEIZUVDE	PVTHAOCTGF	FHHDDHWHQP	CFRBGHCUHO	TDHSSDMHZB
23	WVFVJAVWEF	QWUIBPDUHG	GIIEIEXIRQ	DGSCHIDVIP	UEITTENIAC
24	XGWGKBWCFG	RXVJCQEVIH	HJJFJFYJSR	EHTDIJEWJQ	VFJUUFQJBD
25	YHXHLCXYGH	SYWKDRFWJI	IKKKGZKTS	FIEJJKFXKR	WGKVVGPKE
26	ZIYIMDYZHI	TZXLESGXKJ	JLLHLHALUT	GJVFKLGYLS	XHLWWHQLD

Figure 13-5 (d). Completion of the plain component, text arranged by period (U).

When the high-frequency generatrices underlined above are set down in columns, the now consecutive letters of intelligible plaintext are readily recognizable.

1	2	3	4	5	
5	20	19	8	23	ALPHABET
E	N	C	O	U	GENERATRIX
N	T	E	R	E	
D	R	E	D	I	
N	F	A	N	T	
R	Y	E	S	T	
I	M	A	T	E	
D	A	T	O	N	
E	R	E	G	I	
M	E	N	T	A	
N	D	M	A	C	

13-5. (C) Selection of Generatrices

a. The foregoing demonstrates how quickly a solution may be reached using this technique once the system has been identified and the period determined. However, the real key to the solution lies in the selection of the correct generatrix from each alphabetic column. As shown, it was selected on the basis of the appearance of high-frequency letters in the generatrix. Another method of selection may be used which involves a more systematic approach than mere visual inspection, again using frequency characteristics of plaintext. The probability of the low-frequency letters J, K, Q, X, and Z appearing two or more times in a given generatrix is unlikely so they may be immediately dropped from considera-

tion. For example, the generatrices of alphabet 1 shown crossed out in figure 13-6 could be dropped.

Gen.	ALPHABET 1
1	A-J-Z-J-N-E-Z-A-I-J
2	B-K-A-K-O-F-A-B-J-K
3	C L B L P G B C K L
4	D M C M Q H C D L M
5	E N D N R I D E M N
6	F O E O S J E F N O
7	G P F P T K F G O P
8	H-Q-G-Q-U-L-G-H-P-Q
9	I R H R V M H I Q R
10	J-S-I-S-W-N-I-J-R-S
11	K-T-J-T-X-O-J-K-S-T
12	L-U-K-U-Y-P-K-L-T-U
13	M-V-L-V-Z-Q-L-M-U-V
14	N W M W A R M N V W
15	O-X-N-X-B-S-N-O-W-X
16	P Y O Y C T O P X Y
17	Q-Z-P-Z-D-U-P-Q-Y-Z
18	R-A-Q-A-E-V-Q-R-Z-A
19	S B R B F W R S A B
20	T C S C G X S T B C
21	U D T D H Y T U C D
22	V E U E I Z U V D E
23	W F V F J A V W E F
24	X-G-W-G-K-B-W-X-F-G
25	Y-H-X-H-L-G-X-Y-G-H
26	Z-I-Y-I-M-D-Y-Z-H-I

Figure 13-6 (C). Generatrix identification (U).

Gen.	ALPHABET 1	SUM TOTALS
1	A-J-Z-J-N-E-Z-A-I-J	
2	B-K-A-K-O-F-A-B-J-K	
3	C L B L P G B C K L	0
4	D M C M Q H C D L M	0
5	E N D N R I D E M N	7
6	F O E O S J E F N O	7
7	G P F P T K F G O P	2
8	H-Q-G-Q-U-L-G-H-P-Q	
9	I R H R V M H I Q R	5
10	J-S-I-S-W-N-I-J-R-S	
11	K-T-J-T-X-O-J-K-S-T	
12	L-U-K-U-Y-P-K-L-T-U	
13	M-V-L-V-Z-Q-L-M-U-V	
14	N W M W A R M N V W	4
15	O-X-N-X-B-S-N-O-W-X	
16	P Y O Y C T O P X Y	3
17	Q-Z-P-Z-D-U-P-Q-Y-Z	
18	R-A-Q-A-E-V-Q-R-Z-A	
19	S B R B F W R S A B	5
20	T C S C G X S T B C	4
21	U D T D H Y T U C D	2
22	V E U E I Z U V D E	4
23	W F V F J A V W E F	2
24	X-G-W-G-K-B-W-X-F-G	
25	Y-H-X-H-L-G-X-Y-G-H	
26	Z-I-Y-I-M-D-Y-Z-H-I	

Figure 13-7 (C). Generatrix identification using arbitrary values (U).

b. The choice of generatrices is now considerably lessened by the elimination of the generatrices lined through. The choice can now be further reduced by assigning an arbitrary value of 1 to each of the normal high-frequency letters E T N R O A I S and ϕ to all others. By summing the values, an indication of the correct generatrix is then given. For an example of this note, figure 13-7.

The choice of either generatrix 5 or 6 is obvious. The exact determination of which to use is made by a comparison of generatrices selected by the same process from the other plain component columns.

13-6. (C) Logarithmic Test for Generatrix Selection

a. A somewhat more precise method of determining the correct sequence by measurement may be arrived at by using the logarithmic weights of plain English reproduced below:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
8	4	7	7	9	6	5	7	8	1	2	7	6	8	8	6	2	8	8	9	6	5	5	3	6	0

b. These values are based on the relative frequency of each letter in telegraphic text and therefore are especially effective where the generatrix contains very few values. The procedure for testing the probability of the correct generatrix is essentially the same as that given in the preceding example. A portion of the ciphertext sufficient in size to produce recognizable plaintext is decimated to form a base composed of the cipher values of one period. A column of generatrices is then produced by completing the plain component. Each generatrix of that column then is tested by summing the total values assigned to each of its letters by the values shown above. The generatrix then showing the highest total value is considered the best probability. Upon the selection of a generatrix from each plain component column, the letters are juxtaposed at the interval corresponding to the period to produce plaintext. Of course where doubt exists between several generatrices they may be played against each other to determine the correct one to use.

c. A modification of this system and the one preceding it is to combine the two tests. The first, which is much quicker, may be used to initially select those generatrices which are easy to identify because of their own make up of letters. This test then can be used to select one generatrix from those previously isolated which would not be readily identifiable by the simpler method.

13-7. (C) Theory of Probable Word Method

a. The probable word method, similar to that used in monoalphabetic substitution, may be used to effect a solution where the foregoing methods are of no avail, or where there is an insufficiency of external evidence to indicate the number of alphabets involved. This method is predicated on the use of a plaintext word or words as the cryptographic key and may be used when standard or known mixed alphabets are used.

b. Essentially the method consists of assuming the presence of a word in the text of the message.

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The word is then fitted in turn at various positions in the message. At each point a plain and cipher sequence is juxtaposed to produce the observed cipher values. If the probable word is correct and is placed in the correct position of the message, the

key letters produced by the juxtaposed plain and cipher sequences will yield a plaintext keyword. To demonstrate the theory of the solution, the following short message will be used.

PGSGG DNRUH VMBGR YOUUC WMSGL VTQDO

c. Assuming that the word REGIMENT appears in the above cipher and that it was produced using reversed standard alphabets, it may be set down as follows:

P G S G G D N R
R E G I M E N T

(2) Using two sliding strips, one direct as the plain sequence, the other reversed as the cipher sequence, they are juxtaposed so as to produce the equivalent cipher-plaintext values shown.

(1) The plaintext is set beneath the ciphertext as shown to the right:

(i)
P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C G F E D C B A Z Y X W V U T S R Q P O N M L K J I H
(k)

Thus for the first equivalency the key letter shown below is produced:

C P G S G G D N R
P R E G I M E N T
K G

(3) The same two strips are now repositioned to where $E_p = G_c$, and the second key letter derived.

P A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
C K J I H G F E D C B A Z Y X W V U T S R Q P O N M L
C P G S G G D N R
P R E G I M E N T
K G K

(4) The same process is continued for each letter until all the key letters are determined. A continuation of the process will result in the following:

C P G S G G D N R
P R E G I M E N T
K G K Y O S H A K

process repeated. This trial, using the same sliding strips juxtaposed as appropriate, results in:

C G S G G D N R U
P R E G I M E N T
K X W M O P R E N

(5) Again an intelligible keyword is not produced; therefore continue to shift the probable word to the right, one letter at a time, each time deriving a possible key. When the point of juxtaposition shown below is reached, a keyword becomes evident.

Obviously the key so produced does not result in an intelligible word so the assumed word is shifted one position to the right relative to the text and the

P G S G G D N R U H V M B G R Y O W U C W M S G L V T Q D O
R E G I M E N T
L L B U N K E R

d. It should be noted that the key is a cyclic permutation of BUNKER HILL. Since the key-word or phrase repeats itself during the encipherment of a message it will appear periodically throughout the message determined by the position of the probable word in the text. Thus the keyword may well appear as a cyclic permutation, complete or in part.

13-8. (C) Application of the Probable Word Method

a. In actual practice the application follows somewhat different lines. Using the previous example this can be seen in the following. First the message is written horizontally on cross-section paper and the probable word is written in a column, one space below and to the left of the ciphertext as shown in figure 13-8.

	P	G	S	G	G	D	N	R	U	H	V	M	B	G	R	Y	O	U	U	C	W	M	S	G	L	V	T	Q	D	O
R	x																													
E		x																												
G			x																											
I				x																										
M					x																									
E						x																								
H							x																							
T								x																						

Figure 13-8 (f). Location of probable word (U).

b. If the probable word assumed does exist in the message it may be located beginning at any one of the positions indicated by an x in the matrix above. Rp being the equivalent of the cipher value appears in the text directly above that point. Moreover, the remaining letters of the probable word are represented by the cipher letter to the right of that point. Thus if the key is a plaintext word or a phrase it will appear long the diagonal line, as this diagonal represents the successive encipherment of the probable word. The possible cyclic permutations of the keyword can be noted in the diagonal arrangement of the x's.

c. Again two alphabetic strips, one direct, and one reversed, to correspond with the previous assumption that a reversed standard alphabet is involved, are used. However, since we have assumed that a plaintext word or phrase is being used as a keyword, it is not necessary to derive the key letter of each juxtaposition. Only the amount needed to prove the unacceptability of the relative location of the probable word to a position in the ciphertext is required. This being predicated on the proposition that an incorrect position and the consequent derivation of key letters will produce impossible combinations of letters for a keyword. With this in mind, the strip may be juxtaposed and the keys shown in figure 13-9 below derived.

	P	G	S	G	G	D	N	R	U	H	V	M	B	G	R	Y	O	U	U	C	W	M	S	G	L	V	T	Q	D	O
R	G	X	J	X	X	U	E	I	L	Y	M	D	S	X	I	P	F	L	L	T	H	D	J							
E		K	W	K	K	H	R	V	Y	L	Z	Q	F	K	V	C	S	Y	Y	G	A	Q	W	K						
G			Y	M	M	J	T	X	A	N	B	S	H	M	X	E	U	A	A	I	C	S	Y	M	R					
I																														
M																														
E																														
N																														
T																														

Figure 13-9 (f). Key derivation (U).

d. Examination of the trigraphs occurring along the diagonal, produced by successive juxtaposition of the two sequences, reveals several which may represent a portion of a keyword. For example, note the trigraphs EVA, LLB, XVE, ICU, PSA, LYI, and TAS which appear on the basis of vowel-consonant combinations to represent part of a possible keyword. However, it is also important to remember that seemingly improbable combinations, due to cyclic permutation, may well be the true keyword as in the case of the trigraph LLB appearing under UC above. At this point the analyst needs only to complete those diagonals which show possibilities of containing a keyword, again finding the same keyword. This is illustrated in figure 13-10.

	P	G	S	G	G	D	N	R	U	H	V	M	B	G	R	Y	O	U	U	C	W	M	S	G	L	V	T	Q	D	O
R	G	X	J	X	X	U	E	I	L	Y	M	D	S	X	I	P	F	L	L	T	H	D	J							
E		K	W	K	K	H	R	V	Y	L	Z	Q	F	K	V	C	S	Y	Y	G	A	Q	W	K						
G			Y	M	M	J	T	X	A	N	B	S	H	M	X	E	U	A	A	I	C	S	Y	M	R					
I															P	U				W	C	E	A							
M															H	N					O		S							
E																														
N																														
T																														

Figure 13-10 (f). Key derivation, step 2 (U).

e. Once the keyword has been found, solution is a simple matter, for the process of determining the keyword has of itself proved the assumption concerning the structure of the alphabet used. In this case a matrix is constructed containing one standard alphabet as the plain component and seven reversed standard alphabets as the cipher sequence juxtaposed to form the keyword BUNKER HILL below A of the plain. With this, the ciphertext can be deciphered to read:

"MOVE YOUR REGIMENT TO RJ FIVE TWO SIX."

f. In the foregoing a whole cryptogram was used for example purposes. However, the technique may be applied to a portion of a longer cryptogram. In this case only a few prerequisites are required. First, a reasonably accurate probable word, then an idea of where this word is located in the message. Then, by trial and error as shown above, the keyword can be derived. Further, although the example above used a reversed standard cipher sequence, the method is equally applicable to cases where a direct standard sequence is used, and also when a mixed sequence is used, if it is a known sequence, and the repeating key begins under Ap.

Section II. (C) SYSTEMS USING MIXED CIPHER ALPHABETS

13-9. (C) Characteristics of Mixed Alphabets

a. Polyalphabetic systems which use standard alphabets as cipher and plain sequences, because of their inherent simplicity, are not widely used. The reason for their vulnerability to analysis is threefold. First, only relatively few alphabets are normally used. Second, in this type system they are used periodically, imparting the cyclic phenomena in the text which in turn provides the means of determining the number of alphabets involved. Third, the alphabets used are known alphabets, i.e. the relative sequence of their individual letters are known. This with a limited number of alphabets greatly simplifies the process of equating cipher and plaintext values.

b. In preceding paragraphs, when monoalphabetic substitution using mixed alphabets was discussed, it was pointed out that the use of mixed alphabets greatly increased the difficulty of solution. So it also is in the case of polyalphabetic substitution. However, there are certain characteristics in the type mixed alphabets used which permits a fairly easy solution.

c. In paragraph 12-4 the common configurations of primary components, and of the derived secondary alphabets, used as cipher alphabets were given. In the preceding section, case I was used and the analysis based on the characteristics of those secondary alphabets produced in that case. In this section, alphabets of case II will be treated and their characteristics exploited as the basis for analysis.

d. Alphabets of case II are those whose primary components are not both normal sequences. That is, the plain component may be a standard alphabet and the cipher component a mixed sequence; or the plain component may be a mixed alphabet and the cipher component a normal alphabet. In either case the resulting secondary alphabets are mixed alphabets. An example of the former configuration may be seen below in figure 13-11.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	B	C	D	F	G	I	J	K	M	P	Q	S	U	X	Y	Z	L	E	A	V	N	W	O	R	T	H
C2	L	E	A	V	N	W	O	R	T	H	B	C	D	F	G	I	J	K	M	P	Q	S	U	X	Y	Z
C3	U	X	Y	Z	L	E	A	V	N	W	O	R	T	H	B	C	D	F	G	I	J	K	M	P	Q	S
C4	E	A	V	N	W	O	R	T	H	B	C	D	F	G	I	J	K	M	P	Q	S	U	X	Y	Z	L

Figure 13-11 (C). Case II secondary alphabets (U).

13-10. (C) Direct Symmetry of Position

a. The secondary alphabets above were produced by a juxtaposition of two alphabets. A standard sequence as the plain component and 4 of a possible

26 positional juxtapositions of a keyword mixed alphabet based on the keyword LEAVENWORTH. The four shown, as well as the other 22 possible are in reality only one sequence, each being displaced relative to the plain component. Thus in each a direct symmetry exists, i.e. in each sequence the individual letters follow one another in a fixed order at a fixed distance. Since each cipher sequence is offset a predetermined distance from the index letter of the plain component, symmetry exists between the individual letters of each sequence.

b. The implication of this direct symmetry of position can be shown in the example below. Let us first assume that in the course of analysis of a polyalphabetic cipher that we have determined that a period of four is being used, that the cipher sequence used is mixed, and further that the following values have been recovered.

- ALPHABET 1
Ep=Gc Op=Yc Tp=Vc
- ALPHABET 2
Ep=Nc Op=Gc Tp=Pc
- ALPHABET 3
Ep=Lc Op=Bc Tp=Ic
- ALPHABET 4
Ep=Wc Op=Ic Tp=Qc

The equivalencies shown for the secondary alphabets can be set down in a matrix reconstruction diagram as shown in figure 13-12.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1							G									Y						V				
C2							N									G						P				
C3							L									B						I				
C4							W									I						Q				

Figure 13-12 (C). Letter placement, direct symmetry of position (U).

c. As the individual letters of a mixed sequence follow one another in a fixed order and as each secondary alphabet is the same in respect to the sequence of their letters, only positioned at different points, it follows then that the letters of one can be transferred to another on the basis of constant distance and sequence. For example, in cipher sequence 1 above, Gc, Yc, and Vc are noted in sequence at 10 and 5 letters distance respectively. This same sequence then can be transferred to cipher sequence 2 where a Gc also appears. By counting 10 spaces to the right of Gc, Yc can be inserted below Yp. Continuing the count around the alphabet, Vc can be

located below Dp. For example, note the placement of the values in figure 13-13.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1							G										Y					V				
C2			V	N										G								P				Y
C3					L											B						I				
C4						W											I						Q			

Figure 13-13 (C). Placement transfer, direct symmetry of position (U).

d. By continuing the process of the reconstruction of the secondary alphabets through the principle of direct symmetry of position, the following additional placements can be made as shown in figure 13-14. Note that two elements must be known. First and foremost, one of the components, the cipher or the plain, must be a known sequence. It is unimportant whether it is mixed or standard, only the the exact sequential progression of the letters be known. If either is unknown, direct symmetry even if present, cannot be detected. Secondly, given one known sequence where the other is unknown, only a few equivalencies are required to use the principle of direct symmetry.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1							G									P						Y			V	N
C2			V	N										G								P				Y
C3					L											W						I				Q
C4						W											B						I			L

Figure 13-14 (C). Placement transfer (U).

e. The importance of direct symmetry of position in the analysis of a cryptogram should be obvious. The new values for each cipher alphabet discovered by the process can of course be inserted in the ciphertext, thereby leading to the recovery of further cipher to plain equivalents. This in turn enables the analyst to further develop his matrix reconstruction diagram. In short, it has a snowballing effect, each step leading to additional recovery until a final solution is reached.

13-11. (C) Preliminary Steps

a. In the solution of polyalphabetic ciphers using mixed alphabets, the same general preliminary techniques as those previously given are followed prior to the exploitation of the characteristic of direct symmetry. Assuming that a cryptogram has been identified tentatively as polyalphabetic, it is laid out and repeats are underlined as in figure 13-15.

	5	10	15	20	25																					
A	<u>Q</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>U</u>	
B	<u>L</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>I</u>	
C	<u>V</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>N</u>	
D	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	
E	<u>V</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Q</u>	
F	<u>Q</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>G</u>	
G	<u>V</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>S</u>	
H	<u>M</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>K</u>	
J	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>G</u>	
K	<u>B</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	
L	<u>S</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>J</u>
M	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>N</u>	
N	<u>Q</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>I</u>	
P	<u>I</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>P</u>	
Q	<u>A</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Q</u>	
R	<u>X</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>Q</u>	
S	<u>Q</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>X</u>																

Figure 13-15 (C). Ciphertext prepared for analysis (U).

b. Once the repeated groups of letters are underlined, they are extracted, set in columnar form, the intervals noted, and the factors derived. Note that, in figure 13-16 only the factors to 26 are included. Beyond that, additional factors would be merely repeated cycles of the basic 26 possible alphabets.

POLYGRAPH	INTERVAL	FACTORS
<u>QWBRI</u> <u>VWY</u>	45	3, 5, 9, 15
<u>CGXG</u> <u>B</u>	60	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20
<u>PJEL</u>	95	5, 19
<u>PZGI</u>	145	5
<u>BRIV</u>	330	2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 22
<u>BRIV</u>	285	3, 5, 15, 19
<u>KAG</u>	75	3, 5, 15, 25
<u>QRD</u>	165	3, 5, 15
<u>QWB</u>	45	3, 5, 9, 15
<u>QWB</u>	275	5, 11, 25
<u>WIC</u>	130	2, 5, 10, 13, 26
<u>XNF</u>	45	3, 5, 9, 15
<u>YZT</u>	225	3, 5, 15, 25
<u>ZTC</u>	145	5

Figure 13-16 (C). Determination of period (U).

The constant factor of five is indicative that all repeated appearances are probably causal rather than accidental. Further, their number and size reinforces this assumption. Therefore it may be accepted that the period, i.e. the number of alphabets, is five.

c. Having determined a probable period length the next step is to make a distribution of the ciphertext,

one for each period in order to ascertain the type of alphabet involved, see figure 13-17.




Figure 13-17 (U). Unilateral frequency distribution alphabet 1 (U).

In this case the distribution of alphabet 1 is indicative that the period of five is a correct assumption. If further confirmation is required, a similar distribution for each alphabet could be made and the statistical tests previously explained could be used as confirmation. This is the accepted procedure in most cases. However, accepting the assumed period, the distribution is compared to the normal. In this comparison, two facts should immediately become apparent. First, the pronounced peaks and troughs are indicative of monoalphabetic substitution, as it should be, assuming the period to be correct. Yet the spatial relationship between the peaks and troughs does not conform to the normal. That is, it cannot be fitted to the normal. Thus, the use of mixed sequences is indicated.

d. If the distribution cannot be fitted to the normal, recovery of each value in each alphabet then must be determined on an individual basis. Later, as values are inserted in the text, additional values may be assumed on word patterns, probable words, etc. This individual identification may be accomplished through a study of frequencies of occurrence, a study of a trilateral frequency distribution, or even a study of repetitions and assumptions based thereon. However, for reasons previously explained, it is best to consider all factors. Accordingly, it then becomes

necessary to develop a trilateral frequency distribution.

e. A trilateral frequency distribution made of a polygraphic cipher must be somewhat different than that made previously in the case of monoalphabetic substitution systems. It must show each letter prefix and suffix, and yet account for the fact that there are a number of different alphabets involved. In order to do this, one distribution must be made for each cipher alphabet. In this case, since the period length conforms to group size, each successive letter of each group is listed in its own distribution, the letter preceding and following it is listed below in columnar form as a diagraph. Thus a frequency distribution for each alphabet and a trilateral distribution involving three different alphabets is combined. In the example shown below note that the horizontal line A-Z represents those letters from the first alphabet. The prefix and suffix listed below each letter represents letters of the 5th and 2nd alphabets. Thus for reference purpose QAC, the first trigraph of alphabet 1, may be annotated 512, as may all

Q A C

trigraphs from that distribution. In like manner the following patterns apply.

Alphabet 2	1 2 3
	S A N
Alphabet 3	2 3 4
	Y A H
Alphabet 4	3 4 5
	Z A O
Alphabet 5	4 5 1
	C A I

Note that the annotated numbers are merely a cyclic permutation of the periodic sequence 1-2-3-4-5. Thus the completed trilateral distribution would appear as shown in figures 13-18① through 13-18⑤.

Alphabet 1

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
QC	GW	NT		TV		AE		AS		UD	UW	IT	UT	QP	NX	-W	LB	LA	LA		IW	NN	QI	UX	QR
PT	OP	TC				AD		WC		FI	QX	II		UP		YW	YW	DE			IW				
	GK	TT				LX		HW		FW	LV	OT				NW	QD	RB			UE				
	OW	WB				LW		ND		LR	SY					QC	QD				LC				
	GL							GV				WC				GI					GP				
	GX							WC				GP				QL					QB				
								XD				AB				RI					NW				
								GB				JF				YV					QE				
								IV				DI				NY					IP				
								NR								SW					UP				
								AK								QW									
								QB																	

Figure 13-18① (φ). Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 1 (U).

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Alphabet 2

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
SN	RZ	IJ	IM	GG	MD			MB	IW	QF	WB	BD	ZH	IP	MZ	IX	QB	GN	MJ						
TG	VG	QG	GG	VZ				QG	BZ	BG		OD	IG	CG	QF	VY	BD	QA							
	IE	VG	ID	SZ				QI				VW	LZ	NZ	LV	QY	PF								
	MJ	CB	RG	VD				KL				OJ		MY	IJ	LM	YN								
	SG	IG	KH					MY				MJ		CJ	EG	QB	LN								
	CY	MJ	RZ					XN				VJ		AY		VY									
	IW	AJ										VY										BN			
																						IJ			
																						BF			
																						RN			
																						VD			
																						QB			
																						KF			
																						GF			
																						QJ			

Figure 13-18(2) (U). Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 2 (U).

Alphabet 3

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
YH	WR		PB	BY	WE	CQ	RC	IE	CC		IC	WG	WB		SJ						WV	PM	VC	WC	BE	
	IK		PK		LC	EX	DC		WK			DR	WF									KJ		WE	TE	
	WR		DR		VW	IV			YJ				XF									BR		WI	EY	
	CY		WY		XP	TY			CK				XF												TZ	KZ
	WI		XB		WZ	CX			PQ				AC												IZ	TA
	NR		FZ		WJ	DI			PE				XC												TE	EZ
			EC			CX			PJ				IB												BZ	RN
						LQ			TR																PH	DY
						BR			CR																	
						DD			VR																	
						BZ			PE																	
						AD			WY																	
						RQ																				
						VQ																				

Figure 13-18(3) (U). Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 3 (U).

Alphabet 4

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
ZO	NQ	YA	GG	ZY	NL	MW	AQ	YG	PL	BN		WR	ZQ		FU	GH	BI				GN	FY	GN	ZG	ZG
	DL	JI	GN	YU	NW		XL	GG	JY	JA						GQ	BI						GG	GO	YT
	DN	XU		ZI	NG			BI	JF	DA						JQ	MU						GG	BQ	ZG
	NA	FO		FQ					WQ	JX						GP	GS							DQ	DT
		HN		IW					FQ							GU	DU							EU	YQ
		ND		JL													JD							ZF	GN
		HA		JL													JR							JQ	YT
		LJ		YW													JN								FL
		DQ															BI								
		NL															WX								
		VS																							

Figure 13-18(4) (U). Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 4 (U).

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Alphabet 5

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
CI			CS		JK	IB	QI	RV	CM		JR		KQ	YB	QA	BQ	MQ	RM	ZC	EL		GI	KI	EQ	
KG		RM			YK	YQ		CM		BV		XI	AB		EQ	RS	CQ	ZC	RV		EI	R-	JQ		
KG						XB		EM		FG		VC	CM		YO			ZE	CN		FM		WR		
CM						ZI		RV		ES		CV			QV				RO		EC				
BI						IV		II		CL		BP			QZ					PY					
						XB		RV		ET		ZQ			YR					YK					
						DB				HL		RW			ZA					QV					
						FM				ZG		DI			HV										
						ZI									CL										
															NX										
															JR										
															JQ										
															YI										

Figure 13-18 (C). Trilateral frequency distribution, alphabet 5 (U).

f. In addition to the trilateral frequency distribution a condensed table of repetitions is prepared in which all polygraphs are listed and the alphabet of each letter is indicated. A format of this is shown in figure 13-19.

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3	
Q W B R I V W Y-2	
Q W B	-3
Q W	-5
V P	-3
V W	-3
3 4 5 1	
B R I V-3	
Z Z G I-2	
Y Z T	-2
B R	-3
G Q	-4
G X	-3
J R	-3
N F	-3
Y Z	-3
4 5 1	
K A G-2	
Z T C-2	
R I	-3
Y Q	-3
Z T	-3

Figure 13-19 (C). Condensed table of repetitions (U).

E as beginning letter	ED	EN	ER	ES		1
E as ending letter	NE	RE	SE	TE	VE	1

13-12. (C) Identification of Cipher Values

a. With the completion of the preliminary step, the analysis of the cryptogram may now begin. Using the same analytic techniques as were used in the case of mixed monoalphabetic ciphers, one now attempts to establish the identification of cipher values, doing this for each alphabet. The first step is to separate the vowels from the consonants—through frequency of occurrence alone, or by the consonant line method in doubtful cases. On the

basis of the former it appears that $\frac{2}{Wc}$ and $\frac{5}{Qc}$ are the equivalents of Ep. In the other alphabets this distinction is not so clear-cut. Using the same yardstick of frequency as a measure $\frac{1}{Ic}$, $\frac{3}{Gc}$, and $\frac{4}{Cc}$ appear as likely candidates for Ep.

b. In paragraph 13-11e it was stated that the trilateral distribution of alphabet 1 represents the letters of alphabets 512 as prefix, base, and suffix letters respectively. As the cipher value of Ep has been assumed with some certainty for alphabets 2 and 5 ($\frac{2}{Wc}$ and $\frac{5}{Qc}$), we may use this to determine the vowels and consonants of alphabet 1. The basis for the identification being the familiar diagraph permutations of E, that is:

In terms of the 512 pattern, possible cipher to plain equivalencies may be set down as illustrated in figure 13-20.

$\frac{51}{\underline{EDp}}$	$\frac{51}{\underline{ENp}}$	$\frac{51}{\underline{ERp}}$	$\frac{51}{\underline{ESp}}$	
$\frac{1}{Q-c}$	$\frac{1}{Q-c}$	$\frac{1}{Q-c}$	$\frac{1}{Q-c}$	
	$\frac{12}{\underline{NEp}}$	$\frac{12}{\underline{REp}}$	$\frac{12}{\underline{SCp}}$	$\frac{12}{\underline{TEp}}$
	$\frac{2}{-Wc}$	$\frac{2}{-Wc}$	$\frac{2}{-Wc}$	$\frac{2}{-Wc}$

Figure 13-20 (C). Identification of cipher to plain equivalencies (U).

Thus it can be seen that some of the high frequency letters of alphabet 1; I, M, Q, V, B, G, L, R, S, and C respectively, probably represent the plaintext consonants D, N, R, S, T, and V. Moreover if the consonants can be identified, then the remaining high-frequency cipher letters of alphabet 1 most likely will be limited to vowels.

c. The prefixes of $\frac{2}{Wc}$ and the suffix of $\frac{5}{Qc}$ (both assumed Ep) are shown in the following tabulation figure 13-21, drawn from the trilateral distribution of alphabet 1.

Prefixes of $\frac{2}{Wc}$	Suffixes of $\frac{5}{Qc}$
$\frac{Q}{\underline{G}}$ $\frac{K}{\underline{V}}$ $\frac{R}{\underline{B}}$ $\frac{I}{\underline{L}}$ $\frac{C}{\underline{C}}$	$\frac{I}{\underline{Q}}$ $\frac{R}{\underline{X}}$ $\frac{L}{\underline{V}}$ $\frac{A}{\underline{Z}}$ $\frac{O}{\underline{O}}$

Figure 13-21 (C). Identification of vowels and consonants (U).

Using the data established, it is now possible to study the high-frequency letters, I, M, Q, V, B, G, L, R, S, and C of alphabet 1 in turn, to determine their identity as either a vowel or consonant, and perhaps ascertain their exact plaintext value.

(1) $\frac{1}{Ic}$ previously established as a possible cipher value for Ep may be set aside immediately.

(2) $\frac{2}{Mc}$ is noted as not appearing either as a suffix or prefix in the tables above which indicates that it may be a vowel. Moreover its frequency tends credence to this. If it is a vowel, it may well be Op, as Ep has been excluded, though its identification as either an Ip or Ap cannot yet be discounted.

(3) $\frac{1}{Qc}$ is observed five times as a prefix of $\frac{2}{Wc}$

and three times as a suffix of $\frac{5}{Qc}$. The frequency of its combination with assumed Ep indicates both that it is probably a consonant and that it is the equivalent of Rp.

(4) The letter $\frac{1}{Vc}$ occurs three times as a prefix and twice as a suffix indicating that it, too, is probably a consonant. On the basis of its frequency it then may be assigned the plaintext value of T.

(5) The letter $\frac{1}{Bc}$ occurs only as a prefix of $\frac{2}{Wc}$, then only twice. As its frequency is neither low nor high, it may be a consonant.

(6) $\frac{1}{Gc}$ appears but once, as a prefix; its identity is questionable, though it may be either Ap or Ip.

(7) $\frac{1}{Lc}$ appears one time as both a prefix and a suffix, therefore it is probably a consonant, yet its exact identity cannot be ascertained.

(8) $\frac{1}{Rc}$, because it appears once as a prefix and twice as a suffix of the assumed Ep, is most certainly a consonant.

(9) Neither $\frac{1}{Sc}$ nor $\frac{1}{Cc}$ appears as a suffix or a prefix; therefore, both may be vowels or consonants, though a study of their combinations later, in other

sequences, shows that $\frac{1}{Cc}$ may be a vowel leaving $\frac{1}{Sc}$ unclassified.

d. The same process is applied to each distribution in turn classifying the cipher letters either as vowels or consonants, and identifying specific plain to cipher values where possible. Also, as the process is continued, it then becomes possible to expand the classification and identification by playing one assumed value of one alphabet against an unidentified vowel or consonant in another, thus leading to additional identifications. The completed process could result in the following classification of vowels and consonants. Also previous identifications could be placed in a reconstruction matrix as shown in figure 13-22.

Alphabet	Vowels	Consonants
1	I, M, C	Q, V, B, L, R, G?
2	W, P, I	B, C, D, T
3	G, Z	J, N, D, Y, F
4	C; E?, R?, B?	Y, Z, J, Q
5	Q, U	G, N, A, I, W, L, T

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
C1	C								I								M				Q						
C2									W																		
C3									G																		
C4									C																		
C5									Q																		

Figure 13-22 (C). Reconstruction matrix (U).

13-13. (C) Application of the Principle of Direct Symmetry of Position

a. At first glance the values recovered to this point seem somewhat sketchy. However, on a closer examination the appearance of Qc in both alphabets 1 and 5 is noted as well as the Cc in alphabets 1 and 4. If the cipher system involves the use of one mixed component juxtaposed a number of times against a known standard sequence, the resultant secondary alphabets (cipher alphabets) can be recovered by applying the principle of direct symmetry of position presented above. If this is the case then the values of alphabet 1 can be transferred to alphabet 5 using the

$\frac{5}{Qc}$ as point of reference. It would appear as shown in figure 13-23.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	C?								I								M				Q					
C5		M							Q								C?				I					C?

Figure 13-23 (C). Recovered value transfer (U).

b. This process immediately reveals three additional values; $\frac{5}{Mc}=Bp$, $\frac{5}{Vc}=Gp$, and $\frac{5}{Tc}=Rp$. Note that Bp and Gp are normally low-frequency letters. If the values derived by this process are correct, Mc and Vc of alphabet 5 should appear infrequently.

A check of alphabet 5's distribution reveals that neither appear, which tends to support the assumption.

Note that $\frac{5}{Cc}$ in alphabet 5 appears under Np and Vp . Both are consonants, but are significantly different in that if $\frac{5}{Cc}=Np$, H can be expected to appear quite frequently. If on the other hand $\frac{5}{Cc}$ is Vp it will appear infrequently. Examining the distribution for alphabet 5, it does not appear at all, therefore it must be equivalent of Vp rather than

Np . The definite placement of $\frac{5}{Cc}$ now permits the placement of values in alphabet 4. The total values now consolidated in the reconstruction matrix appear in figure 13-24.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1									I								M				Q					
C2									W																	
C3									G																	
C4	I								C								M				Q					
C5		M							Q								V									

Figure 13-24 (C). Additional value placement (U).

c. At this point it is possible to transfer the values found to the cryptogram. It is possible to continue along the same lines, i.e. determining the value of individual cipher letters through association with those already found, confirmed by their use in other alphabets. However, with the number of values already recovered it may be more profitable to approach the problem directly through the analysis of word patterns in the ciphertext.

13-14. (C) Reconstruction of the Matrix

a. Using the partially recovered matrix, the following plaintext values can be inserted in the cipher work sheet (fig. 13-25).

	5	10	15	20	25
A	<u>QWBRI</u>	<u>VWYCA</u>	<u>ISPJL</u>	<u>RBZEY</u>	<u>QWYEU</u>
	RE R	TE E	E		RE
B	<u>LWMGW</u>	<u>ICJCI</u>	<u>MTZEI</u>	<u>MIBKN</u>	<u>QWBRI</u>
	E	E ER	O R	O	RE R
C	<u>VWYIG</u>	<u>BWNBQ</u>	<u>QCGQH</u>	<u>IWJKA</u>	<u>GEGXN</u>
	TE A	E E	R EN	EE	E
D	<u>IDMRU</u>	<u>VEZYG</u>	<u>QIGVN</u>	<u>CTGYO</u>	<u>BPDBL</u>
	E	T	R EP	I E	
E	<u>VCGXG</u>	<u>BKZZG</u>	<u>IVXCU</u>	<u>NTZAO</u>	<u>BWFEQ</u>
	T E		E E		E E
F	<u>QLFCO</u>	<u>MTYZT</u>	<u>CCBYQ</u>	<u>OPDKA</u>	<u>GDGIG</u>
	R E	O I	I E		EA
G	<u>VPWMR</u>	<u>QIIEW</u>	<u>ICGXG</u>	<u>BLGQQ</u>	<u>VBCRS</u>
	T K	R	E E	ENE	T E
H	<u>MYJJY</u>	<u>QVFWY</u>	<u>RWNFL</u>	<u>GXNFW</u>	<u>MCJXX</u>
	O	R	E		O
J	<u>IDDRU</u>	<u>OPJQQ</u>	<u>ZRHCN</u>	<u>VWDYQ</u>	<u>RDGDG</u>
	E	NE	E	TE E	E
K	<u>BXDBN</u>	<u>PXFPU</u>	<u>YXNFG</u>	<u>MPJEL</u>	<u>SANCD</u>
				O	E
L	<u>SEZZG</u>	<u>IBEYU</u>	<u>KDHCA</u>	<u>MBJJY</u>	<u>KILCJ</u>
		E	E	O	E
M	<u>MFDZT</u>	<u>CTJRD</u>	<u>MIYZQ</u>	<u>ACJRR</u>	<u>SBGZN</u>
	O	I	O E		E
N	<u>QYAHQ</u>	<u>VEDCQ</u>	<u>LXNCL</u>	<u>LVVCS</u>	<u>QWBII</u>
	D E	T EE	E	E	RE AR
P	<u>IVJRN</u>	<u>WNBRI</u>	<u>VPJEL</u>	<u>TAGDN</u>	<u>IRGQP</u>
	E	R	T	E	E EN
Q	<u>ATYEW</u>	<u>CBYZT</u>	<u>EVGQU</u>	<u>VPYHL</u>	<u>LRZHQ</u>
		I	EN	T	E
R	<u>XINBA</u>	<u>IKWJQ</u>	<u>RDZFY</u>	<u>KWFZL</u>	<u>GWFIQ</u>
		E E		E	E E
S	<u>QWJYQ</u>	<u>IBWRX</u>			
	RE E	E			

Figure 13-25 (C). Partially recovered plaintext (U).

b. Possible words are somewhat sketchy, but no impossible combinations are noted. Therefore the plaintext values would be carefully scanned in an attempt to locate possible words. In line A, a word fragment is at once noted.

	5	10	15
A	<u>QWBRI</u>	<u>VWYCA</u>	<u>ISPJL</u>
	RE - -	R TE - E	E

(1) The same pattern occurs on line B as:

	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
B	<u>QWBRI</u>	<u>VWYIG</u>	<u>BWNBQ</u>
	RE - -	R TE - A	E E

Considering possible words which may be used as the beginning of a message, the word REPORT is

quickly selected. Note that the E which follows it may be expanded to REPORTED. Thus the following cipher to plain value may be assumed.

$$\frac{3}{Bc} = Pp$$

$$\frac{4}{Rc} = Op$$

$$\frac{3}{Yc} = Dp$$

(2) A similar pattern is noted on line L

5	1 2 3 4 5	1
S	<u>QWBII</u>	<u>III</u>
	RE	ARE

Having established the values of $\frac{3}{Bc}$ as Pp it leads immediately to the assumption that this plaintext

fragment represents PREPARE and that $\frac{5}{Sc} = Pp$.

(3) Another pattern of interest occurs on lines E and F. Note the word fragment:

1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
<u>CDGIG</u>	<u>VPWMR</u>
EA	T K

This may represent the word ATTACK, and if so the following values could be assumed:

$$\frac{5}{Gc} = Tp$$

$$\frac{2}{Pc} = Ap$$

$$\frac{3}{Wc} = Cp$$

The assumption that $\frac{5}{Gc} = Tp$ is confirmed at the second appearance of REPORTED. Note that this value completes the phrase REPORTED AT.

(4) Reexamining the text in light of the previous assumptions, additional values may be gleaned. For example, beginning at A9 another possible word is noted.

	1 0	1 5
A1	4 5	1 2 3 4 5
	CA	<u>ISPJL</u>
	E	E

With a little imagination the word ENEMY can be seen in the similarity of the placement of the E.

Further, it seems to make sense in that the phrase REPORTED ENEMY would appear at the opening of the message. If the assumption is correct then:

$$\frac{5}{Ac} = Np, \quad \frac{2}{Sc} = Mp \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{3}{Pc} = Yp$$

c. The process outlined can be continued, as long as probable words can be seen in the text. However there is danger in this unless the assumptions are checked periodically for validity against other factors. In this case, the assumed values shown below can be compared to their respective frequency distributions. If no significant differences are noted, then they may be placed in the reconstruction matrix:

New assumed values

- Alphabet 1
- Alphabet 2 $Pc=Ap, Sc=Mp$
- Alphabet 3 $Bc=Pp, Yc=Dp, Wc=Cp, Pc=Yp$
- Alphabet 4 $Rc=Op$
- Alphabet 5 $Sc=Pp, Gc=Tp, Ac=Np$

13-15. (C) The Reconstruction Matrix

a. The values previously established when inserted in the reconstruction matrix would result in the matrix shown in figure 13-26.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1									I																	
C2	P													S												
C3																										
C4																										
C5																										

Figure 13-26 (C). Insertion of recovered values (U).

In so doing an inconsistency becomes apparent. Note the sequences $P C D F$ in alphabet 3 and $P R S T$ in alphabet 5. If, as has been assumed, the same sequences are being dealt with, this is an impossible situation. One or the other must be wrong. Therefore the value of each must be reexamined. In alphabet 3

the values $\frac{C}{W}$ and $\frac{D}{Y}$ were derived by analysis while the position of Gc below Ep was purely on the basis of inspection of the frequency distribution. The

placement of Gc below the $\frac{5}{Tp}$ was on the basis of assuming the word ATTACK. Therefore it is now

determined that the initial assumption of $\frac{3}{Gc}$ as Ep is incorrect. Yet, as seen in the trilateral frequency

distribution, $\frac{3}{Gc}$ behaves like a vowel, therefore it should be replaced beneath a vowel other than E. But which one? Perhaps an answer can be found by ignoring the Gc in alphabet 3 for the moment and applying the principles of direct symmetry of position to transfer vowels. Thus the matrix would now appear as shown in figure 13-27.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	A	S	I	G	C								M	Q	R	V										
C2	P												S													
C3																										
C4	I	G	C										M	Q	R	V								A	S	
C5																										

Figure 13-27 (C). Insertion of recovered values, step 2 (U).

b. The relative position of letters in each sequence is such that the use of a keyword mixed alphabet as the secondary component can be safely assumed. In particular, note the sequence $M - - QRV$ in alphabets 1, 2, 4, and 5, WY in alphabet 3. Note also the $A-S-I-G-C$ sequence, again in alphabets 1, 2, 4, and 5. These sequences are reminiscent of portions of a keyword; $A-S-I-G-C$ being the keyword, possibly the G marking its end; the QRV being a mid portion, and WY of alphabet 3 marking its end. Previously in alphabet 3, G was incorrectly placed immediately following the Y . Perhaps, instead, a Z should be placed there. In the case of the sequence $M - - QRV$, O and P should be placed between the M and Q ; thus, N could be placed between the I and G of the sequence $A-SOI-G-C$. If this was done G would then fall beneath a vowel in alphabet 3 as required. This placement would then allow the reconstruction matrix to be expanded (fig. 13-28).

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	A	S	I	N	G	B	C						M	O	P	Q	R	V	W	Y	Z					
C2	P	Q	R	V	W	Y	Z					A	S	I	N	G	B	C								
C3	R	V	W	Y	Z							A	S	I	N	G	B	C								
C4	I	N	G	B	C								M	O	P	Q	R	V	W	Y	Z			A	S	
C5																										

Figure 13-28 (C). Expansion of matrix (U).

13-16. (C) Completion of the Solution

a. Having reached this point in the analysis, the next step is to again transfer the newly assumed plaintext values to the cryptogram being studied. The object is twofold. First, by so doing the validity of the assumptions may be proved or disproved, according to the structure of the resultant plaintext produced. Second, if the assumptions are proven valid, their insertion into the cryptogram will enable the analyst to assume new plain-to-cipher values. Accordingly, this will produce the following partially recovered cryptogram (fig. 13-29).

	5	10	15	20	25
A	<u>QWBRI</u>	<u>VWYCA</u>	<u>ISPJL</u>	<u>RBZEY</u>	<u>QWYEU</u>
	REPOR	TEDEN	EMY	SRE I	RED
B	<u>LWMGW</u>	<u>ICJCI</u>	<u>MTZEI</u>	<u>MIBKN</u>	<u>QWBRI</u>
	EWCH	ESTER	O E R	OOP S	REPOR
C	<u>VWYIG</u>	<u>BWNBQ</u>	<u>QCGQH</u>	<u>IWJKA</u>	<u>GEGXN</u>
	TEDAT	HENDE	RSON	EE N	G O S
D	<u>IDMRU</u>	<u>VEZYG</u>	<u>QIGVN</u>	<u>CTGYO</u>	<u>BPDBL</u>
	E WO	T ERT	ROOPS	I ORC	HA D
E	<u>VCGXG</u>	<u>BKZZG</u>	<u>IVXCU</u>	<u>NTZAO</u>	<u>BWFEQ</u>
	TSO T	H EST	ED E	F EWC	HE E
F	<u>QLFCO</u>	<u>MTYZT</u>	<u>CCBYQ</u>	<u>OPDKA</u>	<u>GDGIG</u>
	R EC	O DS	ISPRE	PA H	G O T
G	<u>VPWMR</u>	<u>QIIEW</u>	<u>ICGXG</u>	<u>BLGQQ</u>	<u>VBCRS</u>
	TACKF	ROM H	ESO T	H ONE	TROOP
H	<u>MYJYJ</u>	<u>QVFWY</u>	<u>RWNFL</u>	<u>GXNEF</u>	<u>MGJXX</u>
	OF I	RD QI	SEN	G N H	OS
J	<u>IDDRU</u>	<u>OPJQQ</u>	<u>ZRHCV</u>	<u>VWDYQ</u>	<u>RDGDG</u>
	E O	PA N	WC ES	TE RE	S O T
K	<u>BXDBN</u>	<u>PXFPU</u>	<u>YXNFG</u>	<u>MPJEL</u>	<u>SANCD</u>
	H DS	Q M	V N T	OA	CKNE
L	<u>SEZZG</u>	<u>IBEYU</u>	<u>KDHCA</u>	<u>MBJYJ</u>	<u>KILCJ</u>
	C EST	ER R	EN	OR	O E
M	<u>MFDZT</u>	<u>CTJRD</u>	<u>MIYZQ</u>	<u>ACJRR</u>	<u>SBGZN</u>
	O S	I O	OODSE	AS OF	CROSS
N	<u>QYAHQ</u>	<u>VEDCQ</u>	<u>LXNCL</u>	<u>LVVCS</u>	<u>QWBII</u>
	RFI E	T EE	NE	DBEP	REPAR
P	<u>IVJRN</u>	<u>WNBRI</u>	<u>VPJEL</u>	<u>TAGDN</u>	<u>IRGQP</u>
	ED OS	UPPOR	TA	KO S	ECOND
Q	<u>ATYEW</u>	<u>CBYZT</u>	<u>EVGQU</u>	<u>VPYHL</u>	<u>LRZNG</u>
	A D H	IRDS	DON	TAD	CEBE
R	<u>XINBA</u>	<u>IKWJQ</u>	<u>RDZFY</u>	<u>KWEZL</u>	<u>GWFJQ</u>
	ONDN	E C E	S ER	E S	GE E
S	<u>QWJYQ</u>	<u>IBWRX</u>			
	RE RE	ERCO			

Figure 13-29 (C). Plaintext partially recovered (U).

b. With the wealth of plaintext values now added to the cryptogram, the final solution is quite simple. With but little effort, the plaintext can be inferred. For example, line A and the first group of line B reads:

REPORTED ENEMY HAS RETIRED TO
NEWCHESTER

Using the values established by this assumption, the basic cipher sequence, again through the process of direct symmetry of position, can be expanded to:

C1. AUS INGBC J LMNOPQRVWYZE

with only the letters D, F, H, K, T, and X unplaced, recovery of the keyword follows immediately. Considering the positional limitations of the sequences, the keyword mixed sequence is derived as:

EXHAUSTINGBCDFJKLMOPQRVWYZ

and the repeating key is APRIL under Ap.

c. A reconstruction of the cipher matrix using the above key and sequences reveals the message as:

REPORTED ENEMY HAS RETIRED TO
NEWCHESTER(.) ONE TROOP IS RE-
PORTED AT HENDERSON. MEETING
HOUSE(.) TWO OTHER TROOPS IN OR-
CHARD AT SOUTHWEST EDGE OF NEW-
CHESTER(.) SECOND SQ IS PREPARING
TO ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH(.) ONE
TROOP OF THIRD SQ IS ENGAGING
HOSTILE TROOP AT NEWCHESTER(.)
REST OF THIRD SQ IS MOVING TO
ATTACK NEWCHESTER FROM THE
NORTH(.) MOVE YOUR SQ INTO WOODS
EAST OF CROSS(OADS) FIVE THREE
NINE AND BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT
ATTACK OF SECOND AND THIRD SQ(.)
DO NOT ADVANCE BEYOND NEW-
CHESTER(.) MESSAGES HERE(.) TREER,
COL(.)

Section III. (C) SPECIAL CASES AND THEIR SOLUTION

13-17. (C) Solution of Message Using the Same Alphabets—Different Key—Completing the Plain Component

a. It sometimes happens that correspondents will use the same primary components to encipher a series of messages, only using a different key for each message. In this case, if one message is recovered and the primary components are reconstructed, the situation is then one of a message enciphered using a known sequence. Thus the possibility arises that all subsequent messages can be solved by completing the plain component.

b. In previous paragraphs it was shown that, in the case of monoalphabetic ciphers, completion of the plain component was based on inscribing a normal alphabetic sequence below the plain component equivalents, the plaintext then appearing on one generatrix. Also, as was shown in the case of polyalphabetic ciphers using standard alphabets, the plaintext equivalents of each alphabet involved reappeared on the same generatrix; thus it was only necessary to combine the proper generatrices to reproduce the plaintext. In the situation under discussion both processes are combined. The techniques involved are explained in the following paragraphs.

c. Presupposing that the message in figure 13-30 was enciphered using the same primary components

	5	10	15	20	25
A	SFDZR	YRRKX	MIWLL	AQRLU	RQFRT
B	IJQKF	XWUBS	MDJZK	MICQC	UDPTV
C	TYRNH	TRORV	BQLTI	QBNPR	RTUHD
D	PTIVE	RMGQN	LRATQ	PLUKR	KGRZF
E	JCMGP	IHSMR	GQRFX	BCABA	OEMTL
F	PCXJM	RGQSZ	VB		

Figure 13-30 (C). Ciphertext for analysis (U).

as were used in the preceding example, the first step is to determine the period or number of alphabets involved.

(1) The size of the sample and the repetition *MRGQ* occurring at an interval of 21 suggests polyalphabetic encipherment with a period of either 3 or 7. The repeated trigraph *DPT* at an interval of 28 tends to confirm the period as being 7. Thus the message is then transcribed into seven columns—each column corresponding to one period, indicating the use of one alphabet.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
S	F	D	Z	R	Y	R
R	K	X	M	I	W	L
L	A	Q	R	L	U	R
Q	F	R	T	I	J	Q
K	F	X	W	U	B	S
M	D	J	Z	K	M	I
C	Q	C	U	D	P	T
V	T	Y	R	N	H	T
R	O	R	V	B	Q	L
T	I	Q	B	N	P	R
R	T	U	H	D	P	T
I	V	E	R	M	G	Q
N	L	R	A	T	Q	P
L	U	K	R	K	G	R
Z	F	J	C	M	G	P
I	H	S	M	R	G	Q
R	F	X	B	C	A	B
A	O	E	M	T	L	P
C	X	J	M	R	G	Q
S	Z	V	B			

(2) With the message rearranged to reflect the use of its alphabets, the following step consists of converting each column to a plain component equivalent. This is done by juxtaposing the reconstructed cipher component against the normal plain component at any arbitrary point, then listing the pseudo-plain equivalents in columnar form reading from the cipher component, as follows:

P-P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C	E	X	H	A	U	S	T	I	N	G	B	C	D	F	J	K	L	M	O	P	Q	R	V	W	Y	Z
							1	2	3	4	5	6	7													
			C				S	F	D	Z	R	Y	R													
			P-P				F	N	M	Z	Y	V	Y													

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For this it is not necessary to convert all rows—just a sufficient number to form a basis for the subsequent step. In this case 10 rows will do:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
P-P	F	N	M	Z	V	Y	V
	V	P	B	R	H	X	Q
	Q	D	U	V	Q	E	V
	U	N	V	G	H	O	U
	P	N	B	E	X	K	F
	R	M	O	Z	P	R	H
	L	U	L	E	M	T	G
	W	G	Y	V	I	C	G
	V	S	V	W	K	U	Q
	G	H	U	K	I	T	V

(3) Selecting the first five lines of plain component equivalents produced by the preceding step, a generatrix diagram is produced for each by inscribing, in columnar form, the normal alphabetic sequence below each letter. Each generatrix so produced is then rough scored using the methods shown in paragraph 13-5b. This process is illustrated in figure 13-31.

Gen.	Alphabet 1	Alphabet 2	Alphabet 3	Alphabet 4	Alphabet 5
Cipher	<u>SRLQKMCVRT</u>	<u>FKAFFDQTOI</u>	<u>DXQRXJCYRQ</u>	<u>ZMRTUZURVB</u>	<u>RILIWKDNBN</u>
1	1 <u>FVQUPRLWVG</u>	4 <u>NPDDNMUGSH</u>	1 <u>MBUVBOLYVU</u>	<u>ZRVGEZBYWK</u>	<u>VHQHXPMIKI</u>
2	<u>GWRVQSMXWH</u>	7 <u>OQEOONVHTI</u>	1 <u>NCVWCPMZWV</u>	3 <u>ASWHFAFWXL</u>	<u>WIRIYQNJLJ</u>
3	<u>HXSWRTNYXI</u>	3 <u>PREPPOWIUJ</u>	<u>QDWXBDQAXW</u>	<u>BTXIGBGXYF</u>	<u>XJSSJZPGKXK</u>
4	<u>IYTXSUQZYZ</u>	<u>QSGQQPXJK</u>	<u>PXYEROBXX</u>	<u>GUYJHGHIYN</u>	<u>YKIKASPLNE</u>
5	<u>JZUYTVPAZK</u>	<u>RTHRRQYKWB</u>	<u>QFYZFSPGZY</u>	<u>DVZKIBIZAO</u>	<u>ZLULBTQMOH</u>
6	<u>KAVZUWQBAE</u>	<u>SUISSRZLXM</u>	<u>RGZAGTQDAZ</u>	<u>EWALJZJABP</u>	3 <u>AMVMCURNPN</u>
7	2 <u>LBWAVXRCBM</u>	6 <u>TVJTTSAMYN</u>	5 <u>SHABHUREBA</u>	<u>FYBMMKFKBQQ</u>	5 <u>BNWNDVSOQC</u>
8	2 <u>MCXBWYSDCN</u>	<u>UWKUUTBNZO</u>	4 <u>TIBCIVSFCB</u>	2 <u>GYCNLGLCDR</u>	5 <u>COXOEWTPRP</u>
9	<u>NDYGXZTFED</u>	2 <u>VXLVVUCOAP</u>	<u>UJGDIJWTEDE</u>	3 <u>HZDOMHMDES</u>	<u>DPYPFKUQSQ</u>
10	4 <u>OEZDYAUFEP</u>	0 <u>WYMWVDPBQ</u>	<u>VKDEKXUHEB</u>	8 <u>IAEPNINEFT</u>	<u>EQZQGYVTRR</u>
11	<u>PFAEZBYGFG</u>	<u>WZNXWEEQSR</u>	3 <u>WLEFLYVIFE</u>	<u>JBFQOJQFGU</u>	5 <u>FRARHZWSUS</u>
12	2 <u>QGBFACWHGR</u>	4 <u>YAOPYXFRDS</u>	<u>XMFGMZJGJF</u>	<u>KGGRPKPGHV</u>	6 <u>GSBSIAXTVT</u>
13	3 <u>RHCGBDXIHS</u>	<u>ZBPZZYGSSE</u>	<u>YNGHNAXKHG</u>	<u>LDHSQEQHIW</u>	2 <u>HTCTJBYUWU</u>
14	5 <u>SIDHCEYJIT</u>	<u>AGQAAZHTFU</u>	4 <u>ZOHIOBYLIH</u>	<u>MEITRMRIJK</u>	<u>IUDUKGZUKV</u>
15	<u>TJEBDFZKJU</u>	3 <u>BDRBBAIUGV</u>	<u>APIJPGZMJI</u>	<u>NFJUSNSJKY</u>	2 <u>JVEVLDAWYW</u>
16	<u>UKFJEGALKV</u>	2 <u>CESCCBJVHW</u>	<u>BQJKQDANKJ</u>	<u>QCKVTOTKLE</u>	<u>KWFWMHBKZX</u>
17	0 <u>VLGKFHMLW</u>	<u>DEFDDGKWIY</u>	<u>GRKLRBOLK</u>	1 <u>PHLWUPULMA</u>	<u>LXGXNFGYAY</u>
18	2 <u>WMHLGICNMX</u>	<u>EGUEEDLXJY</u>	2 <u>DSLMSFCPML</u>	<u>QIMXVQVMNB</u>	<u>MHYGGDZBBZ</u>
19	<u>XNIMHJDONY</u>	<u>FHVFFEMYKZ</u>	5 <u>ETMNTGDQNM</u>	5 <u>RJNYWRWNOC</u>	<u>NZIZPHEAGA</u>
20	<u>YQJNKEPQZ</u>	3 <u>GIWGGFNZLA</u>	6 <u>FUNOUHERON</u>	<u>SKQZXSXQPD</u>	<u>QAJAQIFBDB</u>
21	<u>ZPKQJLFQPA</u>	<u>HJXHHQOAMB</u>	4 <u>GVOPVIFSPQ</u>	4 <u>TLPAYTFFQE</u>	<u>PBKBRJGSEG</u>
22	<u>AQEPKMGRQB</u>	4 <u>IKYIIHPBNC</u>	<u>HWPQWJGTQP</u>	<u>UMQBZUZQRF</u>	<u>QGLSSKHDFD</u>
23	4 <u>BRMQLNHSRC</u>	<u>JLZJJIQGOD</u>	<u>IXQRXKHURQ</u>	6 <u>VNRCAVARSG</u>	5 <u>RDMDTLIEGE</u>
24	7 <u>CSNRMOITSD</u>	<u>KMAKKJRDPF</u>	5 <u>JYRSYLIVSR</u>	4 <u>WOSDBWBSTH</u>	4 <u>SENEUMJFHF</u>
25	6 <u>DTOSNPJUTE</u>	<u>LNBLKSEQF</u>	<u>KZSTZMJWTS</u>	<u>XPTGKGTUFI</u>	4 <u>TFOFVHKGIG</u>
26	<u>EUPTEQXVUF</u>	3 <u>MOCMMLTFRG</u>	<u>LATUANKXUT</u>	<u>YQVFDYDUVJ</u>	1 <u>UGPGWOLHJH</u>

Figure 13-31 (Q). Rough scoring of generatrices (U).

(4) Those generatrices with the highest score are then set down in columnar form to determine if they will yield plaintext.

Alphabet	1	2	3	4	5
Generatrix	24	2	20	10	12
	C	O	F	I	G
	S	Q	U	A	S
	N	E	N	E	B
	R	O	O	P	S
	M	O	U	N	I
	O	N	H	I	A
	I	V	E	N	X
	T	H	R	E	T
	S	T	O	F	V
	D	I	N	T	T

(5) The presence of plaintext in the matrix is obvious. However, it is also noted that generatrix 12 of alphabet 5, although the highest word, is not correct. Therefore another is selected in its place. Also, since a period of seven was initially assumed, the diagram is expanded to include seven columns, the previous step being completed to produce the

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 EXHAUSTING B C D E F J K L M O P Q R V W Y Z EXHAUSTING B C D F J K L M O P Q R V W Y Z

Thus $A_p = A_c$.

Continuing the process of juxtaposing it will be found that

when		then
	$C_p = S_c$	$A_p = A_c$
	$O_p = F_c$	$A_p = Z_c$
	$F_p = D_c$	$A_p = I_c$
	$I_p = Z_c$	$A_p = M_c$
	$R_p = R_c$	$A_p = U_c$
	$S_p = Y_c$	$A_p = T_c$
	$T_p = R_c$	$A_p = H_c$

The repeating key then is AZIMUTH. Using this, the enciphering matrix can then be reconstructed and the entire message deciphered.

13-18. (C) The Principles of Matching—Solution of Messages Involving an Unknown Component

a. In the preceding example the proposition was the solution of a message where both the primary plain and cipher components were known. The

necessary generatrices. Thus the text would appear as:

Alphabet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	C	O	F	I	R	S	T
	S	Q	U	A	D	R	O
	N	E	N	E	M	Y	T
	R	O	O	P	D	I	S
	M	O	U	N	T	E	D
	O	N	H	I	L	L	F
	I	V	E	N	I	N	E
	T	H	R	E	E	W	E
	S	T	O	F	G	O	O
	D	I	N	T	E	N	T

(6) Comparing the first period of plaintext with the first period of ciphertext, and setting the plain and primary components so as to produce the equivalency shown in each alphabet of the period, the key may be recovered. For example, in

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
P	C	O	F	I	R	S	T
C	S	F	D	Z	R	Y	R

it is observed that $C_p = S_c$. This equation can be duplicated by juxtaposing the two primary sequences so:

key—which controlled the successive juxtaposition—producing the secondary cipher sequences, was the unknown element. This case is one where only the primary cipher sequence and key length is known, the key is unknown, and the primary plain component is unknown. The normal condition, i.e. where the plain component is known, permits the use of the principle of direct symmetry of positions. In this case where only the cipher sequence is the known element, the use of direct symmetry of position or completing the plain components is prohibited. Instead, the principle of matching may be used.

b. This principle is founded on the fact that a form of symmetry, in this case spatial, exists between the successive peaks and troughs of secondary cipher sequences which are produced by the juxtaposition of the two primary components. This spatial symmetry can be seen in the following distributions, figure 13-32, drawn from a cryptogram produced by the method under discussion which involved five secondary alphabets.

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Alphabet 1



Alphabet 2



Alphabet 3



Alphabet 4



Alphabet 5




Figure 13-32 (Q). Unilateral frequency distribution, secondary cipher sequences (U).

Note that in each of the distributions the spatial relationships between the peaks and troughs remain constant, but that between distributions, their positions relative to any given letter differ. In this case, the highest peaks occur in successive alphabets above the *Nc*, *Kc*, *Ac*, *Bc*, and *Ec* in that order. The spatial symmetry is a result of juxtaposing one fixed sequence against another fixed sequence. The difference between the relative location of the peaks and troughs in each distribution is the result of using successively different points of juxtaposition.

c. It was remarked earlier that a periodic poly-alphabetic cipher was really nothing more than a series of monoalphabetic substitution ciphers used in a periodic or cyclic manner. Thus each period, as

reflected in the distributions, will show to a greater or lesser degree the normal frequencies of mono-alphabetic usage. Spatially, in the case where both components are standard, it will be the same as the normal, only offset to the same degree as were the primary components. Where mixed components are used in either or both components, this spatial relationship, relative to the normal, is lost. However, the frequency of usage of individual letters, as reflected in peaks and troughs, remains. The fact that this can be observed at all indicates that the cipher sequence is a known sequence. Note that in the above, the cipher sequence is known, and in this case is a standard alphabet. However, when the cipher alphabet is a mixed alphabet, the same principles will

apply if its sequence is known. But in that case, the distribution must be made using this sequence of letters. In either case, if the wrong sequence is used the symmetry between each distribution will be lost.

d. With the knowledge that each distribution is a monoalphabetic distribution reflecting the underlying plaintext, several possibilities are immediately opened. First, by matching the peaks and troughs of each and bringing them into agreement, relative equal values can be determined. That is, *Nc*, *Kc*, *Ac*, *Bc*, and *Ec*, the highest frequency letter of each distribution, can be equated as representing the same plaintext value. If this is so, then, because of the similar spatial relationship between each distribution, all letters can be equated. Second, as the peaks and troughs represent the underlying plaintext frequencies it becomes possible to identify an equated series of letters to one specific plaintext value. Barring the fact that specific identification is possible, the assignment of an arbitrary plaintext value to each set of equated cipher values permits the reduction of the plaintext to monoalphabetic terms. The first step then is matching the distributions. This involves the cyclic shifting of the alphabets as seen in figure 13-33.




Figure 13-33 (C). Matching by cyclic shifting (U).

(1) Note that in the above, the sequence *Nc*, *Kc*, *Gc*, *Bc*, *Ec*, was used rather than the sequence *Nc*, *Kc*, *Ac*, *Bc*, *Ec*, previously used as a frame of reference. This is because the alinement of *Ac* to the other values resulted in the mismatch of the remaining high-frequency letters. This is a reflection of the necessity to gain the best alinement of all peaks and troughs. Once the alphabets have been alined, a set of arbitrary plaintext values can be generated. This can be done by substituting the values of alphabets 2-3-4 and 5 in the ciphertext, for the value directly above it in alphabet 1. Thus whenever *Xc*, *Tc*, *Oc*, and *Rc* occurs in the cyclic positions 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively, an *Ac* is substituted. This process, the reduction to monoalphabetic terms, converts the ciphertext to the form shown in figure 13-34.

	5	10	15	20	25
A	Q	H	V	H	T
B	E	U	T	G	N
C	Y	K	T	Y	N
D	N	H	S	H	C
E	X	X	K	S	U
F	B	Y	U	R	E
G	S	S	I	T	K
H	N	F	M	E	Q
J	X	X	X	H	K
K	N	V	G	U	U
L	Y	K	P	H	Y
M	J	L	D	K	H
N	J	X	B	S	K
P	D	N	L	U	I
Q	K	M	J	N	I
R	N	T	J	K	H
S	J	U	G	F	U
T	T	H	J	K	H
U	J	N	H	F	N
V	K	P	D	Y	K
W	X	N	U	M	X
X	I	V	H	G	N
Y	G	Y	D	H	T

Figure 13-34 (C). Ciphertext reduced to monoalphabetic terms (U).

(2) By compiling the individual frequency distributions using the same method as was used to

convert the text to monoalphabetic terms, a uniliteral frequency distribution for the text can be

generated which in effect is merely a tabulation of the former five. See figure 13-35.




Figure 13-35 (U). Uniliteral frequency distribution of monoalphabetic terms (U).

e. Subsequent analysis of the cryptogram is now quite simple. The text converted to uniliteral terms can be attacked through an analysis of idiomorphic patterns, repeated digraphs, trigraphs, etc. In the course of determining the correct cipher equivalents for the pseudoplain text, in this case alphabet 1, the mixed-plain component will be found. With this as a base, it only requires that the cipher components and plain components be juxtaposed to produce the values shown in each distribution; the process resulting in the reproduction of the enciphering matrix and the keyword.

13-19. (C) Application of Principles—Matching

a. In the foregoing paragraph the example involved the use of a standard sequence as the cipher component. In this example a mixed sequence is used. It will be observed that irrespective of the type sequence used, the principle of matching may be applied if the cipher sequence is known. However, if the cipher sequence is unknown, these principles cannot be applied.

b. The first step, as in all cases of the analysis of polyalphabetic ciphers, is to underline observed repeats and tabulate intervals and factors as shown in figure 13-36.

c. The derived factors show that the period involved is probably five. Since the text is in groups of five, its rearrangement is not required. Now, assuming that through preknowledge the primary cipher component is probably a keyword mixed

	5	10	15	20	25
A	<u>I</u> C E N X	<u>J</u> J B N L	<u>Q</u> U K D A	<u>N</u> P I Q A	<u>Q</u> J P <u>B</u> T
B	<u>I</u> C P M H	<u>B</u> C M B D	<u>K</u> Z P V Z	<u>W</u> P A B H	<u>Q</u> J K <u>M</u> H
C	<u>B</u> C I F M	<u>J</u> K F S C	<u>T</u> Z P F D	<u>M</u> H S E H	<u>H</u> H C I A
D	<u>N</u> E L A Y	<u>A</u> V F N Y	<u>M</u> I L Y X	<u>J</u> P Q J E	<u>W</u> E K N W
E	<u>A</u> C M B U	<u>W</u> E G G G	<u>K</u> C K G D	<u>Z</u> F E B T	<u>I</u> C P P A
F	<u>J</u> A M X C	<u>Q</u> D N N U	<u>N</u> U C T A	<u>X</u> E M B D	<u>K</u> K O A A
G	<u>I</u> H R G P	<u>J</u> E G E C	<u>M</u> W A X T	<u>J</u> H D V Z	<u>T</u> Z R N X
H	<u>N</u> Q P O A	<u>K</u> E A F Q	<u>Q</u> Z O N M	<u>Q</u> J I I N	<u>I</u> C J Y H
J	<u>N</u> K R G D	<u>V</u> P E C X	<u>N</u> U U A N	<u>W</u> C N W A	<u>U</u> H K K N
K	<u>J</u> P M C Q	<u>V</u> H R Y X	<u>J</u> M L D E	<u>T</u> Y Q E G	<u>M</u> K R R J
L	<u>Q</u> G O E Z	<u>I</u> V P F J	<u>E</u> M L D E	<u>T</u> H N K F	<u>B</u> H A I H
M	<u>Y</u> K Z G C	<u>E</u> P R C B	<u>J</u> P M N G	<u>M</u> K I I C	<u>R</u> H R A X
N	<u>Q</u> D P W F	<u>Z</u> G A F H	<u>N</u> E K E C	<u>W</u> R P E G	<u>Z</u> P Q A B
P	<u>H</u> I B S F	<u>V</u> J P I Y	<u>Y</u> C Q B H	<u>H</u> K X N N	<u>N</u> F E E J
Q	<u>W</u> B A B F	<u>M</u> C P X C	<u>T</u> Q Z J Y	<u>R</u> C D A X	<u>Q</u> M P K C
R	<u>I</u> C M X X				

Repeats	Interval	Factors
B T I C P	95	5 19
M H B C	20	2, 4, 5, 10
M B D K	110	5, 10, 11 22
M L D E T	25	5

Figure 13-36 (C). Period determination (U).

alphabet based on the word PURLOIN, five separate distributions using this mixed alphabet are prepared (fig. 13-37).




Figure 13-37 (U). Unilateral frequency distribution of periodic cipher alphabets (U).

d. Visual inspection shows that the profile of each one is similar. The next step is to align the alphabets to bring the peaks and troughs of each into conformance. Normally this is a step by step process. Two alphabets are selected and juxtaposed in what appears the most probable alinement. Note the possibility that any one of 26 juxtapositions are possible, but consideration of profiles immediately limits this to but a few. In this case three possible initial matches may be considered (fig. 13-38).

e. Of the three most probable matches, match 3 seems best so it is selected. Using these two alphabets as a base, the third alphabet is compared, again in several probable positions, until one is considered best. Thus in turn all alphabets are matched. The result of the process is shown in figure 13-39.




Figure 13-38 (U). Possible matches, periodic cipher alphabet 1 and 2 (U).




Figure 13-39 (U). Final match of periodic cipher alphabets (U).

f. If the columns of letters formed by the match are inspected, the repeating key "THIEF" may be observed, which lends credence to the match. Moreover, this might be the point of juxtaposition of the cipher alphabet to Ap. Unaware that the plain component is a mixed sequence, the analyst arbitrarily presumes a direct standard for the purpose of reducing the ciphertext to monoalphabetic terms. Thus Ap equals Pc, Tc, Ec, Mc, Qc; Bp equals Uc, Vc, Fc, Qc, Sc; etc. A standard alphabet is inscribed above the matrix shown above, and it is used to reduce the ciphertext to monoalphabetic terms. The reduction produces the text illustrated in figure 13-40.

g. Compiling the individual frequency distributions, a uniliteral frequency distribution for the text is generated (fig. 13-41).

h. Inspection of the text reveals the initial idiomorphic pattern.

A B C B A B D E B
C F P A P F P V X P L

Which may be a reflection of the underlying plaintext-REFERENCE; which may be part of the phrase "REFERENCE MY (YOUR) MESSAGE." If this is correct Pc would equal Ep, an assumption warranted by the frequency shown for Pc. With this an entering wedge, the plaintext and accompanying

	5	10	15	20	25
A	<u>F P A P F</u>	<u>P V X P L</u>	<u>S H F T P</u>	<u>G G U B P</u>	<u>S V P R C</u>
B	<u>F P P A W</u>	<u>I P G R S</u>	<u>Q F P E H</u>	<u>W G W R W</u>	<u>S V G A W</u>
C	<u>I P U V Z</u>	<u>P W B C R</u>	<u>U F P V S</u>	<u>R U I U W</u>	<u>G U Y O P</u>
D	<u>G R S Q G</u>	<u>H B B P G</u>	<u>R L S H F</u>	<u>P G H Y T</u>	<u>W R F P E</u>
E	<u>H P G R J</u>	<u>W R C W V</u>	<u>Q P F W S</u>	<u>Z S A R C</u>	<u>F P P J P</u>
F	<u>P N G G R</u>	<u>S Q V P J</u>	<u>G H Y D P</u>	<u>X R G R S</u>	<u>Q W T Q P</u>
G	<u>F U R W I</u>	<u>P R C U R</u>	<u>P C W G C</u>	<u>P U Z E H</u>	<u>U F R P F</u>
H	<u>G Y P N P</u>	<u>Q R W V A</u>	<u>S F T P Z</u>	<u>S V U O O</u>	<u>F P E H W</u>
J	<u>G W R W S</u>	<u>V G A S F</u>	<u>G H Q Q O</u>	<u>W P G F P</u>	<u>B U F Z O</u>
K	<u>P G G S A</u>	<u>V U R H F</u>	<u>P X S T T</u>	<u>U E H U V</u>	<u>R W R L X</u>
L	<u>S T T U H</u>	<u>F B P V X</u>	<u>L X S T T</u>	<u>U U V Z U</u>	<u>I U W O W</u>
M	<u>Y W O W R</u>	<u>L G R S Q</u>	<u>P G G P V</u>	<u>R W U O R</u>	<u>C U R Q F</u>
N	<u>S Q P F U</u>	<u>Z T W V W</u>	<u>G R F U R</u>	<u>W I P U V</u>	<u>Z G H Q Q</u>
P	<u>O L X C U</u>	<u>V V P O G</u>	<u>Y P H R W</u>	<u>O W M P Z</u>	<u>R S A U X</u>
Q	<u>W O W R U</u>	<u>R P P G R</u>	<u>U Y O W G</u>	<u>C P Z Q F</u>	<u>S A P Z H</u>
R	<u>F P G X X</u>				

Figure 13-40 (C). Ciphertext reduced to monoalphabetic terms (U).

cipher-to-pseudo-plain equivalent, figure 13-42, can quickly be found.




Figure 13-41 (U). Uniliteral frequency distribution of monoalphabetic terms (U).

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R E F E R E N C E Y O U R M E S S A G E O N E T H
 F P A P F P V X P L S H F T P G G U B P S V P R C

 R E E F I V E S T O P R E Q U I S I T I O N S F I
 F P P A W I P G R S Q F P E H W G W R W S V G A W

 V E A N D E I G H T A R E N O T A V A I L A B L E
 I P U V Z P W B C R U F P V S R U I U W O U Y O P

 S T O P S U G G E S T Y O U R E S U B M I T R E Q
 G R S Q G H B B P G R L S H F P G H Y T W R F P E

 U E S T W I T H I N P E R I O D O F T H R E E W E
 H P G R J W R C W V Q P F W S Z S A R C F P P J P

 C K S S T O P N E W S U B J E C T S T O P I N P E o o o e t c .
 P N G G R S Q V P J G H Y D P X R G R S Q W T Q P o o o e t c .

Plain F G H J Q R S U V W Y K L E P T O M A N I C S D
 Pseudo-plain A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Figure 13-42 (C). Solution of ciphertext (U).

Plain: K L E P T O M A N I C B D F G H J Q R S U V W X Y Z

C1:	G	H	J	K	M	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Y	Z	P	U	R	L	O	I	N	A	B	C	D	E	F
C2:	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	M	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Y	Z	P	U	R	L	O	I	N
C3:	Y	Z	P	U	R	L	O	I	N	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	M	Q	S	T	V	W	X
C4:	O	I	N	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	M	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Y	Z	P	U	R	L
C5:	I	N	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	M	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Y	Z	P	U	R	L	O

Figure 13-43 (C). Recovered matrix (U).

i. In the plain sequence the keyword KLEPTO-MANIC is observed. By using it then as a base with Kp as the index letter, five cipher sequences may be inscribed below it to reproduce the original enciphering matrix. The juxtaposition of each of these sequences must be used to reproduce the original ciphertext. That is, the letter Ep when enciphered

by the five successive cipher alphabets must result in Jc, Cc, Pc, Nc and Ac respectively. Although any plaintext letter may be used for this alignment process, Ep was chosen because of its frequency. Thus the following matrix is reconstructed, figure 13-43.

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CHAPTER 14 (C)

INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLE APERIODIC CIPHERS

Section I. (C) SIMPLE APERIODIC SYSTEMS

14-1. (C) Introduction

a. It was demonstrated in the preceding chapter that the ordered use of a number of alphabets in periodic ciphers resulted in the occurrence of cyclic phenomena in the ciphertext. It was also shown how this cyclic phenomena could be used as the basis for the cryptanalysis of the cipher. This was true even though a greater number or different types of mixed alphabets were involved. The significance of this phenomena was recognized by cryptographers, and means of suppression were soon considered. Two basic methods of suppression are available. First, the cyclic phenomena may be avoided simply by extending the key length to such a point that it repeats itself only a few times in a given message, and second, by the key length extending indefinitely, forming a running or continuous key. This particular solution, however, is impractical for use in all except machine systems. For this reason, and because the analysis of continuous keyed systems involves techniques and methods beyond the scope of this manual, it will not be treated further.

b. An alternate scheme, which permits the use of a matrix or table similar to those of the periodic ciphers, is to vary the period of key usage and thus suppress cyclic phenomena at the outset. Consideration of why periodicity is inherent to periodic polyalphabetic ciphers reveals that it is composed of the two elements involved in its production. That is, successive letters of a number of alphabets controlled by a repetitive key are applied to successive letters of the plaintext. Thus, if either of these components are varied, an aperiodic system is generated. Note that in aperiodic systems cyclic repetition does occur; however, it does so at an irregular interval which serves to suppress its appearance to a greater or lesser degree in the text.

c. Aperiodic systems then may be arbitrarily classified by the cryptographic method used to develop their aperiodicity, that is, by those components selected to vary and those selected to remain constant. Thus, those systems where the plaintext is made variable and the key sequence held constant

may be considered as one class, and those systems where the plaintext is held constant and the key sequence used variably may be considered as another. Note that the resultant ciphers produced by either method are similar in that they will yield to the same general technique of analysis.

14-2. (C) Methods of Variations

a. One method of introducing variation in the plaintext is by word-length encipherment. In this method the key is applied in its sequential order to successive words of the plaintext, i.e. the first word is enciphered from the first alphabet, the second word from the second alphabet, etc. In this manner the key is completely run through, its cyclic reuse beginning anew following the use of the last alphabet.

b. One practical difficulty involved in decipherment of messages of this type by cryptographic personnel was in recognizing the end of a word, as in the case of INFORM, INFORMS, INFORMED, INFORMING, and INFORMATION. This led to the inclusion of a word separator. The word separator was used to mark the end of a word (the resumption of the keying cycle at its initial point), thus aiding the deciphering clerk. A low-frequency letter was selected to be the word separator because it was necessary to preclude the possibility of interrupting the keying cycle at the wrong position. The letter selected as a separator (J or V for example) was often excluded from the enciphering matrix, this being essential to avoid ambiguity in the decryption.

c. This particular method suffers from an obvious fault. Since successive words vary in length in an extremely irregular manner, the process then results in the destruction of obvious periodicity. Note that individual words are being enciphered in mono-alphabetic terms. Thus, solution is quite simple. If standard alphabets are involved, completion of the plain component will lead to an immediate solution. If, on the other hand, mixed alphabets are used, idiomorphism remains and provides a relatively easy entry.

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d. In those cases where idiomorphic patterns are not obvious, the word separator may be used as an initial entry. A word separator may be either a plaintext value or a cipher value. The plaintext value will be enciphered and somewhat more difficult to recognize. If, however, it is a constant cipher value, it should be readily apparent. In either case, once isolated, word separators serve to distinguish individual words, thus providing a basis for analysis through a study of the uniliteral characteristics of the words.

14-3. (Q) Numerically Keyed Encipherment

a. Another method of varying the plaintext is by using variable plaintext groupings which are not successive words. In this method the plaintext is divided into segments of predetermined lengths. Again, in the encipherment process, one alphabet is used to encipher each group. The key cycle of encipherment extends through a number of groups, then begins anew at its initial point once one key cycle is completed. Group length may exhibit a patterned regularity as shown in figure 14-1.

Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4
Group	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
P	C	OM	MAN	DING	GENER	A	LF	IRS	TARM	YHASI
C	<u>Q</u>	<u>UW</u>	<u>UGT</u>	<u>KFAH</u>	<u>UWNWJ</u>	L	HN	<u>ARQ</u>	<u>NGPU</u>	<u>PGNVF</u>
Key	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2
P	S	SU	EDO	RDER	SEFFE	C	TI	VET	WENT	YFIRS
C	<u>I</u>	<u>TR</u>	<u>OPE</u>	<u>RFER</u>	<u>OCBBC</u>	L	HS	<u>QHS</u>	<u>WOFZ</u>	<u>KDARQ</u>
Key	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
P	T	AT	NOO	NDIR	ECTIN	G	TH	ATT	ELEP	HONES
C	<u>N</u>	<u>NU</u>	<u>NMM</u>	<u>YIDU</u>	<u>OQZKF</u>	C	NZ	<u>NUU</u>	<u>WPWL</u>	<u>EXYHT</u>
Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	ooo	
P	C	OM	MAS	WITC	HBOAR	D	SC	OMM	ooo	
C	<u>Q</u>	<u>UW</u>	<u>UGO</u>	<u>RFUL</u>	<u>TZMAJ</u>	I	<u>AQ</u>	<u>UWW</u>	ooo	
C	<u>QUWUG</u>	<u>TKFAH</u>	<u>UWNWJ</u>	<u>LHNAR</u>	<u>QNGPU</u>	<u>PGNVF</u>	<u>ITROP</u>	<u>ERFER</u>		
	<u>OCBBC</u>	<u>LHSQH</u>	<u>SWOFZ</u>	<u>KDARQ</u>	<u>NNUNM</u>	<u>MYIDU</u>	<u>OQZKF</u>	<u>CNZNU</u>		
	<u>UWPWL</u>	<u>EXYHT</u>	<u>QUWUG</u>	<u>ORFUL</u>	<u>TZMAJ</u>	<u>IAQUW</u>	<u>W...</u>			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
1	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T
2	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J
3	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H
4	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O
5	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B
6	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M

Figure 14-1 (Q). Encipherment by arbitrary group length (U).

Group length may also be varied, the key of the matrix is used for this purpose. For example, assuming a keyword TRACK, a numeric key of 54123 can be generated. Thus, the text would be divided into groups of 5, 4, 1, 2, and 3 letters, the cycle

being repeated throughout the message. Encipherment would then follow the same method of encipherment as shown in figure 14-1 above, each group being enciphered by one alphabet. For example:

Alphabet Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2
Group Key	5	4	1	2	3	5	4	1
P	COMMA	DING	G	EN	ERA	LFIRS	TARM	Y
C	QEGGS	FAVC	A	JA	WJA	AGDUT	ZSBG	K

b. The example in figure 14-1 serves to illustrate one of the faults of arbitrary group division. In theory, when the keying element is kept constant and the plaintext groupings are made variable, even though the key is used cyclically, external periodicity will be suppressed. Note that when the plaintext grouping contains similar letters, and when the cycle of variable grouping is applied several times to the message, periodicity can occur. The two occurrences of QUWUG illustrate this point. They are separated by an interval of 90 letters; their plaintext letters, their group size, and their key letters are the same, thus they constitute a true periodic repetition. Also of interest is that 30 groups intervene. Since the length of the key is 6, the cycle is repeated 5 times; thus, in the case of true periodicity, the interval of 90 is the product of

the total number of letters in the key multiplied by the number of cycles of the key.

c. The repetition of ARQN is of another type, termed partial periodic to distinguish it from the former. In this case the interval is 39 letters. It is true that this repetition involves similar plaintext values IRST, but involves different cyclic groupings. Note also that the points within the two groupings are different. In the first case the repetition begins with the first letter of group 3 and ends on the first letter of group 4. In the second appearance it commences at the third letter of group 5 and ends on group 1. However, it should be observed that the number of key groups intervening between the two repetitions (twelve), is the product of the maximum number of key groups (six), multiplied by the number of repetitions of the key (two).

Section II. (C) SOLUTION OF SIMPLE APERIODIC SYSTEMS

14-4. (C) Solution of Numerically Keyed Encipherment

a. Solution of numerically keyed encipherment follows essentially the same step as that shown in the preceding example regardless of whether the individual groups are of increasing length through the cycle or are irregularly mixed. Initial identification of the system may be somewhat difficult, its recognition resting largely on two characteristics. First, any uniliteral distribution of the ciphertext will be relatively flat, similar to a periodic system. Second, it may be distinguished from a periodic system in that observed repetitions will not factor evenly in all cases. Moreover, in a long message enciphered by either system there are usually many repetitions of both types so that identification might

hinge on the availability of outside information to determine the basic system.

b. Once the system is recognized, analysis may take one of two courses depending upon the alphabets used. Where the system involves either the use of standard cipher alphabets or known mixed cipher alphabets produced by the sliding of a mixed component against the normal sequence, solution may be accomplished by completing the plain component. In such cases bits of plaintext will be found on several different generatrices. The number of plaintext letters appearing successively on one generatrix is the same as the number enciphered at one setting of the numerical key. This is illustrated in figure 14-2 which shows the completed plain component and its accompanying matrix.

C BDKTHCBMJYHVVTMBHFSLGFR T

5 10 15 20 25

C E L U I D C N K Z I W U N C I G T M H G S U
 D F M V J E D O L A J X V O D J H U N I H T V
 E G N W K F E P M B K Y W P E K I V O J I U W
 F H O X L G F Q N C L Z X Q F L J W P K J V X
 G I P Y M H G R O D M A Y R G M K X Q L K W Y
 H J Q Z N I H S P E N B Z S H N L Y R M L X Z
 I K R A O J I T Q F O C A T I O M Z S N M Y A
 J L S B P K J U R G P D B U J P N A T O H Z B
 K M T C Q L K V S H Q E C V K Q O B U P O A C
 L N U D R M L W T I R F D W L R P C V Q P B D
 M O V E S N M X U J S G E X M S Q D W R Q C E
 N P W F T O N Y V K T H F Y N T R E X S R D
 O Q X G U P O Z W L U I G Z O U S F Y T S E
 P R Y H V Q P A X M V J H A P V T G Z U T F

A HZNZH ZPDAF RZVPB XZLCA QBOBV
 B RBIGH IIMAR UHBJB YTWVX RSYHI
 C XAKWH VHQQE IMMXZ DDWKG YPXFI
 D EJFQP VUXRV ABVGC VXQRM BXUGB
 E LRDDS LXBAE AFAZQ PAVIC MBAIW
 F KVHQP

B
C
D
E

Figure 14-3 (C). Aperiodic cipher message (U).

Numerical Key 4-3-1-2-6-5
 P O I N T S

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
C2	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
C3	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
C4	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
C5	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
C6	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R

Figure 14-2 (C). Numerically keyed encipherment, standard alphabets (U).

c. In the case where the primary components are a mix of known and unknown sequences, solution is possible through the application of idiomorphism and the principles of direct symmetry of position. To illustrate the methods involved in this approach, the message in figure 14-3 will be used.

(1) A brief inspection of the ciphertext reveals the sequence *HZNZH*, which is significant under

two conditions. First, the cipher is numerically keyed; the possibility exists that this sequence is the product of the application of one key, the number of letters enciphered corresponding to one setting of the key. If this is true, it represents a period of monoalphabetic encipherment and the idiomorphic pattern ABCBAB may be used in assuming a plaintext word. Second, if a known sequence was used as either component, direct symmetry of position can be used. Assuming both conditions to exist, a list of idiomorphic patterns is searched to locate a word which matches the pattern derived. Among others, the word REFERENCE is noted. This is an ideal word for opening a message. Then, assuming a standard sequence was used for the plain component, the following preliminary matrix may be set down:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C					Z	N												H								

(2) Thus the above results in the following plaintext insertions:

5 10
 A C HZNZH ZPDAF RZVPB XZLCA
 P REFERENCE

Logically REFERE should be expanded to REFERENCE, thus providing additional equivalencies. The problem that arises, however, is the determination of the length of the group, i.e. how far does monoalphabeticity extend in this case. A consideration of

the word itself reveals that it must break between A6 and A9, for the last Ep value at A9 is Ac and the last repeated monoalphabetic bit is Ep=Zc at A6. A second cipher component, when Np=Pc, may be inscribed in the matrix:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1				Z	N													H								
C2			D	A											P											

(3) At this point the question of what would be the most profitable method of attack must be considered. Should we expand the plaintext, or apply the principle of direct symmetry of position? Perhaps the two can be incorporated. But first, the matrix should be examined. Note the occurrence of the *Zc* and *Nc* in adjacent positions in cipher alphabet 1. If the initial word assumption is correct, the cipher component is not a standard alphabet. Mixed sequences may be derived by decimation, keyword, transposition, or by random methods. However, if the cipher sequence is keyword mixed, *Zc Nc* is significant in that it may mark the end of the sequence and the beginning of the keyword. The letter *Hc* appearing 12 spaces to the right may represent, in

this case, a portion of the sequence where alphabetic sequencing is resumed; its distance from *Nc* makes it improbable as a part of the keyword. In any case, if each successive secondary cipher alphabet is but a different juxtaposition of one basic sequence, then the principle of direct symmetry of position will apply. But to be used, the same letters in several alphabets must be found.

(4) Perhaps such a hit may be discovered by expanding on the assumption of the plaintext. The assumption of the word REFERENCE should lead to the further assumption of the phrase REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE, or REFERENCE MY MESSAGE. Neither may be right, but they are worthy of consideration until proven untrue. Accordingly, the following may be inscribed:

									5																		
	A								C																		
P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
C1				Z	N																						
C2																P											
C3			D																								
C4				A																							
C5																										F	
C6																											
C7																										Z	
C8																											
C9																											
C10																											
C11																											
C12																											
C13																											
C14																											
C15																											

Figure 14-4 (ϕ). Expansion of matrix (U).

Using the equivalencies, the matrix may be expanded further. However, each letter must temporarily occupy a separate horizontal line because the points where the keys are changed are unknown except in the case where $SSp = XCc$. Thus, the matrix would appear as in figure 14-4.

(5) Several interesting patterns indicative of key changes may be observed in the matrix. First is the assumed value of *Sp* for *Xc* and *Zc* in alphabets 11-12. If the assumption is correct, then this is a point of key change. Note also that there are four values for *Ep* shown, *Zc* in alphabet 1, *Ac* in 4, *Bc* in 10, and again *Ac* in alphabet 15. Thus four key changes are indicated in a period of 15 letters, one period being a repetition of another in respect to the point of juxtaposition. Moreover, *Hc* in alphabet 1 and *Vc* in alphabet 8 are noted as equaling *Rp*. On the basis of these patterns an indication of the periods may be shown as follows:

C HZNZH Z/PDAF RZ/VPB X/ZLCA
P REFER E/NCEY OU/RME S/SAGE

It must be understood that this delimitation of periods is arbitrary, only serving to limit some possibilities and providing a basis for either proving or disproving previous assumptions.

(6) The matrix may now be rearranged in order to compare the patterns (fig. 14-5).

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1							Z	N										H								
C2		D	A										P	R						Z						F
C3				B									P					V	X							
C4	L			A	C														Z							

Figure 14-5 (6). Matrix reduction (U).

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1					Z	N			F			D		A				H								

This leaves the occurrence of the sequence *PRc* as equivalencies of the sequence *NOp* in alphabet 2 to be explained. It may be possible that *Q* is part of the keyword, for where else could it appear in light of the assumed *PRc* sequence? This placement is unlikely. Therefore, the sequence in this position may be incorrect. Moreover, note that the *Pc=Np* equivalency appears in the initial reconstruction matrix prior to the *Rc=Op* equivalency in cipher alphabets 2 and 6 respectively. Therefore, they may not have been drawn from the same alphabet. In this case *Qc* could have come from a preceding alphabet. If so, it would fall prior to *Hc*, out of

sequence except as a part of the keyword. This does not seem likely, so it may be set aside for the moment.

(7) The third alphabet may now be considered. Four spaces, normally occupied by the letters *QRSTU*, are observed intervening between the letter *Pc* and *Vc*, although no space is noted between *Vc* and *Xc*, which is usually occupied by the *Wc*. Perhaps the *Wc* and one of the letters *RSTU* (*Q* being discounted) may be part of the keyword. Assuming that in the unknown cipher sequence that *Xc* and *Yc* will precede *Zc*, this sequence can be incorporated into the sequence thusly:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1		V	X	Y	Z	N			F			D		A	B			H							P	

By maintaining similar spacing *Bc* may also be placed in its proper position relative to *Ac*. The *Pc* now falls into proper sequence.

(8) This leaves only the fourth sequence to be fitted, which appears to be quite easy as *Ac* and *Zc* have been placed. However, when the fitting is attempted it will be found that the sequential relationships are incorrect. Counting from *Zc* to *Lc* an interval of 8 is noted, thus placing *Lc* below *Mp*, in the protosequence, and adjacent to *Ac*

below *Np*, yet *Lc* and *Ac* are separated by one space in the fourth sequence. Referring to the ciphertext with its assumed plaintext shown in (5) above, it is observed that the equivalencies of *Lc* and *Ac* are separated by the *Cc=Gp* equivalency. This inconsistency may be explained by another key change, *Zc*, *Lc*, and *Cc* from one alphabet and *Ac* from another. Accepting this for the moment, it is found they can be fitted, thereby retaining the previously established sequence.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1		V	X	Y	Z	N			F			D	L	A	B	C		H							P	

d. With the partially recovered cipher sequence, the recovery of the matrix and decipherment of the cryptogram may be started. This is a simultaneous effort, and the values found are transferred from one to the other. First, a matrix which will produce the correct plain-to-cipher equivalencies for the assumed plaintext is constructed. A separate strip is prepared for each period of use, as shown in figure 14-6. Note that in so doing *Rc* can be placed in the third sequence, a value which is immediately transferred. Also, because of spacing, *Qc* is inserted and transferred.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
6 C1	V	X	Y	Z	N	F		D	L	A	B	C	H				P	Q	R							
3 C2		D	L	A	B	C	H								P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F	
7 C3	D	L	A	B	C	H									P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F	
2 C4	L	A	B	C	H										P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F	D
4 C5		D	L	A	B	C	H								P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F	

Key Group	1	2	3	4	5	
A	HZNZH REFER	TPDAF ENCFY	RZVPB OURME	XZLCA SSAGE	QBOBV OF	EBIGH
B	IIMAR	UHBJB	YTUVX	RSYHI	XAKWH	
C	VHQQE	IMIXZ	DDWKG	YPXFI	EJFQP	
D	VUXRV	ABVGC	VXQRM	BXUGB	LRDDS	
E	LXBAE	AFAZQ	PAVIC	MBAIW	KVHQF	

Figure 14-6 (C). Partial matrix and recoveries of plaintext (U).

(1) At the fifth period it is discovered that further decipherment using the juxtapositions found is no longer possible, thus another key change for an undetermined period is indicated. In this case two sliding strips should be constructed to test the assumption of possible words, keeping in mind that one juxtaposition will render plaintext for an undetermined number of letters. In context with the assumed plaintext it seems logical to expect a time reference to follow. Accordingly, the words ZERO, ONE, or TWO may be assumed. The strips are then juxtaposed to produce the required values. If the assumption is correct, then all assumed equivalencies must match.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	
C		D	L	A	B	C		H								P	Q	R				V	X	Y	Z	N			F	O	

(2) After a short period of experimentation the strip above will be found which will produce the assumed ZERO plus the letters E--H. This confirms the ZERO assumption and E--H possibly represents the word EIGHT. Accordingly, the cipher values can be inserted in the matrix (fig. 14-7) which would now appear as:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
6 C1	V	X	Y	Z	N	F	O	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I				F	Q	R						
3 C2	O	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I						P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F		
7 C3	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I							P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F	O	
2 C4	L	A	B	C	G	H	I								P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F	O	D
4 C5	O	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I						P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F		
8 C6	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I							P	Q	R		V	X	Y	Z	N		F		

Figure 14-7 (C). Insertion of cipher values (U).

(3) Observation of the periods used show that they are 6-3-7-2-4-8, thus key periods 1 and 5 are missing, also possibly 9 and 0. A glance at the cryptogram reveals that the groups IIMAR UHBJB immediately follow that which gives ZERO EIGHT. Then, where *Tp* of EIGHT equals *Ic*, the second *Ic* must also equal *Tp*. Therefore, this period could be five. In any event, it can quickly be determined by aligning the two sequences so *Ic* equals *Tp*. In so doing, *Wp* is found to equal *Mc*. The matrix may now be transcribed as shown in figure 14-8.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z		
6 C1	V	X	Y	Z	N			F	O			D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I			M	P	Q	R			
3 C2	O		D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I				M	P	Q	R			V	X	Y	Z	N			F	
7 C3			D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I				M	P	Q	R			V	X	Y	Z	N			F	
2 C4	L	A	B	C	G	H	I				M	P	Q	R			V	X	Y	Z	N			F	O	D		
4 C5	O		D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I				M	P	Q	R			V	X	Y	Z	N			F	
8 C6			D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I				M	P	Q	R			V	X	Y	Z	N			O	
5 C7			V	X	Y	Z	N			F	O			D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I			M	P	Q	R	

Figure 14-8 (C). Transcription of matrix (U).

N F O D L A B C G H I J K L M P Q V X Y Z
 —————
 E R S T U W

(5) Considered in this light it takes little imagination to recognize a probable keyword in NEWFOUNDLAND. Accordingly, the values are inserted and the matrix recovered as shown in figure 14-9. Note that a key is recovered which explains the sequence of periods used.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
6 C1	T	V	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F	O	U	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S
3 C2	O	U	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S	T	V	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F
7 C3	U	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S	T	V	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F	O
2 C4	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S	T	V	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F	O	U	D
4 C5	O	U	D	L	A	D	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S	T	U	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F
8 C6	U	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S	T	V	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F	O
5 C7	S	T	V	X	Y	Z	N	E	W	F	O	U	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R
1 C8	E	W	F	O	U	D	L	A	B	C	G	H	I	J	K	M	P	Q	R	S	T	U	X	Y	Z	N

Figure 14-9 (C). Recovered matrix (U).

Using this matrix and the period sequence shown, further decipherment of the cryptogram is merely a cryptographic task.

e. A very important point is that the solution presented above represents but one method which is possible only because of the circumstances involved in producing the cryptogram. First, the message contained a stereotyped beginning. Second, the stereotype was discernible in the ciphertext, as the initial period of key usage 6-3-7-2 was sufficiently long to produce an idiomorphic pattern. Third, the use of a standard sequence for the plain component and a keyword mixed sequence for the ciphertext permitted the use of direct symmetry of position. Thus the solution was relatively simple. However,

(4) The values of TTWOZp for IIMARc, derived by alphabet C7 above, provide the clue that the juxtaposition of the eighth alphabet in the Uc of the group UHBJBc must equal Ep to provide an E for ZERO. However, note that no U placement exists for the cipher sequence. Perhaps the U placement may be inferred by elimination from the information at hand. In the sequence R - - V above, two spaces intervene which should be occupied by either S, T, or U. Obviously, one of these must be part of the keyword. Considering each vacant space in turn, the following letters can be placed. The remaining letters are assumed to be part of the keyword. This may be observed in the following:

had one or more of these factors been different, that is, smaller key periods, a different cipher sequence derived by a more complicated method, or two unknown sequences, the final solution would have been more difficult if not impossible. A solution is possible where the analyst has some preknowledge concerning the system, its contents, or operation, in the case of small samples. Where this knowledge is not available with the information presented to this point, only one other means of solution is possible. That is, through the acquisition of sufficient depth, so that values can be played against one another. This particular technique will be illustrated in succeeding paragraphs.

14-5. (C) Analysis of Variable Length Keying Units

a. The preceding examples dealt with the use of variable length plaintext groupings enciphered with a constant length key element as one means of introducing aperiodicity into a system. Aperiodicity, avoiding external periodicity, may also be introduced by the reversal of the same techniques, that is, by holding the plaintext units constant while applying a variable length keying unit. The most common method of producing a variable length keying unit, where the base keying unit is limited or fixed in length, is by irregularly interrupting it. Thus a cyclic keying sequence, which would normally produce periodic phenomena in the ciphertext, would now introduce an aperiodic element instead.

b. There are several methods which may be used to interrupt a normal cyclic key, all of which may be classified into one of three general types. The types are:

- (1) The keying sequence merely stops at some

point in the sequence, succeeding points differing irregularly, and resumes at the initial starting point

after each stop. An example of this encipherment is depicted below using the preceding matrix.

	Base Key Sequence 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8																		
Key Element	1	2	3	4	*	1	2	3	*	1	2	3	4	5	6	*	1	2	*
Letter Number	1	2	3	4		5	6	7		8	9	10	11	12	13		14	15	
Plaintext	R	E	F	E		R	E	N		C	E	M	Y	M	E		S	S	
Ciphertext	H	A	C	G		H	A	Q		X	A	P	U	M	B		I	V	

(2) One or more elements of the base key are dropped irregularly during each keying cycle. On the completion of one cycle the base sequence is resumed

again, with different elements dropped by pre-arrangement between the cryptographers. This method is depicted below.

	Base Key Sequence 1-2-3-4-5-6																				
Key Element	2	3	4	5	*	1	2	5	*	1	3	4	5	6	*	2	3	4	*	1	2
Letter Number	1	2	3	4		5	6	7		8	9	10	11	12		13	14	15			
Plaintext	R	E	F	E		R	E	N		C	E	M	Y	M		E	S	S			
Ciphertext	T	B	H	A		H	A	P		X	B	R	W	P		A	X	Z			

(3) The base key sequence is applied to the text, alternating irregularly in direction, with or without the omission of elements. The base key

sequence is reapplied in the same manner throughout the text. The example below illustrates this method.

	Base Key Sequence 1-2-3-4-5-6-7																				
Key Element	1	2	3	4	5	*	4	3	*	4	5	6	7	*	5	4	3	2	1		
Letter Number	1	2	3	4	5		6	7		8	9	10	11		12	13	14	15	16		
Plaintext	R	E	F	E	R		E	N		C	E	M	Y		M	E	S	S	A		
Ciphertext	H	A	C	B	T		G	Q		B	A	P	Q		M	G	X	V	T		

Note that in this method, if no key elements were omitted and the key sequence was repeated, it could be treated as though it was a 16-element key sequence rather than an interrupted system. The cryptographic effect of it is the same.

consequently the more useful this method is. The stacking of successive cycles to illustrate the bits of monoalphabetic encipherment is shown below. Note the repeated cipher letters that occur; each represents the encipherment of a single plaintext letter.

14-6. (C) Periodic Patterns in Aperiodic Systems

a. Although aperiodicity is introduced into a system by this method, certain patterns are retained which, if recognized, may be exploited for a solution. The first of these patterns arises through the successive use of the same basic key sequence. For example, if the analyst knows the points of interruption, the several cycles of a given message may be stacked upon themselves to produce bits of monoalphabetic encipherment. Of course, the longer the message the greater the size of the bits, and

(1) Method 1.

Key Element	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Letter Number	1	2	3	4				
Ciphertext	H	A	C	G				
	5	6	7					
	H	A	Q					
	8	9	10	11	12	13		
	X	A	P	U	M	B		
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	I	V
	22	23						
	24	25	26	27

(2) Method 2.

Key Element	1	2	3	4	5	6
Letter Number	1	2	3	4		
Ciphertext	<i>T</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>A</i>		
	5	6			7	
	<i>H</i>	<i>A</i>			<i>P</i>	
	8		9	10	11	12
	<i>X</i>		<i>B</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>P</i>
		13	14	15		etc.
		<i>A</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Z</i>		

(3) Method 3.

Key Element	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Letter Number	1	2	3	4	5		
Ciphertext	<i>H</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>T</i>		
			7	6			
			<i>G</i>	<i>Q</i>			
				8	9	10	11
				<i>B</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>
	16	15	14	13	12		
	<i>T</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>M</i>		

Obviously the ability to stack successive sections of a message by the successive sections of a keying sequence is predicated on the preknowledge of both the key sequence and its points of interruption. This technique is primarily applicable in those cases where past analysis has resulted in the determination of the system, its key, and its use.

b. Other patterns which may occur in systems of this type are the familiar idiomorphs. They may represent a complete word or a part of a word. These patterns arise as a consequence of similar portions of plaintext being enciphered by similar portions of the keying sequence. Where the point of interruption falls on a given word consistently, particularly in the case of method 1 above, this phenomena is likely to result. For example, note the situation in figure 14-10.

Message A	P	1	2	3	*	1	2	3	4	*	1	2	3	4	5	6	...	KEY	
	C	<i>R</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>T</i>		<i>R</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>T</i>		<i>W</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E</i>	...	PLAIN	
		<i>G</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>B</i>		<i>G</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>G</i>		<i>L</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>W</i>	...	CIPHER	
Message B	P	1	2	3	4	5	*	1	*	1	2	3	4	5	6	*	1	...	KEY
	C	<i>O</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>T</i>		<i>T</i>		<i>A</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	...	PLAIN	
		<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>		<i>I</i>		<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>A</i>	...	CIPHER	
Message C	P	1	2	*	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	*	1	2	3	4	...	KEY	
	C	<i>A</i>	<i>T</i>		<i>T</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>		<i>U</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>E</i>	...	PLAIN	
		<i>P</i>	<i>H</i>		<i>I</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>G</i>		<i>J</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>R</i>	...	CIPHER	

Figure 14-10 (ϕ). Idiomorphs formed in encipherment (U).

Observe that the patterns so produced may be both idiomorphic, as

R E T R E

in the case of the pattern ABCAB for *G S B G S* in message A, or merely repetitions as in the case of T A C K

I P Q S in messages B and C. Obviously then, the usefulness of these is limited by the chance of their happening. That is, their production rests upon the accidental occurrence of fortunate circumstances.

c. A more important pattern, in terms of usefulness to the cryptanalyst, lies in the repeated use of the same starting point in a sequence of keying elements in a number of messages. Where this occurs, monoalphabeticity is present in the columns formed when a number of messages of the same system are superimposed. Note that the initial sequence of keying elements must be constant and that the messages superimposed must all be from the same system. Also, the greater the depth, the more pronounced the monoalphabeticity exhibited by each column. This is particularly applicable in the case of short messages, because the number of messages, not their length, is the important criteria when all other factors are constant. To observe the significance of this, note the superimposed messages and the frequency distribution derived from the first 10 columns so formed in figure 14-11.

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Message No.	Letter Number	Message No.	Letter Number
	1 1 1 1 1		1 1 1 1 1
1	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4	19	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4
2	Z C T P Z W Z P E P Z Q X	20	A F E O J T D T I T
3	W T E Q M X Z S Y S P R C	21	K P V F Q W P K T E V
4	T C R W C X T B H H	22	Z A B G R T X P U Q X
5	E F K C S Z R I H A	23	Y H E O C U H M D T
6	Y A N C I H Z N U W	24	C L C P Z I K O T H
7	V Z I E T I R R G X	25	A F L W W Z Q M D T
8	H C Q I C K G U O N	26	Z C W A P M B S A W L
9	Z C F C L X R K Q W	27	H F L M H R Z N A P E C E
10	H W W P T E W C I M J S	28	C L Z G E M K Z T O
11	E P D O Z C L I K S J	29	T P Y F K O T I Z U H
12	W T S S Q Z P Z I E T	30	Z C C P S N E O P H D Y L
13	Z C G G Y F C S B G	31	C I Y G I F T S Y T L E
14	C W Z A O O E M H W T P	32	Y T S V W V D G H P G U Z
15	C I Y G I F B D T V X	33	N O C A I F B J B L G H Y
16	E A Q D R D N S R C A P D T	34	Z X X F L F E G J L
17	Y F W C Q Q B Z C W C	35	Z C T M M B Z J O O
18	W T E Z Q S K U H C		H C Q I W S Y S B P H C Z V
	Z C V X Q Z K Z Y D W L K		




Figure 14-11 (C). Frequency distribution columns 1-10 (U).

(1) The first and second distributions are certainly monoalphabetic. The peaks and troughs are pronounced, and the number of blanks, considering the size of the samples, corresponds with that expected. But note that the same pattern is lost in the remaining alphabets. This may be explained by a change in the successive points of interruption.

(2) Assuming that the first, second, and possibly third columns are monoalphabetic, the possibility of an entry is provided, based upon the assumption of probable words. Recall that most military messages are prone to stereotypes, particularly in beginnings and endings. Thus words such as REFERENCE, REFER, REQUEST, ENEMY, IN, etc., are commonly found. High-frequency digraphs used in the initial portions of common words are observable in the first two or three columns. For example, in the first two columns above, the following digraphs can be found:

ZC-7 WT-3 HC-2
 CI-2 AF-2 CL-2

Key-----BUSINESSMACHIBUSBUSIBUSINE|
 Plain---AMMUNITIONFO(R)FI(R)STAR(T)ILLE(R)|
 Cipher--BOLYRPJDROJKXKJFYXSXDJUPSY|

Key-----BUSINESSMACHINESBU|BUSINESSMACHI|
 Plain---YWILLBELOADED(A)FTE(R)AMMUNITIONFO(R)|
 Cipher--IYDPYFXURAF(A)ENMJJV|BOLYRPJDROJKX|

Key-----BUSIBUSBUSINEBUSIN|
 Plain---THI(R)DA(R)TILLE(R)Y...|
 Cipher--DGD(X)GUF(D)JUPSY(I)...|

Cryptogram

BOLYR PJDRO JKXKJ FYSX DJUPS YIYDP
YFXUR AFAEN MJJV OLYRP JDROJ KX DGD
XGUF DJUPSY IXXXX

(Rp) Interruptor letter

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	
C	1	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C
	2	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A
	3	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q
	4	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L
	5	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M
	6	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B
	7	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K
	8	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R
	9	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I
	10	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	V	Z

Figure 14-12 (ϕ). Plaintext letter as interrupter (U).

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(1) In this example, the plaintext letter R was selected as the interrupter letter. Each time Rp appears, the key is changed following its encipherment, then the key reverts to its initial starting point. As a consequence of using a high-frequency letter, repetitions will occur quite often. This is true because a high-frequency letter will be a part of many common words, because it will be followed quite often by the same letter, and also because the word in which it appears may be followed by words that are frequently repeated. Thus each time the word ARTILLERY appears in the plaintext, the cipher equivalents of TILLERY must be the same because the key sequence reverts to its initial position following the encipherment of the R. If a low-frequency letter was selected as a plaintext interrupter, then each cycle of key usage would be greatly extended, resulting in an approximation of periodic substitution with the probability of numerous repetitions.

(2) Although the length of the intervals between repetitions in any of the foregoing cases would be irregular, thus suppressing periodicity, the length

of each interval is normally sufficient to permit solution by two general methods. First, if the cipher alphabets are known from the results of prior analysis, and the cryptogram to be deciphered merely represents a key change, solution would be possible through the probable-word method. Second, repetitions found in the text would be examined in the light of their presence being due to a stereotype word. A probable word, then selected, would be applied in successive juxtaposition to the ciphertext. Using the known sequences, a key letter for each letter of the probable word would be derived. The process would be continued until such time as an intelligible key sequence was found or the probable word disproved. In the latter case, a different probable word would be assumed and the same process repeated.

c. In the example above, a plaintext letter served as the interrupter letter. But suppose the correspondents had agreed upon a ciphertext letter instead. In this case the same message, using the same key and cipher sequences, would now appear as shown in figure 14-13.

```

Key-----BUSINESSMACHINESBUSINESSM
Plain----AMMUNITIONFORFIRSTARTILLE
Cipher---BOLYRPJDROJKXTPFYXSXBPUUⓄ

Key-----BUSINESSMACHIN|BUSINESSMACH|BU
Plain----RYWILLBELOADED|AFTERAMMUNITIO
Cipher---HRNMYTTXHP|CRFⓄ|BEJFIELLBNⓄ|OⓄ

Key-----BUSINESS|MACH|BUSINE
Plain----NORTHIR|DARTILLERY
Cipher---VECXBODF|PAZⓄ|ONUFIC
    
```

Cryptogram

```

BOLYR  PJDRO  JKXTP  FYSX  BPUUQ  HRNMY
TTXHP  CRFQB  EJFIE  LLBN  QOQVE  CXBOD
FPAZQ  ONUFIC  CXXXX
    
```

Ⓞ = Interrupter letter

Figure 14-13 (c). Cipher letter as interrupter (U).

Note that in this example there are no significant repetitions. This is due only to the selection of Qc as the interrupter. Had another letter been chosen,

repetitions might have been plentiful. For example, note the repetitions occurring in the message shown in figure 14-14 when Sc is used as an interrupter.

Key-----B A N D S B A N D S B A N D S B A N D S B A N | B A N D S B A N D S B
 Plain-----F R O M F O U R F I V E T O F O U R F I F T E | E N A M B A R R A G E
 Cipher----K T A K Z W X I I D A C B N Z W X I I D K W (S) J O N K T B T I D H J

(Sc) = Interruptor letter

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C
C2	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R
C3	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M
C4	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y
C5	S	T	V	W	X	Z	H	Y	D	R	A	U	L	I	C	B	E	F	G	J	K	M	N	O	P	Q

Figure 14-14 (C). Repetitions as a result of interrupter letter encipherment (U).

(1) This last example provides a clue which may be used as an entry. Note that in this case the key is short, thus the key sequence is repeated several times before being interrupted. This of itself provides the possibility of repeated segments between periods of interruption. In such cases as above, where cipher repeats appear closely, the intervening letters between repeats may be eliminated from consideration as interrupter letters. Thus *Ac*, *Cc*, *Bc*, and *Nc* may be eliminated from consideration.

(2) Insofar as analysis is concerned, two possibilities are presented: superimposition or direct attack. In the first case, if the interrupter can be identified, the message may be divided into segments, each representing a key sequence run, and stacked as shown previously, the columns so formed being monoalphabetic. One difference in respect to the use of probable words should be noted. In cases similar to this, the analyst works from the inside of the message. That is, he attempts to find a given word in the body of the message. This is a much more difficult task than attacking the beginning of a message. This of course applies only to the case of stacking one message upon itself. Should depth of 30 to 40 messages of the same system and key be available, this system can be solved more readily by superimposition. In the second case, a direct attack

upon an individual message is possible, but unless it contains some inconsistency in its text it can be a very difficult problem.


14-8. (C) Solution by Superimposition

a. As mentioned previously in the case of both numerically keyed and interrupter-letter encipherment, solution is best accomplished by superimposition which requires a depth of messages known to be from the same system. The solution will be made easier if the analyst has some preknowledge concerning the possible contents of the message. Here the knowledge of common stereotyped beginnings is invaluable. The general techniques used in this approach are demonstrated in the following paragraphs.


b. The first two or three groups constituting the beginning of the message are selected from messages produced by the same system, superimposed to form a column. A unilateral frequency distribution is made of these columns. Normally only the first two or three columns are so treated, because it is assumed that beyond this point the use of an interrupter in some of the messages will destroy columnar monoalphabeticity. This process is demonstrated in figure 14-15.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. T Q P F Y I N G C R F K E X C | 19. W T R N C N M H E Y U A H H K |
| 2. I G X P J C T R F K E X G F W | 20. V D N E F A Y Z K Q X C M F T |
| 3. S Q E Q X E T E T I R A X D X | 21. T Q C P F Y A E Q D D T R N C |
| 4. M G Q D F P N Z Y M O R T Y T | 22. Z G I U Y L R X G F I T O O D |
| 5. T Q P P X C F N E T I N Q X P | 23. K R W T S P U Z E D M G I N J |
| 6. F M A B M R H Z K T C G D T S | 24. T Q B Z X A U S P B F R M D X |
| 7. K B Y T D H C K H T M G J R Z | 25. T Q X C F O L Y G D J T B V F |
| 8. I U E R B G K Q D A P P Z Q A | 26. I G X S N G M A Y Z O Z F T Q |
| 9. I G Y I X G X P Y Z K Q X Q R | 27. K B Y P S Y Q E X S D Y I R G |
| 10. T Q C F T B R I U W Q E Z U Y | 28. G X C P C J F O O J N I A R A |
| 11. T Q B Z B Z F K F Z Z T I R A | 29. F D D Y S D Y I R G C J L M E |
| 12. P Q A L A T K Q D F P N Z Y M | 30. D Q R Y H R H Z K T C G D T R |
| 13. D G S B J I B M K B Q A T S B | 31. C H A P Q G A Z E M G Q D F P |
| 14. T Q M P O N L Q O G Z Q D F P | 32. K D A L K J L M S L P W Q D K |
| 15. I G X B J G L N Y Z Z E L A G | 33. K S H G R O J N Q Z N H O Q A |
| 16. G H N H H M K T S N B X L R Z | 34. S Q P F X R J G A R L Z B C W |
| 17. C H M F T I R A X D X D N N F | 35. T Q M P O A Q F M L Z Y W F P |
| 18. I G Y I R G C N H A E F U G I | |


Column Number 1



Column Number 2



Column Number 3



- | | | |
|-------|-------|------|
| TQP 2 | IGX 3 | TQ 9 |
| TQC 2 | IGY 2 | IG 5 |
| TQB 2 | | |
| TQM 2 | | |
| TQX 1 | | |

Figure 14-15 (φ). Frequency distribution and polygraphs of superimposed columns (U).

c. The distribution derived from the first three columns exhibits several interesting characteristics. Note that the first distribution shows a pattern similar to that expected for a monoalphabetic distribution, but that the second has two peaks which seem abnormally high. These two peaks probably represent two vowels. The third distribution is somewhat flatter than the first. This may be the result of a key change occurring in several of the messages included in the distribution at this point. Considering these possibilities, the repeated

trigrams and digraphs observed may be examined for possible stereotype words.

(1) The repeated TQc digraph followed an equal number of times by Pc, Cc, Dc, and Mc is characteristic of the digraph REp in typical message beginnings, such as REQUEST, REFERENCE, REFER, RECEIPT, RECOMMEND, etc., and provides a ready point for initial assumptions. The only problem is associating the correct word with the correct digraph. In some instances the frequency of individual patterns compared to the

expected frequency of digraphs and trigraphs may provide a clue. In others such as this, where similar frequencies are involved, final resolution is merely a matter of trial and error. With this in mind and accepting that *TQc* is REp, the following associations are arbitrarily made.

P REC REP REQ REF
 C TQP TQC TQB TQM

(2) Using the assumed equivalencies and assuming that the plain component is a direct standard alphabet, a matrix may now be set up as follows (fig. 14-16).

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1																				T						
C2			q																							
C3		P		M													C	B								

Figure 14-16 (C). Initial placement of values (U).

(3) The assumed values for the third alphabet

1. C T Q P F Y I N G C R F K E X C
P R E C
2. C I G X P J C T R F K E X G F W
P C O U
3. C S Q E Q X E T E T I R A X D X
P S E N
4. C M G Q D F P N Z Y M O R T Y T
P Y O B
5. C T Q P P X C F N E T I N Q X P
P R E C
6. C F M A B M R H Z K T C G D T S
P F I R T
7. C K B Y T D H C K H T M G J R Z
P A T T
8. C I U E R B G K Q D A P P Z Q A
P C A N
9. C I G Y I X G X P Y Z K Q X Q R
P C O T
10. C T Q C F T B R I U W Q E Z U Y
P R E P
11. C T Q B Z B Z F K F Z Z T I R A
P R E Q
12. C P Q A L A T K Q D F P N Z Y M
P V E R
13. C D G S B J I B M K B Q A T S B
P H O Z
14. C T Q M P O N L Q O G Z Q D F P
P R E F
15. C I G X B J G L N Y Z Z E L A G
P C O U
16. C G H N H H M K T S N B X L R Z
P E N E
17. C C H M F T I R A X D X D N N F
P I N F
18. C I G Y I R G C N H A E F U G I
P C O T

reveal two distinctive patterns that indicate the type alphabet involved. Note that *Rc--Mc* and *Cbc* are in reverse order, and also that the values involved are reciprocal, that is $C_p = P_c$ and $P_p = C_c$. As the two patterns are characteristic of a reversed standard alphabet, this configuration is inserted in all three cipher sequences (fig. 14-17). The assumption being that, as in most cases, the secondary sequences are derived from the successive juxtaposition of two basic sequences.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L
C2	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V
C3	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S

Figure 14-17 (C). Completion of assumed sequences (U).

(4) Using this matrix, the first three columns of each message beginning are now deciphered as shown in figure 14-18.

19. C W T R N C N M H E Y U A H H K
P O B A
20. C V D N E F A Y Z K Q X C M F T
P P R E
21. C T Q C P F Y A E Q D D T R N C
P R E P
22. C Z G I U Y L R X G F I T O O D
P L O J
23. C K R W T S P U Z E D M G I N J
P A D V
24. C T Q B Z X A U S P B F R M D X
P R E Q
25. C T Q X C F O L Y G D J T B V F
P R E U
26. C I G X S N G M A Y Z O Z F T Q
P C O U
27. C K B Y P S Y Q E X S D Y I R G
P A T T
28. C G X C P C J F O O J N I A R A
P E X P
29. C F D D Y S D Y I R G C J L M E
P F R O
30. C D Q R Y H R H Z K T C G D T R
P H E A
31. C C H A P Q G A Z E M G Q D F P
P I N R
32. C K D A L K J L M S L P W Q D K
P A R R
33. C K S H G R O J N Q Z N H O Q A
P A C K
34. C S Q P F X R J G A R L Z B C W
P S E C
35. C T Q M P O A Q F M L Z Y W F P
P R E F

Figure 14-18 (C). Insertion of plaintext values (U).

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(5) Several of the trigraphs so produced can easily be expanded to full words. Among these are:

- REC RECOMMEND or RECEIVE
- FIR FIRST
- ATT ATTACK or ATTENTION
- CAN CANCEL
- REQ REQUEST or REQUIRE
- COU COUNTER
- ENE ENEMY
- INF INFANTRY or INFORMATION

Other trigraphs seem to be impossible combinations of letters. Among these are:

- YOB OBA
- COT LOJ
- HOZ INR

This may be explained by a period of interruption occurring somewhere in the first two positions of these messages. In respect to this, note that, with the exception of INR, the letter "O" is common to all.

(6) To test the possibility of a key change being involved, a fourth cipher sequence for those seemingly good trigraphs can be constructed. The equivalencies thus established then can be tested against those which seem improbable. If the tetragraphs produced seem illogical, a key change may be assumed. Thus the following is produced:

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C4	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U

Using this sequence, the trigraphs assumed to be good may now be expanded to:

- | | | | |
|------|---------|-------|---------|
| 1. C | T Q P F | 7. C | K B Y T |
| P | R E C O | P | A T T A |
| 2. C | I G X P | 8. C | I U E R |
| P | C O U E | P | C A N C |
| 3. C | S Q E Q | 16. C | G H N H |
| P | S E N D | P | E N E N |
| 6. C | F M A B | 17. C | C H M F |
| P | F I R S | P | I N F O |

sequence 1 each time the Op appears. Doing this, we find that the questionable groups now produce:

- | | | | |
|------|---------|-------|---------|
| 2. C | I G X P | 19. C | W T R N |
| P | C O N F | P | O R D E |
| | * | | * |
| 4. C | M G Q D | 22. C | Z G I U |
| P | Y O U R | P | L O C A |
| | * | | * |
| 9. C | I G Y J | 31. C | C H A P |
| P | C O M M | P | I N R E |

(7) Each of the tetragraphs produced by this sequence conforms to the words assumed, with the exception of number 2. But note again that the O appears as plaintext. Moreover the same sequence applied to the improbable trigraphs now produces the following:

- | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|
| Y O B Q | H O Z S | L O J Z |
| C O T L | O B A G | I N R E |

Thus a key change is indicated, and since O appears in all except INRE, which now appears to be two words (IN RE), it may be tentatively accepted as the interrupter letter. This being the case, the obvious step is to confirm this assumption by trying to decipher these groups that revert back to cipher

(8) The appearance of valid plaintext confirms the assumption of Op as the interrupter letter. The final solution is now quite simple. Knowing the sequence of the cipher and plain components, and having identified the interrupter letter, all that remains to reconstruct the system is to determine the number of alphabets involved and their respective juxtapositions. This can be done by selecting one or more messages in which the probably word or words contain no O and juxtaposing the sequences to produce the known ciphertext. When the points of juxtaposition repeat, the full key length is reproduced. Thus, the matrix size is determined. For example:

- | | |
|-----|-------------------------------|
| 6. | F M A B M R H Z K T C G D T S |
| | F I R S T A R T I L L E R Y |
| 7. | K B Y T D H C |
| | A T T A C K |
| 8. | I U E R B G K |
| | C A N C E L L |
| 14. | T Q M P O N L Q O |
| | R E F E R E N C E |
| Key | K U R T F R Y S S E N K U R |

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The matrix may now be reconstructed as shown in figure 14-19, and each message deciphered.

P	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
C1	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L
C2	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V
C3	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S
C4	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U
C5	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G
C6	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S
C7	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z
C8	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T
C9	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T
C10	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F
C11	N	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	Y	X	W	V	U	T	S	R	Q	P	O

Figure 14-19 (C). Completion of matrix (U).

PART SIX (C)
INTRODUCTORY CODE SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 15 (C)
CODE SYSTEMS

Section I. (C) INTRODUCTION

15-1. (C) Classification of Code Systems

Codes differ from ciphers in two respects. First, a group of symbols (letters, numbers, or a mixture of both) is used to represent a letter, syllable, word, phrase, or sentence of plaintext. Second, as they are not generated by an enciphering process, they do not bear the same relationship to the structure of the underlying plaintext as does a cipher. As code systems are arbitrary in nature, each group having its own assigned value, they require the use of books, lists, charts, etc., to tabulate the codes and their meanings. Codes may be classified by the number and type of documents used.

a. Open codes are systems of disguised secret writing in which units of normal plaintext are used as the code equivalent for letters, numbers, words, etc., of the plaintext message. They can be, and often are, combined to form an intelligible text of an apparently innocent message. An example of such an open code message is the poem passed by BBC on 1 June 1944 warning the French underground that the invasion of France was to be launched in less than 2 weeks:

LES SANGLOTS LONGS
DES VIOLONS
DE L'AUTOMNE

Another example is the following message passed to Secretary of War Stimson at the Potsdam Conference to advise him of the success of the explosion of the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

DOCTOR HAS JUST RETURNED MOST EN-
THUSIASTIC AND CONFIDENT THAT THE
LITTLE BOY IS AS HUSKY AS HIS BIG
BROTHER. THE LIGHT IN HIS EYES DIS-
CERNIBLE FROM HERE TO HIGHHOLD

AND COULD HAVE HEARD HIS SCREAMS
FROM HERE TO MY FARM.

The BIG BROTHER referred to in the preceding message is the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.

b. Book codes are code systems in which the code groups are contained in bound documents, arranged in some systematic order. They may be classified as either one- or two-part codes.

(1) A one-part code is a code in which the plaintext element and its corresponding code group are contained in one document, arranged in alphabetic, numeric, or other systematic order. This is an example of a one-part code:

165 GAS ALERT OFF
166 GAS ALERT ON
167 GAS ATTACK READY
168 GAS HAS BEEN RELEASED
169 GAS HAS BLOWN BACK
170 GAS HAS CEASED TO BE RELEASED
171 GAS WILL BE RELEASED AT (TIME)

(2) A two-part code is a randomized code system consisting of an encoding book and a decoding book, or sections of either. In the encoding book or section, the plaintext equivalents are arranged in alphabetical or numerical order, the code groups being assigned at random. In the decoding section or book, the code groups are arranged in a systematic order, alphabetical or numerical, and are accompanied by their meanings as given in the encoding section. The significant difference between two-part codes and one-part codes is that, in the former, the sequential relationship between code groups and plaintext does not exist. For example, compare the two-part code shown in figure 15-1 with the one-part code above.

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ENCODING SECTION					
W E I P	2583	Intercept ing ion or s	F I P I	0514	Key s
X I G L	2756	- station	C U F Z	0255	Ki
K A X P	1072	Intercepted	K A K B	1059	Kill ing s
R O T B	2043	Interdict ing ion s	F Y V M	0595	Killed
W O G L	2631	Interdicted	C I Q M	0215	Kilocycle s
Q O P Y	1889	Interfere ing nce s (in)	H O D U	0828	Kilometer s
G A V Q	0620	Interfered (in) (with)	V Y R U	2541	Kind s (of)
X A X D	2722	Intermediate	G Y K Z	0734	Kitchen s
H I Z R	0824	Intermittent ly	N O P A	1589	Knew
B O G C	0081	Interpreter s	Q A G T	1806	Knot s
Z E I N	2883	Interrogate ing ion s	Q Y X E	1947	Know ing s
L A V M	1220	Interrupt ing ion s	K Y T F	1193	Knowledge (of)
M Y E P	1479	Interrupted	L Y X I	1347	Known
H A M F	0761	Intersect ing ion s	F I K D	0509	Ko
Z U S T	2967	Interval s (of)	M O K W	1434	Ku

DECODING SECTION					
H A L E	0760	Few	H I G H	0815	Meteorological
M F	61	Intersect ing ion s	R I	16	Allowance s (for)
N G	62	Short ly	S K	17	Demoralize ation ing s
O H	63	Circular s	T L	18	Presence (of)
P I	64	U	U M	19	Altogether
H A Q K	0765	Centimeter s	H I V N	0820	USS
R L	66	Repulse ing s	W O	21	Release ing s
S M	67	Your message (No.)	X P	22	Fi
T N	68	Assembly point s	Y Q	23	Well
U O	69	Runner s	Z R	24	Intermittent ly
H A V P	0770	Air base s	H O A R	0825	Strengthened
W Q	71	River s	B S	26	Often
X R	72	Mask ing s	C T	27	Void
Y S	73	Built	D U	28	Kilometer s
Z T	74	Gain ing s	E V	29	Favorable y

Figure 15-1 (C). Two-part code (U).

15-2. (C) Matrix Codes

a. Matrix codes as a class represent a transition between cipher and code systems. They may range from simple syllabary squares correctly classed as ciphers to code charts which include a small vocabulary of words and phrases. Generally, matrix codes follow closely the cryptographic principles of multi-literal systems treated previously. They differ from cipher systems primarily in their construction. In

cipher systems, excepting the monome-dinome and monome-dinome-trinome systems, the ratio between plain and cipher elements is nearly constant. Matrix codes, however, have no definite ratio. Substitution of values may involve constant-length code groups for variable-length plaintext units composed of a mixture of letters, syllables, words, phrases, or sentences. An example of a typical matrix code is shown in figure 15-2.

	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46
25	A	ADVANCE	AMMO	AN	AND	ATTACK	B	BE	C
26	CA	CALIBER	CO	D	DE	DIVISION	E	EAST	EM
27	ENEMY	ER	F	FLANK	FOR	FROM	G	H	HAS
28	HAVE	HQ	I	IN	INFO	ING	IT	J	K
29	L	LE	M	MACH GUN	MENT	MSG	N	NE	NO
30	NORTH	O	OF	ON	ORDER	P	POSITION	Q	R
31	RE	REGT	REPORT	REQUEST	S	SE	SECTOR	SEND	SOUTH
32	STOP	SUPPORT	T	TANK	BEGIN SPELL	THAT	TION	U	END SPELL
33	V	W	WEST	WILL	X	Y	Z	ZEPO	<u>1</u>
34	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0

Sample Message:

	BEGIN		END						
REPORT	SPELL	NE	W	SPELL	POSITION	OF	REGT	STOP	
3140	3242	2945	3339	3246	3044	3040	3139	3238	

Figure 15-2 (Q). Matrix code (U).

b. The cryptographic operation of the system is quite simple, following the same methods as given for multilateral systems. For example, the plaintext message:

REPORT NEW POSITION OF REGIMENT

is enciphered as:

3140 3242 2945 3339 3246 3044 3040 3139 3238

Note that each plaintext value is represented by the row and column indicator which intersected at the position of the desired plaintext value. Thus 3140 equates to REPORT. Note also that words which do not appear in the chart are spelled out, as in the case of NEW which is represented by two code groups, 2945=NE and W=3339. This characteristic, in conjunction with specific groups which indicates

when to begin spell (3242) and when to end spell (3246) is a means of entry into the system.

c. A variant form of the matrix code illustrated in figure 15-3 is the so-called "upper and lower case" matrix code. Essentially it is similar to the normal matrix code, only so structured as to contain two plaintext values in each cell. Thus the capacity of the matrix is doubled and variant plaintext values for the equivalent code group are introduced. The cryptographic operation of this system is similar to that of the foregoing with one exception. That is, in this system at least two groups which normally have but one plain value are set aside to indicate whether the groups following are upper or lower case. An example of this system and the method of its operation are shown in figure 15-3.

	1	2	3	4	5
00	A AMMO	1 ARTY	AND ATTACK	AT BARRAGE	AN BATTALION
13	B BATTERY	2 BEGIN	BE BRIDGE	BY CAPTURE	LOWER CASE
25	C CASUALTY	3 COMMAND	CA COMMUNI- CATION	CE COMPANY	CO CROSSROADS
37	D DAILY	4 DASH	DA DISPOSTI- TION	DE DIVISION	UPPER CASE
49	DO EAST	DR EMPLACE- MENT	E ENEMY	5 EQUIP- MENT	ED EVEPY

Sample message:

BEGIN ATTACK AT 1245 HOURS AND CAPTURE BRIDGE 321.

BEGIN ATTACK UPPER CASE AT 1 2 4 5
132 003 375 004 002 132 372 494

AND LOWER CASE CAPTURE BRIDGE UPPER CASE
003 135 134 133 375

3 2 1
252 132 002

Figure 15-3 (C). Upper case, lower case, matrix code (U).

Although a system of this type introduces variant values, i.e. the code group 252 may indicate either the number 3 or the word COMMAND, it does not provide a great deal more security than the normal matrix code. Its chief advantage lies in the inclusion of a long vocabulary.

d. Syllabary codes are used either to supplement a book code by adding a means of expanding its vocabulary, or to provide a flexible means of secret communications. As in all matrix codes, it appears

R	E	C	O	N	N	A	I	S	S	A	N	C	E	or
81	35	25	74	60	60	11	54	88	88	14	28			
RE	CO	N	N	A	I	S	S	A	N	C	E	or		
83	29	60	60	11	59	88	14	28						
R	E	CO	N	N	A	I	S	S	A	N	C	E	or	
81	35	29	60	60	11	59	88	11	60	25	35			
RE	C	ON	N	A	I	S	S	A	N	C	E	etc.		
83	25	76	60	11	59	88	14	25	35					

e. Code charts are similar to the syllabary square in that they are of like dimensions and operate on the same cryptographic principles. A significant difference between the two is that the code chart containing words and phrases is normally designed to serve a specific function, while the syllabary square has more general application. Further, the code chart, being limited in intent, normally contains less internal variants. An example of these facets of a code chart may be seen in one of its more common applications: an operator's code. A code chart of this

in the form of a matrix. However, the contents of the matrix are normally limited to letters, numbers, and syllables. Cryptographically, it is also similar to multilateral systems, having row and column coordinates for the purpose of designating the plaintext element within the cells of the matrix. A sample of a syllabary square is shown in figure 15-4.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1	A	1	AL	AN	AND	AR	ARE	AS	AT	ATE
2	ATI	B	2	BE	C	3	CA	CE	CO	COM
3	D	4	DA	DE	E	5	EA	ED	EN	ENT
4	ER	ERE	ERS	ES	EST	F	6	G	7	H
5	8	HAS	HE	I	9	IN	ING	ION	IS	IT
6	IVE	J	Ø	K	L	LA	LE	M	ME	N
7	ND	NE	NT	O	OF	ON	OR	OW	P	Q
8	R	RA	RE	RED	RES	RI	RO	S	SE	SH
9	ST	STO	T	TE	TED	TER	TH	THE	THI	THR
0	TI	TO	U	V	VE	W	WL	X	Y	Z

Figure 15-4 (C). Syllabary square (U).

The system provides for all the letters of the alphabet, the cardinal numbers, and the more common polygraphs. Also, the placement of the plaintext elements are such that the finding of any value is easy for the cryptographer. In effect, the system above provides variant values by the inclusion of both letters and polygraphs, without variant row and column coordinates. For example, the word reconnaissance could appear in ciphertext as:

type contains those common words, phrases, operating signals, and words that relate directly to the establishment and maintenance of communications between two points. Provision is made for the cardinal numbers and occasionally the letters of the alphabet. Although security of interoperator communications may be important in these cases, the chief object is to be the provision of a concise and rapid means of communications. Figure 15-5 depicts a type of operator code.

	0	1	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
1	1	QAP	QRA	QRM	QRN	QRO	QRP	QSA	QSU	10
2	A	Z	Read Numbers				Read Signals	20	QSP	
3	B	1	3				30	QSL	GTA	
4	C	J	0	4	QRK	QRL	40	W	Routine	
5	D	K	P	S	5	.50	U	X	Priority	
6	E	L	Q	T	60	6	V	Y	Immediate	
7	F	M	R	70	QTR	QSY	7	Z	Flash	
8	G	N	80	QRX	QRX	QRZ	QRV	8	QTC	
9	H	90	Refer your Message					9	QRW	
0		Read Phrases	Number Precedence					Read Letters	0	

Figure 15-5 (Q). Operator's code (U).

15-3. (C) Enciphered Codes

Occasionally the code groups of coded messages undergo a further process of encipherment; the resulting cryptogram constitutes an enciphered code message. Enciphered code is used to enhance the security of a widely held code. It can be used as a means of securing messages encoded in common commercial and telegraphic codes, and it can be used when increased security is required for highly classified communications normally passed in a less secure system.

a. Both of the two general classes of cipher methods, transposition and substitution, can be used to encipher code. Encipherment by transposition is used less as it is subject to error and requires highly skilled personnel for its practical use. The bulkiness of code materials and elements makes transposition encipherment of codes unwieldy for practical military use.

b. All of the methods of substitution from the simple monoalphabetic methods to the most complex

polyalphabetic systems can be used for the encipherment of code groups. Substitution tables of various sorts are often used. Tables may be used to convert 5-letter code groups to pronounceable groups of 5 letters, to convert 5-letter code groups to 5-figure code groups, or simply to convert combinations of letters into other combinations. The most important method, however, is the arithmetical method which is favored because of its simplicity and relative speed of operation as compared to that of the alphabetical methods.

c. Two basic arithmetic techniques are used. They are addition and subtraction. In both, an arbitrarily selected sequence of numbers, normally corresponding in length to the code group, is added to or subtracted from the code group using noncarrying methods. The resulting sum or quotient becomes the ciphertext for transmission. The recipient of the message has only to reverse the operation, using the same key to uncover the plain code groups. Both processes are shown in figure 15-6.

Additive:		Enciphering					
Message		ENEMY	FORCES	DEPLOYED	ALONG	RIVER	LINE
Code		2514	2337	1233	0864	0771	2970
Additive		2701	2701	2701	2701	2701	2701
Text		4215	4038	3934	2565	2472	4671
		Deciphering					
Text		4215	4038	3934	2565	2472	4671
Subtractive		2701	2701	2701	2701	2701	2701
Code		2514	2337	1233	0864	0771	2970
Message		ENEMY	FORCES	DEPLOYED	ALONG	RIVER	LINE

Subtractive:		Enciphering					
Message		ENEMY	FORCES	DEPLOYED	ALONG	RIVER	LINE
Code		2514	2337	1233	0864	0771	2970
Subtractive		0891	0709	9579	8426	7268	3984
Text		2723	4638	2764	2448	3513	9096
		Deciphering					
Text		2723	4638	2764	2448	3513	9096
Additive		0891	0709	9579	8426	7268	3984
Code		2514	2337	1233	0864	0771	2970
Message		ENEMY	FORCES	DEPLOYED	ALONG	RIVER	LINE

Figure 15-6 (C). Arithmetic enciphered codes (U).

The additive or subtractive may be fixed or variable. Fixed additives and subtractives, i.e. a series of numbers, the same or repeating, used to encipher each code group, are particularly weak cryptographically if the basic code system contains any inherent limitations in size or sequential arrangement. If, however, a variable additive or subtractive, i.e. nonrepeating groups, is used, a much more secure system may be provided. Variable additives or subtractives are normally obtained from special tables or lists which contain a series of heterogeneous elements, none of which is used more than once. Using this method, a high degree of security may be imparted to the enciphered message, even if the basic code book is possessed by the enemy.

15-4. (C) Disadvantages and Advantages of Code Systems

a. One great disadvantage of code systems is the sheer bulk of material required to provide a comprehensive vocabulary and the attendant problems of distribution and operation. However, code systems offer certain advantages which in some cases may outweigh the disadvantages. The advantages are:

(1) Code systems offer a more secure means of communications than most other hand systems, particularly in the case of small two-part codes which are superseded rapidly.

(2) Economy in transmission is made possible by the nature of code systems. That is, it is possible to express an entire word or thought and convey it by a single group, whereas in cipher systems the same word or thought requires a great deal more in the way of ciphertext to accomplish the same thing.

(3) Code systems are particularly adaptable to languages which are based on idiographs as are Chinese and Japanese. In Chinese for example, to allow for the transmission of idiographs, the "Chinese telegraphic code" was compiled. This code contains 10,000 characters, each represented by one code group and arranged similar to a two-part code.

b. In terms of military usage, code finds its greatest application both in brevity codes and in field codes. A brevity code has for its sole purpose the shortening of messages and is not necessarily a secret code. An example of this type code may be observed in the Q and Z signals common to telecommunications. A field code, on the other hand, is a secret code and is designed primarily for low-echelon units. Code systems which are often used for this purpose are the matrix codes given above and occasionally two-part codes with limited vocabularies. An example of this type code may be seen in the current US Army KAC-P operation codes.

Section II. (C) ANALYSIS OF CODES

15-5. (C) Introduction

The analysis of any code beyond the most simple form is dependent upon the availability of a volume of messages derived from the same system. The volume of messages required for successful analysis is in direct proportion to the complexity of the system. The analysis of complex systems generally presupposes the use of data processing equipment to sort, collate, and list significant repeats and characteristics observed in the raw traffic in preparation for analysis. The use of this material enables the analyst to enter the system through some identifiable characteristic. Through a preliminary study of

associated communications data (callsigns, frequencies, operator chatter, etc.), characteristics of the code system (indicators, syllabary spelling, special indicators, etc.), and collateral information concerning the units and their operations, the analyst may isolate specific messages and identify certain plaintext values, such as placenames, personnel, and stereotypes which may be used to break into the code's values. In short the analysis of code systems involves the study of large volumes of material. For this reason, and since in military usage code systems find their greatest application as field codes, this section will treat only the analysis of matrix codes.

15-6. (C) Principles of Analysis

a. Since the cryptographic principles underlying the operation of matrix codes are similar to those of multilateral systems, the same general techniques are used with some slight modification to fit each situation. Additionally, the characteristics themselves provide a basis for analysis of the matrix code. These characteristics are given below, and their significance in terms of analytic attack is noted. However, they are not listed in order of importance, as the applicability of each is determined by the system itself, which is subject to variation.

b. The plaintext values in a code matrix are usually arranged in some systematic order, usually alphabetically, to ease the encoding process. However, this is not always the case, for some systems may have plaintext values inserted in the cells of the matrix in random order. The significance of the former case lies in the possibility of assuming additional plaintext values and of placing questionable values. For example, in the matrix code shown in figure 15-2, note that the sequence of plaintext values in the first row of cells is "A, ADVANCE, AMMO, AN, AND, ATTACK, B, BE, and C" respectively. If the values "AMMO and AND" had been previously placed, one could obviously assume that the intervening cell would contain a plaintext value beginning with A and having either an M or N as its second letter. Of course where the plaintext values are inserted randomly, this technique is inappropriate.

c. The row and column coordinates are usually one or two digits each, forming groups of two, three, or four digits. The coordinates where numbers are used may be in numerical order, some systematic disarranged order, or randomly ordered. The same situation may apply in cases where letters are used. However, since the amount of letters available is greater than the amount of numbers possible, variations are increased. Insofar as analysis is concerned, the significance of two points, their identity and the method of their order, lies in the possibility of their use as a means of entry into the system. Usually, in all forms of matrix codes, the coordinates are changed regularly to provide a degree of security to offset the limitation imposed by the usual small size of the matrix, where interior values are generally fixed. Thus, once the initial recovery of a matrix is accomplished in part or in whole, analysis thereafter is concerned with the recovery of the row and column coordinates. If a systematic method of generation and assignment is involved, it is possible that the analyst may be able to predict their use in advance. If this does occur, then cryptanalysis is replaced by cryptography. The patterned use of row and column indicators is also of significance in

the initial analysis of a matrix system as it often permits the placement of possible values within the matrix and the prior location of all coordinates during the initial stage of analysis.

d. Also of importance to the cryptanalyst is the use of special code groups within a matrix to indicate: begin spell, end spell, read number, read letter, upper case, and lower case. Note that the variant values provided by matrix systems for special meanings are usually somewhat limited. Therefore their use introduces a limitation into the resultant code which provides a sure entry into the system. The initial break into most matrix code systems and book codes, where syllabary spelling is a part, is through the recovery of syllabary spelling or numbers. The principle of analysis is quite simple where spelling is the basis of attack. The analyst searches the intercepted traffic for one or more groups which are repeated quite frequently, assuming that these groups represent the special indicators. If these are found, the code groups lying between are extracted and studied as either possible spelled words or sequences of numbers. These in turn are searched for recognizable patterns and compared to a list of suspect words or numbers which, through the analysis of collateral information, have been determined to be words likely to appear in the underlying plaintext. From this comparison, possible plaintext values are assigned to the code groups, the values being used to assume additional words.

e. The complete solution of a given system normally involves the use of one or more of the techniques outlined above, and when several are used, analysis is usually approached on a simultaneous basis. That is, after the system is first identified and its messages are isolated, all techniques are employed to reconstruct the original encoding matrix and derive the plaintext equivalencies of the code text. The methodology involved herein is discussed in other paragraphs.

15-7. (C) Identification

a. Identification of matrix codes rests on their similarity to multilateral systems. That is, the code groups will appear almost exactly like the cipher groups produced by long multilateral tables. Factors which might serve to distinguish the two are: the repeated appearance of a few groups equating to the special indicators mentioned previously, and perhaps a slight variation between observed and expected digraphic frequency distribution. However, these means of initial identification are extremely tenuous. Normally, identification comes through either a process of elimination (that is, a solution is first attempted as a multilateral, then when failing, the system is assumed to be a matrix code) or from

preknowledge of the system in use by the correspondents.

b. Code groups, when they are three to five digits in length, are normally transmitted in their original length. Smaller groups of two or three digits may be combined in some instances for transmission. The study of these groups often permits the identification of the code system. For example, code groups produced by a matrix often show positional limitations in their structure, again

Row coordinates 03, 13, 23, 33, 43, 53, 63, 73, 83, 93
 Column coordinates 00, 01, 22, 33, 44, 55, 66, 77, 88, 99

With such obvious values as coordinates, the analyst could assume with certainty that the system is based upon a 10 x 10 matrix. Moreover, the progression of the numbers themselves is possibly indicative of the order of their assignment to the rows and columns.

c. As a general rule, positional limitations will always be present in matrix codes, although not as apparent. Exceptions to this rule occur when the number of rows or columns match the number of different values used. For example, in the case of a 10 x 10 matrix where single numbers are used, all possible combinations are exhausted, thus no limitation will exist. This may be observed in figure 15-7.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1										
2										
3										
4										
5										
6										
7										
8										
9										
0										

Code groups possible 00 through 99

Figure 15-7 (U). 10 x 10 matrix, single digit coordinates (U).

similar to the limitations produced by multilateral cipher systems. This may be seen in the groups below.

1344 7344 6322 7300 2311 3388 7344 1366
 5355 8322 6300 4333 2388 4377 0366 3366
 3300 6399 1333 2388 6322 7333 9311 7344
 1366 2388

A glance suffices to show that only a few combinations of dinomes are involved in each group. The limitations in the case are:

If on the other hand the number of possible combinations exceeds the total number of cells, a definite limitation exists. This may be observed in figure 15-8.

	09	19	29	39	49	59	69	79	89	99
10										
20										
30										
40										
50										
60										
70										
80										
90										
00										

Possible code groups 0009 - 9099

Groups used 100

Figure 15-8 (U). 10 x 10 matrix, dinome coordinates (U).

15-8. (C) Matrix Reconstruction

a. Matrix reconstruction in the case of initial analysis involves the study of characteristics, if any, of both coordinate generation and assignment, and the sequence of the plaintext values inserted in the cells of the matrix. If some systematic method is involved and is recognizable early in the analytic attack, the whole process of cryptanalysis can be greatly simplified.

b. In the case of coordinates, the analyst first determines if a limitation exists in the code groups. If this occurs, he uses these limitations to determine the total size of the matrix and the dimensions in terms of numbers of rows and columns. Using this information, he constructs a skeleton matrix. If some pattern exists in the digits used as coordinate indicators, he may attempt to place them correctly prior to the analysis of the internal plaintext values. The correct sequence of randomly generated coordinates cannot, of course, be determined without the prior recovery of the internal values. Where generation is involved, prior or concurrent placement is always possible. In those cases where the coordinates are rapidly superseded and where all or part of the internal values are known, this becomes doubly important. Some examples of systematic generation are:

Numerical order

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Constant additive (+9)

86 95 04 13 22 31 40 49 58 67

Progressive additives (+1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

10 11 13 16 20 25 31 38 46 55

c. When analysis has progressed to the point where plaintext values are assumed for specific code groups, the order in which they are inscribed in the matrix should be carefully checked. Often, but not always, inscription of plaintext values follows a specific route. If this route can be identified, assumption of plaintext values is greatly simplified as identification of each given group can be limited to a restricted number of choices. This limitation is especially important where a pattern in the order of row and column coordinates has been predetermined. In this case the placement of plaintext values is not subject to distortion by errors of location.

Section III. (C) ANALYSIS OF MATRIX CODES

15-9. (C) Analysis of Code Charts

a. The analysis of procedure tables or operator code charts is usually a rather simple task. This is due in part to the internal limitations of the code chart and also to the circumstances in which the code chart would be used. For example, the code charts, as shown in the preceding example, are generally limited on content, subject matter, and occasion of use, and usually refer to the operations of a communications system only. Given the knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the transmission of a particular message, the analyst can usually infer its contents. Hence, it is but a short step to the recovery of the plaintext value.

b. An additional factor that usually aids in solving these systems is that charts of this type are infrequently changed. Thus the analyst over a period of time is able to recover all interior plain values. Once this has been accomplished, further analysis of the system becomes a case of key recovery.

c. The periods of key usage will vary from case to case usually depending upon the usage of the chart. In some cases, they can be changed daily; in others, weeks may elapse before they are changed. In either case, key recovery is based on applying a procedure in reverse to that used heretofore, i.e. the analyst will find himself determining the correct cipher elements for one or more known values. For example, if the analyst knew that the digraphs 01 92 22 10 54 related to a message "QSY 5965," he would have little difficulty in placing the row and column indicators in their respective correct posi-

tions. Further recovery and development of the chart is merely a matter of time.

15-10. (C) Analysis of Syllabary Squares

a. Essentially, the only difference between the method and technique of solving for plaintext of codes produced by a syllabary code and the previously covered multiliteral system lies in the volume of material required. For a given code sequence of assumed plaintext value, a larger number of plaintext elements may have to be considered. The code text for the word RECONNAISSANCE shown in paragraph 15-2 illustrates this point. Four possible forms of encoding were given. Assume then that the analyst knows that the sequence 81 35 29 60 60 11 59 88 11 60 25 35 equates to that word. Even with this knowledge, he still has to determine the correct way in which the word is divided, i.e. does 81c=Rp or does it equal REp. In cases such as these, the analyst must modify his interpretation of frequency characteristics and idiomorphic patterns.

b. As a general rule, solution of this system is quite difficult in those cases where a volume of messages produced by a given system is lacking or where the cryptographer has made full use of the variants available within the system. Fortunately, cryptographers often develop patterns of usage which are beneficial to the cryptanalyst. On occasion some will tend to reuse certain code values consistently, thus producing an easily identifiable word pattern. Moreover, this consistent use of one code value for one letter or polygraph establishes that one-to-

one relationship which quickly leads to the determination of a plaintext value.

c. Another method in which it is possible to establish plaintext values for a number of variants is the analysis of a number of messages which have repeated elements, words, or stereotyped phrases. The significance of this can be observed in the codings given for RECONNAISSANCE above. The similarity in the structure of the cipher sequences, representing different possibilities of encoding, would lead the analyst to valid assumptions concerning the structure of the underlying word. For example, consider the code group repeated in figure 15-9.

- (1) 81 35 25 74 60 60 11 54 88 88 14 28
- (2) 83 29 60 60 11 59 88 14 28
- (3) 81 35 29 60 60 11 59 88 11 60 25 35
- (4) 83 25 76 60 11 59 88 14 25 35

Figure 15-9 (C). Idiomorphism in code sequences (U).

(1) Examination of the first three code sequences reveals the repeated dinome 60 preceded by four, three, and two dinomes respectively. Since 60 is repeated, it is probably a single letter rather than a digraph or trigraph. If in the first code

A	B	C	D	D	E	F	G	G	E	D	B	A	
81	35	25	74	60	60	11	54	88	88	11	60	25	35
R	E	C	O	N	N	A	I	S	S	A	N	C	E

d. Another method of entry into a syllabary square which does not require the depth of text that the above implies is the study and classification of repetition characters. This classification is based upon a general knowledge of the behavior of general classes of plaintext elements. For example, code units representing digits may appear in clusters representing time, map coordinates, etc. Further, particular digits in certain usages have positional limitations. The first digit of the 24-hour time system, for example, is limited to 0, 1, or 2; the second digit will use all numbers 1 through 0, the third from 0 to 5, and the last 1 through 0. Further, the 0, one of the three numbers appearing in the first position, may also appear double in the last two positions with any noteworthy frequency.

e. In either case, once sufficient equivalencies can be established, it becomes possible to reduce the greater part of the text to uniliteral terms and solve accordingly. The way is also opened for the recovery of the matrix. If the analyst has either a wholly—or a partially-recovered matrix available, the solution is thereby greatly simplified, as values can be assumed with a great degree of certainty.

sequence the groups 81 35 25 74 represent 4 letters preceding the repeated letters indicated by 60, then the groups 83 29 of the second sequence must represent the same letters as digraphs. Further, since the first and third sequences start with the same two dinomes, 81 and 35, but differ in that the groups 25 74 of the first is replaced by 29 in the third, then 83 of the fourth equals a combination of the values for 81 and 35, and 29 for 25 and 74. This can be shown as:

81	35	25	74	60	60
83		29	60	60	

Following the same logic, the following equivalencies are discovered:

- 81+35=83
- 25+74=29
- 74+60=76
- 54+88=59
- 11+60=14
- 25+35=28

(2) With equivalencies established, it becomes possible to break the code sequence into uniliteral terms, thus forming the basis for drawing up word patterns. For example, the code sequences above could be reduced to the following code digraphs and one-word patterns established as shown:

f. An important point in respect to reducing a matrix code to uniliteral terms is that this is possible only under the circumstances where the encoding process proceeds along a nearly one-for-one basis. That is, a given code group equates to a given letter more often than it equates to a polygraph. Such a situation most often occurs in syllabary squares or in matrices which made them susceptible to this particular method of attack.

15-11. (C) Analysis of Matrix Codes

a. The analysis of matrix codes follows the same general approach as that used for syllabary squares. That is, the code groups are studied to determine their inherent positional limitations. From their limitations the dimensions of the matrix are assumed and, using the row and column values, a reconstruction matrix is set up. Where possible, the initial entry into the system is made through sequences of syllabary spelling. Then, equivalencies for the code groups are established and the plaintext values are inserted into the body of the matrix. Once segments of spelling can be identified and the plaintext determined, it then becomes possible to attack the

remaining code groups on the basis of possible plaintext values which can be associated with the spelled sequences.

b. Note that this proposition depends entirely on the use of syllabary spelling in the code under analysis and the ability of the analyst to identify these sequences. Normally, identification is predicated on the basis of isolating repeated sequences in the code text of a number of messages. For this purpose an index listing prepared by data processing facilities may be used. An index listing is nothing more than a systematic listing of the groups that appear in a series of messages believed to have been produced by the same code system. There is no fixed type of index, its specific form being determined by the structure of the code system under analysis and the requirements of the analyst. Two common types are: an index of repeated groups, and an index of repeated sequences.

(1) An index of repeated groups is made up of a listing of all repeated groups appearing in a number of messages. Additionally, the repeated groups are keyed to a specific message and location within that message. This type of listing is convenient to use where great numbers of codes are processed and where a complete listing of all the groups would be too bulky. It is also useful for the initial identification of the special indicators discussed previously.

(2) The second general type is an index of repeated sequences. This can be based on the previous type index where specific groups have been isolated as spelling indicators or, if such are not used in a particular code system, simply a list of repeated sequences. This particular index form is especially suitable for the location and subsequent analysis of

syllabary spelling sequences that occur in the body of a code as differentiated from stereotyped beginnings or endings.

c. In the case where no indication is given that a sequence represents a spelled word or phrase, the possibility always exists that it might represent a sequence of words rather than letters. In such cases, differentiation can sometimes be made on the frequency and position of the repeated groups. For example, if a repeated sequence of code groups appeared consistently at the beginning or ending of a message, one could assume that it represented a stereotype address and, in this case, might represent words. On the other hand, if a given sequence appeared in different positions in several messages, one might assume that it represented a commonly used spelled word. In either case, note that identification of this sort is merely an assumption which has to be either proved or disproved in subsequent analysis.

d. Assuming that a number of given sequences have been isolated as spell-sequences, the problem then is to determine what words are actually being spelled. The general approach is to attempt to fit the sequence to a stereotype common to the communications under study. These stereotypes may be military terms, titles, ranks, geographic place names, etc. In actual practice, the analyst's familiarity with the communications system, the correspondents, and the area of operations is an invaluable aid. The actual recovery of plaintext equivalencies for code groups can make use of idiomatic patterns of the words. Note that these patterns may represent single letters as well as polygraphs, though usually digraphs are not common.

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APPENDIX A (C)
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENGLISH
DIGRAPHS

Frequency distributions of English digraphs appearing in 50,000 letters of governmental plaintext telegrams, reduced to 5,000 digraphs.

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Table A-1 (C). Frequency distribution digraphs (U).

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	TOTAL	BLANKS	
A	3	6	14	27	1	4	6	2	17	1	2	32	14	64	2	12		44	41	47	13	7	3		12		374	3	
B	4				18				2	1		6	1		4			2	1	1	2					7		49	14
C	20		3	1	32	1		14	7		4	5	1	1	41			4	1	14	4		1		1		155	8	
D	32	4	4	8	33	8	2	2	27	1		3	5	4	16	5	2	12	13	15	5	3	4		1		209	3	
E	35	4	32	60	42	18	4	7	27	1		29	14	111	12	20	12	87	54	37	3	20	7	7	4	1	648	1	
F	5		2	1	10	11	1		39			2	1		40	1		9	3	11	3		1		1		141	9	
G	7		2	1	14	2	1	20	5	1		2	1	3	6	2		5	3	4	2		1				82	7	
H	20	1	3	2	20	5			33			1	2	3	20	1	1	17	4	28	8		1		1		171	7	
I	8	2	22	6	13	10	19				2	23	9	75	41	7		27	35	27		25		15		2	368	7	
J	1				2										2							2						7	22
K	1		1		6				2			1	1						1									13	19
L	8	3	3	9	37	3	1	1	20			27		1	13	3		2	6	8	2	2	2		10		183	5	
M	36	6	3	1	26	1		1	9				13	10	8			2	4	2	2				2		126	10	
N	26	3	19	52	57	9	27	4	30	1	2	5	5	8	18	3	1	4	24	82	7	3	3		5		397	2	
O	7	4	8	12	3	25	2	3	5	1	2	19	25	77	6	25		64	14	19	37	7	8	1	2		376	2	
P	14	1	1	1	23	2		3	6			13	4	1	17	11		18	6	8	3	1	1		1		135	6	
Q													1					1				15						17	23
R	39	2	9	17	98	6	7	3	30	1	1	5	9	7	28	13		11	31	42	5	5	4		9		382	3	
S	24	3	13	5	49	12	2	26	34		1	2	3	4	15	10		5	19	63	11	1	4		1		307	4	
T	28	3	6	6	71	7	1	78	45			5	6	7	50	2	1	17	19	19	5		36		41	1	454	4	
U	5	3	3	3	11	1	8		5			6	5	21	1			31	12	12		1					130	9	
V	6				57				12						1						1							77	21
W	12				22			4	13			1	2	19				1	1						1			76	16
X	2		2	1	1	1		1	2					1	1	2		1	1	7								23	13
Y	6	2	4	4	9	11	1	1	3			2	2	6	10	3		4	11	15	1		1				96	7	
Z	1				2				1																			4	23
TOTAL	370	46	154	217	657	137	82	170	374	8	14	189	123	397	373	130	17	368	304	462	130	75	77	23	99	4	5000		
BLANKS	1	11	6	7	1	7	12	10	3	18	19	6	6	7	3	8	21	4	4	5	7	15	11	3	10	23		248	

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Table A-2 (C). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U).

F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)				
EN	111	2.05	99	DA	32	1.51	.76	OL	19	1.28	.67	EQ	12	1.08	.58
RE	98	1.99	.96	EC	32	1.51	.76	OT	19	1.28	.67	OD	12	1.08	.58
ER	87	1.94	.94	RS	31	1.49	.75	SS	19	1.28	.67	SF	12	1.08	.58
NT	82	1.91	.93	UR	31	1.49	.75	TS	19	1.28	.67	US	12	1.08	.58
TH	78	1.89	.92	NI	30	1.48	.75	TT	19	1.28	.67	UT	12	1.08	.58
ON	77	1.89	.92	RI	30	1.48	.75	WO	19	1.28	.67	VI	12	1.08	.58
IN	75	1.88	.92	EL	29	1.46	.74	BE	18	1.26	.66	WA	12	1.08	.58
TE	71	1.85	.91	HT	28	1.45	.74	EF	18	1.26	.66	FF	11	1.04	.56
AN	64	1.81	.89	LA	28	1.45	.74	NO	18	1.26	.66	FT	11	1.04	.56
OR	64	1.81	.89	RO	28	1.45	.74	PR	18	1.26	.66	PP	11	1.04	.56
ST	63	1.80	.88	TA	28	1.45	.74	AI	17	1.23	.64	RR	11	1.04	.56
ED	60	1.78	.88		22,495			HR	17	1.23	.64	SU	11	1.04	.56
NE	57	1.76	.87	AD	27	1.43	.73	PO	17	1.23	.64	UE	11	1.04	.56
VE	57	1.76	.87	DI	27	1.43	.73	RD	17	1.23	.64	YF	11	1.04	.56
ES	54	1.73	.86	EI	27	1.43	.73	TR	17	1.23	.64	YS	11	1.04	.56
ND	52	1.72	.85	IR	27	1.43	.73	DO	16	1.20	.63	FE	10	1.00	.55
TO	50	1.70	.84	IT	27	1.43	.73	DT	15	1.18	.62	IF	10	1.00	.55
SE	49	1.69	.84	LL	27	1.43	.73	IX	15	1.18	.62	LY	10	1.00	.55
	11,249			NG	27	1.43	.73	QO	15	1.18	.62	MO	10	1.00	.55
AT	47	1.67	.83	ME	26	1.41	.72	SO	15	1.18	.62	SP	10	1.00	.55
TI	45	1.65	.82	NA	26	1.41	.72	YT	15	1.18	.62	YO	10	1.00	.55
AR	44	1.64	.82	SH	26	1.41	.72	AC	14	1.15	.61	FR	9	0.95	.53
EE	42	1.62	.81	IV	25	1.40	.72	AM	14	1.15	.61	IM	9	0.95	.53
RT	42	1.62	.81	OF	25	1.40	.72	CH	14	1.15	.61	LD	9	0.95	.53
AS	41	1.61	.80	OM	25	1.40	.72	CT	14	1.15	.61	MI	9	0.95	.53
CO	41	1.61	.80	OP	25	1.40	.72	EM	14	1.15	.61	NF	9	0.95	.53
IO	41	1.61	.80	NS	24	1.38	.71	GE	14	1.15	.61	RC	9	0.95	.53
TY	41	1.61	.80	SA	24	1.38	.71	OS	14	1.15	.61	RM	9	0.95	.53
FO	40	1.60	.80	IL	23	1.36	.70	PA	14	1.15	.61	RY	9	0.95	.53
FI	39	1.59	.80	PE	23	1.36	.70	AU	13	1.11	.59	YE	9	0.95	.53
RA	39	1.59	.80	IC	22	1.34	.69	DS	13	1.11	.59	DD	8	0.90	.51
ET	37	1.57	.79	WE	22	1.34	.69	IE	13	1.11	.59	DF	8	0.90	.51
LE	37	1.57	.79	UN	21	1.32	.68	LO	13	1.11	.59	HU	8	0.90	.51
OU	37	1.57	.79	CA	20	1.30	.67	MM	13	1.11	.59	IA	8	0.90	.51
MA	36	1.56	.78	EP	20	1.30	.67	PL	13	1.11	.59	LT	8	0.90	.51
TW	36	1.56	.78	EV	20	1.30	.67	RP	13	1.11	.59	MP	8	0.90	.51
EA	35	1.54	.78	GH	20	1.30	.67	SC	13	1.11	.59	NN	8	0.90	.51
IS	35	1.54	.78	HA	20	1.30	.67	WI	13	1.11	.59	OC	8	0.90	.51
SI	34	1.53	.77	HE	20	1.30	.67		33,745			OW	8	0.90	.51
DE	33	1.52	.77	HO	20	1.30	.67	AP	12	1.08	.58	PT	8	0.90	.51
HI	33	1.52	.77	LI	20	1.30	.67	AY	12	1.08	.58	UG	8	0.90	.51
AL	32	1.51	.76	IG	19	1.28	.67	DR	12	1.08	.58	AV	7	0.85	.48
CE	32	1.51	.76	NC	19	1.28	.67	EO	12	1.08	.58	BY	7	0.85	.48
												CI	7	0.85	.48

¹ The 18 digraphs above this line compose 25% of the total.
² The 53 digraphs above this line compose 50% of the total.
³ The 122 digraphs above this line compose 75% of the total.

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Table A-2 (X). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U) - Continued

	F	L ₁₀	L ₂₂₄		F	L ₁₀	L ₂₂₄		F	L ₁₀	L ₂₂₄		F	L ₁₀	L ₂₂₄
	(F)	(2F)			(F)	(2F)			(F)	(2F)			(F)	(2F)	
EH	7	0.85	.48	RU ...	5	0.70	.42	GS	3	0.48	.33	JE	2	0.30	.25
EW	7	0.85	.48	RV ...	5	0.70	.42	HC	3	0.48	.33	JO	2	0.30	.25
EX	7	0.85	.48	SD	5	0.70	.42	HN ...	3	0.48	.33	JU	2	0.30	.25
GA ...	7	0.85	.48	SR	5	0.70	.42	LB	3	0.48	.33	KI	2	0.30	.25
IP	7	0.85	.48	TL	5	0.70	.42	LC	3	0.48	.33	LM ...	2	0.30	.25
NU ...	7	0.85	.48	TU	5	0.70	.42	LF	3	0.48	.33	LR	2	0.30	.25
OA ...	7	0.85	.48	UA ...	5	0.70	.42	LP	3	0.48	.33	LU	2	0.30	.25
OV ...	7	0.85	.48	UI ...	5	0.70	.42	MC	3	0.48	.33	LV ...	2	0.30	.25
RG ...	7	0.85	.48	UM ...	5	0.70	.42	NP	3	0.48	.33	LW ...	2	0.30	.25
RN ...	7	0.85	.48	AF	4	0.60	.38	NV ...	3	0.48	.33	MR ...	2	0.30	.25
TF	7	0.85	.48	BA	4	0.60	.38	NW ...	3	0.48	.33	MT ...	2	0.30	.25
TN	7	0.85	.48	BO	4	0.60	.38	OE	3	0.48	.33	MU ...	2	0.30	.25
XT	7	0.85	.48	CK	4	0.60	.38	OH ...	3	0.48	.33	MY ...	2	0.30	.25
AB ...	6	0.78	.45	CR	4	0.60	.38	PH ...	3	0.48	.33	NB ...	2	0.30	.25
AG ...	6	0.78	.45	CU	4	0.60	.38	PU ...	3	0.48	.33	NK ...	2	0.30	.25
BL ...	6	0.78	.45	DB	4	0.60	.38	RH ...	3	0.48	.33	OG ...	2	0.30	.25
GO ...	6	0.78	.45	DC	4	0.60	.38	SB ...	3	0.48	.33	OK ...	2	0.30	.25
ID	6	0.78	.45	DN ...	4	0.60	.38	SM ...	3	0.48	.33	OY ...	2	0.30	.25
KE	6	0.78	.45	DW ...	4	0.60	.38	TB ...	3	0.48	.33	PF ...	2	0.30	.25
LS ...	6	0.78	.45	EB ...	4	0.60	.38	UB ...	3	0.48	.33	RB ...	2	0.30	.25
MB ...	6	0.78	.45	EG ...	4	0.60	.38	UC ...	3	0.48	.33	SG ...	2	0.30	.25
OO ...	6	0.78	.45	EY ...	4	0.60	.38	UD ...	3	0.48	.33	SL ...	2	0.30	.25
PI ...	6	0.78	.45	GT ...	4	0.60	.38	YI ...	3	0.48	.33	TP ...	2	0.30	.25
PS ...	6	0.78	.45	HS ...	4	0.60	.38	YP ...	3	0.48	.33	UP ...	2	0.30	.25
RF ...	6	0.78	.45	MS ...	4	0.60	.38	AH ...	2	0.30	.25	WN ...	2	0.30	.25
TC ...	6	0.78	.45	NH ...	4	0.60	.38	AK ...	2	0.30	.25	XA ...	2	0.30	.25
TD ...	6	0.78	.45	NR ...	4	0.60	.38	AO ...	2	0.30	.25	XC ...	2	0.30	.25
TM ...	6	0.78	.45	OB ...	4	0.60	.38	BI ...	2	0.30	.25	XI ...	2	0.30	.25
UL ...	6	0.78	.45	PM ...	4	0.60	.38	BR ...	2	0.30	.25	XP ...	2	0.30	.25
VA ...	6	0.78	.45	RW ...	4	0.60	.38	BU ...	2	0.30	.25	YB ...	2	0.30	.25
YA ...	6	0.78	.45	SN ...	4	0.60	.38	DG ...	2	0.30	.25	YL ...	2	0.30	.25
YN ...	6	0.78	.45	SW ...	4	0.60	.38	DH ...	2	0.30	.25	YM ...	2	0.30	.25
CL ...	5	0.70	.42	WH ...	4	0.60	.38	DQ ...	2	0.30	.25	ZE ...	2	0.30	.25
DM ...	5	0.70	.42	YC ...	4	0.60	.38	FC ...	2	0.30	.25	AE ...	1	0.00	.13
DP ...	5	0.70	.42	YD ...	4	0.60	.38	FL ...	2	0.30	.25	AJ ...	1	0.00	.13
DU ...	5	0.70	.42	YR ...	4	0.60	.38	GC ...	2	0.30	.25	BJ ...	1	0.00	.13
FA ...	5	0.70	.42	AA ...	3	0.48	.33	GF ...	2	0.30	.25	BM ...	1	0.00	.13
GI ...	5	0.70	.42	AW ...	3	0.48	.33	GL ...	2	0.30	.25	BS ...	1	0.00	.13
GR ...	5	0.70	.42	CC ...	3	0.48	.33	GP ...	2	0.30	.25	BT ...	1	0.00	.13
HF ...	5	0.70	.42	CD ...	3	0.48	.33	GU ...	2	0.30	.25	CD ...	1	0.00	.13
NL ...	5	0.70	.42	DL ...	3	0.48	.33	HD ...	2	0.30	.25	CF ...	1	0.00	.13
NM ...	5	0.70	.42	DV ...	3	0.48	.33	HM ...	2	0.30	.25	CM ...	1	0.00	.13
NY ...	5	0.70	.42	EU ...	3	0.48	.33	IB ...	2	0.30	.25	CN ...	1	0.00	.13
OI ...	5	0.70	.42	FS ...	3	0.48	.33	IK ...	2	0.30	.25	CS ...	1	0.00	.13
RL ...	5	0.70	.42	FU ...	3	0.48	.33	IZ ...	2	0.30	.25	CW ...	1	0.00	.13
				GN ...	3	0.48	.33								

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Table A-4 (C). The 53 digraphs composing 50% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically according to their initial letters (U)

(1) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR FINAL LETTERS

(2) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

			F			F			F			F			
	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
AL	32	1.51	.76	MA ...	36	1.56	.78	AN ...	64	1.81	.89	MA ...	36	1.56	.78
AN	64	1.81	.89	ND ...	52	1.72	.85	AT	47	1.67	.83	NT	82	1.91	.93
AR ...	44	1.64	.82	NE	57	1.76	.87	AR ...	44	1.64	.82	NE	57	1.76	.87
AS	41	1.61	.80	NI	30	1.48	.75	AS	41	1.61	.80	ND ...	52	1.72	.85
AT	47	1.67	.83	NT	82	1.91	.93	AL	32	1.51	.76	NI	30	1.48	.75
CE	32	1.51	.76	ON ...	77	1.89	.92	CO	41	1.61	.80	ON ...	77	1.89	.92
CO	41	1.61	.80	OR ...	64	1.81	.89	CE	32	1.51	.76	OR ...	64	1.81	.89
DA ...	32	1.51	.76	OU ...	37	1.57	.79	DE	33	1.52	.77	OU ...	37	1.57	.79
DE	33	1.52	.77	RA ...	39	1.59	.80	DA ...	32	1.51	.76	RE	98	1.99	.96
EA	35	1.54	.78	RE	98	1.99	.96	EN	111	2.05	.99	RT	42	1.62	.81
EC	32	1.51	.76	RI	30	1.48	.75	ER	87	1.94	.94	RA ...	39	1.59	.80
ED	60	1.78	.88	RO ...	28	1.45	.74	ED	60	1.78	.88	RS	31	1.49	.75
EE	42	1.62	.81	RS	31	1.49	.75	ES	54	1.73	.86	RI	30	1.48	.75
EL	29	1.46	.74	RT	42	1.62	.81	EE	42	1.62	.81	RO ...	28	1.45	.74
EN	111	2.05	.99	SE	49	1.69	.84	ET	37	1.57	.79	ST	63	1.80	.88
ER	87	1.94	.94	SI	34	1.53	.77	EA	35	1.54	.78	SE	49	1.69	.84
ES	54	1.73	.86	ST	63	1.80	.88	EC	32	1.51	.76	SI	34	1.53	.77
ET	37	1.57	.79	TA	28	1.45	.74	EL	29	1.46	.74	TH	78	1.89	.92
FI	39	1.59	.80	TE	71	1.85	.91	FO	40	1.60	.80	TE	71	1.85	.91
FO	40	1.60	.80	TH	78	1.89	.92	FI	39	1.59	.80	TO	50	1.70	.84
HI	33	1.52	.77	TI	45	1.65	.82	HI	33	1.52	.77	TI	45	1.65	.82
HT	28	1.45	.74	TO	50	1.70	.84	HT	28	1.45	.74	TY	41	1.61	.80
IN	75	1.88	.92	TW ...	36	1.56	.78	IN	75	1.88	.92	TW ...	36	1.56	.78
IO	41	1.61	.80	TY	41	1.61	.80	IO	41	1.61	.80	TA	28	1.45	.74
IS	35	1.54	.78	UR ...	31	1.49	.75	IS	35	1.54	.78	UR ...	31	1.49	.75
LA	28	1.45	.74	VE	57	1.76	.87	LE	37	1.57	.79	VE	57	1.76	.87
LE	37	1.57	.79		2,495			LA	28	1.45	.74		2,495		

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Table A-5 (C). The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically according to their initial letters (U)

(1) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR FINAL LETTERS

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
AC	14	1.15	.61	ER	87	1.94	.94	MA	36	1.56	.78	RS	31	1.49	.75
AD	27	1.43	.73	ES	54	1.73	.86	ME	26	1.41	.72	RT	42	1.62	.81
AI	17	1.23	.64	ET	37	1.57	.79								
AL	32	1.51	.76	EV	20	1.30	.67	NA	26	1.41	.72	SA	24	1.38	.71
AM	14	1.15	.61					NC	19	1.28	.67	SE	49	1.69	.84
AN	64	1.81	.89	FI	39	1.59	.80	ND	52	1.72	.85	SH	26	1.41	.72
AR	44	1.64	.82	FO	40	1.60	.80	NE	57	1.76	.87	SI	34	1.53	.77
AS	41	1.61	.80					NG	27	1.43	.73	SO	15	1.18	.62
AT	47	1.67	.83	GE	14	1.15	.61	NI	30	1.48	.75	SS	19	1.28	.67
AU	13	1.11	.59	GH	20	1.30	.67	NO	18	1.26	.66	ST	63	1.80	.88
								NS	24	1.38	.71				
BE	18	1.26	.66	HA	20	1.30	.67	NT	82	1.91	.93	TA	28	1.45	.74
				HE	20	1.30	.67					TE	71	1.85	.91
CA	20	1.30	.67	HI	33	1.52	.77	OF	25	1.40	.72	TH	78	1.89	.92
CE	32	1.51	.76	HO	20	1.30	.67	OL	19	1.28	.67	TI	45	1.65	.82
CH	14	1.15	.61	HR	17	1.23	.64	OM	25	1.40	.72	TO	50	1.70	.84
CO	41	1.61	.80	HT	28	1.45	.74	ON	77	1.89	.92	TR	17	1.23	.64
CT	14	1.15	.61					OP	25	1.40	.72	TS	19	1.28	.67
DA	32	1.51	.76	IC	22	1.34	.69	OR	64	1.81	.89	TT	19	1.28	.67
DE	33	1.52	.77	IE	13	1.11	.59	OS	14	1.15	.61	TW	36	1.56	.78
DI	27	1.43	.73	IG	19	1.28	.67	OT	19	1.28	.67	TY	41	1.61	.80
DO	16	1.20	.63	IL	23	1.36	.70	OU	37	1.57	.79				
DS	13	1.11	.59	IN	75	1.88	.92					UN	21	1.32	.68
DT	15	1.18	.62	IO	41	1.61	.80	PA	14	1.15	.61	UR	31	1.49	.75
				IR	27	1.43	.73	PE	23	1.36	.70				
EA	35	1.54	.78	IS	35	1.54	.78	PO	17	1.23	.64	VE	57	1.76	.87
EC	32	1.51	.76	IT	27	1.43	.73	PR	18	1.26	.66				
ED	60	1.78	.88	IV	25	1.40	.72					WE	22	1.34	.69
EE	42	1.62	.81	IX	15	1.18	.62	QU	15	1.18	.62	WO	19	1.28	.67
EF	18	1.26	.66												
EI	27	1.43	.73	LA	28	1.45	.74	RA	39	1.59	.80	YT	15	1.18	.62
EL	29	1.46	.74	LE	37	1.57	.79	RD	17	1.23	.64		3,745		
EM	14	1.15	.61	LI	20	1.30	.67	RE	98	1.99	.96				
EN	111	2.05	.99	LL	27	1.43	.73	RI	30	1.48	.75				
EP	20	1.30	.67	LO	13	1.11	.59	RO	28	1.45	.74				

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Table A-5 (U). The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically according to their initial letters (U) — Continued

(2) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
AN ...	64	1.81	.89	EI	27	1.43	.73	MA ...	36	1.56	.78	RI	30	1.48	.75
AT	47	1.67	.83	EP	20	1.30	.67	ME ...	26	1.41	.72	RO ...	28	1.45	.74
AR ...	44	1.64	.82	EV	20	1.30	.67					RD ...	17	1.23	.64
AS ...	41	1.61	.80	EF	18	1.26	.66	NT	82	1.91	.93				
AL	32	1.51	.76	EM ...	14	1.15	.61	NE	57	1.76	.87				
AD ...	27	1.43	.73					ND ...	52	1.72	.85	ST	63	1.80	.88
AI	17	1.23	.64	FO	40	1.60	.80	NI ...	30	1.48	.75	SE	49	1.69	.84
AC	14	1.15	.61	FI ...	39	1.59	.80	NG ...	27	1.43	.73	SI ...	34	1.53	.77
AM ...	14	1.15	.61					NA ...	26	1.41	.72	SH ...	26	1.41	.72
AU ...	13	1.11	.59	GH ...	20	1.30	.67	NS ...	24	1.38	.71	SA ...	24	1.38	.71
				GE ...	14	1.15	.61	NC ...	19	1.28	.67	SS ...	19	1.28	.67
BE	18	1.26	.66					NO ...	18	1.26	.66	SO ...	15	1.18	.62
				HI	33	1.52	.77								
CO	41	1.61	.80	HT	28	1.45	.74	ON ...	77	1.89	.92	TH	78	1.89	.92
CE	32	1.51	.76	HA ...	20	1.30	.67	OR ...	64	1.81	.89	TE ...	71	1.85	.91
CA ...	20	1.30	.67	HE ...	20	1.30	.67	OU ...	37	1.57	.79	TO ...	50	1.70	.84
CH ...	14	1.15	.61	HO ...	20	1.30	.67	OF ...	25	1.40	.72	TI ...	45	1.65	.82
CT ...	14	1.15	.61	HR ...	17	1.23	.64	OM ...	25	1.40	.72	TY ...	41	1.61	.80
								OP ...	25	1.40	.72	TW ...	36	1.56	.78
DE	33	1.52	.77	IN	75	1.88	.92	OL ...	19	1.28	.67	TA ...	28	1.45	.74
DA ...	32	1.51	.76	IO ...	41	1.61	.80	OT ...	19	1.28	.67	TS ...	19	1.28	.67
DI ...	27	1.43	.73	IS ...	35	1.54	.78	OS ...	14	1.15	.61	TT ...	19	1.28	.67
DO ...	16	1.20	.63	IR ...	27	1.43	.73					TR ...	17	1.23	.64
DT ...	15	1.18	.62	IT ...	27	1.43	.73	PE	23	1.36	.70				
DS ...	13	1.11	.59	IV ...	25	1.40	.72	PR ...	18	1.26	.66	UR ...	31	1.49	.75
				IL ...	23	1.36	.70	PO ...	17	1.23	.64	UN ...	21	1.32	.68
EN	111	2.05	.99	IC ...	22	1.34	.69	PA ...	14	1.15	.61				
ER ...	87	1.94	.94	IG ...	19	1.28	.67					VE ...	57	1.76	.87
ED ...	60	1.78	.88	IX ...	15	1.18	.62	QU ...	15	1.18	.62				
ES ...	54	1.73	.86	IE ...	13	1.11	.59					WE ...	22	1.34	.69
EE ...	42	1.62	.81					RE ...	98	1.99	.96	WO ...	19	1.28	.67
ET ...	37	1.57	.79	LE ...	37	1.57	.79	RT ...	42	1.62	.81				
EA ...	35	1.54	.78	LA ...	28	1.45	.74	RA ...	39	1.59	.80	YT ...	15	1.18	.62
EC ...	32	1.51	.76	LL ...	27	1.43	.73	RS ...	31	1.49	.75				
EL ...	29	1.46	.74	LI ...	20	1.30	.67								
				LO ...	13	1.11	.59								

3,745

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Table A-6 (c). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
AN ...	64	1.81	.89	CT	14	1.15	.61	ED	60	1.78	.88	GH ...	20	1.30	.67
AT	47	1.67	.83	CI	7	0.85	.48	ES	54	1.73	.86	GE	14	1.15	.61
AR ...	44	1.64	.82	CL	5	0.70	.42	EE	42	1.62	.81	GA ...	7	0.85	.48
AS	41	1.61	.80	CK	4	0.60	.38	ET	37	1.57	.79	GO ...	6	0.78	.45
AL	32	1.51	.76	CR	4	0.60	.38	EA	35	1.54	.78	GI ...	5	0.70	.42
AD ...	27	1.43	.73	CU	4	0.60	.38	EC	32	1.51	.76	GR ...	5	0.70	.42
AI	17	1.23	.64	CC	3	0.48	.33	EL	29	1.46	.74	GT ...	4	0.60	.38
AC	14	1.15	.61	CD	1	0.00	.13	EI	27	1.43	.73	GN ...	3	0.48	.33
AM ...	14	1.15	.61	CF	1	0.00	.13	EP	20	1.30	.67	GS ...	3	0.48	.33
AU ...	13	1.11	.59	CM ...	1	0.00	.13	EV ...	20	1.30	.67	GC ...	2	0.30	.25
AP	12	1.08	.58	CN	1	0.00	.13	EF ...	18	1.26	.66	GF ...	2	0.30	.25
AY ...	12	1.08	.58	CS ...	1	0.00	.13	EM ...	14	1.15	.61	GL ...	2	0.30	.25
AV ...	7	0.85	.48	CW ...	1	0.00	.13	EO ...	12	1.08	.58	GP ...	2	0.30	.25
AB	6	0.78	.45	CY ...	1	0.00	.13	EQ ...	12	1.08	.58	GU ...	2	0.30	.25
AG ...	6	0.78	.45					EH ...	7	0.85	.48	GD ...	1	0.00	.13
AF	4	0.60	.38	DE	33	1.52	.77	EW ...	7	0.85	.48	GG ...	1	0.00	.13
AA ...	3	0.48	.33	DA ...	32	1.51	.76	EX ...	7	0.85	.48	GJ ...	1	0.00	.13
AW ...	3	0.48	.33	DI ...	27	1.43	.73	EB ...	4	0.60	.38	GM ...	1	0.00	.13
AH ...	2	0.30	.25	DO ...	16	1.20	.63	EG ...	4	0.60	.38	GW ...	1	0.00	.13
AK ...	2	0.30	.25	DT ...	15	1.18	.62	EY ...	4	0.60	.38				
AO ...	2	0.30	.25	DS ...	13	1.11	.59	EU ...	3	0.48	.33				
AE	1	0.00	.13	DR ...	12	1.08	.58	EJ ...	1	0.00	.13				
AJ	1	0.00	.13	DD ...	8	0.90	.51	EZ ...	1	0.00	.13	HI	33	1.52	.77
				DF ...	8	0.90	.51					HT	28	1.45	.74
BE	18	1.26	.66	DM ...	5	0.70	.42	FO ...	40	1.60	.80	HA ...	20	1.30	.67
BY	7	0.85	.48	DP ...	5	0.70	.42	FI ...	39	1.59	.80	HE ...	20	1.30	.67
BL	6	0.78	.45	DU ...	5	0.70	.42	FF ...	11	1.04	.56	HO ...	20	1.30	.67
BA	4	0.60	.38	DB ...	4	0.60	.38	FT ...	11	1.04	.56	HR ...	17	1.23	.64
BO ...	4	0.60	.38	DC ...	4	0.60	.38	FE ...	10	1.00	.55	HU ...	8	0.90	.51
BI ...	2	0.30	.25	DN ...	4	0.60	.38	FR ...	9	0.95	.53	HF ...	5	0.70	.42
BR ...	2	0.30	.25	DW ...	4	0.60	.38	FA ...	5	0.70	.42	HS ...	4	0.60	.38
BU ...	2	0.30	.25	DL ...	3	0.48	.33	FS ...	3	0.48	.33	HC ...	3	0.48	.33
BJ ...	1	0.00	.13	DV ...	3	0.48	.33	FU ...	3	0.48	.33	HN ...	3	0.48	.33
BM ...	1	0.00	.13	DG ...	2	0.30	.25	FC ...	2	0.30	.25	HD ...	2	0.30	.25
BS ...	1	0.00	.13	DH ...	2	0.30	.25	FL ...	2	0.30	.25	HM ...	2	0.30	.25
BT ...	1	0.00	.13	DQ ...	2	0.30	.25	FD ...	1	0.00	.13	HB ...	1	0.00	.13
				DJ ...	1	0.00	.13	FG ...	1	0.00	.13	HL ...	1	0.00	.13
CO	41	1.61	.80	DY ...	1	0.00	.13	FM ...	1	0.00	.13	HP ...	1	0.00	.13
CE	32	1.51	.76					FP ...	1	0.00	.13	HQ ...	1	0.00	.13
CA ...	20	1.30	.67	EN	111	2.05	.99	FW ...	1	0.00	.13	HW ...	1	0.00	.13
CH ...	14	1.15	.61	ER	87	1.94	.94	FY ...	1	0.00	.13	HY ...	1	0.00	.13

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Table A-6 (U). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U) -
Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
IN	75	1.88	.92	LO	13	1.11	.59	ND	52	1.72	.85	OV	7	0.85	.48
IO	41	1.61	.80	LY	10	1.00	.55	NI	30	1.48	.75	OO	6	0.78	.45
IS	35	1.54	.78	LD	9	0.95	.53	NG	27	1.43	.73	OI	5	0.70	.42
IR	27	1.43	.73	LT	8	0.90	.51	NA	26	1.41	.72	OB	4	0.60	.38
IT	27	1.43	.73	LS	6	0.78	.45	NS	24	1.38	.71	OE	3	0.48	.33
IV	25	1.40	.72	LB	3	0.48	.33	NC	19	1.28	.67	OH	3	0.48	.33
IL	23	1.36	.70	LC	3	0.48	.33	NO	18	1.26	.66	OG	2	0.30	.25
IC	22	1.34	.69	LF	3	0.48	.33	NF	9	0.95	.53	OK	2	0.30	.25
IG	19	1.28	.67	LP	3	0.48	.33	NN	8	0.90	.51	OY	2	0.30	.25
IX	15	1.18	.62	LM	2	0.30	.25	NU	7	0.85	.48	OJ	1	0.00	.13
IE	13	1.11	.59	LR	2	0.30	.25	NL	5	0.70	.42	OX	1	0.00	.13
IF	10	1.00	.55	LU	2	0.30	.25	NM	5	0.70	.42				
IM	9	0.95	.53	LV	2	0.30	.25	NY	5	0.70	.42	PE	23	1.36	.70
IA	8	0.90	.51	LW	2	0.30	.25	NH	4	0.60	.38	PR	18	1.26	.66
IP	7	0.85	.48	LG	1	0.00	.13	NR	4	0.60	.38	PO	17	1.23	.64
ID	6	0.78	.45	LH	1	0.00	.13	NP	3	0.48	.33	PA	14	1.15	.61
IB	2	0.30	.25	LN	1	0.00	.13	NV	3	0.48	.33	PL	13	1.11	.59
IK	2	0.30	.25					NW	3	0.48	.33	PP	11	1.04	.56
IZ	2	0.30	.25	MA	36	1.56	.78	NB	2	0.30	.25	PT	8	0.90	.51
				ME	26	1.41	.72	NK	2	0.30	.25	PI	6	0.78	.45
JE	2	0.30	.25	MM	13	1.11	.59	NJ	1	0.00	.13	PS	6	0.78	.45
JO	2	0.30	.25	MO	10	1.00	.55	NQ	1	0.00	.13	PM	4	0.60	.38
JU	2	0.30	.25	MI	9	0.95	.53					PH	3	0.48	.33
JA	1	0.00	.13	MP	8	0.90	.51	ON	77	1.89	.92	PU	3	0.48	.33
				MB	6	0.78	.45	OR	64	1.81	.89	PF	2	0.30	.25
KE	6	0.78	.45	MS	4	0.60	.38	OU	37	1.57	.79	PB	1	0.00	.13
KI	2	0.30	.25	MC	3	0.48	.33	OF	25	1.40	.72	PC	1	0.00	.13
KA	1	0.00	.13	MR	2	0.30	.25	OM	25	1.40	.72	PD	1	0.00	.13
KC	1	0.00	.13	MT	2	0.30	.25	OP	25	1.40	.72	PN	1	0.00	.13
KL	1	0.00	.13	MU	2	0.30	.25	OL	19	1.28	.67	PV	1	0.00	.13
KN	1	0.00	.13	MY	2	0.30	.25	OT	19	1.28	.67	PW	1	0.00	.13
KS	1	0.00	.13	MD	1	0.00	.13	OS	14	1.15	.61	PY	1	0.00	.13
				MF	1	0.00	.13	OD	12	1.08	.58				
LE	37	1.57	.79	MH	1	0.00	.13	OC	8	0.90	.51	QU	15	1.18	.62
LA	28	1.45	.74					OW	8	0.90	.51	QM	1	0.00	.13
LL	27	1.43	.73	NT	82	1.91	.93	OA	7	0.85	.48	QR	1	0.00	.13
LI	20	1.30	.67	NE	57	1.76	.87								

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Table A-6 (C). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U) - Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
RE	98	1.99	.96	SR	5	0.70	.42	US	12	1.08	.58	XI	2	0.30	.25
RT	42	1.62	.81	SN	4	0.60	.38	UT	12	1.08	.58	XP	2	0.30	.25
RA	39	1.59	.80	SW	4	0.60	.38	UE	11	1.04	.56	XD	1	0.00	.13
RS	31	1.49	.75	SB	3	0.48	.33	UG	8	0.90	.51	XE	1	0.00	.13
RI	30	1.48	.75	SM	3	0.48	.33	UL	6	0.78	.45	XF	1	0.00	.13
RO	28	1.45	.74	SG	2	0.30	.25	UA	5	0.70	.42	XH	1	0.00	.13
RD	17	1.23	.64	SL	2	0.30	.25	UI	5	0.70	.42	XN	1	0.00	.13
RP	13	1.11	.59	SK	1	0.00	.13	UM	5	0.70	.42	XO	1	0.00	.13
RR	11	1.04	.56	SV	1	0.00	.13	UB	3	0.48	.33	XR	1	0.00	.13
RC	9	0.95	.53	SY	1	0.00	.13	UC	3	0.48	.33	XS	1	0.00	.13
RM	9	0.95	.53					UD	3	0.48	.33				
RY	9	0.95	.53	TH	78	1.89	.92	UP	2	0.30	.25	YT	15	1.18	.62
RG	7	0.85	.48	TE	71	1.85	.91	UF	1	0.00	.13	YF	11	1.04	.56
RN	7	0.85	.48	TO	50	1.70	.84	UO	1	0.00	.13	YS	11	1.04	.56
RF	6	0.78	.45	TI	45	1.65	.82	UV	1	0.00	.13	YO	10	1.00	.55
RL	5	0.70	.42	TY	41	1.61	.80					YE	9	0.95	.53
RU	5	0.70	.42	TW	36	1.56	.78	VE	57	1.76	.87	YA	6	0.78	.45
RV	5	0.70	.42	TA	28	1.45	.74	VI	12	1.08	.58	YN	6	0.78	.45
RW	4	0.60	.38	TS	19	1.28	.67	VA	6	0.78	.45	YC	4	0.60	.38
RH	3	0.48	.33	TT	19	1.28	.67	VO	1	0.00	.13	YD	4	0.60	.38
RB	2	0.30	.25	TR	17	1.23	.64	VT	1	0.00	.13	YR	4	0.60	.38
RJ	1	0.00	.13	TF	7	0.85	.48					YI	3	0.48	.33
RK	1	0.00	.13	TN	7	0.85	.48	WE	22	1.34	.69	YP	3	0.48	.33
				TC	6	0.78	.45	WO	19	1.28	.67	YB	2	0.30	.25
ST	63	1.80	.88	TD	6	0.78	.45	WI	13	1.11	.59	YL	2	0.30	.25
SE	49	1.69	.84	TM	6	0.78	.45	WA	12	1.08	.58	YM	2	0.30	.25
SI	34	1.53	.77	TL	5	0.70	.42	WH	4	0.60	.38	YG	1	0.00	.13
SH	26	1.41	.72	TU	5	0.70	.42	WN	2	0.30	.25	YH	1	0.00	.13
SA	24	1.38	.71	TB	3	0.48	.33	WL	1	0.00	.13	YU	1	0.00	.13
SS	19	1.28	.67	TP	2	0.30	.25	WR	1	0.00	.13	YW	1	0.00	.13
SO	15	1.18	.62	TG	1	0.00	.13	WS	1	0.00	.13				
SC	13	1.11	.59	TQ	1	0.00	.13	WY	1	0.00	.13	ZE	2	0.30	.25
SF	12	1.08	.58	TZ	1	0.00	.13					ZA	1	0.00	.13
SU	11	1.04	.56					XT	7	0.85	.48	ZI	1	0.00	.13
SP	10	1.00	.55	UR	31	1.49	.75	XA	2	0.30	.25		5,000		
SD	5	0.70	.42	UN	21	1.32	.68	XC	2	0.30	.25				

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Table A-7 (C). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by final letters, then by absolute frequency, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
RA	39	1.59	.80	EC	32	1.51	.76	RE	98	1.99	.96	GF	2	0.30	.25
MA	36	1.56	.78	IC	22	1.34	.69	TE	71	1.85	.91	PF	2	0.30	.25
EA	35	1.54	.78	NC	19	1.28	.67	NE	57	1.76	.87	CF	1	0.00	.13
DA	32	1.51	.76	AC	14	1.15	.61	VE	57	1.76	.87	MF	1	0.00	.13
LA	28	1.45	.74	SC	13	1.11	.59	SE	49	1.69	.84	UF	1	0.00	.13
TA	28	1.45	.74	RC	9	0.95	.53	EE	42	1.62	.81	XF	1	0.00	.13
NA	26	1.41	.72	OC	8	0.90	.51	LE	37	1.57	.79				
SA	24	1.38	.71	TC	6	0.78	.45	DE	33	1.52	.77				
CA	20	1.30	.67	DC	4	0.60	.38	CE	32	1.51	.76	NG	27	1.43	.73
HA	20	1.30	.67	YC	4	0.60	.38	ME	26	1.41	.72	IG	19	1.28	.67
PA	14	1.15	.61	CC	3	0.48	.33	PE	23	1.36	.70	UG	8	0.90	.51
WA	12	1.08	.58	HC	3	0.48	.33	WE	22	1.34	.69	RG	7	0.85	.48
IA	8	0.90	.51	LC	3	0.48	.33	HE	20	1.30	.67	AG	6	0.78	.45
GA	7	0.85	.48	MC	3	0.48	.33	BE	18	1.26	.66	EG	4	0.60	.38
OA	7	0.85	.48	UC	3	0.48	.33	GE	14	1.15	.61	DG	2	0.30	.25
VA	6	0.78	.45	FC	2	0.30	.25	IE	13	1.11	.59	OG	2	0.30	.25
YA	6	0.78	.45	GC	2	0.30	.25	UE	11	1.04	.56	SG	2	0.30	.25
FA	5	0.70	.42	XC	2	0.30	.25	FE	10	1.00	.55	FG	1	0.00	.13
UA	5	0.70	.42	KC	1	0.00	.13	YE	9	0.95	.53	GG	1	0.00	.13
BA	4	0.60	.38	PC	1	0.00	.13	KE	6	0.78	.45	LG	1	0.00	.13
AA	3	0.48	.33					OE	3	0.48	.33	TG	1	0.00	.13
XA	2	0.30	.25					JE	2	0.30	.25	YG	1	0.00	.13
JA	1	0.00	.13	ED	60	1.78	.88	ZE	2	0.30	.25				
KA	1	0.00	.13	ND	52	1.72	.85	AE	1	0.00	.13				
ZA	1	0.00	.13	AD	27	1.43	.73	XE	1	0.00	.13				
				RD	17	1.23	.64					TH	78	1.89	.92
AB	6	0.78	.45	OD	12	1.08	.58					SH	26	1.41	.72
MB	6	0.78	.45	LD	9	0.95	.53					GH	20	1.30	.67
DB	4	0.60	.38	DD	8	0.90	.51	OF	25	1.40	.72	CH	14	1.15	.61
EB	4	0.60	.38	ID	6	0.78	.45	EF	18	1.26	.66	EH	7	0.85	.48
OB	4	0.60	.38	TD	6	0.78	.45	SF	12	1.08	.58	NH	4	0.60	.38
LB	3	0.48	.33	SD	5	0.70	.42	FF	11	1.04	.56	WH	4	0.60	.38
SB	3	0.48	.33	YD	4	0.60	.38	YF	11	1.04	.56	OH	3	0.48	.33
TB	3	0.48	.33	UD	3	0.48	.33	IF	10	1.00	.55	PH	3	0.48	.33
UB	3	0.48	.33	HD	2	0.30	.25	NF	9	0.95	.53	RH	3	0.48	.33
IB	2	0.30	.25	CD	1	0.00	.13	DF	8	0.90	.51	AH	2	0.30	.25
NB	2	0.30	.25	FD	1	0.00	.13	TF	7	0.85	.48	DH	2	0.30	.25
RB	2	0.30	.25	GD	1	0.00	.13	RF	6	0.78	.45	LH	1	0.00	.13
YB	2	0.30	.25	MD	1	0.00	.13	HF	5	0.70	.42	MH	1	0.00	.13
HB	1	0.00	.13	PD	1	0.00	.13	AF	4	0.60	.38	XH	1	0.00	.13
PB	1	0.00	.13	XD	1	0.00	.13	LF	3	0.48	.33	YH	1	0.00	.13

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Table A-7 (C). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by final letters then by absolute frequency, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U) - Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
TI	45	1.65	.82	LL	27	1.43	.73	AN	64	1.81	.89	RP	13	1.11	.59
FI	39	1.59	.80	IL	23	1.36	.70	UN	21	1.32	.68	AP	12	1.08	.58
SI	34	1.53	.77	OL	19	1.28	.67	NN	8	0.90	.51	PP	11	1.04	.56
HI	33	1.52	.77	PL	13	1.11	.59	RN	7	0.85	.48	SP	10	1.00	.55
NI	30	1.48	.75	BL	6	0.78	.45	TN	7	0.85	.48	MP	8	0.90	.51
RI	30	1.48	.75	UL	6	0.78	.45	YN	6	0.78	.45	IP	7	0.85	.48
DI	27	1.43	.73	CL	5	0.70	.42	DN	4	0.60	.38	DP	5	0.70	.42
EI	27	1.43	.73	NL	5	0.70	.42	SN	4	0.60	.38	LP	3	0.48	.33
LI	20	1.30	.67	RL	5	0.70	.42	GN	3	0.48	.33	NP	3	0.48	.33
AI	17	1.23	.64	TL	5	0.70	.42	HN	3	0.48	.33	YP	3	0.48	.33
WI	13	1.11	.59	DL	3	0.48	.33	WN	2	0.30	.25	GP	2	0.30	.25
VI	12	1.08	.58	FL	2	0.30	.25	CN	1	0.00	.13	TP	2	0.30	.25
MI	9	0.95	.53	GL	2	0.30	.25	KN	1	0.00	.13	UP	2	0.30	.25
CI	7	0.85	.48	SL	2	0.30	.25	LN	1	0.00	.13	XP	2	0.30	.25
PI	6	0.78	.45	YL	2	0.30	.25	PN	1	0.00	.13	FP	1	0.00	.13
GI	5	0.70	.42	HL	1	0.00	.13	XN	1	0.00	.13	HP	1	0.00	.13
OI	5	0.70	.42	KL	1	0.00	.13								
UI	5	0.70	.42	WL	1	0.00	.13								
YI	3	0.48	.33					TO	50	1.70	.84	EQ	12	1.08	.58
BI	2	0.30	.25					CO	41	1.61	.80	DQ	2	0.30	.25
KI	2	0.30	.25	OM	25	1.40	.72	IO	41	1.61	.80	HQ	1	0.00	.13
XI	2	0.30	.25	AM	14	1.15	.61	FO	40	1.60	.80	NQ	1	0.00	.13
ZI	1	0.00	.13	EM	14	1.15	.61	RO	28	1.45	.74	TQ	1	0.00	.13
				MM	13	1.11	.59	HO	20	1.30	.67				
AJ	1	0.00	.13	IM	9	0.95	.53	WO	19	1.28	.67	ER	87	1.94	.94
BJ	1	0.00	.13	RM	9	0.95	.53	NO	18	1.26	.66	OR	64	1.81	.89
DJ	1	0.00	.13	TM	6	0.78	.45	PO	17	1.23	.64	AR	44	1.64	.82
EJ	1	0.00	.13	DM	5	0.70	.42	DO	16	1.20	.63	UR	31	1.49	.75
GJ	1	0.00	.13	NM	5	0.70	.42	SO	15	1.18	.62	IR	27	1.43	.73
NJ	1	0.00	.13	UM	5	0.70	.42	LO	13	1.11	.59	PR	18	1.26	.66
OJ	1	0.00	.13	PM	4	0.60	.38	EO	12	1.08	.58	HR	17	1.23	.64
RJ	1	0.00	.13	SM	3	0.48	.33	MO	10	1.00	.55	TR	17	1.23	.64
				HM	2	0.30	.25	YO	10	1.00	.55	DR	12	1.08	.58
CK	4	0.60	.38	LM	2	0.30	.25	GO	6	0.78	.45	RR	11	1.04	.56
AK	2	0.30	.25	YM	2	0.30	.25	OO	6	0.78	.45	FR	9	0.95	.53
IK	2	0.30	.25	BM	1	0.00	.13	BO	4	0.60	.38	GR	5	0.70	.42
NK	2	0.30	.25	CM	1	0.00	.13	AO	2	0.30	.25	SR	5	0.70	.42
OK	2	0.30	.25	FM	1	0.00	.13	JO	2	0.30	.25	CR	4	0.60	.38
RK	1	0.00	.13	GM	1	0.00	.13	UO	1	0.00	.13	NR	4	0.60	.38
SK	1	0.00	.13	QM	1	0.00	.13	VO	1	0.00	.13	YR	4	0.60	.38
								XO	1	0.00	.13	BR	2	0.30	.25
				EN	111	2.05	.99					LR	2	0.30	.25
AL	32	1.51	.76	ON	77	1.89	.92	OP	25	1.40	.72	MR	2	0.30	.25
EL	29	1.46	.74	IN	75	1.88	.92	EP	20	1.30	.67	QR	1	0.00	.13
												WR	1	0.00	.13
												XR	1	0.00	.13

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Table A-7 (C). The 428 digraphs of Table A-1, arranged in alphabetic order by final letters, then according to their absolute frequency, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U) - Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
ES	54	1.73	.86	OT	19	1.28	.67	JU	2	0.30	.25	PW	1	0.00	.13
AS	41	1.61	.80	TT	19	1.28	.67	LU	2	0.30	.25	YW	1	0.00	.13
IS	35	1.54	.78	DT	15	1.18	.62	MU	2	0.30	.25				
RS	31	1.49	.75	YT	15	1.18	.62	YU	1	0.00	.13	IX	15	1.18	.62
NS	24	1.38	.71	CT	14	1.15	.61					EX	7	0.85	.48
SS	19	1.28	.67	UT	12	1.08	.58	IV	25	1.40	.72	OX	1	0.00	.13
TS	19	1.28	.67	FT	11	1.04	.56	EV	20	1.30	.67				
OS	14	1.15	.61	LT	8	0.90	.51	AV	7	0.85	.48	TY	41	1.61	.80
DS	13	1.11	.59	PT	8	0.90	.51	OV	7	0.85	.48	AY	12	1.08	.58
US	12	1.08	.58	XT	7	0.85	.48	RV	5	0.70	.42	LY	10	1.00	.55
YS	11	1.04	.56	GT	4	0.60	.38	DV	3	0.48	.33	RY	9	0.95	.53
LS	6	0.78	.45	MT	2	0.30	.25	NV	3	0.48	.33	BY	7	0.85	.48
PS	6	0.78	.45	BT	1	0.00	.13	LV	2	0.30	.25	NY	5	0.70	.42
HS	4	0.60	.38	VT	1	0.00	.13	PV	1	0.00	.13	EY	4	0.60	.38
MS	4	0.60	.38					SV	1	0.00	.13	MY	2	0.30	.25
FS	3	0.48	.33	OU	37	1.57	.79	UV	1	0.00	.13	OY	2	0.30	.25
GS	3	0.48	.33	QU	15	1.18	.62					CY	1	0.00	.13
BS	1	0.00	.13	AU	13	1.11	.59	TW	36	1.56	.78	DY	1	0.00	.13
CS	1	0.00	.13	SU	11	1.04	.56	OW	8	0.90	.51	FY	1	0.00	.13
KS	1	0.00	.13	HU	8	0.90	.51	EW	7	0.85	.48	HY	1	0.00	.13
WS	1	0.00	.13	NU	7	0.85	.48	DW	4	0.60	.38	PY	1	0.00	.13
XS	1	0.00	.13	DU	5	0.70	.42	RW	4	0.60	.38	SY	1	0.00	.13
				RU	5	0.70	.42	SW	4	0.60	.38	WY	1	0.00	.13
NT	82	1.91	.93	TU	5	0.70	.42	AW	3	0.48	.33				
ST	63	1.80	.88	CU	4	0.60	.38	NW	3	0.48	.33	IZ	2	0.30	.25
AT	47	1.67	.83	EU	3	0.48	.33	LW	2	0.30	.25	EZ	1	0.00	.13
RT	42	1.62	.81	FU	3	0.48	.33	CW	1	0.00	.13	TZ	1	0.00	.13
ET	37	1.57	.79	PU	3	0.48	.33	FW	1	0.00	.13		5,000		
HT	28	1.45	.74	BU	2	0.30	.25	GW	1	0.00	.13				
IT	27	1.43	.73	GU	2	0.30	.25	HW	1	0.00	.13				

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Table A-9 (C). The 53 digraphs composing 50% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U) - Continued

(2) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
RA ...	39	1.59	.80	EE	42	1.62	.81	EN	111	2.05	.99	ES	54	1.73	.86
MA ...	36	1.56	.78	LE	37	1.57	.79	ON ...	77	1.89	.92	AS	41	1.61	.80
EA	35	1.54	.78	DE	33	1.52	.77	IN	75	1.88	.92	IS	35	1.54	.78
DA ...	32	1.51	.76	CE	32	1.51	.76	AN ...	64	1.81	.89	RS	31	1.49	.75
LA	28	1.45	.74												
TA	28	1.45	.74	TH	78	1.89	.92	TO	50	1.70	.84	NT	82	1.91	.93
EC	32	1.51	.76					CO	41	1.61	.80	ST	63	1.80	.88
				TI	45	1.65	.82	IO	41	1.61	.80	AT	47	1.67	.83
ED	60	1.78	.88	FI	39	1.59	.80	FO	40	1.60	.80	RT	42	1.62	.81
ND ...	52	1.72	.85	SI	34	1.53	.77	RO ...	28	1.45	.74	ET	37	1.57	.79
				HI	33	1.52	.77					HT	28	1.45	.74
RE	98	1.99	.96	NI	30	1.48	.75					OU ...	37	1.57	.79
TE	71	1.85	.91	RI	30	1.48	.75	ER	87	1.94	.94	TW ...	36	1.56	.78
NE	57	1.76	.87					OR ...	64	1.81	.89				
VE	57	1.76	.87	AL	32	1.51	.76	AR ...	44	1.64	.82	TY	41	1.61	.80
SE	49	1.69	.84	EL	29	1.46	.74	UR ...	31	1.49	.75		2,495		

Table A-10 (C). The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U)

(1) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR INITIAL LETTERS

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
CA	20	1.30	.67	ND ...	52	1.72	.85	EF	18	1.26	.66	SI	34	1.53	.77
DA ...	32	1.51	.76	RD ...	17	1.23	.64	OF	25	1.40	.72	TI	45	1.65	.82
EA	35	1.54	.78												
HA ...	20	1.30	.67	BE	18	1.26	.66	IG	19	1.28	.67	AL	32	1.51	.76
LA	28	1.45	.74	CE	32	1.51	.76	NG ...	27	1.43	.73	EL	29	1.46	.74
MA ...	36	1.56	.78	DE	33	1.52	.77				IL	23	1.36	.70	
NA ...	26	1.41	.72	EE	42	1.62	.81	CH	14	1.15	.61	LL	27	1.43	.73
PA	14	1.15	.61	GE	14	1.15	.61	GH ...	20	1.30	.67	OL	19	1.28	.67
RA ...	39	1.59	.80	HE	20	1.30	.67	SH	26	1.41	.72				
SA	24	1.38	.71	IE	13	1.11	.59	TH	78	1.89	.92	AM ...	14	1.15	.61
TA	28	1.45	.74	LE	37	1.57	.79				EM ...	14	1.15	.61	
				ME ...	26	1.41	.72	AI	17	1.23	.64	OM ...	25	1.40	.72
AC	14	1.15	.61	NE	57	1.76	.87	DI	27	1.43	.73				
EC	32	1.51	.76	PE	23	1.36	.70	EI	27	1.43	.73	AN ...	64	1.81	.89
IC	22	1.34	.69	RE	98	1.99	.96	FI	39	1.59	.80	EN	111	2.05	.99
NC	19	1.28	.67	SE	49	1.69	.84	HI	33	1.52	.77	IN	75	1.88	.92
				TE	71	1.85	.91	LI	20	1.30	.67	ON ...	77	1.89	.92
AD ...	27	1.43	.73	VE	57	1.76	.87	NI	30	1.48	.75	UN ...	21	1.32	.68
ED	60	1.78	.88	WE ...	22	1.34	.69	RI	30	1.48	.75				

Table A-10 (C). The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U) - Continued

(1) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR INITIAL LETTERS- Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
CO	41	1.61	.80	AR ...	44	1.64	.82	RS	31	1.49	.75	TT	19	1.28	.67
DO ...	16	1.20	.63	ER	87	1.94	.94	SS	19	1.28	.67	YT	15	1.18	.62
FO	40	1.60	.80	HR ...	17	1.23	.64	TS	19	1.28	.67				
HO ...	20	1.30	.67	IR	27	1.43	.73					AU ...	13	1.11	.59
IO	41	1.61	.80	OR ...	64	1.81	.89					OU ...	37	1.57	.79
LO	13	1.11	.59	PR	18	1.26	.66	AT	47	1.67	.83	QU ...	15	1.18	.62
NO ...	18	1.26	.66	TR	17	1.23	.64	CT	14	1.15	.61	EV	20	1.30	.67
PO	17	1.23	.64	UR ...	31	1.49	.75	DT	15	1.18	.62	IV	25	1.40	.72
RO ...	28	1.45	.74					ET	37	1.57	.79				
SO	15	1.18	.62	AS	41	1.61	.80	HT	28	1.45	.74	TW ...	36	1.56	.78
TO	50	1.70	.84	DS	13	1.11	.59	IT	27	1.43	.73	IX	15	1.18	.62
WO ...	19	1.28	.67	ES	54	1.73	.86	NT	82	1.91	.93				
				IS	35	1.54	.78	OT	19	1.28	.67	TY	41	1.61	.80
EP	20	1.30	.67	NS	24	1.38	.71	RT	42	1.62	.81		3,745		
OP	25	1.40	.72	OS	14	1.15	.61	ST	63	1.80	.88				

(2) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
RA ...	39	1.59	.80	RE	98	1.99	.96	TH	78	1.89	.92	OM ...	25	1.40	.72
MA ...	36	1.56	.78	TE	71	1.85	.91	SH	26	1.41	.72	AM ...	14	1.15	.61
EA	35	1.54	.78	NE	57	1.76	.87	GH ...	20	1.30	.67	EM ...	14	1.15	.61
DA ...	32	1.51	.76	VE	57	1.76	.87	CH	14	1.15	.61				
LA	28	1.45	.74	SE	49	1.69	.84					EN	111	2.05	.99
TA	28	1.45	.74	EE	42	1.62	.81	TI	45	1.65	.82	ON ...	77	1.89	.92
NA ...	26	1.41	.72	LE	37	1.57	.79	FI	39	1.59	.80	IN	75	1.88	.92
SA	24	1.38	.71	DE	33	1.52	.77	SI	34	1.53	.77	AN ...	64	1.81	.89
CA	20	1.30	.67	CE	32	1.51	.76	HI	33	1.52	.77	UN ...	21	1.32	.68
HA ...	20	1.30	.67	ME ...	26	1.41	.72	NI	30	1.48	.75	TO	50	1.70	.84
PA	14	1.15	.61	PE	23	1.36	.70	RI	30	1.48	.75	CO	41	1.61	.80
				WE ...	22	1.34	.69	DI	27	1.43	.73	IO	41	1.61	.80
EC	32	1.51	.76	HE	20	1.30	.67	EI	27	1.43	.73	FO	40	1.60	.80
IC	22	1.34	.69	BE	18	1.26	.66	LI	20	1.30	.67	RO ...	28	1.45	.74
NC	19	1.28	.67	GE	14	1.15	.61	AI	17	1.23	.64	HO ...	20	1.30	.67
AC	14	1.15	.61	IE	13	1.11	.59	AL	32	1.51	.76	WO ...	19	1.28	.67
				OF	25	1.40	.72	EL	29	1.46	.74	NO ...	18	1.26	.66
ED	60	1.78	.88	EF	18	1.26	.66	LL	27	1.43	.73	PO	17	1.23	.64
ND ...	52	1.72	.85					IL	23	1.36	.70	DO ...	16	1.20	.63
AD ...	27	1.43	.73	NG ...	27	1.43	.73	OL	19	1.28	.67	SO	15	1.18	.62
RD ...	17	1.23	.64	IG	19	1.28	.67				LO	13	1.11	.59	

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Table A-10 (C). The 122 digraphs composing 75% of the digraphs of Table A-1, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities, arranged alphabetically by final letters (U) - Continued

(2) AND ACCORDING TO THEIR ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES-Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₂₄ (2F)
OP	25	1.40	.72	ES	54	1.73	.86	NT	82	1.91	.93	OU ...	37	1.57	.79
EP	20	1.30	.67	AS	41	1.61	.80	ST	63	1.80	.88	QU ...	15	1.18	.62
				IS	35	1.54	.78	AT	47	1.67	.83	AU ...	13	1.11	.59
				RS	31	1.49	.75	RT	42	1.62	.81				
ER	87	1.94	.94	NS	24	1.38	.71	ET	37	1.57	.79	IV	25	1.40	.72
OR ...	64	1.81	.89	SS	19	1.28	.67	HT	28	1.45	.74	EV	20	1.30	.67
AR ...	44	1.64	.82	TS	19	1.28	.67	IT	27	1.43	.73				
UR ...	31	1.49	.75	OS	14	1.15	.61	OT	19	1.28	.67	TW ...	36	1.56	.78
IR	27	1.43	.73	DS	13	1.11	.59	TT	19	1.28	.67				
PR	18	1.26	.66					DT	15	1.18	.62	IX	15	1.18	.62
HR ...	17	1.23	.64					YT	15	1.18	.62				
TR	17	1.23	.64					CT	14	1.15	.61	TY	41	1.61	.80
													3,745		

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APPENDIX B (C)
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENGLISH
TRIGRAPHS

Frequency distributions of English trigraphs appearing in 50,000 letters of governmental plaintext telegrams.

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Table B-1 (C). The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)			
ENT	569	2.76	.99	TOP	174	2.24	.82	EIG	135	2.13	.79
ION	260	2.41	.88	NTH	171	2.23	.82	FIV	135	2.13	.79
AND	228	2.36	.86	TWE	170	2.23	.82	MEN	131	2.12	.78
ING	226	2.35	.86	TWO	163	2.21	.81	SEV	131	2.12	.78
IVE	225	2.35	.86	ATI	160	2.20	.81	ERS	126	2.10	.78
TIO	221	2.34	.85	THR	158	2.20	.81	UND	125	2.10	.78
FOR	218	2.34	.85	NTY	157	2.20	.81	NET	118	2.07	.77
OUR	211	2.32	.85	HRE	153	2.18	.80	PER	115	2.06	.76
THI	211	2.32	.85	WEN	153	2.18	.80	STA	115	2.06	.76
ONE	210	2.32	.85	FOU	152	2.18	.80	TER	115	2.06	.76
NIN	207	2.32	.85	ORT	146	2.16	.80	EQU	114	2.06	.76
STO	202	2.31	.84	REE	146	2.16	.80	RED	113	2.05	.76
EEN	196	2.29	.84	SIX	146	2.16	.80	TED	112	2.05	.76
GHT	196	2.29	.84	ASH	143	2.16	.80	ERI	109	2.04	.76
INE	192	2.28	.83	DAS	140	2.15	.79	HIR	106	2.03	.75
VEN	190	2.28	.83	IGH	140	2.15	.79	IRT	105	2.02	.75
EVE	177	2.25	.82	ERE	138	2.14	.79	DER	101	2.00	.74
EST	176	2.25	.82	COM	136	2.13	.79	DRE	100	2.00	.74
TEE	174	2.24	.82	ATE	135	2.13	.79				

Table B-2 (C). The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)			
AND	228	2.36	.86	GHT	196	2.29	.84	REE	146	2.16	.80
ATI	160	2.20	.81	HRE	153	2.18	.80	RED	113	2.05	.76
ASH	143	2.16	.80	HIR	106	2.03	.75	STO	202	2.31	.84
ATE	135	2.13	.79	ION	260	2.41	.88	SIX	146	2.16	.80
COM	136	2.13	.79	ING	226	2.35	.86	SEV	131	2.12	.78
DAS	140	2.15	.79	IVE	225	2.35	.86	STA	115	2.06	.76
DER	101	2.00	.74	INE	192	2.28	.83	TIO	221	2.34	.85
DRE	100	2.00	.74	IGH	140	2.15	.79	THI	211	2.32	.85
ENT	569	2.76	.99	IRT	105	2.02	.75	TEE	174	2.24	.82
EEN	196	2.29	.84	MEN	131	2.12	.78	TOP	174	2.24	.82
EVE	177	2.25	.82	NIN	207	2.32	.85	TWE	170	2.23	.82
EST	176	2.25	.82	NTH	171	2.23	.82	TWO	163	2.21	.81
ERE	138	2.14	.79	NTY	157	2.20	.81	THR	158	2.20	.81
EIG	135	2.13	.79	NET	118	2.07	.77	TER	115	2.06	.76
ERS	126	2.10	.78	OUR	211	2.32	.85	TED	112	2.05	.76
EQU	114	2.06	.76	ONE	210	2.32	.85	UND	125	2.10	.78
ERI	109	2.04	.76	ORT	146	2.16	.80	VEN	190	2.28	.83
FOR	218	2.34	.85	PER	115	2.06	.76	WEN	153	2.18	.80
FOU	152	2.18	.80								
FIV	135	2.13	.79								

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Table B-3 (C). The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by central letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)			
DAS	140	2.15	.79	TIO	221	2.34	.85	HRE	153	2.18	.80
EEN	196	2.29	.84	NIN	207	2.32	.85	ORT	146	2.16	.80
VEN	190	2.28	.83	SIX	146	2.16	.80	ERE	138	2.14	.79
TEE	174	2.24	.82	EIG	135	2.13	.79	ERS	126	2.10	.78
WEN	153	2.18	.80	FIV	135	2.13	.79	ERI	109	2.04	.76
REE	146	2.16	.80	HIR	106	2.03	.75	IRT	105	2.02	.75
MEN	131	2.12	.78	ENT	569	2.76	.99	DRE	100	2.00	.74
SEV	131	2.12	.78	AND	228	2.36	.86	EST	176	2.25	.82
NET	118	2.07	.77	ING	226	2.35	.86	ASH	143	2.16	.80
PER	115	2.06	.76	ONE	210	2.32	.85	STO	202	2.31	.84
TER	115	2.06	.76	INE	192	2.28	.83	NTH	171	2.23	.82
RED	113	2.05	.76	UND	125	2.10	.78	ATI	160	2.20	.81
TED	112	2.05	.76	ION	260	2.41	.88	NTY	157	2.20	.81
DER	101	2.00	.74	FOR	218	2.34	.85	ATE	135	2.13	.79
IGH	140	2.15	.79	TOP	174	2.24	.82	STA	115	2.06	.76
THI	211	2.32	.85	FOU	152	2.18	.80	OUR	211	2.32	.85
GHT	196	2.29	.84	COM	136	2.13	.79	IVE	225	2.35	.86
THR	158	2.20	.81	EQU	114	2.06	.76	EVE	177	2.25	.82
								TWE	170	2.23	.82
								TWO	163	2.21	.81

Table B-4 (C). The 56 trigraphs appearing 100 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by final letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₅₈₆ (F)			
STA	115	2.06	.76	THI	211	2.32	.85	TER	115	2.06	.76
AND	228	2.36	.86	ATI	160	2.20	.81	HIR	106	2.03	.75
UND	125	2.10	.78	ERI	109	2.04	.76	DER	101	2.00	.74
RED	113	2.05	.76	COM	136	2.13	.79	DAS	140	2.15	.79
TED	112	2.05	.76	ION	260	2.41	.88	ERS	126	2.10	.78
IVE	225	2.35	.86	NIN	207	2.32	.85	ENT	569	2.76	.99
ONE	210	2.32	.85	EEN	196	2.29	.84	GHT	196	2.29	.84
INE	192	2.28	.83	VEN	190	2.28	.83	EST	176	2.25	.82
EVE	177	2.25	.82	WEN	153	2.18	.80	ORT	146	2.16	.80
TEE	174	2.24	.82	MEN	131	2.12	.78	NET	118	2.07	.77
TWE	170	2.23	.82	TIO	221	2.34	.85	IRT	105	2.02	.75
HRE	153	2.18	.80	STO	202	2.31	.84	FOU	152	2.18	.80
REE	146	2.16	.80	TWO	163	2.21	.81	EQU	114	2.06	.76
ERE	138	2.14	.79	TOP	174	2.24	.82	FIV	135	2.13	.79
ATE	135	2.13	.79	FOR	218	2.34	.85	SEV	131	2.12	.78
DRE	100	2.00	.74	OUR	211	2.32	.85	SIX	146	2.16	.80
ING	226	2.35	.86	THR	158	2.20	.81	NTY	157	2.20	.81
EIG	135	2.13	.79	PER	115	2.06	.76				
NTH	171	2.23	.82								
ASH	143	2.16	.80								
IGH	140	2.15	.79								

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APPENDIX C (C)
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH
TETRAGRAPHS

Frequency distributions of English tetragraphs appearing in 50,000 letters of governmental plaintext telegrams.

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Table C-1 (C). The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times, arranged by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)
TION	218	2.34	.99	THIR	104	2.02	.87	ASHT	64	1.81	.79
EVEN	168	2.23	.95	EENT	102	2.01	.87	HUND	64	1.81	.79
TEEN	163	2.21	.94	REQU	98	1.99	.86	DRED	63	1.80	.79
ENTY	161	2.21	.94	HIRT	97	1.99	.86	RIOD	63	1.80	.79
STOP	154	2.19	.93	COMM	93	1.97	.85	IVED	62	1.79	.78
WENT	153	2.18	.93	QUES	87	1.94	.84	ENTS	62	1.79	.78
NINE	153	2.18	.93	UEST	87	1.94	.84	FFIC	62	1.79	.78
TWEN	152	2.18	.93	EQUE	86	1.93	.84	FROM	59	1.77	.78
THRE	149	2.17	.93	NDRE	77	1.89	.82	IRTY	59	1.77	.78
FOUR	144	2.16	.92	OMMA	71	1.85	.81	RTEE	59	1.77	.78
IGHT	140	2.15	.92	LLAR	71	1.85	.81	UNDR	59	1.77	.78
FIVE	135	2.13	.91	OLLA	70	1.85	.81	NAUG	56	1.75	.77
HREE	134	2.13	.91	VENT	70	1.85	.81	OURT	56	1.75	.77
DASH	132	2.12	.91	DOLL	68	1.83	.80	UGHT	56	1.75	.77
EIGH	132	2.12	.91	LARS	68	1.83	.80	STAT	54	1.73	.76
SEVE	121	2.08	.89	THIS	68	1.83	.80	AUGH	52	1.72	.76
ENTH	114	2.06	.89	PERI	67	1.83	.80	CENT	52	1.72	.76
MENT	111	2.05	.88	ERIO	66	1.82	.80	FICE	50	1.70	.75

Table C-2 (C). The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by initial letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)
ASHT	64	1.81	.79	HREE	134	2.13	.91	REQU	98	1.99	.86
AUGH	52	1.72	.76	HIRT	97	1.99	.86	RIOD	63	1.80	.79
				HUND	64	1.81	.79	RTEE	59	1.77	.78
COMM	93	1.97	.85								
CENT	52	1.72	.76	IGHT	140	2.15	.92	STOP	154	2.19	.93
				IVED	62	1.79	.78	SEVE	121	2.08	.89
DASH	132	2.12	.91	IRTY	59	1.77	.78	STAT	54	1.73	.76
DOLL	68	1.83	.80								
DRED	63	1.80	.79	LLAR	71	1.85	.81	TION	218	2.34	.99
				LARS	68	1.83	.80	TEEN	163	2.21	.94
EVEN	168	2.23	.95					TWEN	152	2.18	.93
ENTY	161	2.21	.94	MENT	111	2.05	.88	THRE	149	2.17	.93
EIGH	132	2.12	.91					THIR	104	2.02	.87
ENTH	114	2.06	.89	NINE	153	2.18	.93	THIS	68	1.83	.80
EENT	102	2.01	.87	NDRE	77	1.89	.82				
EQUE	86	1.93	.84	NAUG	56	1.75	.77	UEST	87	1.94	.84
ERIO	66	1.82	.80					UNDR	59	1.77	.78
ENTS	62	1.79	.78	OMMA	71	1.85	.81	UGHT	56	1.75	.77
				OLLA	70	1.85	.81				
FOUR	144	2.16	.92	OURT	56	1.75	.77	VENT	70	1.85	.81
FIVE	135	2.13	.91								
FFIC	62	1.79	.78	PERI	67	1.83	.80				
FROM	59	1.77	.78								
FICE	50	1.70	.75	QUES	87	1.94	.84	WENT	153	2.18	.93

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Table C-3 (C). The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by their second letters, and then according to their absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)
DASH	132	2.12	.91	TION	218	2.34	.99	HREE	134	2.13	.91
LARS	68	1.83	.80	NINE	153	2.18	.93	ERIO	66	1.82	.80
NAUG	56	1.75	.77	FIVE	135	2.13	.91	DRED	63	1.80	.79
NDRE	77	1.89	.82	EIGH	132	2.12	.91	FROM	59	1.77	.78
TEEN	163	2.21	.94	HIRT	97	1.99	.86	IRTY	59	1.77	.78
WENT	153	2.18	.93	RIOD	63	1.80	.79	ASHT	64	1.81	.79
SEVE	121	2.08	.89	FICE	50	1.70	.75	STOP	154	2.19	.93
MENT	111	2.05	.88	LLAR	71	1.85	.81	RTEE	59	1.77	.78
EENT	102	2.01	.87	OLLA	70	1.85	.81	STAT	54	1.73	.76
REQU	98	1.99	.86	OMMA	71	1.85	.81	QUES	87	1.94	.84
UEST	87	1.94	.84	ENTY	161	2.21	.94	HUND	64	1.81	.79
VENT	70	1.85	.81	ENTH	114	2.06	.89	OURT	56	1.75	.77
PERI	67	1.83	.80	ENTS	62	1.79	.78	AUGH	52	1.72	.76
CENT	52	1.72	.76	UNDR	59	1.77	.78	EVEN	168	2.23	.95
FFIC	62	1.79	.78	FOUR	144	2.16	.92	IVED	62	1.79	.78
IGHT	140	2.15	.92	COMM	93	1.97	.85	TWEN	152	2.18	.93
UGHT	56	1.75	.77	DOLL	68	1.83	.80				
THRE	149	2.17	.93	EQUE	86	1.93	.84				
THIR	104	2.02	.87								
THIS	68	1.83	.80								

Table C-4 (C). The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by their their letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)
LLAR	71	1.85	.81	EIGH	132	2.12	.91	COMM	93	1.97	.85
STAT	54	1.73	.76	AUGH	52	1.72	.76	OMMA	71	1.85	.81
FICE	50	1.70	.75	IGHT	140	2.15	.92	WENT	153	2.18	.93
UNDR	59	1.77	.78	ASHT	64	1.81	.79	NINE	153	2.18	.93
EVEN	168	2.23	.95	UGHT	56	1.75	.77	MENT	111	2.05	.88
TEEN	163	2.21	.94	THIR	104	2.02	.87	EENT	102	2.01	.87
TWEN	152	2.18	.93	THIS	68	1.83	.80	VENT	70	1.85	.81
HREE	134	2.13	.91	ERIO	66	1.82	.80	HUNT	64	1.81	.79
QUES	87	1.94	.84	FFIC	62	1.79	.78	CENT	52	1.72	.76
DRED	63	1.80	.79	OLLA	70	1.85	.81	TION	218	2.34	.99
IVED	62	1.79	.78	DOLL	68	1.83	.80	STOP	154	2.19	.93
RTEE	59	1.77	.78					RIOD	63	1.80	.79
								FROM	59	1.77	.78

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Table C-4 (C). The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by their third letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U) - Continued

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)
REQU	98	1.99	.86	DASH	132	2.12	.91	FOUR	144	2.16	.92
THRE	149	2.17	.93	UEST	87	1.94	.84	EQUE	86	1.93	.84
HIRT	97	1.99	.86					NAUG	56	1.75	.77
NDRE	77	1.89	.82	ENTY	161	2.21	.94				
LARS	68	1.83	.80	ENTH	114	2.06	.89				
PERI	67	1.83	.80	ENTS	62	1.79	.78	FIVE	135	2.13	.91
OURT	56	1.75	.77	IRTY	59	1.77	.78	SEVE	121	2.08	.89

Table C-5 (C). The 54 tetragraphs appearing 50 or more times, arranged in alphabetic order by their final letters, then by absolute frequencies, accompanied by the logarithms of their assigned probabilities (U)

	F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)		F	L ₁₀ (F)	L ₂₄₄ (F)
OMMA	71	1.85	.81	DASH	132	2.12	.91	QUES	87	1.94	.84
OLLA	70	1.85	.81	EIGH	132	2.12	.91	THIS	68	1.83	.80
				ENTH	114	2.06	.89	LARS	68	1.83	.80
FFIC	62	1.79	.78	AUGH	52	1.72	.76	ENTS	62	1.79	.78
				PERI	67	1.83	.80				
HUND	64	1.81	.79	DOLL	68	1.83	.80	WENT	153	2.18	.93
DRED	63	1.80	.79					IGHT	140	2.15	.92
RIOD	63	1.80	.79	COMM	93	1.97	.85	MENT	111	2.05	.88
IVED	62	1.79	.78	FROM	59	1.77	.78	EENT	102	2.01	.87
				TION	218	2.34	.99	HIRT	97	1.99	.86
NINE	153	2.18	.93	EVEN	168	2.23	.95	UEST	87	1.94	.84
THRE	149	2.17	.93	TEEN	163	2.21	.94	VENT	70	1.85	.81
FIVE	135	2.13	.91	TWEN	152	2.18	.93	ASHT	64	1.81	.79
HREE	134	2.13	.91	ERIO	66	1.82	.80	OURT	56	1.75	.77
SEVE	121	2.08	.89	STOP	154	2.19	.93	UGHT	56	1.75	.77
EQUE	86	1.93	.84	FOUR	144	2.16	.92	STAT	54	1.73	.76
NDRE	77	1.89	.82	THIR	104	2.02	.87	CENT	52	1.72	.76
RTEE	59	1.77	.78	LLAR	71	1.85	.81				
FICE	50	1.70	.75	UNDR	59	1.77	.78	REQU	98	1.99	.86
NAUG	56	1.75	.77					ENTY	161	2.21	.94
								IRTY	59	1.77	.78

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APPENDIX D (S)
WORD AND PATTERN LISTS

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Table D-1 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)

TWO LETTER WORDS

AM	BY	EM	IN	MM	OK	TO
AN	CO	GO	IS	MP	ON	US
AS	CP	HE	IT	MY	OR	WD
AT	CQ	HQ	MC	NO	QM	WE
BE	DO	IF	ME	OF	SO	WO
BN						

THREE LETTER WORDS

ACT	BIG	EAT	HER	MIX	PVT	TEN
ADD	BOX	END	HIM	NAN	QMC	THE
ADJ	BUT	EYE	HIS	NET	RED	TIN
AGE	BUY	FAR	HOW	NEW	RID	TON
AGO	CAM	FEW	ILL	NOT	ROB	TOO
AID	CAN	FIT	ITS	NOW	RUN	TOP
AIM	CAR	FIX	JIG	OFF	SAW	TRY
AIR	CAV	FOR	JOB	OLD	SAY	TUB
ALL	COL	FOX	KEG	ONE	SEA	TWO
AND	CPL	GAL	LAW	OUR	SEE	USE
ANY	CUT	GAS	LAY	OUT	SET	VAT
APT	CWT	GEN	LET	OWE	SGT	WAR
ARC	DAY	GET	LOT	OWN	SHE	WAS
ARE	DID	GHQ	LOW	PAR	SIX	WAY
ARM	DIE	GOT	MAJ	PAY	SPY	WET
ASK	DOG	GUN	MAN	PEN	SUM	WGT
BAD	DRY	HAD	MAT	PER	SUN	WON
BAG	DUE	HAM	MAY	PIN	TAN	YET
BAR	DUN	HAS	MEN	PUT	TAX	YOU
BID						

FOUR LETTER WORDS

ABLE	BOTH	EACH	FLEE	HIGH	LATE	MAIN
AIDE	BULB	EAST	FORM	HILL	LEAD	MANY
ALLY	BULK	EASY	FOUR	HITS	LEAK	MASK
ALSO	CALL	EDGE	FROM	HOLD	LEFT	MASS
AREA	CELL	EYES	FULL	HOOK	LESS	MEAT
ARMY	CITY	FALL	FUSE	INTO	LIEU	MEET
ASIA	CODE	FARM	FUZE	ITEM	LINE	MESS
AWAY	COOK	FAST	GUNS	JOIN	LIST	MIKE
AXIS	DARK	FEEL	HALF	JULY	LOAD	MILE
BACK	DASH	FEET	HALT	JUNE	LONG	MINE
BASE	DATE	FELL	HAND	JUST	LOOK	MORE
BEEN	DAYS	FILE	HARD	KEEP	LOSS	MOVE
BLUE	DIRT	FIRE	HAVE	KIND	LOST	MTCL
BODY	DOWN	FIRM	HEAD	KING	LOVE	MULE
BOMB	DRAW	FIVE	HERD	LAND	MADE	NAVY
BOOK	DUMP	FLAG	HERE	LAST	MAIM	NEAR

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Table D-1 (e). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

FOUR LETTER WORDS-- Continued

NEXT	PARK	REAR	SHOT	TEAM	TOOK	WEST
NINE	PASS	RIOT	SIDE	TENT	TOOL	WHAT
NOON	PIPE	ROAD	SOME	TEXT	TOWN	WHEN
NOTE	PLAN	ROUT	SOON	THAN	TYPE	WILL
OBOE	POST	RULE	STOP	THAT	UNIT	WIRE
OMIT	PUMP	RUSH	SUNK	THEM	VARY	WITH
ONCE	PUSH	SAID	TAKE	THEN	VERY	XRAY
ONLY	RAID	SAME	TALK	THEY	WEAK	YOKE
OPEN	RAIL	SANK	TANK	THIS	WEEK	YOUR
ORAL	RAIN	SEEN	TARE	TIME	WELL	ZERO
OVER	RANK	SHIP	TASK	TONS	WERE	ZONE

FIVE LETTER WORDS

ABOUT	BOATS	DECKS	FLIGHT	LATER	PRIOR	SHIPS	TITLE
AFTER	BOMBS	DEFER	FIRES	LEAST	PROOF	SHORE	TODAY
AGAIN	BOOTH	DELAY	FIRST	LEAVE	PROVE	SIEGE	TOTAL
AGENT	BREAK	DEPOT	FLANK	LEVEL	QUEEN	SIGHT	TRACT
ALARM	BRIBE	DEPTH	FLARE	LIGHT	QUICK	SIXTH	TRAIN
ALERT	BROKE	DOCKS	FLATS	LIMIT	QUIET	SIXTY	TROOP
ALIGN	BURST	DRAWN	FLEET	LOCAL	RADIO	SLOPE	TRUCE
ALINE	CANAL	DRESS	FOGGY	MAJOR	RAFTS	SMALL	TRUCK
ALLOW	CASES	DRILL	FORCE	MARCH	RAIDS	SMOKE	UNDER
ALONG	CAUSE	DRIVE	FORTY	METER	RALLY	SOUTH	UNION
AMONG	CEASE	EAGER	FRESH	MILES	RANGE	SPEED	UNITS
ANNEX	CHECK	EARLY	FRONT	MOTOR	RAPID	SPELL	USUAL
APPLY	CHIEF	EIGHT	GATES	NAVAL	REACH	SPLIT	VALOR
APRIL	CLEAR	ENEMY	GAUGE	NIGHT	READY	SQUAD	VISIT
AREAS	CLERK	ENTER	GIVEN	NINTH	REFER	STAFF	VITAL
ARMOR	CLOSE	EQUAL	GOING	NORTH	REPEL	STAKE	VOCAL
ASSET	COAST	EQUIP	GROUP	ORDER	RIDGE	START	VOICE
AWAIT	COLON	ERASE	GUARD	OTHER	RIGHT	STEEL	WAGON
AWARD	COMMA	ERROR	GUEST	PACKS	RIGID	SUGAR	WEIGH
BAKER	CORPS	EITHER	HEAVY	PAIRS	RIVER	TAKEN	WHEEL
BANKS	COUNT	EVERY	HONOR	PARTY	ROGER	TANKS	WHERE
BARGE	COVER	FATAL	HORSE	PETER	ROUTE	TENTH	WHICH
BEACH	CREEK	FEARS	HOURS	PLACE	SCALE	THEIR	WIDTH
BEGIN	CREST	FERRY	HOUSE	PLAIN	SEIZE	THERE	WIPED
BEING	CROSS	FIELD	ISSUE	PLANS	SEVEN	THESE	WOODS
BLACK	CURVE	FIFTH	JAPAN	POINT	SHELL	THIRD	YARDS
BLIND	DAILY	FIFTY	LARGE	PRESS	SHIFT	THREE	ZEBRA

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Table D-1 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

SIX LETTER WORDS

ACCEPT	BOMBED	DEGREE	FIERCE	LESSON	OTHERS	RESUME	SUFFER
ACCESS	BOMBER	DEPART	FILING	LETTER	OUTPUT	RETIRE	SUMMER
ACROSS	BOTTOM	DEPEND	FINISH	LINING	PANAMA	RETURN	SUMMIT
ACTION	BRANCH	DEPLOY	FIRING	LIQUID	PARADE	REVIEW	SUMMON
ACTIVE	BREACH	DESERT	FLIGHT	LITTER	PARLEY	RIDING	SUNDAY
ADJUST	BREEZE	DETACH	FLYING	LITTLE	PASSED	ROCKET	SUNKEN
ADVICE	BRIDGE	DETAIL	FOLLOW	LOCATE	PASSES	ROUTED	SUNSET
ADVISE	BROKEN	DEVICE	FORCES	LOSSES	PATROL	ROUTES	SUPPLY
AFFAIR	BUREAU	DEVISE	FORMAL	MANAGE	PERIOD	RUBBER	SURVEY
ALASKA	CANADA	DIRECT	FORMED	MANNER	PICKET	RUNNER	SWITCH
ALLEGE	CANCEL	DIVERT	FOUGHT	MANUAL	PINCER	SALARY	SYSTEM
ALLIED	CANNOT	DIVIDE	FOURTH	MEAGER	PISTOL	SCHEME	TABLES
ALLIES	CANVAS	DOCTOR	FRIDAY	MEDIUM	PLACES	SCHOOL	TANKER
ALWAYS	CASUAL	DOLLAR	FUTURE	MEMBER	PLANES	SCORED	TARGET
ANIMAL	CAUSED	DOWNED	GARAGE	METHOD	POINTS	SCREEN	TATTOO
ANNUAL	CENTER	DRYRUN	GEORGE	METRIC	POISON	SEAMAN	TERROR
ANYWAY	CHANGE	DUGOUT	GREASE	MINING	POLICE	SEAMEN	THIRTY
APPEAR	CHARGE	DURING	GROUND	MINUTE	PONTON	SEARCH	THOUGH
ARABIA	CHEESE	EFFECT	GUNNER	MIRROR	POSTAL	SECOND	THREAT
ARMIES	CHURCH	EFFORT	HALTED	MOBILE	PREFER	SECTOR	TRAINS
ARMORY	CIPHER	EIGHTH	HAMMER	MONDAY	PROMPT	SECURE	TRENCH
ARREST	CIRCLE	EIGHTY	HAPPEN	MORALE	PROPER	SELECT	TROOPS
ARRIVE	COFFEE	EITHER	HARBOR	MORTAR	PURSUE	SERIAL	TURRET
ASSETS	COLORS	ELEVEN	HELPER	MOVING	RADIAL	SETTLE	TWELVE
ASSIST	COLUMN	EMBARK	HIGHER	MURDER	RAIDED	SEVERE	TWENTY
ASSURE	COMBAT	EMPLOY	HOURLY	MUZZLE	RATION	SHELLS	UNABLE
ATTACH	COMMIT	ENCODE	INDEED	NAUGHT	RAVINE	SIGCOM	UNITED
ATTACK	COMMON	ENGAGE	INFORM	NEARER	RECORD	SIGNAL	UNLESS
ATTAIN	CONVEY	ENGINE	INLAND	NINETY	REDUCE	SINGLE	VALLEY
AUGUST	CONVOY	ENROLL	INTEND	NORMAL	REFILL	SLIGHT	VERBAL
BANNER	COURSE	ENTIRE	INTENT	NOTING	REFUGE	SPHERE	VERIFY
BARBED	CREDIT	ERASER	INVENT	NOUGHT	REFUSE	SPOOLS	VESSEL
BARGES	CRISIS	ESCORT	ISLAND	NOVICE	REJECT	SPOONS	VICTIM
BATTEN	CRITIC	EUROPE	ISSUES	NOZZLE	RELIEF	STATES	VICTOR
BATTLE	DAMAGE	EXCEPT	KEEPER	NUMBER	REMAIN	STATUS	VISITS
BEETLE	DEBARK	EXCESS	KILLED	OCCUPY	REMEDY	STRAFE	VISUAL
BEFORE	DECIDE	EXCITE	LADDER	OFFEND	REPAIR	STREET	WEIGHT
BETTER	DECODE	EXPECT	LANDED	OFFICE	REPORT	STRESS	WIRING
BEYOND	DECREE	EXPELS	LAUNCH	OPPOSE	RESCUE	STRIPS	WITHIN
BILLET	DEFEAT	EXPEND	LEADER	ORDERS	RESIST	SUBMIT	WOODED
BITTER	DEFECT	EXTEND	LEAGUE	ORIENT	RESULT	SUDDEN	ZIGZAG
BODIES	DEFEND	EXTENT					

SEVEN LETTER WORDS

ABANDON	ALMANAC	APPOINT	ASIATIC	AVIATOR	BATTERY	BETWEEN
ABSENCE	AMMETER	APPROVE	ASSAULT	AWKWARD	BATTLES	BICYCLE
ADDRESS	ANALYZE	ARMORED	ATTACKS	BAGGAGE	BEARING	BINDING
ADVANCE	ANOTHER	ARRANGE	ATTEMPT	BALLOON	BECAUSE	BIVOUAC
AGAINST	ANTENNA	ARRIVAL	AVERAGE	BARRAGE	BEDDING	BOMBARD

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Table D-1 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

SEVEN LETTER WORDS--Continued

BOMBERS	DEBOUCH	FISHING	LANDING	PACKAGE	REQUEST	SUPPOSE
BOMBING	DECIDED	FITTING	LEADING	PASSAGE	REQUIRE	SURPLUS
BOYCOTT	DECLARE	FOGHORN	LECTURE	PASSIVE	RESERVE	SUSPEND
BRIBERY	DECODED	FORCING	LIAISON	PATROLS	RESPECT	TACTICS
BRIGADE	DEFENSE	FORGING	LIBRARY	PAYROLL	RESPOND	TALKING
CALIBER	DELAYED	FORWARD	LICENSE	PLACING	RETIRED	TARGETS
CALIBRE	DELIVER	FOXHOLE	LIFTING	PLATOON	RETREAT	TERRAIN
CAPTAIN	DERRICK	FUELOIL	LOADING	POUNDER	REVENUE	THATTHE
CAPTIVE	DESTROY	FURNISH	LOGICAL	PRAIRIE	REVERSE	THROUGH
CARRIER	DETRAIN	FURTHER	LOOKOUT	PRECEDE	REVOLVE	TOBACCO
CAVALRY	DETRUCK	GASSING	MACHINE	PREPARE	ROUTINE	TONIGHT
CENTRAL	DEVELOP	GENERAL	MANDATE	PRESENT	RUNNING	TONNAGE
CHANGES	DIAGRAM	GETTING	MANNING	PRESSED	SAILORS	TORPEDO
CHANNEL	DISCUSS	GLASSES	MAPPING	PRIMARY	SATISFY	TRACTOR
CHARLIE	DISEASE	GRADUAL	MARCHED	PROCEED	SECREC Y	TRAFFIC
CHASSIS	DISTILL	GRENADE	MARSHAL	PROGRAM	SECTION	TRAWLER
CIRCUIT	GUARDED	GUARDED	MARTIAL	PROMOTE	SECTORS	TRIGGER
CLIPPER	DROPPED	HALTING	MAXIMUM	PROPOSE	SERVICE	TUESDAY
COASTAL	EASTERN	HASBEEN	MEDICAL	PROTECT	SESSION	TWELFTH
COLLECT	ECHELON	HEADING	MESSAGE	PROTEST	SETBACK	UNKNOWN
COLLEGE	ELEMENT	HEAVIER	MESSING	PROVOST	SEVENTH	UNUSUAL
COLONEL	ELEVATE	HIGHEST	MILITIA	PURPOSE	SEVENTH	USELESS
COMMAND	EMBASSY	HOLDING	MINIMUM	PURSUIT	SEVERAL	UTILITY
COMMEND	ENCODED	HORIZON	MISFIRE	PUSHING	SHELLED	VACANCY
COMMENT	ENEMIES	HOSTILE	MISSING	QUARTER	SHORTLY	VARYING
COMMUTE	ENFORCE	HUNDRED	MISSION	QUICKLY	SIGNIFY	VESSELS
COMPANY	ENGAGED	ICEBERG	MORNING	RADIATE	SIMILAR	VICTORY
COMPASS	ENTENTE	ILLEGAL	NATURAL	RAIDING	SIMPLEX	VILLAGE
CONCEAL	ENTRAIN	ILLNESS	NEAREST	RAILWAY	SINKING	VISIBLE
CONDEMN	ENTRUCK	INCLUDE	NIGHTLY	RAINING	SIXTEEN	VISITOR
CONDUCT	ENVELOP	INFLECT	NOTHING	RAPIDLY	SLOPING	WARFARE
CONFINE	EVENING	INITIAL	NUMBERS	REACHED	SMOKING	WARSHIP
CONTACT	EXCLUDE	INQUIRE	OBSERVE	RECEIPT	SOLDIER	WEATHER
CONTAIN	EXPLAIN	INQUIRY	OCTOBER	RECEIVE	STARTER	WESTERN
CONTROL	EXPRESS	INSPIRE	OFFENSE	RECOVER	STATION	WHETHER
CORRECT	EXTRACT	INSTALL	OFFICER	RECRUIT	STEAMER	WILLIAM
COUNCIL	EXTREME	INSTANT	OMITTED	REDUCED	STOPPED	WINDAGE
COURIER	FALLING	INVADED	OPERATE	REFUGEE	STORAGE	WITHOUT
COVERED	FARTHER	ISLANDS	OPINION	REGULAR	SUCCESS	WITHTHE
CROSSED	FEDERAL	ISSUING	ORDERED	RELEASE	SUGGEST	WITNESS
CRUISER	FIFTEEN	JANUARY	OUTPOST	RELIEVE	SUMMARY	WOUNDED
CURRENT	FIGHTER	JUMPOFF	OUTSIDE	REPAIRS	SUNRISE	WRECKED
CYCLONE	FILLING	KITCHEN	PACIFIC	REPLACE	SUPPORT	WRITTEN
DAMAGED	FINDING	KILLING				

EIGHT LETTER WORDS

ACTIVITY	ADVANCED	AIRBORNE	AIRPLANE	ANNOUNCE	APPROACH	ASSEMBLE
ACTUALLY	ADVANCES	AIRCRAFT	ALTITUDE	ANTITANK	APPROVAL	ASSEMBLY
ADJACENT	ADVISING	AIRDROME	AMERICAN	APPARENT	ARMAMENT	ASSIGNED
ADJUTANT	ADVISORY	AIRFIELD	ANALYSIS	APPEARED	ARRESTED	ASSOONAS

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Table D-1 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

EIGHT LETTER WORDS--Continued

ATLANTIC	CRITIQUE	DRIFTING	FORENOON	MEDICINE	PRIORITY	SERGEANT
ATTACKED	CROSSING	EASTERLY	FORTRESS	MEMORIAL	PRISONER	SHELLING
ATTEMPTS	CRUISERS	EASTWARD	FOURTEEN	MERCIFUL	PROBABLE	SHIPPING
AVIATION	DAMAGING	ECONOMIC	FRONTAGE	MESSAGES	PROBABLY	SIGHTING
BARRACKS	DARKNESS	EFFECTED	FUSELAGE	MIDNIGHT	PROGRESS	SKIRMISH
BARRAGES	DAYLIGHT	EFFICACY	GARRISON	MILITARY	PROHIBIT	SOLDIERS
BATTERED	DECEMBER	EIGHTEEN	GROUNDED	MISFIRES	PROTESTS	SOUTHERN
BATTLING	DECIPHER	ELEMENTS	GROUPING	MISSIONS	PROTOCOL	SPECIFIC
BESIEGED	DECISION	ELEVENTH	GUARDING	MOBILIZE	PURPOSES	SPOTTING
BILLEDED	DECISIVE	ELIGIBLE	HAVEBEEN	MONOPOLY	QUARTERS	SQUADRON
BOUNDARY	DECLARED	EMPLOYEE	HINDERED	MOUNTAIN	RAILHEAD	STANDARD
BREAKING	DECREASE	EMPLOYER	HOSPITAL	MOVEMENT	RAILROAD	STATIONS
BUILDING	DEDICATE	ENCIPHER	HOWITZER	NATIONAL	RALLYING	STRATEGY
BULLETIN	DEFEATED	ENCIRCLE	IDENTIFY	NAUTICAL	RECEIVER	SUFFERED
BUSINESS	DEFENDED	ENFILADE	IGNITION	NINETEEN	RECORDER	SUITABLE
CALAMITY	DEFENDER	ENGAGING	IMPROPER	NORTHERN	REDCROSS	SUPERIOR
CAMPAIGN	DEFENSES	ENGINEER	IMPROVED	NOVEMBER	REENLIST	SUPPLIES
CANISTER	DEFERRED	ENLISTED	INCIDENT	OBSERVED	REGIMENT	SURPRISE
CAPACITY	DEFINITE	ENORMOUS	INDICATE	OBSERVER	REGISTER	SURROUND
CAPTURED	DELAYING	ENROLLED	INDIRECT	OBSOLETE	REJECTED	SURVIVED
CARELESS	DEMANDED	ENTERING	INFANTRY	OBSTACLE	REJECTOR	SUSPENSE
CARRIAGE	DEPARTED	ENTRENCH	INFECTED	OCCUPIED	REMEDIES	SWEEPING
CARRIERS	DEPLOYED	ENVELOPE	INITIATE	OFFENDED	REMEMBER	SWIMMING
CARRYING	DEPORTED	EQUALIZE	INSECURE	OFFICERS	REPAIRED	TACTICAL
CASUALTY	DESCRIBE	EQUIPAGE	INSIGNIA	OFFICIAL	REPEATER	TAXATION
CAUSEWAY	DESERTED	ESCORTED	INSTRUCT	OPERATOR	REPELLED	TELEGRAM
CEMETERY	DESERTER	ESTIMATE	INTEREST	OPPOSING	REPLACED	TERRIBLE
CENTERED	DESPATCH	EUROPEAN	INTERIOR	OPPOSITE	REPORTED	TERRIFIC
CHAPLAIN	DETACHED	EVACUATE	INTERNAL	ORDINATE	REPULSED	THATHAVE
CHEMICAL	DETECTOR	EXCAVATE	INTRENCH	ORDNANCE	REQUIRED	THIRTEEN
CIRCULAR	DETONATE	EXCHANGE	INVADING	OUTBOARD	RESEARCH	THOUSAND
CITATION	DEVELOPE	EXERCISE	INVASION	OUTGUARD	RESERVES	THURSDAY
CIVILIAN	DICTATED	EXPANDED	INVENTED	OUTPOSTS	RESPECTS	TOMORROW
CLERICAL	DICTATOR	EXPEDITE	JETPLANE	PAINTING	RESTORED	TOTALING
CODEBOOK	DIMINISH	EXPELLED	JUNCTION	PARALLAX	RETIRING	TRAILERS
COMMANDS	DIRECTOR	EXPENDED	LANGUAGE	PARALLEL	RETURNED	TRAINING
COMMENCE	DISARMED	EXPENSES	LATITUDE	PASSPORT	REVIEWED	TRANSFER
COMMERCE	DISASTER	EXTENDED	LETTERED	PLANNING	REVOLVER	TRAVERSE
COMPLETE	DISLODGE	EXTERIOR	LIMITING	POLITICS	RIGOROUS	TRAWLERS
COMPOSED	DISPATCH	FACTIONS	LOCATION	PONTOONS	SABOTAGE	VEHICLES
CONCLUDE	DISPERSE	FATALITY	LUMINOUS	POSITION	SANITARY	VICINITY
CONCRETE	DISTANCE	FEBRUARY	MAINTAIN	POSITIVE	SATURDAY	VIGOROUS
CONFLICT	DISTRESS	FERRYING	MANDATED	POSSIBLE	SCHEDULE	WARSHIPS
CONGRESS	DISTRICT	FIGHTERS	MANEUVER	POSTPONE	SEABORNE	WESTERLY
CONTINUE	DIVIDING	FIGHTING	MARCHING	PREPARED	SEALEVEL	WESTWARD
CONTRACT	DIVISION	FINISHED	MARITIME	PRESERVE	SELECTED	WINDWARD
CORPORAL	DOCTRINE	FLANKING	MATERIAL	PRESSING	SENTENCE	WIRELESS
CORRIDOR	DOMINANT	FLEXIBLE	MATERIEL	PRESSURE	SENTINEL	WITHDRAW
COVERING	DRESSING	FOOTHOLD	MECHANIC	PRINTING	SEPARATE	WITHDREW
CRITICAL						

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Table D-1 (S). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

NINE LETTER WORDS

ACCESSORY	CENTERING	DEVELOPED	FORMATION	MOVEMENTS	PROTECTOR
ACCOMPANY	CHALLENGE	DIETITIAN	FORTIFIED	MUNITIONS	PROTESTED
ACCORDING	CHARACTER	DIFFERENT	FRONTLINE	NAVALBASE	PROVISION
ADDRESSED	CHAUFFEUR	DIFFICULT	GROUPEMENT	NECESSARY	PROXIMITY
ADDRESSES	CHRONICAL	DIMENSION	GYROMETER	NECESSITY	RADIATION
ADMISSION	CIGARETTE	DIRECTION	HOSTILITY	NEGLIGENT	RADIOGRAM
ADVANCING	CIRCULATE	DIRIGIBLE	HURRICANE	NEWSPAPER	READINESS
ADVANTAGE	CIVILIANS	DISAPPEAR	IDENTICAL	NORTHEAST	REARGUARD
AERODROME	CLEARANCE	DISCUSSED	IMMEDIATE	NORTHERLY	REBELLION
AEROPLANE	COALITION	DISINFECT	IMPORTANT	NORTHWARD	RECEIVING
AFTERNOON	COLLAPSED	DISMISSAL	IMPRESSED	NORTHWEST	RECOGNIZE
AGREEMENT	COLLISION	DISPERSED	INCENTIVE	NUMBERING	RECOMMEND
AIRDROMES	COMBATANT	DISTRICTS	INCIDENCE	OBJECTION	REENFORCE
AIRPLANES	COMMANDED	DIVISIONS	INCIDENTS	OBJECTIVE	REFERENCE
ALLOTMENT	COMMANDER	DOMINANCE	INCLINING	OBTAINING	REFILLING
ALLOWANCE	COMMITTEE	DOMINATED	INCLUDING	OCCUPYING	REGARDING
ALTERNATE	COMPANIES	ECHELONED	INCLUSIVE	OFFENSIVE	REINFORCE
AMBULANCE	COMPELLED	EFFECTIVE	INCREASED	OFFICIALS	REINSTATE
AMUSEMENT	COMPLETED	EFFICIENT	INDEMNITY	OPERATING	REMAINDER
ANNOUNCED	CONDEMNED	ELABORATE	INDICATED	OPERATION	REMAINING
ANONYMOUS	CONDENSED	ELEVATION	INFLATION	OSCILLATE	REPRESENT
APPARATUS	CONDITION	ELSEWHERE	INFLICTED	OUTSKIRTS	REPRISALS
APPOINTED	CONFERRED	EMBASSIES	INFLUENCE	PARACHUTE	REQUESTED
ARBITRARY	CONFIDENT	EMERGENCY	INHABITED	PARAGRAPH	REQUIRING
ARTILLERY	CONFLICTS	EMPLOYING	INSTANTLY	PARTITION	RESOURCES
ASCENSION	CONQUERED	ENDURANCE	INTEGRITY	PASSENGER	RESTRAINT
ASSAULTED	CONTINUAL	ENGINEERS	INTENSIVE	PATRIOTIC	RETENTION
ASSISTANT	CONTINUED	ENLISTING	INTENTION	PENETRATE	RETURNING
ASSOCIATE	CONTINUES	ENTRAINED	INTERCEPT	PERMANENT	REVIEWING
ASSURANCE	COOPERATE	EQUIPMENT	INTERDICT	PERSONNEL	SCREENING
ATTACKING	CORRECTED	ESTABLISH	INTERFERE	PLACEMENT	SEAPLANES
ATTEMPTED	CRITICISE	ESTIMATED	INTERMENT	POLITICAL	SECRETARY
ATTENTION	CRITICISM	ESTIMATES	INTERPOSE	POPULATED	SEMICOLON
AUTOMATIC	DEBARKING	EXCESSIVE	INTERRUPT	POSITIONS	SEMI-RIGID
AVAILABLE	DECREASED	EXCLUSION	INTERVENE	PRACTICAL	SEPTEMBER
BALLISTIC	DEFECTIVE	EXCLUSIVE	INTERVIEW	PRECEDING	SERIOUSLY
BAROMETER	DEFENSIVE	EXECUTIVE	INVENTION	PREFERRED	SERVICING
BATTALION	DEFICIENT	EXERCISES	IRREGULAR	PREMATURE	SEVENTEEN
BATTERIES	DEPARTURE	EXHIBITED	KILOMETER	PREPARING	SHELLFIRE
BEACHHEAD	DEPENDENT	EXPANSION	LAUNCHING	PRESIDENT	SITUATION
BEGINNING	DESCRIBED	EXPANSIVE	LIABILITY	PRINCIPAL	SIXTEENTH
BLOCKADED	DESIGNATE	EXPENSIVE	LOGISTICS	PRINCIPLE	SOUTHEAST
BOMBARDED	DESTITUTE	EXPLOSION	LONGITUDE	PRISONERS	SOUTHWARD
BRIGADIER	DESTROYED	EXPLOSIVE	MAINTAINS	PROCEDURE	SOUTHWEST
BUILDINGS	DESTROYER	EXTENDING	MANGANESE	PROCEEDED	SPEARHEAD
CABLEGRAM	DETENTION	EXTENSION	MECHANISM	PROJECTOR	STANDARDS
CAMPAIGNS	DETERMINE	EXTENSIVE	MEMORANDA	PROMOTION	STATEMENT
CANCELLED	DETONATED	FIFTEENTH	MESSENGER	PROPOSALS	STRAGGLER
CARTRIDGE	DETRAINED	FIREALARM	MOTORIZED	PROTECTED	STRATEGIC

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Table D-1 (e). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

NINE LETTER WORDS-- Continued

SUBMITTED	SUSPENDED	TELEPHONE	THEREFORE	UNTENABLE	WEDNESDAY
SUCCEEDED	SUSPICION	TENTATIVE	TRANSPORT	VARIATION	WITNESSES
SURRENDER	TECHNICAL	TERRITORY	TWENTIETH	WATERTANK	YESTERDAY
SUSPECTED	TECHNIQUE				

TEN LETTER WORDS

ACCEPTABLE	COLLISIONS	DESPTACHES	EXPENDABLE	MAINTAINED
ACCEPTANCE	COMMANDANT	DESTROYERS	EXPERIENCE	MANAGEMENT
ACCIDENTAL	COMMANDEER	DETACHMENT	EXPERIMENT	MECHANIZED
ACCORDANCE	COMMANDING	DETERMINED	EXPLOSIONS	MEMORANDUM
ACTIVITIES	COMMISSARY	DETONATION	EXTINGUISH	MILLIMETER
ADDITIONAL	COMMISSION	DETRAINING	FACILITIES	MOTORCYCLE
AIRCONTROL	COMMITMENT	DETRUCKING	FLASHLIGHT	NATURALIZE
AIRSUPPORT	COMMUNIQUE	DIFFERENCE	FORMATIONS	NAVIGATION
ALLEGIANCE	COMPENSATE	DIPLOMATIC	FOUNDATION	NEGLIGENCE
ALLOCATION	COMPLETELY	DIRECTIONS	FOURTEENTH	NEWSPAPERS
AMBASSADOR	COMPRESSED	DISCIPLINE	FRONTLINES	NINETEENTH
AMMUNITION	CONCERNING	DISCUSSION	GEOGRAPHIC	OBJECTIVES
ANTEDATING	CONCESSION	DISPATCHED	GONIOMETER	OCCUPATION
ANTICIPATE	CONCLUSION	DISPATCHER	GOVERNMENT	ONEHUNDRED
APPARENTLY	CONDITIONS	DISPATCHES	GYROSCOPIC	OPERATIONS
APPEARANCE	CONFERENCE	DISPERSION	HYDROMETER	OPPOSITION
APPROACHED	CONFESSION	DISTRESSED	HYGROMETER	OVERCOMING
ARMORED CAR	CONFIDENCE	DISTRIBUTE	ILLITERATE	PATROLLING
ARTIFICIAL	CONNECTING	DIVEBOMBER	ILLUMINATE	PERMISSION
ASPOSSIBLE	CONNECTION	DOMINATION	ILLUSTRATE	PERSISTENT
ASSEMBLIES	CONSPIRACY	EFFICIENCY	IMPASSABLE	PHOSPHORUS
ASSESSMENT	CONSTITUTE	EIGHTEENTH	IMPOSSIBLE	POPULATION
ASSIGNMENT	CONTINGENT	ELEMENTARY	IMPRESSION	POSSESSION
ASSISTANCE	CONTINUOUS	EMPLOYMENT	IMPRESSIVE	POSTOFFICE
ATOMIC BOMB	CONTRABAND	ENCIPHERED	INCENDIARY	PRECEDENCE
ATTACHMENT	CONVENIENT	ENCIRCLING	INDICATING	PREFERENCE
ATTAINMENT	COORDINATE	ENEMY TANKS	INDICATION	PRESCRIBED
ATTEMPTING	CORRECTIOIN	ENGAGEMENT	INDIVIDUAL	PROHIBITED
AUDIBILITY	CREDENTIAL	ENLISTMENT	INFLICTING	PROPORTION
AUTOMOBILE	CROSSROADS	ENROLLMENT	INSECURITY	PROTECTION
BALLISTICS	DEBOUCHING	ENTERPRISE	INSPECTION	PROVISIONS
BATTLESHIP	DECIPHERED	ENTRENCHED	INSTRUCTED	QUARANTINE
BEE NEEDED	DECORATION	ENTRUCKING	INSTRUCTOR	RECEPTACLE
BRIDGEHEAD	DEDICATION	EQUIVALENT	INSTRUMENT	RECREATION
CAMOUFLAGE	DEFICIENCY	ESTIMATION	INTERNMENT	RECRUITING
CAPABILITY	DEFINITION	EVACUATING	INVITATION	REENFORCED
CASUALTIES	DEMobilize	EVACUATION	IRRIGATION	REENLISTED
CENSORSHIP	DEPARTMENT	EVALUATION	KILOMETERS	REGIMENTAL
CENTRALIZE	DEPENDABLE	EXCAVATION	LABORATORY	REGULATION
CIRCUITOUS	DEPLOYMENT	EXCITEMENT	LIEUTENANT	REINFORCED
COASTGUARD	DEPRESSION	EXHIBITION	LIMITATION	RESISTANCE
COLLECTING	DESIGNATED	EXPEDITING	LOCOMOTIVE	RESPECTFUL
COLLECTION	DESPATCHED	EXPEDITION	MACHINEGUN	RESTRICTED

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Table D-1 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

TEN LETTER WORDS-- Continued

REVOLUTION	SUBMISSION	SUSPENSION	TRANSPORTS	UNEXPENDED
SANITATION	SUBSTITUTE	SUSPICIONS	TRANSVERSE	UNSUITABLE
SEPARATION	SUCCESSFUL	SUSPICIOUS	TROOPSHIPS	VICTORIOUS
SIGNALLING	SUCCESSIVE	THIRTEENTH	TWENTYFIVE	VISIBILITY
SIMILARITY	SUFFICIENT	THREATENED	UNDERSTAND	WILLATTACK
STATISTICS	SUPPORTING	TRAJECTORY	UNDERSTOOD	WITHDRAWAL

ELEVEN LETTER WORDS

ACCESSORIES	CONCEALMENT	EMBARKATION	INTERCEPTED	REAPPOINTED
AERONAUTICS	CONCENTRATE	EMPLACEMENT	INTERESTING	RECOGNITION
ACKNOWLEDGE	CONFINEMENT	ENCOUNTERED	INTERFERING	RECOMMENDED
ALTERNATING	CONSTITUTED	ENEMYPLANES	INTERPRETER	RECONNOITER
APPLICATION	CONSUMPTION	ENFORCEMENT	INTERRUPTED	REPLACEMENT
APPOINTMENT	CONTINENTAL	ENGAGEMENTS	INTERVENING	REQUIREMENT
APPROACHING	CONTROVERSY	ENGINEERING	INVESTIGATE	REQUISITION
APPROPRIATE	COOPERATION	ESTABLISHED	LEGISLATION	RESERVATION
APPROXIMATE	CORPORATION	ESTIMATEDAT	LIGHTBOMBER	RESIGNATION
ARBITRATION	CORRECTNESS	EXAMINATION	MAINTENANCE	RESPONSIBLE
ARMORED CARS	CREDENTIALS	EXPLANATION	MANUFACTURE	RESTRICTION
ARRANGEMENT	CUSTOMHOUSE	EXTENSIVELY	MEASUREMENT	RETALIATION
ASSESSMENTS	DEBARKATION	EXTERMINATE	NATIONALISM	RETROACTIVE
ASSIGNMENTS	DEMONSTRATE	FINGERPRINT	NATIONALITY	SCHOOLHOUSE
ASSOCIATION	DESCRIPTION	FIRECONTROL	NAVALATTACK	SEVENTEENTH
BATTLEFIELD	DESCRIPTIVE	HEAVYBOMBER	NAVALBATTLE	SEVENTYFIVE
BATTLESHIPS	DESIGNATION	HEAVYLOSSES	NAVALFORCES	SIGNIFICANT
BELLIGERENT	DESTRUCTION	HOSTILITIES	NECESSITATE	SMOKESCREEN
BLOCKBUSTER	DETERIORATE	IMMEDIATELY	OBSERVATION	STRATEGICAL
BOMBARDMENT	DEVELOPMENT	IMMIGRATION	OVERWHELMED	SUBSISTENCE
CATASTROPHE	DISAPPEARED	IMPEDIMENTA	PARENTHESSES	SUITABILITY
CERTIFICATE	DISCONTINUE	IMPROVEMENT	PARENTHESIS	SUPERIORITY
CIRCULATION	DISCREPANCY	INCOMPETENT	PENETRATION	SURRENDERED
COEFFICIENT	DISINFECTED	INDEPENDENT	PERFORMANCE	SYNCHRONIZE
COINCIDENCE	DISPOSITION	INFLAMMABLE	PHILIPPINES	TEMPERATURE
COMMUNICATE	DISTINCTION	INFORMATION	PHOTOGRAPHY	THERMOMETER
COMMUNIQUES	DISTINGUISH	INSPIRATION	PREARRANGED	TOPOGRAPHIC
COMPARTMENT	DYNAMOMETER	INSTITUTION	PREPARATION	TRADITIONAL
COMPETITION	ECHOLONMENT	INSTRUCTION	PRELIMINARY	TRANSFERRED
COMPOSITION	EFFECTIVELY	INSTRUMENTS	PROGRESSIVE	WITHDRAWING
COMPUTATION	ELECTRICITY	INTELLIGENT	RANGEFINDER	

TWELVE LETTER WORDS

ADVANTAGEOUS	CARELESSNESS	CONCENTRATED	CONSIDERABLE	COORDINATION
AGRICULTURAL	COMMENCEMENT	CONCILIATION	CONSTITUTING	DECENTRALIZE
ANNOUNCEMENT	COMMENDATION	CONFIDENTIAL	CONSTITUTION	DECIPHERMENT
ANTIAIRCRAFT	COMMISSIONED	CONFIRMATION	CONSTRUCTION	DEMONSTRATED
ANTICIPATION	COMMISSIONER	CONFISCATION	CONTINUATION	DEPARTMENTAL
BREAKTHROUGH	COMPENSATION	CONFORMATION	CONVALESCENT	DIFFICULTIES
CANCELLATION	COMPLETENESS	CONSCRIPTION	CONVERSATION	DISORGANIZED

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Table D-1 (c). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word length (U)--Continued

TWELVE LETTER WORDS--Continued

DISPLACEMENT	HYDROGRAPHIC	INTERVENTION	PREPAREDNESS	SHARPSHOOTER
DISSEMINATED	ILLUMINATING	INTRODUCTION	PRESERVATION	SIGNIFICANCE
DISTRIBUTING	ILLUMINATION	INTRODUCTORY	PRESIDENTIAL	SIMULTANEOUS
DISTRIBUTION	ILLUSTRATION	IRREGULARITY	PROCLAMATION	SOUTHWESTERN
EMPLACEMENTS	INAUGURATION	LIGHTBOMBERS	PSYCHROMETER	SUBSTITUTION
ENCIPHERMENT	INCOMPETENCE	MARKSMANSHIP	RADIOSTATION	SUCCESSFULLY
ENTANGLEMENT	INEFFICIENCY	MEASUREMENTS	RECREATIONAL	TRANSFERRING
ENTERPRISING	INSTRUCTIONS	MEDIUMBOMBER	REENLISTMENT	TRANSMISSION
FIGHTERPLANE	INTELLIGENCE	MOBILIZATION	REGISTRATION	TRANSPACIFIC
GENERALALARM	INTERCEPTION	NONCOMBATANT	REPLACEMENTS	UNIDENTIFIED
GENERALSTAFF	INTERDICTION	NORTHWESTERN	RESPECTFULLY	UNITEDSTATES
GEOGRAPHICAL	INTERFERENCE	OBSTRUCTIONS	ROADJUNCTION	UNSUCCESSFUL
HEADQUARTERS	INTERMEDIATE	ORGANIZATION	SATISFACTORY	VERIFICATION
HEAVYBOMBERS	INTERRUPTION	PREPARATIONS	SEARCHLIGHTS	VETERINARIAN

THIRTEEN LETTER WORDS

ACCOMMODATION	CORRESPONDING	DISTINGUISHED	INSTANTANEOUS	REAPPOINTMENT
APPROXIMATELY	COUNTERATTACK	ENTERTAINMENT	INTERNATIONAL	REENFORCEMENT
CHRONOLOGICAL	DECENTRALIZED	ESTABLISHMENT	INVESTIGATION	REIMBURSEMENT
CIRCUMSTANCES	DEMONSTRATION	EXTERMINATION	MEDIUMBOMBERS	REINFORCEMENT
COMMUNICATION	DEPENDABILITY	EXTRAORDINARY	MISCELLANEOUS	REINSTATEMENT
CONCENTRATING	DETERMINATION	FIGHTERPLANES	PRELIMINARIES	REVOLUTIONARY
CONCENTRATION	DISAPPEARANCE	IMPRACTICABLE	QUALIFICATION	SPECIFICATION
CONGRESSIONAL	DISCREPANCIES	INDETERMINATE	QUARTERMASTER	TRANSATLANTIC
CONSIDERATION	DISSEMINATION	INSTALLATIONS		

FOURTEEN LETTER WORDS

ADMINISTRATION	DEMOBILIZATION	IRREGULARITIES	RECONSTRUCTION
ADMINISTRATIVE	DISCONTINUANCE	METEOROLOGICAL	REORGANIZATION
CENTRALIZATION	DISTINGUISHING	NATURALIZATION	REPRESENTATIVE
CHARACTERISTIC	IDENTIFICATION	RECOMMENDATION	RESPONSIBILITY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL	INTERPRETATION	RECONNAISSANCE	SATISFACTORILY
CLASSIFICATION	INVESTIGATIONS	RECONNOITERING	TRANSPORTATION
CORRESPONDENCE			

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Table D-2 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)

THREE LETTER WORDS

SEA	SEE	MAJ	TAN	TOP	EAT	BUT	FIX
JOB	AGE	ADJ	GEN	GHQ	MAT	CUT	MIX
ROB	SHE	ASK	MEN	BAR	VAT	OUT	SIX
TUB	THE	GAL	PEN	CAR	ACT	PUT	BOX
QMC	DIE	ALL	TEN	FAR	GET	PVT	FOX
ARC	ONE	ILL	PIN	PAR	LET	CWT	DAY
BAD	ARE	COL	TIN	WAR	NET	YOU	LAY
HAD	USE	CPL	TON	HER	SET	CAV	MAY
ADD	DUE	CAM	WON	PER	WET	LAW	PAY
RED	OWE	HAM	DUN	AIR	YET	SAW	SAY
AID	EYE	AIM	GUN	FOR	SGT	FEW	WAY
BID	OFF	HIM	RUN	OUR	WGT	NEW	ANY
DID	BAG	ARM	SUN	GAS	FIT	HOW	SPY
RID	KEG	SUM	OWN	HAS	GOT	LOW	DRY
OLD	BIG	CAN	AGO	WAS	LOT	NOW	TRY
AND	JIG	MAN	TOO	HIS	NOT	TAX	BUY
END	DOG	NAN	TWO	ITS	APT		

FOUR LETTER WORDS

AREA	MIKE	BASE	WEEK	WELL	NOON	PASS	LIST
ASIA	YOKE	FUSE	TALK	HILL	SOON	LESS	LOST
BULB	ABLE	DATE	BULK	WILL	DOWN	MESS	POST
BOMB	FILE	LATE	RANK	FULL	TOWN	LOSS	JUST
HEAD	MILE	NOTE	SANK	TOOL	ZERO	HITS	ROUT
LEAD	MULE	BLUE	TANK	TEAM	ALSO	DAYS	NEXT
LOAD	RULE	HAVE	SUNK	THEM	INTO	MEAT	TEXT
ROAD	SAME	FIVE	BOOK	ITEM	KEEP	THAT	LIEU
RAID	TIME	LOVE	COOK	MAIM	SHIP	WHAT	DRAW
SAID	SOME	MOVE	HOOK	FROM	DUMP	FEET	XRAY
HOLD	LINE	FUZE	LOOK	FARM	PUMP	MEET	AWAY
HAND	MINE	HALF	TOOK	FIRM	STOP	LEFT	BODY
LAND	NINE	FLAG	DARK	FORM	NEAR	OMIT	THEY
KIND	ZONE	KING	PARK	THAN	REAR	UNIT	ALLY
HARD	JUNE	LONG	MASK	PLAN	OVER	HALT	ONLY
HERD	OBOE	EACH	TASK	BEEN	FOUR	TENT	JULY
ONCE	PIPE	HIGH	ORAL	SEEN	YOUR	SHOT	ARMY
MADE	TYPE	DASH	MTCL	THEN	EYES	RIOT	MANY
AIDE	TARE	PUSH	FEEL	WHEN	THIS	DIRT	VARY
SIDE	HERE	RUSH	RAIL	OPEN	AXIS	EAST	VERY
CODE	WERE	WITH	CALL	MAIN	TONS	FAST	EASY
FLEE	FIRE	BOTH	FALL	RAIN	GUNS	LAST	CITY
EDGE	WIRE	LEAK	CELL	JOIN	MASS	WEST	NAVY
TAKE	MORE	BACK	FELL				

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Table D-2 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

FIVE LETTER WORDS

COMMA	SCALE	ALONG	CANAL	WAGON	PRIOR	DRESS	START
ZEBRA	TITLE	AMONG	FATAL	UNION	MAJOR	PRESS	ALERT
SQUAD	ALINE	BEACH	VITAL	COLON	VALOR	CROSS	LEAST
SPEED	SLOPE	REACH	TOTAL	DRAWN	ARMOR	FLATS	COAST
WIPED	FLARE	WHICH	EQUAL	RADIO	HONOR	BOATS	CREST
RIGID	THERE	MARCH	USUAL	EQUIP	ERROR	RAFTS	GUEST
RAPID	WHERE	WEIGH	NAVAL	TROOP	MOTOR	UNITS	FIRST
FIELD	SHORE	FRESH	WHEEL	GROUP	AREAS	TRACT	BURST
BLIND	CEASE	WIDTH	STEEL	CLEAR	BOMBS	FLEET	ABOUT
GUARD	ERASE	FIFTH	REPEL	SUGAR	RAIDS	QUIET	ALLOW
AWARD	THESE	TENTH	LEVEL	UNDER	WOODS	ASSET	ANNEX
THIRD	CLOSE	NINTH	APRIL	ORDER	YARDS	SHIFT	TODAY
BRIBE	HORSE	BOOTH	SMALL	DEFER	MILES	EIGHT	DELAY
PLACE	CAUSE	DEPTH	SHELL	REFER	FIRES	FIGHT	READY
VOICE	HOUSE	NORTH	SPELL	EAGER	CASES	LIGHT	FOGGY
FORCE	ROUTE	SOUTH	DRILL	ROGER	GATES	NIGHT	DAILY
TRUCE	ISSUE	SIXTH	ALARM	ETHER	PACKS	RIGHT	RALLY
THREE	LEAVE	BREAK	JAPAN	OTHER	DECKS	SIGHT	APPLY
RIDGE	DRIVE	BLACK	QUEEN	BAKER	DOCKS	AWAIT	EARLY
SIEGE	PROVE	CHECK	TAKEN	LATER	BANKS	SPLIT	ENEMY
RANGE	CURVE	QUICK	SEVEN	METER	TANKS	LIMIT	EVERY
BARGE	SEIZE	TRUCK	GIVEN	PETER	PLANS	VISIT	FERRY
LARGE	CHIEF	CREEK	ALIGN	AFTER	SHIPS	AGENT	FIFTY
GAUGE	STAFF	FLANK	AGAIN	ENTER	CORPS	POINT	PARTY
STAKE	PROOF	CLERK	PLAIN	RIVER	FEARS	FRONT	FORTY
SMOKE	BEING	LOCAL	TRAIN	COVER	PAIRS	COUNT	SIXTY
BROKE	GOING	VOCAL	BEGIN	THEIR	HOURS	DEPOT	HEAVY

SIX LETTER WORDS

CANADA	HALTED	DEVICE	CHARGE	SEVERE	ARRIVE	TRENCH	MANUAL
ARABIA	ROUTED	NOVICE	GEORGE	RETIRE	ACTIVE	LAUNCH	ANNUAL
ALASKA	LIQUID	FIERCE	REFUGE	ENTIRE	TWELVE	SEARCH	CASUAL
PANAMA	INLAND	REDUCE	MORALE	BEFORE	BREEZE	CHURCH	VISUAL
METRIC	ISLAND	PARADE	UNABLE	SECURE	RELIEF	SWITCH	CANCEL
CRITIC	DEFEND	DECIDE	CIRCLE	ASSURE	ZIGZAG	THOUGH	VESSEL
BOMBED	OFFEND	DIVIDE	SINGLE	FUTURE	RIDING	FINISH	DETAIL
BARBED	DEPEND	DECODE	MOBILE	GREASE	FILING	EIGHTH	REFILL
RAIDED	EXPEND	ENCODE	BEETLE	CHEESE	LINING	FOURTH	ENROLL
LANDED	INTEND	COFFEE	BATTLE	ADVISE	MINING	ATTACK	SCHOOL
WOODED	EXTEND	DECREE	SETTLE	DEVISE	FIRING	DEBARK	PATROL
INDEED	SECOND	DEGREE	LITTLE	OPPOSE	WIRING	EMBARK	PISTOL
ALLIED	BEYOND	STRAFE	NOZZLE	COURSE	DURING	VERBAL	SYSTEM
KILLED	GROUND	ENGAGE	MUZZLE	REFUSE	NOTING	RADIAL	VICTIM
FORMED	METHOD	DAMAGE	SCHEME	LOCATE	MOVING	SERIAL	SIGCOM
DOWNED	PERIOD	MANAGE	RESUME	EXCITE	FLYING	ANIMAL	BOTTOM
SCORED	RECORD	GARAGE	ENGINE	MINUTE	BREACH	FORMAL	INFORM
PASSED	OFFICE	BRIDGE	RAVINE	RESCUE	DETACH	NORMAL	MEDIUM
CAUSED	POLICE	ALLEGE	EUROPE	LEAGUE	ATTACH	SIGNAL	SUDDEN
UNITED	ADVICE	CHANGE	SPHERE	PURSUE	BRANCH	POSTAL	SCREEN

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Table D-2 (∅). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

SIX LETTER WORDS--Continued

SUNKEN	MORTAR	RUNNER	FORCES	COLORS	TARGET	CANNOT	MONDAY
BROKEN	RUBBER	KEEPER	BARGES	ACCESS	PICKET	ACCEPT	SUNDAY
SEAMEN	MEMBER	HELPER	BODIES	EXCESS	ROCKET	EXCEPT	ANYWAY
HAPPEN	BOMBER	PROPER	ALLIES	UNLESS	BILLET	PROMPT	REMEDY
BATTEN	NUMBER	NEARER	ARMIES	STRESS	TURRET	DEPART	VALLEY
ELEVEN	PINCER	ERASER	TABLES	ACROSS	SUNSET	DESERT	PARLEY
REMAIN	LEADER	CENTER	PLANES	ASSETS	WEIGHT	DIVERT	CONVEY
ATTAIN	LADDER	BETTER	PASSES	VISITS	FLIGHT	ESCORT	SURVEY
WITHIN	MURDER	LETTER	LOSSES	POINTS	SLIGHT	EFFORT	VERIFY
COLUMN	PREFER	BITTER	STATES	STATUS	NAUGHT	REPORT	SUPPLY
RATION	SUFFER	LITTER	ROUTES	ALWAYS	FOUGHT	ARREST	HOURLY
ACTION	MEAGER	AFFAIR	ISSUES	COMBAT	NOUGHT	RESIST	DEPLOY
COMMON	HIGHER	REPAIR	CRISIS	DEFEAT	CREDIT	ASSIST	EMPLOY
SUMMON	CIPHER	HARBOR	SHELLS	THREAT	SUBMIT	AUGUST	CONVOY
POISON	EITHER	TERROR	SPOOLS	DEFECT	COMMIT	ADJUST	OCCUPY
LESSON	TANKER	MIRROR	TRAINS	EFFECT	SUMMIT	DUGOUT	SALARY
PONTON	HAMMER	SECTOR	SPOONS	REJECT	RESULT	OUTPUT	ARMORY
RETURN	SUMMER	VICTOR	STRIPS	SELECT	ORIENT	BUREAU	NINETY
DRYRUN	BANNER	DOCTOR	TROOPS	EXPECT	INTENT	REVIEW	EIGHTY
TATTOO	MANNER	CANVAS	ORDERS	DIRECT	EXTENT	FOLLOW	TWENTY
APPEAR	GUNNER	PLACES	OTHERS	STREET	INVENT	FRIDAY	THIRTY
DOLLAR							

SEVEN LETTER WORDS

MILITIA	RETIRED	WINDAGE	DECLARE	COMMUTE	FISHING	VARYING
ANTENNA	ARMORED	BAGGAGE	PREPARE	REVENUE	PUSHING	ICEBERG
ALMANAC	PRESSED	PACKAGE	CALIBRE	RELIEVE	NOTHING	DEBOUGH
BIVOUAC	CROSSED	VILLAGE	MISFIRE	RECEIVE	TALKING	THROUGH
TRAFFIC	OMITTED	TONNAGE	INSPIRE	PASSIVE	SINKING	FURNISH
PACIFIC	DELAYED	AVERAGE	REQUIRE	CAPTIVE	SMOKING	TWELFTH
ASIATIC	COMMAND	STORAGE	INQUIRE	REVOLVE	FALLING	SEVENTH
REDUCED	COMMEND	BARRAGE	LECTURE	APPROVE	FILLING	SETBACK
INVADED	SUSPEND	PASSAGE	RELEASE	OBSERVE	KILLING	DERRICK
DECIDED	RESPOND	MESSAGE	DISEASE	RESERVE	EVENING	DETRUCK
DECODED	BOMBARD	COLLEGE	SUNRISE	ANALYZE	RAINING	ENTRUCK
ENCODED	AWKWARD	ARRANGE	LICENSE	JUMPOFF	MANNING	MEDICAL
WOUNDED	FORWARD	WITHTHE	DEFENSE	BOMBING	RUNNING	LOGICAL
GUARDED	REPLACE	THATTHE	OFFENSE	PLACING	MORNING	CONCEAL
PROCEED	SERVICE	CHARLIE	PROPOSE	FORCING	SLOPING	ILLEGAL
ENGAGED	ADVANCE	PRAIRIE	SUPPOSE	HEADING	MAPPING	MARSHAL
DAMAGED	ABSENCE	VISIBLE	PURPOSE	LEADING	BEARING	INITIAL
REACHED	ENFORCE	BICYCLE	REVERSE	LOADING	GASSING	MARTIAL
MARCHED	BRIGADE	HOSTILE	BECAUSE	BEDDING	MESSING	FEDERAL
WRECKED	GRENADE	EXTREME	MANDATE	RAIDING	MISSING	GENERAL
SHELLED	PRECEDE	CONFINE	RADIATE	HOLDING	LIFTING	SEVERAL
DROPPED	OUTSIDE	MACHINE	OPERATE	LANDING	HALTING	CENTRAL
STOPPED	INCLUDE	ROUTINE	ELEVATE	BINDING	GETTING	NATURAL
HUNDRED	EXCLUDE	CYCLONE	ENTENTE	FINDING	FITTING	COASTAL
ORDERED	REFUGEE	WARFARE	PROMOTE	FORGING	ISSUING	GRADUAL
COVERED						

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Table D-2 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

SEVEN LETTER WORDS--Continued

UNUSUAL	ENTRAIN	ENVELOP	STARTER	SUCCESS	ASSAULT	RAILWAY
ARRIVAL	CONTAIN	SIMILAR	QUARTER	USELESS	INSTANT	SECRECY
CHANNEL	CAPTAIN	REGULAR	DELIVER	ILLNESS	ELEMENT	VACANCY
COLONEL	CONDEMN	CALIBER	RECOVER	WITNESS	COMMENT	SIGNIFY
COUNCIL	ABANDON	OCTOBER	AVIATOR	ADDRESS	CURRENT	SATISFY
FUELOIL	OPINION	OFFICER	TRACTOR	EXPRESS	PRESENT	RAPIDLY
INSTALL	SESSION	POUNDER	VISITOR	DISMISS	APPOINT	QUICKLY
DISTILL	MISSION	TRIGGER	TACTICS	DISCUSS	RECEIPT	NIGHTLY
PAYROLL	STATION	WEATHER	ISLANDS	TARGETS	ATTEMPT	SHORTLY
CONTROL	SECTION	WHETHER	CHANGES	SURPLUS	SUPPORT	COMPANY
WILLIAM	ECHELON	ANOTHER	ENEMIES	RETREAT	SUGGEST	DESTROY
DIAGRAM	BALLOON	FARTHER	BATTLES	EXTRACT	HIGHEST	PRIMARY
PROGRAM	PLATOON	FURTHER	GLASSES	CONTACT	NEAREST	SUMMARY
MINIMUM	LIAISON	SOLDIER	CHASSIS	COLLECT	PROTEST	LIBRARY
MAXIMUM	HORIZON	CARRIER	ATTACKS	RESPECT	REQUEST	JANUARY
HASBEEN	EASTERN	COURIER	VESSELS	CORRECT	AGAINST	BRIBERY
FIFTEEN	WESTERN	HEAVIER	PATROLS	PROTECT	OUTPOST	BATTERY
SIXTEEN	FOGHORN	TRAWLER	BOMBERS	INFLICT	PROVOST	INQUIRY
BETWEEN	UNKNOWN	STEAMER	NUMBERS	CONDUCT	BOYCOTT	CAVALRY
KITCHEN	TOBACCO	CLIPPER	REPAIRS	TONIGHT	WITHOUT	VICTORY
WRITTEN	TORPEDO	CRUISER	SAILORS	CIRCUIT	LOOKOUT	EMBASSY
EXPLAIN	WARSHIP	AMMETER	SECTORS	RECRUIT	SIMPLEX	UTILITY
TERRAIN	DEVELOP	FIGHTER	COMPASS	PURSUIT	TUESDAY	SEVENTY
DETRAIN						

EIGHT LETTER WORDS

INSIGNIA	EXPELLED	DICTATED	STANDARD	LANGUAGE	ENVELOPE	OPPOSITE
SPECIFIC	ENROLLED	EFFECTED	OUTBOARD	DISLODGE	INSECURE	CONTINUE
TERRIFIC	DISARMED	INFECTED	OUTGUARD	EXCHANGE	PRESSURE	CRITIQUE
ECONOMIC	ASSIGNED	REJECTED	WINDWARD	PROBABLE	DECREASE	THATHAVE
MECHANIC	RETURNED	SELECTED	EASTWARD	SUITABLE	EXERCISE	DECISIVE
ATLANTIC	APPEARED	BILLETED	WESTWARD	ELIGIBLE	SURPRISE	POSITIVE
RAILHEAD	DECLARED	INVENTED	DESCRIBE	TERRIBLE	SUSPENSE	PRESERVE
RAILROAD	PREPARED	DEPARTED	ORDNANCE	POSSIBLE	DISPERSE	EQUALIZE
REPLACED	HINDERED	DESERTED	DISTANCE	FLEXIBLE	TRAVERSE	MOBILIZE
ADVANCED	SUFFERED	ESCORTED	COMMENCE	ASSEMBLE	DEDICATE	INVADING
DEMANDED	CENTERED	DEPORTED	SENTENCE	OBSTACLE	INDICATE	DIVIDING
EXPANDED	BATTERED	REPORTED	ANNOUNCE	ENCIRCLE	INITIATE	BUILDING
DEFENDED	LETTERED	ARRESTED	COMMERCE	SCHEDULE	ESTIMATE	GUARDING
OFFENDED	REPAIRED	ENLISTED	ENFILADE	MARITIME	ORDINATE	ENGAGING
EXPENDED	REQUIRED	SURVIVED	CONCLUDE	AIRDROME	DETONATE	DAMAGING
EXTENDED	RESTORED	IMPROVED	LATITUDE	AIRPLANE	SEPARATE	MARCHING
GROUNDED	DEFERRED	OBSERVED	ALTITUDE	JETPLANE	EVACUATE	BREAKING
BESIEGED	CAPTURED	REVIEWED	EMPLOYEE	MEDICINE	EXCAVATE	FLANKING
DETACHED	REPULSED	DEPLOYED	CARRIAGE	DOCTRINE	OBSOLETE	TOTALING
FINISHED	COMPOSED	AIRFIELD	FUSELAGE	POSTPONE	COMPLETE	SHELLING
OCCUPIED	MANDATED	FOOTHOLD	EQUIPAGE	SEABORNE	CONCRETE	BATTLING
ATTACKED	DEFEATED	THOUSAND	FRONTAGE	AIRBORNE	EXPEDITE	SWIMMING
REPULLED	REPEATED	SURROUND	SABOTAGE	DEVELOPE	DEFINITE	TRAINING

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Table D-2 (ø). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

EIGHT LETTER WORDS--Continued

PLANNING	ELEVENTH	CAMPAIGN	PRISONER	VEHICLES	RESPECTS	WITHDRAW
SWEEPING	ANTITANK	CHAPLAIN	IMPROPER	MISFIRES	ELEMENTS	WITHDREW
SHIPPING	CODEBOOK	MAINTAIN	REPEATER	DEFENSES	ATTEMPTS	TOMORROW
GROUPING	CHEMICAL	MOUNTAIN	DESERTER	EXPENSES	PROTESTS	PARALLAX
ENTERING	CLERICAL	BULLETIN	DISASTER	PURPOSES	OUTPOSTS	SATURDAY
COVERING	TACTICAL	INVASION	REGISTER	RESERVES	ENORMOUS	THURSDAY
RETIRING	CRITICAL	DECISION	CANISTER	ANALYSIS	LUMINOUS	CAUSEWAY
ADVISING	NAUTICAL	DIVISION	RECEIVER	BARRACKS	RIGOROUS	EFFICACY
OPPOSING	OFFICIAL	LOCATION	REVOLVER	MISSIONS	VIGOROUS	IDENTIFY
DRESSING	MATERIAL	AVIATION	OBSERVER	STATIONS	CONTRACT	STRATEGY
PRESSING	MEMORIAL	CITATION	MANEUVER	FACTIONS	INDIRECT	PROBABLY
CROSSING	NATIONAL	TAXATION	EMPLOYER	PONTOONS	CONFLICT	ASSEMBLY
DRIFTING	INTERNAL	JUNCTION	HOWITZER	WARSHIPS	DISTRICT	ACTUALLY
FIGHTING	CORPORAL	IGNITION	CORRIDOR	OFFICERS	INSTRUCT	MONOPOLY
SIGHTING	HOSPITAL	POSITION	SUPERIOR	SOLDIERS	AIRCRAFT	EASTERLY
LIMITING	APPROVAL	FORENOON	INTERIOR	CARRIERS	DAYLIGHT	WESTERLY
PAINTING	MATERIEL	SQUADRON	EXTERIOR	TRAILERS	MIDNIGHT	BOUNDARY
PRINTING	PARALLEL	GARRISON	OPERATOR	TRAWLERS	PROHIBIT	MILITARY
SPOTTING	SENTINEL	NORTHERN	DICTATOR	CRUISERS	SERGEANT	SANITARY
DELAYING	SEALEVEL	SOUTHERN	REJECTOR	FIGHTERS	DOMINANT	FEBRUARY
RALLYING	PROTOCOL	CIRCULAR	DIRECTOR	QUARTERS	ADJUTANT	CEMETERY
CARRYING	MERCIFUL	DECEMBER	DETECTOR	CARELESS	ADJACENT	ADVISORY
FERRYING	TELEGRAM	REMEMBER	ASSOONAS	WIRELESS	INCIDENT	INFANTRY
APPROACH	AMERICAN	NOVEMBER	POLITICS	BUSINESS	ARMAMENT	CAPACITY
ENTRENCH	EUROPEAN	DEFENDER	COMMANDS	DARKNESS	MOVEMENT	FATALITY
INTRENCH	CIVILIAN	RECORDER	ADVANCES	CONGRESS	REGIMENT	CALAMITY
RESEARCH	HAVEBEEN	ENGINEER	BARRAGES	PROGRESS	APPARENT	VICINITY
DISPATCH	NINETEEN	TRANSFER	MESSAGES	FORTRESS	PASSPORT	PRIORITY
DISPATCH	EIGHTEEN	DECIPHER	REMEDIES	DISTRESS	INTEREST	ACTIVITY
SKIRMISH	THIRTEEN	ENCIPHER	SUPPLIES	REDCROSS	REENLIST	CASUALTY
DIMINISH	FOURTEEN					

NINE LETTER WORDS

MEMORANDA	CANCELLED	IMPRESSED	ATTEMPTED	ASSURANCE	AERODROME
STRATEGIC	COMPELLED	DISCUSSED	PROTESTED	ALLOWANCE	HURRICANE
AUTOMATIC	DETRAINED	INDICATED	REQUESTED	INCIDENCE	AEROPLANE
PATRIOTIC	ENTRAINED	POPULATED	SUBMITTED	REFERENCE	INTERVENE
BALLISTIC	CONDEMNED	ESTIMATED	CONTINUED	INFLUENCE	FRONTLINE
BEACHHEAD	ECHELONED	DOMINATED	DESTROYED	REENFORCE	DETERMINE
SPEARHEAD	DEVELOPED	DETONATED	MOTORIZED	REINFORCE	TELEPHONE
DESCRIBED	CONQUERED	SUSPECTED	SEMIRIGID	LONGITUDE	INTERFERE
ANNOUNCED	PREFERRED	CORRECTED	RECOMMEND	COMMITTEE	ELSEWHERE
BLOCKADED	CONFERRED	PROTECTED	REARGUARD	ADVANTAGE	SHELLFIRE
SUCCEDED	DECREASED	INFLECTED	NORTHWARD	CARTRIDGE	THEREFORE
PROCEEDED	INCREASED	COMPLETED	SOUTHWARD	CHALLENGE	PROCEDURE
COMMANDED	CONDENSED	INHABITED	AMBULANCE	AVAILABLE	PREMATURE
SUSPENDED	COLLAPSED	EXHIBITED	DOMINANCE	UNTENABLE	DEPARTURE
BOMBARDED	DISPERSED	ASSAULTED	CLEARANCE	DIRIGIBLE	NAVALBASE
FORTIFIED	ADDRESSED	APPOINTED	ENDURANCE	PRINCIPLE	MANGANESE

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Table D-2 (c). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

NINE LETTER WORDS--Continued

CRITICISE	REGARDING	PERSONNEL	INVENTION	CONTINUES	STATEMENT
INTERPOSE	ACCORDING	CABLEGRAM	PROMOTION	BUILDINGS	EQUIPMENT
ASSOCIATE	INCLUDING	RADIOGRAM	SEMICOLON	OFFICIALS	GROUPMENT
IMMEDIATE	LAUNCHING	FIREALARM	AFTERNOON	REPRISALS	INTERMENT
OSCILLATE	ATTACKING	CRITICISM	DISAPPEAR	PROPOSALS	ALLOTMENT
CIRCULATE	DEBARKING	MECHANISM	IRREGULAR	CIVILIANS	PERMANENT
DESIGNATE	REFILLING	DIETITIAN	SEPTEMBER	CAMPAIGNS	DIFFERENT
ALTERNATE	SCREENING	SEVENTEEN	COMMANDER	MAINTAINS	REPRESENT
COOPERATE	REMAINING	SUSPICION	SURRENDER	DIVISIONS	RESTRAINT
ELABORATE	OBTAINING	BATTALION	REMAINDER	MUNITIONS	INTERCEPT
PENETRATE	INCLINING	REBELLION	PASSENGER	POSITIONS	INTERRUPT
REINSTATE	BEGINNING	COLLISION	MESSENGER	ENGINEERS	TRANSPORT
CIGARETTE	RETURNING	PROVISION	BRIGADIER	PRISONERS	NORTHEAST
PARACHUTE	PREPARING	EXPANSION	STRAGGLER	READINESS	SOUTHEAST
DESTITUTE	NUMBERING	ASCENSION	NEWSPAPER	CONFLICTS	NORTHWEST
TECHNIQUE	CENTERING	DIMENSION	CHARACTER	DISTRICTS	SOUTHWEST
EXPANSIVE	REQUIRING	EXTENSION	KILOMETER	INCIDENTS	INTERVIEW
DEFENSIVE	OPERATING	EXPLOSION	BAROMETER	MOVEMENTS	YESTERDAY
OFFENSIVE	ENLISTING	ADMISSION	GYROMETER	OUTSKIRTS	WEDNESDAY
EXPENSIVE	RECEIVING	EXCLUSION	DESTROYER	ANONYMOUS	EMERGENCY
INTENSIVE	REVIEWING	RADIATION	PROJECTOR	APPARATUS	NORTHERLY
EXTENSIVE	EMPLOYING	VARIATION	PROTECTOR	DISINFECT	SERIOUSLY
EXPLOSIVE	OCCUPYING	INFLATION	CHAUFFEUR	INTERDICT	INSTANTLY
EXCESSIVE	PARAGRAPH	FORMATION	LOGISTICS	DIFFICULT	ACCOMPANY
INCLUSIVE	ESTABLISH	OPERATION	STANDARDS	COMBATANT	ARBITRARY
EXCLUSIVE	TWENTIETH	SITUATION	RESOURCES	IMPORTANT	NECESSARY
TENTATIVE	FIFTEENTH	ELEVATION	COMPANIES	ASSISTANT	SECRETARY
DEFECTIVE	SIXTEENTH	OBJECTION	BATTERIES	CONFIDENT	ARTILLERY
EFFECTIVE	WATERTANK	DIRECTION	EMBASSIES	PRÉSIDENT	ACCESSORY
OBJECTIVE	TECHNICAL	CONDITION	AIRDROMES	DEPENDENT	TERRITORY
INCENTIVE	CHRONICAL	COALITION	SEAPLANES	NEGLIGENT	LIABILITY
EXECUTIVE	PRACTICAL	PARTITION	AIRPLANES	DEFICIENT	HOSTILITY
RECOGNIZE	POLITICAL	DETENTION	EXERCISES	EFFICIENT	PROXIMITY
SERVICING	IDENTICAL	RETENTION	WITNESSES	PLACEMENT	INDEMNITY
ADVANCING	PRINCIPAL	INTENTION	ADDRESSES	AGREEMENT	INTEGRITY
PRECEDING	DISMISSAL	ATTENTION	ESTIMATES	AMUSEMENT	NECESSITY
EXTENDING	CONTINUAL				

TEN LETTER WORDS

ATOMICBOMB	APPROACHED	COMPRESSED	UNDERSTOOD	CONFIDENCE
GEOGRAPHIC	ENTRENCHED	DISTRESSED	COASTGUARD	NEGLIGENCE
GYROSCOPIC	DESPATCHED	DESIGNATED	POSTOFFICE	EXPERIENCE
DIPLOMATIC	DISPATCHED	RESTRICTED	ACCORDANCE	PREFERENCE
BRIDGEHEAD	THREATENED	INSTRUCTED	ALLEGIANCE	DIFFERENCE
PRESCRIBED	MAINTAINED	PROHIBITED	APPEARANCE	CONFERENCE
REENFORCED	DETERMINED	REENLISTED	ACCEPTANCE	CAMOUFLAGE
REINFORCED	ONEHUNDRED	MECHANIZED	RESISTANCE	DEPENDABLE
BEENNEEDED	DECIPHERED	CONTRABAND	ASSISTANCE	EXPENDABLE
UNEXPENDED	ENCIPHERED	UNDERSTAND	PRECEDENCE	IMPASSABLE

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Table D-2 (e). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

TEN LETTER WORDS--Continued

UNSUITABLE	EVACUATING	ALLOCATION	GONIOMETER	CONTINGENT
ACCEPTABLE	COLLECTING	FOUNDATION	HYDROMETER	SUFFICIENT
IMPOSSIBLE	CONNECTING	RECREATION	HYGROMETER	CONVENIENT
RECEPTACLE	INFLECTING	IRRIGATION	AMBASSADOR	EQUIVALENT
MOTORCYCLE	EXPEDITING	NAVIGATION	INSTRUCTOR	ENGAGEMENT
AUTOMOBILE	RECRUITING	REGULATION	BALLISTICS	MANAGEMENT
DISCIPLINE	ATTEMPTING	POPULATION	STATISTICS	EXCITEMENT
QUARANTINE	SUPPORTING	ESTIMATION	CROSSROADS	DETACHMENT
ENTERPRISE	EXTINGUISH	DOMINATION	DESPATCHES	ATTACHMENT
TRANSVERSE	NINETEENTH	DETONATION	DISPATCHES	EXPERIMENT
COORDINATE	EIGHTEENTH	OCCUPATION	ASSEMBLIES	ENROLLMENT
ILLUMINATE	THIRTEENTH	SEPARATION	FACILITIES	ASSIGNMENT
ANTICIPATE	FOURTEENTH	DECORATION	ACTIVITIES	ATTAINMENT
ILLITERATE	WILLATTACK	LIMITATION	CASUALTIES	INTERMENT
ILLUSTRATE	ARTIFICIAL	SANITATION	FRONTLINES	GOVERNMENT
COMPENSATE	CREDENTIAL	INVITATION	SUBMARINES	ASSESSMENT
DISTRIBUTE	ADDITIONAL	EVACUATION	OBJECTIVES	COMMITMENT
SUBSTITUTE	ACCIDENTAL	EVALUATION	ENEMYTANKS	DEPARTMENT
CONSTITUTE	REGIMENTAL	EXCAVATION	SUSPICIONS	ENLISTMENT
COMMUNIQUE	INDIVIDUAL	COLLECTION	COLLISIONS	INSTRUMENT
TWENTYFIVE	WITHDRAWAL	CONNECTION	PROVISIONS	EMPLOYMENT
SUCCESSIVE	AIRCONTROL	INSPECTION	EXPLOSIONS	EMPLOYMENT
IMPRESSIVE	SUCCESSFUL	CORRECTION	FORMATIONS	PERSISTENT
LOCOMOTIVE	RESPECTFUL	PROTECTION	OPERATIONS	AIRSUPPORT
CENTRALIZE	MEMORANDUM	EXHIBITION	DIRECTIONS	CONSPIRACY
NATURALIZE	SUSPENSION	EXPEDITION	CONDITIONS	DEFICIENCY
DEMOBILIZE	DISPERSION	DEFINITION	TROOPSHIPS	EFFICIENCY
COMMANDING	CONCESSION	AMMUNITION	NEWSPAPERS	COMPLETELY
DEBOUCHING	CONFESSION	OPPOSITION	KILOMETERS	APPARENTLY
DETRUCKING	DEPRESSION	PROPORTION	DESTROYERS	INCENDIARY
ENTRUCKING	IMPRESSION	REVOLUTION	TRANSPORTS	COMMISSARY
ENCIRCLING	POSSESSION	MACHINEGUN	SUSPICIOUS	ELEMENTARY
SIGNALLING	SUBMISSION	BATTLESHIP	VICTORIOUS	LABORATORY
PATROLLING	COMMISSION	CENSORSHIP	CIRCUITOUS	TRAJECTORY
OVERCOMING	PERMISSION	ARMORED CAR	CONTINUOUS	CAPABILITY
DETRAINING	DISCUSSION	DIVEBOMBER	PHOSPHORUS	AUDIBILITY
CONCERNING	CONCLUSION	COMMANDEER	FLASHLIGHT	VISIBILITY
INDICATING	DEDICATION	DISPATCHER	COMMANDANT	SIMILARITY
ANTEDATING	INDICATION	MILLIMETER	LIEUTENANT	INSECURITY

ELEVEN LETTER WORDS

IMPEDIMENTA	SURRENDERED	CONSTITUTED	CATASTROPHE	CUSTOMHOUSE
TOPOGRAPHIC	ENCOUNTERED	BATTLEFIELD	IMFLAMMABLE	CERTIFICATE
RECOMMENDED	TRANSFERRED	PERFORMANCE	RESPONSIBLE	COMMUNICATE
PREARRANGED	DISINFECTED	MAINTENANCE	NAVALBATTLE	INVESTIGATE
ESTABLISHED	REAPPOINTED	COINCIDENCE	TEMPERATURE	APPROPRIATE
OVERWHELMED	INTERCEPTED	SUBSISTENCE	MANUFACTURE	APPROXIMATE
DISAPPEARED	INTERRUPTED	ACKNOWLEDGE	SCHOOLHOUSE	EXTERMINATE

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Table D-2 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

ELEVEN LETTER WORDS--Continued

DETERIORATE	NATIONALISM	RESTRICTION	ENEMYPLANES	CONFINEMENT
CONCENTRATE	SMOKESCREEN	DISTINCTION	PHILIPPINES	REQUIREMENT
DEMONSTRATE	APPLICATION	DESTRUCTION	PARENTHESSES	MEASUREMENT
NECESSITATE	ASSOCIATION	INSTRUCTION	HEAVYLOSSES	IMPROVEMENT
DISCONTINUE	RETALIATION	RECOGNITION	COMMUNIQUES	CONCEALMENT
SEVENTYFIVE	DEBARKATION	REQUISITION	PARENTHESIS	ECHELONMENT
PROGRESSIVE	EMBARKATION	COMPOSITION	CREDENTIALS	DEVELOPMENT
RETROACTIVE	LEGISLATION	DISPOSITION	BATTLESHIPS	APPOINTMENT
DESCRIPTIVE	CIRCULATION	COMPETITION	ARMORED CARS	COMPARTMENT
SYNCHRONIZE	INFORMATION	DESCRIPTION	CORRECTNESS	BELLIGERENT
APPROACHING	EXPLANATION	CONSUMPTION	ENGAGEMENTS	INCOMPETENT
INTERVENING	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION	ASSIGNMENTS	FINGERPRINT
ENGINEERING	RESIGNATION	LIGHTBOMBER	ASSESSMENTS	DISCREPANCY
INTERFERING	EXAMINATION	HEAVYBOMBER	INSTRUMENTS	PHOTOGRAPHY
ALTERNATING	PREPARATION	RANGEFINDER	ESTIMATED AT	IMMEDIATELY
INTERESTING	COOPERATION	DYNAMOMETER	SIGNIFICANT	EXTENSIVELY
WITHDRAWING	IMMIGRATION	THERMOMETER	INDEPENDENT	EFFECTIVELY
DISTINGUISH	INSPIRATION	INTERPRETER	INTELLIGENT	PRELIMINARY
SEVENTEENTH	CORPORATION	RECONNOITER	COEFFICIENT	CONTROVERSY
NAVALATTACK	PENETRATION	BLOCKBUSTER	BOMBARDMENT	ELECTRICITY
STRATEGICAL	ARBITRATION	AERONAUTICS	REPLACEMENT	NATIONALITY
TRADITIONAL	COMPUTATION	NAVALFORCES	EMPLACEMENT	SUITABILITY
CONTINENTAL	OBSERVATION	ACCESSORIES	ENFORCEMENT	SUPERIORITY
FIRECONTROL	RESERVATION	HOSTILITIES	ARRANGEMENT	

TWELVE LETTER WORDS

TRANSPACIFIC	CONSTITUTING	ILLUMINATION	SUBSTITUTION	REPLACEMENTS
HYDROGRAPHIC	BREAKTHROUGH	ANTICIPATION	CONSTITUTION	EMPLACEMENTS
UNIDENTIFIED	GEOGRAPHICAL	REGISTRATION	NORTHWESTERN	MEASUREMENTS
COMMISSIONED	CONFIDENTIAL	ILLUSTRATION	SOUTHWESTERN	ADVANTAGEOUS
DISSEMINATED	PRESIDENTIAL	INAUGURATION	MARKSMANSHIP	SIMULTANEOUS
CONCENTRATED	RECREATIONAL	COMPENSATION	MEDIUMBOMBER	ANTI-AIRCRAFT
DEMONSTRATED	AGRICULTURAL	CONVERSATION	COMMISSIONER	NONCOMBATANT
DISORGANIZED	DEPARTMENTAL	RADIOSTATION	PSYCHROMETER	CONVALESCENT
SIGNIFICANCE	UNSUCCESSFUL	CONTINUATION	SHARPSHOOTER	DISPLACEMENT
INTELLIGENCE	GENERALALARM	PRESERVATION	DIFFICULTIES	COMMENCEMENT
INTERFERENCE	VETERINARIAN	MOBILIZATION	UNITED STATES	ANNOUNCEMENT
INCOMPETENCE	TRANSMISSION	ORGANIZATION	PREPARATIONS	ENTANGLEMENT
CONSIDERABLE	VERIFICATION	INTERDICTION	OBSTRUCTIONS	DECIPHERMENT
FIGHTERPLANE	CONFISCATION	ROADJUNCTION	INSTRUCTIONS	ENCIPHERMENT
INTERMEDIATE	COMMENDATION	INTRODUCTION	LIGHTBOMBERS	REENLISTMENT
DECENTRALIZE	CONCILIATION	CONSTRUCTION	HEAVYBOMBERS	INEFFICIENCY
GENERALSTAFF	CANCELLATION	INTERVENTION	HEADQUARTERS	SUCCESSFULLY
TRANSFERRING	PROCLAMATION	INTERCEPTION	PREPAREDNESS	RESPECTFULLY
ENTERPRISING	CONFIRMATION	CONSCRIPTION	COMPLETENESS	SATISFACTORY
ILLUMINATING	CONFORMATION	INTERRUPTION	CARELESSNESS	INTRODUCTORY
DISTRIBUTING	COORDINATION	DISTRIBUTION	SEARCHLIGHTS	IRREGULARITY

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Table D-2 (S). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically in reverse order according to word length (U)--Continued

THIRTEEN LETTER WORDS

TRANSATLANTIC	CHRONOLOGICAL	DETERMINATION	FIGHTERPLANES	REINSTATEMENT
DISTINGUISHED	CONGRESSIONAL	EXTERMINATION	INSTALLATIONS	ESTABLISHMENT
DECENTRALIZED	INTERNATIONAL	CONSIDERATION	MEDIUMBOMBERS	ENTERTAINMENT
DISAPPEARANCE	SPECIFICATION	CONCENTRATION	MISCELLANEOUS	REAPPOINTMENT
IMPRACTICABLE	QUALIFICATION	DEMONSTRATION	INSTANTANEOUS	APPROXIMATELY
INDETERMINATE	COMMUNICATION	QUARTERMASTER	REENFORCEMENT	EXTRAORDINARY
CORRESPONDING	ACCOMMODATION	CIRCUMSTANCES	REINFORCEMENT	REVOLUTIONARY
CONCENTRATING	INVESTIGATION	DISCREPANCIES	REIMBURSEMENT	DEPENDABILITY
COUNTERATTACK	DISSEMINATION	PRELIMINARIES		

FOURTEEN LETTER WORDS

CHARACTERISTIC	RECONNOITERING	ADMINISTRATION	REORGANIZATION
RECONNAISSANCE	METEOROLOGICAL	INTERPRETATION	RECONSTRUCTION
DISCONTINUANCE	CIRCUMSTANTIAL	TRANSPORTATION	IRREGULARITIES
CORRESPONDENCE	CLASSIFICATION	CENTRALIZATION	INVESTIGATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE	IDENTIFICATION	NATURALIZATION	SATISFACTORILY
REPRESENTATIVE	RECOMMENDATION	DEMobilIZATION	RESPONSIBILITY
DISTINGUISHING			

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)

PATTERN AA

A CC EPT	FA LL	MA NN ER
A CC ORDING	FE LL	A NN EX
O CC UPY	FU LL	CA NN OT
A DD	HI LL	T OO
SU DD EN	I LL	W OO DS
LA DD ER	INSTA LL	PR OO F
BE DD ING	PAYRO LL	B OO K
FL EE	REFI LL	C OO K
S EE	SHE LL	H OO K
THR EE	SMA LL	L OO K
PROC EE D	SPE LL	T OO K
SP EE D	WE LL	SCH OO L
CR EE K	WI LL	T OO L
W EE K	VI LL AGE	PLAT OO N
F EE L	CO LL APSED	S OO N
ST EE L	DO LL AR	TR OO PS
WH EE L	OSCI LL ATE	C OO RDINATE
B EE N	KI LL ED	B OO TH
FOURT EE N	BI LL ET	STO PP ED
HASB EE N	BU LL ETIN	HA PP EN
QU EE N	VA LL EY	CLI PP ER
SCR EE N	A LL IED	MA PP ING
S EE N	A LL IES	A PP LY
SIXT EE N	FA LL ING	SU PP LY
R EE NLIST	PATRO LL ING	A PP OINT
K EE P	SHE LL ING	A PP OINTED
SW EE PING	A LL OW	SU PP ORT
F EE T	A LL Y	SU PP ORTING
FL EE T	RA LL Y	A PP ROVE
M EE T	CO MM A	TE RR AIN
JUMPO FF	CO MM AND	CU RR ENT
O FF	CO MM ANDER	A RR EST
STA FF	SU MM ARY	HU RR ICANE
O FF END	CO MM END	DE RR ICK
SU FF ER	CO MM ENT	GA RR ISON
TRA FF IC	HA MM ER	A RR IVE
O FF ICE	SU MM ER	CA RR Y
O FF ICER	CO MM IT	FE RR Y
E FF ORT	SU MM IT	ACRO SS
FO GG Y	SU MM ON	COMPA SS
A LL	CO MM UTE	CONGRE SS
CA LL	TO NN AGE	CRO SS
CE LL	CHA NN EL	DARKNE SS
DRI LL	BA NN ER	DRE SS
ENRO LL	GU NN ER	LE SS

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Table D-3 (c). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

PATTERN AA-- Continued

LO SS	A SS	IGNED	BA TT	EN
MA SS	CRO SS	ING	WRI TT	EN
ME SS	DRE SS	ING	BI TT	ER
PA SS	ME SS	ING	LI TT	ER
PRE SS	PA SS	IVE	BA TT	ERY
UNLE SS	LE SS	ON	SPO TT	ING
WITNE SS	I SS	UE	BA TT	LE
PA SS	A SS	URE	BA TT	LESHIP
A SS	EMBA SS	Y	MU ZZ	LE
A SS	OMI TT	ED	NO ZZ	LE
PO SS	SUBMI TT	ED		

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS

AABA	AGR	EEME	NT	AABC	SU	FFICI	ENT
AABA	K	EEPE	R	AABC	A	LLEGE	
AABA	CH	EESE		AABC	CO	LLEGE	
AABA	BR	EEZE		AABC	BI	LLETE	D
AABA	MA	NNIN	G	AABC	A	MMETE	R
AABA	PLA	NNIN	G	AABC	W	OODD	
AABA	RU	NNIN	G	AABC	TE	RRIFI	C
AABA	L	OOKO	UT	AABC	BA	TTERE	D
AABA	E	RROR		AABC	DI	FFERENCE	
AABA	MI	RROR		AABCC	A	CCESS	
AABA	TE	RROR		AABCC	A	CCESS	ORY
AABA	GLA	SSES		AABCC	CO	MMISS	ARY
AABA	LO	SSES		AABCCB	WI	LLATTA	CK
AABA	PA	SSES		AABCCDD	CO	MMITTEE	
AABA	CHA	SSIS		AABCCDEFBC	A	CCESSORIES	
AABA	A	SSIS	T	AABCDA	I	LLEGAL	
AABAACB	A	SSESSME	NT	AABCDA	A	TTEMT	
AABAACBDEA	A	SSESSMENTS		AABCDB	A	TTEMT	D
AABAB	PROC	EEDED		AABCDB	O	FFENSE	
AABB	CO	FFEE		AABCDB	CHA	LLANGE	
AABB	BA	LLOO	N	AABCDB	BA	LLISTI	C
AABBAACAC	B	EENNEFDED		AABCDB	A	RRESTE	D
AABBCBC	SU	CCEDED		AABCDB	PA	SSENGE	R
AABCA	B	EETLE		AABCDB	BA	TTERIE	S
AABCA	A	NNOUN	CE	AABCDBA	SU	RRENDER	
AABCA	F	OOHO	LE	AABCDBABD	SU	RRENDERED	
AABCA	CA	RRIER		AABCDBC	CO	MMANDAN	T
AABCA	A	SSETS		AABCDBD	O	FFENDED	
AABCA	I	SSUES		AABCDBEC	BA	LLISTICS	
AABCADEC	CO	MMITMENT		AABCDC	E	FFICAC	Y
AABCADEC	A	TENTION		AABCDD	A	DDRESS	
AABCADEFEA	A	NNOUNCEMEN	T	AABCDD	I	LLNESS	
AABC	SCR	EENIN	G	AABCDDCA	A	DDRESSED	
AABC	SU	FFERE	D	AABCDDCD	A	DDRESSES	
AABC	DI	FFERE	NT	AABCDEB	CO	MMUNIQUE	E
AABC	O	FFICI	AL	AABCDEB	TR	OOPSHIP	

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Table D-3 (c). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS-- Continued

AABCDEB	A	SSEMBLE	ABA	GROUN	DED
AABCDEBC	TR	OOPSHIPS	ABA	GUAR	DED
AABCDEC	CO	MMANDIN	ABA	INVA	DED
AABCDECB	BA	TTLEFIEL	ABA	LAN	DED
AABCDED	CO	MMADED	ABA	RAI	DED
AABCDEDFC	A	MMUNITION	ABA	WOUN	DED
AABCDEE	CO	MMADEE	ABA		DID
AABCDEFA	R	EENLISTE	ABA	IC	EBE RG
AABCDEFA	I	RREGULAR	ABA	PR	ECE DING
AABCDEFB	O	FFENSIVE	ABA	R	ECE IPT
AABCDEFBA	A	SSEMBLIES	ABA	CR	EDE NTIAL
AABCDEFB	A	LLOTMENT	ABA	F	EDE RAL
AABCDEFB	C	OOPERATE	ABA	D	EFE AT
AABCDEFD	I	LLUSTRAT	ABA	D	EFE CT
AABCDEFD	A	SSIGNMEN	ABA	D	EFE R
AABCDEFDGA	A	SSIGNMENTS	ABA	SI	EGE
AABCDEFGA	C	OOPERATIO	ABA	R	EJE CT
AABCDEFGABF	R	EENLISTMENT	ABA	S	ELE CT
AABCDEFGD	BA	TTLESHIPS	ABA	T	ELE GRAM
AABCDEFGDAE	C	OORDINATION	ABA		ELE VATION
AABCDEFGDE	A	PPPOINTMENT	ABA	SCH	EME
ABA		AGA IN	ABA	R	EME DY
ABA		AGA INST	ABA	DISPLAC	EME NT
ABA	C	ALA MITY	ABA	PLAC	EME NT
ABA		ALA RM	ABA		ENE MY
ABA	S	ALA RY	ABA	G	ENE RAL
ABA	D	AMA GE	ABA	R	EPE L
ABA	M	ANA GE	ABA	H	ERE
ABA	C	ANA L	ABA	SPH	ERE
ABA		ANA LYZE	ABA	TH	ERE
ABA	J	APA N	ABA	W	ERE
ABA	P	ARA CHUTE	ABA	WH	ERE
ABA	P	ARA DE	ABA	CONQU	ERE D
ABA	SEP	ARA TION	ABA	COV	ERE D
ABA	F	ATA L	ABA	TH	ESE
ABA	N	AVA L	ABA	PR	ESE NT
ABA	N	AVA LFORCES	ABA	D	ESE RT
ABA	C	AVA LRY	ABA	COMPL	ETE
ABA	EXC	AVA TION	ABA	KILOM	ETE R
ABA		AWA IT	ABA	M	ETE R
ABA		AWA RD	ABA	P	ETE R
ABA		AWA Y	ABA	D	EVE LOP
ABA	PRO	BAB LE	ABA	S	EVE N
ABA	PRO	BAB LY	ABA	S	EVE NTH
ABA	BI	CYC LE	ABA	S	EVE NTY
ABA		CYC LONE	ABA	S	EVE RAL
ABA	BLOCKA	DED	ABA		EVE RY

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABA		EYE		ABA	M	OTO RIZED
ABA		FIF TH		ABA	PR	OVO ST
ABA		FIF TY		ABA		PIP E
ABA	EIG	HTH		ABA		POP ULATED
ABA	L	IAI SON		ABA	LIB	RAR Y
ABA	PROH	IBI T		ABA	AI	RDR OME
ABA	SERV	ICI NG		ABA	CA	RTR IDGE
ABA	RA	IDI NG		ABA	D	RYR UN
ABA	R	IDI NG		ABA	DI	SAS TER
ABA	R	IGI D		ABA	CA	SES
ABA	F	ILI NG		ABA	RE	SIS T
ABA	M	ILI TARY		ABA		SUS PEND
ABA	MOB	ILI ZE		ABA		SYS TEM
ABA	S	IMI LAR		ABA	S	TAT ION
ABA	L	IMI T		ABA	DIC	TAT OR
ABA	PROX	IMI TY		ABA		TIT LE
ABA	F	INI SH		ABA	AL	TIT UDE
ABA	F	IRI NG		ABA	LA	TIT UDE
ABA	RET	IRI NG		ABA		TOT AL
ABA	W	IRI NG		ABA		TOT ALING
ABA	V	ISI BLE		ABA	A	UGU ST
ABA	D	ISI NFECT		ABA	F	USU AL
ABA	ADV	ISI NG		ABA		UTU RE
ABA	DEC	ISI ON		ABA	SUR	VIV ED
ABA	V	ISI T		ABAA	HAV	EBEE N
ABA	V	ISI TOR		ABAA		SESS ION
ABA	POL	ITI CS		ABAACC		TATTOO
ABA	CR	ITI QUE		ABAB	DETRA	ININ G
ABA	POS	ITI VE		ABAB	L	ININ G
ABA		MEM ORIAL		ABAB	M	ININ G
ABA		NAN		ABAB	OBTA	ININ G
ABA	DOMI	NAN CE		ABAB	RA	ININ G
ABA	ORD	NAN CE		ABAB	REMA	ININ G
ABA	DOMI	NAN T		ABAB	TRA	ININ G
ABA		NIN E		ABAB	CR	ISIS
ABA		NIN ETY		ABAB	WI	THTH E
ABA	MOR	NIN G		ABAB	PAR	TITI ON
ABA		NIN TH		ABACA	C	ANADA
ABA		OBO E		ABACA	P	ANAMA
ABA	C	OLO N		ABACA	PR	ECEDE
ABA	SEMIC	OLO N		ABACA		ELEME NT
ABA	C	OLO RS		ABACA		ELEME NTARY
ABA	AUT	OMO BILE		ABACA		ELEVE N
ABA	PR	OMOTE		ABACA	C	EMETE RY
ABA	H	ONO R		ABACA	S	EVERE
ABA	VIG	ORO US		ABACA	AUD	IBILI TY
ABA	M	OTO R		ABACA	EXH	IBITI ON

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)-- Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABACA	V	ICINI	TY	ABACDA	R	ECEIVE	
ABACA	M	ILITI	A	ABACDA	D	ECEMBE	R
ABACA	FAC	ILITI	ES	ABACDA	D	EFENSE	
ABACA	D	IMINI	SH	ABACDA	R	EJECTE	D
ABACA	L	IMITI	NG	ABACDA	R	RELEASE	
ABACA		INITI	AL	ABACDA	S	ELECTE	D
ABACA	DEF	INITI	ON	ABACEA	R	EMEDIE	S
ABACA	D	IRIGI	BLE	ABACDA		EMERGE	NCY
ABACA	SEM	IRIGI	D	ABACDA		ENEMIE	S
ABACA	REQU	ISITI	ON	ABACDA	R	EPEATE	D
ABACA	C	IVILI	AN	ABACDA	R	EVENUE	
ABACA	D	IVISI	ON	ABACDA	R	NKNOWN	
ABACA	L	OCOMO	TIVE	ABACDA	PR	OMOTIO	N
ABACA	M	ONPO	LY	ABACDAAC	S	EVENTEEN	
ABACA	PR	OTOCO	L	ABACDAACD	S	EVENTEENT	H
ABACA	CONS	TITUT	E	ABACDAC	D	ESERTER	
ABACA		UNUSU	AL	ABACDAD	D	EFENSES	
ABACADA	V	ISIBILI	TY	ABACDAED		AVAILABL	E
ABACADB	DEF	INITION		ABACDAEEC	N	AVALBATTL	E
ABACADBA	PR	ECEDENCE		ABACDB	F	ATALIT	Y
ABACADC		INITIAT	E	ABACDB	A	NONYMO	US
ABACADD	COMPL	ETENESS		ABACDB	C	OLONEL	
ABACADDA	N	AVALATTA	CK	ABACDBA	TH	EREFOR	
ABACADEC	D	IVISIONS		ABACDC	R	ECEIVI	NG
ABACB	V	ACANC	Y	ABACDC		EVENIN	G
ABACB	COMB	ATANT		ABACDC	DYNA	MOMETE	R
ABACB	C	ATAST	ROPHE	ABACDCA	L	IMITATI	ON
ABACB	D	ETECT	OR	ABACDCCA		NINETEEN	
ABACB	V	ISITS		ABACDCCAD		NINETEENT	H
ABACB		MEMBE	R	ABACDCEA	S	TATEMENT	
ABACBDEC	D	ETENTION		ABACDCECFGHIE	M	ETEOROLOGICAL	
ABACBDEC	R	ETENTION		ABACDD		FIFTEE	N
ABACBDEFGFAG		NONCOMBATANT		ABACDD	FO	RTRESS	
ABACC	R	EBELL	ION	ABACDDEC		FIFTEENT	H
ABACC	N	ECESS	ARY	ABACDEA		ELEVATE	
ABACC	N	ECESS	ITY	ABACDEA	D	EVELOPE	
ABACC	CAR	ELESS		ABACDEA	VER	IFICATI	ON
ABACC	WIR	ELESS		ABACDEA	S	IMILARI	TY
ABACCA	P	ARALLA	X	ABACDEAD		SUSPENSE	
ABACCA	R	EPELLE	D	ABACDEAFGE		SUSPENSION	
ABACCA	T	OMORRO	W	ABACDEB	EXPL	ANATION	
ABACCDACC	CAR	ELESSNESS		ABACDEB	T	OPOGRAP	HIC
ABACDC	P	ARALLEL		ABACDEBFA	R	ECEPTACLE	
ABACCDEFEA	N	ECESSITATE		ABACDEC		ABANDON	
ABACDA		ALASKA		ABACDEC	D	AMAGING	
ABACDA		ARABIA		ABACDEC	QU	ARANTIN	E
ABACDA	N	AVALBA	SE	ABACDECA	P	ENETRATE	

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Table D-3 (e). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABACDECFB	D	ETERIORATE	ABBA	COMP	ELLE	D
ABACDECFCB	P	ENETRATION	ABBA	SH	ELLE	D
ABACDEED	C	APABILI TY	ABBA	CONF	ERRE	D
ABACDED	M	OTORCYC LE	ABBA	COMPR	ESSE	D
ABACDED		SUSPICI ON	ABBA	IMPR	ESSE	D
ABACDEDED	G	ENERALALAR M	ABBA	PR	ESSE	D
ABACDEDEFB		SUSPICIOUS	ABBA	V	ESSE	L
ABACDEDEFGA		SUSPICIONS	ABBA	CIGAR	ETTE	
ABACDEFBA	D	EFFECTIVE	ABBA	B	ETTE	R
ABACDEFB	D	EFENSIVE	ABBA	L	ETTE	R
ABACDEFB	T	ELEPHONE	ABBA	D	IFFI	CULT
ABACDEFB	D	ETERMINE	ABBA	W	ILLI	AM
ABACDEFB	D	EVELOPME NT	ABBA	F	ILLI	NG
ABACDEFB		EXERCISE	ABBA	K	ILLI	NG
ABACDEFB		EXERCISES	ABBA	REF	ILLI	NG
ABACDEFB		DEDICATE	ABBA	SW	IMMI	NG
ABACDEFB		ENEMYTAN KS	ABBA	SH	IPPI	NG
ABACDEFB		DEDICATI ON	ABBA	M	ISSI	NG
ABACDEFB	V	ETERINARIAN	ABBA	ADM	ISSI	ON
ABACDEFB		ELECTRICIT Y	ABBA	M	ISSI	ON
ABACDEFB		SUSPECTE D	ABBA	PERM	ISSI	ON
ABACDEFB		SUSPENDED	ABBA	F	ITTI	NG
ABACDEFB		ANALYSIS	ABBA	AFTER	NOON	
ABACDEFB		EXECUTIVE	ABBA		NOON	
ABACDEFB		POPULATIO N	ABBA	F	OLLO	W
ABACDEFB		ENEMYPLANE S	ABBA	C	OMMO	N
ABACDEFB	S	EVENTYFIVE	ABBA		OPPO	SE
ABACDEFB	D	ETERMINATION	ABBA		OPPO	SITE
ABACDEFB	G	ENERALSTAFF	ABBA	B	OTTO	M
ABACDEFB		MEMORANDA	ABBAB	B	AGGAG	E
ABACDEFB		MEMORANDUM	ABBAB	WITN	ESSES	
ABACDEFB	D	ECENTRALIZE	ABBACA		APPARA	TUS
ABBA		AFFA IR	ABBACA	L	ETTERE	D
ABBA		APPA RENT	ABBACB	V	ESSELS	
ABBA		APPA RENTLY	ABBACDA	M	ESSENCE	R
ABBA	B	ARRA CKS	ABBACDA		EFFECTE	D
ABBA	B	ARRA GE	ABBACDB	M	ISSIONS	
ABBA		ARRA NGE	ABBACDEA		IRRIGATI	ON
ABBA		ASSA ULT	ABBACDEDA		OPPOSITIO	N
ABBA	P	ASSA GE	ABBACDEFA		EFFECTIVE	
ABBA	IMP	ASSA BLE	ABBACDEFA	D	IFFICULTI	ES
ABBA		ATTA CH	ABBACDEFA		IMMIGRATI	ON
ABBA		ATTA CK	ABBACDEFCD		ILLITERATE	
ABBA		ATTA IN	ABBACDEFDB		ATTAINMENT	
ABBA	B	ATTA LION	ABBACDEFEC		ARRANGEMEN T	
ABBA	IN	DEED	ABBACDEFGB		ATTACHMENT	
ABBA		EFFE CT	ABBCA		ANNUA	L

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Table D-3 (Ø). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABBCA		APPEA	R	ABBCDEAFBGBC	REENFORCEMEN T
ABBCA	DIS	APPEA	R	ABBCDEAFD	APPLICATI ON
ABBCA	C	ARRIA	GE	ABBCDEAFEC	ASSOCIATIO N
ABBCA	S	ETTL		ABBCDEAFGC	ACCEPTABLE
ABBCA		ISSUI	NG	ABBCDEAFGC	ALLEGIAN
ABBCA	FOUR	TEENT	H	ABBCDEAFGHF	C ORRESPONDIN G
ABBCA	SIX	TEENT	H	ABBCDEFGA	ACCIDENTA L
ABBCA	CHA	UFFEU	R	ABBCDEFGA	APPROXIMA TE
ABBCA	S	URROU	ND	ABBCDEFGA	OCCUPATIO N
ABBCADAIEFC		APPEARANCE		ABBCDEFGBA	IRREGULARI TY
ABBCADAIEFC	DIS	APPEARANCE		ABBCDEFGBAHAC	IRREGULARITIE S
ABBCADC		APPEARE	D	ABBCDEFGEA	ILLUSTRATI ON
ABBCBBDA	P	OSSESSIO	N	ABBCDEFGHAD	C OMMENDATION
ABBCBDA		ASSISTA	NCE	ABCA	P ACKA GE
ABBCBDAED		ASSISTANT		ABCA	EV ACUA TING
ABBCCDAB		ASSOONAS		ABCA	EV ACUA TION
ABBCDA		ALLOWA	NCE	ABCA	R ADIA L
ABBCDA		APPROA	CH	ABCA	R ADIA TE
ABBCDA		ARRIVA	L	ABCA	ADJA CENT
ABBCDA		ASSURA	NCE	ABCA	GR ADUA L
ABBCDA	M	ESSAGE		ABCA	ADVA NCE
ABBCDA		ILLUMI	NATE	ABCA	DI AGRA M
ABBCDAB	M	ESSAGES		ABCA	EV ALUA TION
ABBCDAB	C	ORRIDOR		ABCA	ALWA YS
ABBCDAEA	B	ELLIGERE	NT	ABCA	C AMPA IGN
ABBCDAEFC		ALLOCATIO N		ABCA	M ANDA TE
ABBCDAEFC		IMMEDIATE		ABCA	M ANUA L
ABBCDAEFGAE		ILLUMINATIN G		ABCA	J ANUA RY
ABBCDAEFGAHE	D	ISSEMINATION		ABCA	C ANVA S
ABBCDBCEA		APPROPRIA TE		ABCA	CH APLA IN
ABBCDCA		EFFICIE NT		ABCA	C APTA IN
ABBCDCA	C	OLLISIO N		ABCA	AREA
ABBCDCAED		EFFICIENC Y		ABCA	DEB ARKA TION
ABBCDCAED	C	OLLISIONS		ABCA	EMB ARKA TION
ABBCDCEFA		ADDITIONA L		ABCA	CO ASTA L
ABBCDDCA	C	OMMISSIO N		ABCA	C ASUA L
ABBCDDCA	C	OMMISSIO NER		ABCA	C ASUA LTY
ABBCDDCEAFGC		ACCOMMODATIO N		ABCA	AVIA TOR
ABBCDEA		ACCOMPA NY		ABCA	BARB ED
ABBCDEA		APPROVA L		ABCA	BOMB
ABBCDEA		ASSOCIA TE		ABCA	BOMB ARD
ABBCDEA	SH	ELLFIRE		ABCA	BOMB ER
ABBCDEA	T	ERRIBLE		ABCA	LIGHT BOMB ER
ABBCDEAFB		ACCORDANC E		ABCA	BRIB E
ABBCDEAFB		REENFORCE		ABCA	BULB
ABBCDEAFBC		ACCEPTANCE		ABCA	CANC EL

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS- Continued

ABCA	CHEC	K	ABCA	GEOG	RAPHIC
ABCA	CIRC	LE	ABCA	FOR GING	
ABCA	CIRC	ULATE	ABCA	W HIGH	
ABCA	CONC	EAL	ABCA	HIGH	
ABCA	CONC	LUDE	ABCA	HIGH	ER
ABCA	HUN DRED		ABCA	HIGH	EST
ABCA	L EADE	R	ABCA	V ICTI	M
ABCA	EAGE	R	ABCA	M IDNI	GHT
ABCA	M EAGE	R	ABCA	DR IFTI	NG
ABCA	S EAME	N	ABCA	L IFTI	NG
ABCA	ST EAME	R	ABCA	S IGNI	FY
ABCA	N EARE	ST	ABCA	BU ILDI	NG
ABCA	C EASE		ABCA	INDI	CATE
ABCA	GR EASE		ABCA	INDI	RECT
ABCA	INCR EASE	D	ABCA	DESCR IPTI	ON
ABCA	L EAVE		ABCA	L IQUI	D
ABCA	ECHE	LON	ABCA	A IRFI	ELD
ABCA	WR ECKE	D	ABCA	REPR	ISAL
ABCA	INF ECTE	D	ABCA	M ISFI	RE
ABCA	EDGE		ABCA	F ISHI	NG
ABCA	S EIZE		ABCA	W ITHI	N
ABCA	R ELIE	F	ABCA	FUE LOIL	
ABCA	H ELPE	R	ABCA	MAIM	
ABCA	TW ELVE		ABCA	LA NDIN	G
ABCA	NOV EMBE	R	ABCA	I NFAN	TRY
ABCA	ABS ENCE		ABCA	CO NFIN	E
ABCA	LIC ENSE		ABCA	U NION	
ABCA	C ENTE	R	ABCA	SU NKEN	
ABCA	ENTE	R	ABCA	FLA NKIN	G
ABCA	ENVE	LOP	ABCA	I NLAN	D
ABCA	R EQU	ST	ABCA	I NTEN	D
ABCA	FI ERCE		ABCA	CO NTIN	UAL
ABCA	S ERGE	ANT	ABCA	CO NTIN	UE
ABCA	MAT ERIE	L	ABCA	I NVEN	T
ABCA	REV ERSE		ABCA	OCTO	BER
ABCA	OBS ERVE		ABCA	D OCTO	R
ABCA	R ESPE	CT	ABCA	F OGH	RN
ABCA	W ESTE	RLY	ABCA	P OISO	N
ABCA	W ESTE	RN	ABCA	C OMPO	SED
ABCA	ETHE	R	ABCA	C ONVO	Y
ABCA	MAN EUVE	R	ABCA	EN ORMO	US
ABCA	R EVIE	W	ABCA	EXPL OSIO	N
ABCA	EXCE	PT	ABCA	PUMP	
ABCA	EXPE	CT	ABCA	PURP	OSE
ABCA	EXPE	ND	ABCA	HA RBOR	
ABCA	EXTE	ND	ABCA	AI RBOR	NE
ABCA	GAUG	E	ABCA	MU RDER	

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCA	O RDER		ABCAB	PA INTIN G
ABCA	O RDER S		ABCAB	PR INTIN G
ABCA	REAR		ABCAB	I NTENT
ABCA	RECR	UIT	ABCAB	P ONTON
ABCA	COU RIER		ABCAB	C ORPOR AL
ABCA	P RIOR		ABCAB	RECRE ATION
ABCA	SUPE RIOR		ABCAB	P RIORI TY
ABCA	A RMOR		ABCAB	SUPE RIORI TY
ABCA	A RMOR Y		ABCAB	DI SEASE
ABCA	P ROGR AM		ABCAB	PRO TECTE D
ABCA	MO RTAR		ABCAB	PRO TESTE D
ABCA	QUA RTER		ABCAB	O UTPUT
ABCA	QUA RTER S		ABCABA	INT ERFERE
ABCA	FEB RUAR Y		ABCABB	D ISMISS
ABCA	FO RWAR D		ABCABB	D ISMISS AL
ABCA	CEN SORS	HIP	ABCABC	THATHA VE
ABCA	SUNS	ET	ABCABCA	ENTENTE
ABCA	IMPOR TANT		ABCABDA	S ENTENCE
ABCA	S TART		ABCABDB	REPRESE NT
ABCA	PRO TECT		ABCABDBEFGFHIB	REPRESENTATIVE
ABCA	TENT		ABCABDBEFGFHIED	REPRESENTATIONS
ABCA	TENT H		ABCABDC	RETREAT
ABCA	PRO TEST		ABCABDED	M ANGANESE
ABCA	TEXT		ABCABDEFA	C ORPORATIO N
ABCA	THAT		ABCABDEFGHD	RECREATIONA L
ABCA	S TRAT EGIC		ABCAC	ARMAM ENT
ABCA	S TRAT EGY		ABCAC	N EARER
ABCA	D UGOU T		ABCAC	PROPO SE
ABCA	UNSU ITABLE		ABCAC	P RAIRI E
ABCA	P URSU E		ABCAC	PRO TESTS
ABCA	P URSU IT		ABCACA	D IETITI AN
ABCA	O UTGU ARD		ABCACB	O RDERED
ABCAA	D ECREE		ABCACBDEC	PROPORTIO N
ABCAA	D EGREE		ABCACDEFD	PROPOSALS
ABCAA	B ETWEE N		ABCADA	ALMANA C
ABCAA	DI SCUSS		ABCADA	R ELIEVE
ABCAA	A SPOSS IBLE		ABCADA	C ENTERE D
ABCAAB	P ONTOON		ABCADA	B ESIEGE D
ABCAAB	THATTH E		ABCADA	R EVIEWE D
ABCAACDEB	P REARRANGE	D	ABCADAB	CO NTINENT AL
ABCAB	W ARFAR E		ABCADAC	S EALEVEL
ABCAB	S ECREC Y		ABCADAC	INDIVID UAL
ABCAB	OBS ERVER		ABCADAEC	IGNITION
ABCAB	W HETHE R		ABCADAEFB	TENTATIVE
ABCAB	B INDIN G		ABCADAEFC	S IGNIFICAN T
ABCAB	F INDIN G		ABCADAEFCE	S IGNIFICANC E
ABCAB	S INKIN G		ABCADAIEFGHF	SUBSISTENCE

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS-- Continued

ABCADB		ATLANT	IC	ABCADEAB	CO	NTINGENT	
ABCADB		BRIBER	Y	ABCADEAE		EXPENDED	
ABCADB		CIRCUI	T	ABCADEAE		EXPENSES	
ABCADB	W	EDNESD	AY	ABCADEAE		EXTENDED	
ABCADB	LOG	ISTICS		ABCADEAFA		ELSEWHERE	
ABCADB	EXPL	OSIONS		ABCADEAFGA		EXPERIENCE	
ABCADB		PREPAR	ING	ABCADEB	C	ENTERIN	G
ABCADB	IM	PROPER		ABCADEB		ENTERIN	G
ABCADB		PROPER		ABCADEB	R	ESPECTS	
ABCADBA		INSIGNI	A	ABCADEB		INCIDEN	T
ABCADBC		PREPARE		ABCADEB	M	ISFIRES	
ABCADBCEFCGG		PREPAREDNESS		ABCADEBCE		INCIDENCE	
ABCADBD		PREPARA	TION	ABCADEC	M	ANDATED	
ABCADBFEFD		CIRCUITOU	S	ABCADEC	S	ECRETAR	Y
ABCADC	R	ADIATI	ON	ABCADEC	GYR	OSCOPIE	
ABCADC	ST	ANDARD		ABCADECA		REARGUAR	D
ABCADC	V	ARIATI	ON	ABCADECAF	D	ISTINCTION	
ABCADC		ASIATI	C	ABCADECFC		CONCERNIN	G
ABCADC		AVIATI	ON	ABCADEDA	CO	NFINEMEN	T
ABCADC	R	EVIEWI	NG	ABCADEDAFB		INVITATION	
ABCADC		EXTENT		ABCADEDBD		SUBSTITUT	E
ABCADC	I	NVENTE	D	ABCADEDBDE		SUBSTITUTI	ON
ABCADC		TACTIC	S	ABCADEDC	LI	EUTENANT	
ABCADC	S	TARTER		ABCADEDFGA		ENTERPRISE	
ABCADC		ZIGZAG		ABCADEDFGDBC		CONCILIATION	
ABCADCA	CO	NVENIEN	T	ABCADEDFGFB		ENTERPRISIN	G
ABCADCB	CO	NDENSED		ABCADEE	P	ROGRESS	
ABCADCB		TACTICA	L	ABCADEEBFGHC		CANCELLATION	
ABCADCFBGABC		ENTERTAINMENT		ABCADEED		CANCELE	D
ABCADCFEGED		CONCENTRATE		ABCADEEFBC		CONCESSION	
ABCADCFEGEHC		CONCENTRATIN	G	ABCADEEFGD	P	ROGRESSIVE	
ABCADCFEGEHC		CONCENTRATION		ABCADEFA		ECHELONE	D
ABCADD	D	EPRESS	ION	ABCADEFA		ENVELOPE	
ABCADD		EXCESS		ABCADEFA		EXPEDITE	
ABCADD	D	ISTILL		ABCADEFA		EXPERIME	NT
ABCADD	P	OSTOFF	ICE	ABCADEFAB		INDICATIN	G
ABCADD	B	OYCOTT		ABCADEFAB	D	ISTINGUIS	H
ABCADDA		AMBASSA	DOR	ABCADEFABGADE	D	ISTINGUISHING	
ABCADDA		EXPELLE	D	ABCADEFAGB		INDICATION	
ABCADDECCFA		UNSUCCESSFU	L	ABCADEFB		ADVANCED	
ABCADDEFA		EXCESSIVE		ABCADEFBA	EXT	RAORDINAR	Y
ABCADEA		ADVANTA	GE	ABCADEFB		BOMBARDM	ENT
ABCADEA		ADVANTA	GEOUS	ABCADEFB		CIRCULAR	
ABCADEA	D	ECREASE		ABCADEFB		CIRCULAR	
ABCADEA	S	EPTEMBE	R	ABCADEFB	U	NTENABLE	
ABCADEA	R	EQUESTE	D	ABCADEFB		RETROACTIVE	
ABCADEA	D	ISCIPLI	NE	ABCADEFD		ADVANCIN	G
ABCADEA				ABCADEFD		EXTENDIN	G

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCADEFD		EXTERIOR		ABCBA	AC	TIVIT Y
ABCADEFE		CONCRETE		ABCBA	U	SELESS
ABCADEFE		EXPEDITI	NG	ABCBAAB	P	REFERRE D
ABCADEFE		EXPEDITI	ON	ABCBA		DIVIDI NG
ABCADEFE		OBSOLETE		ABCBA	AC	TIVITI ES
ABCADEFE	G	ONIOMETE	R	ABCBA	P	REFERENCE
ABCADEFE		PURPOSES		ABCBA		REFERENCE
ABCADEFE		RECRUITI	NG	ABCBA		MINIMUM
ABCADEFEA	C	COMPOSITIO	N	ABCBA	P	RESERVE
ABCADEFGA		EXPENSIVE		ABCBA		RESERVE
ABCADEFGA		EXTENSIVE		ABCBA		REVERSE
ABCADEFGAF		ECHELONMEN	T	ABCBA		RESERVES
ABCADEFGB	C	ASUALTIES		ABCBA	SPE	CIFICATI ON
ABCADEFGB		CIRCULATI	ON	ABCBA		REMEMBER
ABCADEFGB		CONCLUSION		ABCBA		DEFEND
ABCADEFGB		INDICATED		ABCBA		DEPEND
ABCADEFGC	S	TRATEGICA	L	ABCBA	MU	NITION S
ABCADEFGD		EXTENSION		ABCBA		RESEAR CH
ABCADEFGDC		CONCEALMEN	T	ABCBA		STATES
ABCADEFGE		REPRISALS		ABCBA		STATUS
ABCADEFGE		BOMBARDED		ABCBA	IN	TEREST
ABCADEFGHAB	C	ONFORMATION		ABCBA		DEFENDE R
ABCADEFGHCA		EXTERMINATE		ABCBA	E	NGAGING
ABCADEFGHCFIG		EXTERMINATION		ABCBA		DEFENDED
ABCADEFHGHEIGCF		REORGANIZATION		ABCBA		DEPENDEN T
ABCADEFGHH	R	ESPECTFULL	Y	ABCBA		STATISTICS
ABCADEFGHIAJF		CIRCUMSTANCES		ABCBA		DEPENDABLE
ABCADEFGHIB		RETROACTIVE		ABCBA		DEPENDABILI TY
ABCADEFGHIE		GEOGRAPHICA	L	ABCBA		PARAGRAP H
ABCADEFGHIGBH		CIRCUMSTANTIA	L	ABCBA		DEFERRED
ABCBA	COMP	LETEL	Y	ABCBA	E	CONOMIC
ABCBA		AWKWA	RD	ABCBA		DAMAGED
ABCBA		CAPAC	ITY	ABCBA	PO	LITICAL
ABCBA	PA	CIFIC		ABCBA		MANAGEMEN T
ABCBA	SPA	CIFIC		ABCBA		DEFEATED
ABCBA	HIN	DERED		ABCBA		DESERTED
ABCBA		DIVID	E	ABCBA		RECEIVER
ABCBA		GARAG	E	ABCBA		REPEATER
ABCBA	C	ITATI	ON	ABCBA		REJECTOR
ABCBA		LEVEL		ABCBA		STATIONS
ABCBA	P	REFER		ABCBA		DEVELOPED
ABCBA		REFER		ABCBA	R	ESISTANCE
ABCBA	P	RESER	VATION	ABCBA		DETERMINED
ABCBA		RESER	VATION	ABCBA		DISINFECTED
ABCBA		TAXAT	ION	ABCBA		DECENTRALIZED
ABCBA	HOS	TILIT	Y	ABCBA		LITTL E
ABCBA	U	TILIT	Y	ABCBA		PASSP ORT

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Table D-3 (ex). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCCA	S TREET	ABCD A	M ARTIA	L
ABCCABDEC	C ROSSROADS	ABCD A	E ASTWA	RD
ABCCBADED	MILLIMETE R	ABCD A	N ATURA	L
ABCCBCA	BE GINNING	ABCD A	N ATURA	LIZE
ABCCBDA	INF LAMMABL E	ABCD A	TE CHNIC	AL
ABCCDA	COLLEC T	ABCD A	COUNC	IL
ABCCDA	CORREC T	ABCD A	R EACHE	D
ABCCDA	T RIGGER	ABCD A	L EAGUE	
ABCCDA	RUBBER	ABCD A	EASTE	RLY
ABCCDA	RUNNER	ABCD A	EASTE	RN
ABCCDA	SPOOLS	ABCD A	W EATHE	R
ABCCDA	SPOONS	ABCD A	H EAVIE	R
ABCCDA	SUGGES T	ABCD A	INS ECURE	
ABCCDA	SUPPOS E	ABCD A	S ECURE	
ABCCDA	TURRET	ABCD A	R EDUCE	
ABCCDAA	SUCCESS	ABCD A	SCH EDULE	
ABCCDAAEB	SUCCESSFU L	ABCD A	B EFORE	
ABCCDAAEBFF	SUCCESSFUL Y	ABCD A	R EFUGE	
ABCCDAAEFD	SUCCESSIVE	ABCD A	R EFUSE	
ABCCDAB	P RESSURE	ABCD A	R EGIME	NT
ABCCDAEC	TERRITOR Y	ABCD A	R EGIME	NTAL
ABCCDAED	CORRECTE D	ABCD A	EITHE	R
ABCCDAEFB	COLLECTIO N	ABCD A	FUS ELAGE	
ABCCDAEFB	CORRECTIO N	ABCD A	D ELIVE	R
ABCCDAEFBC	CONNECTION	ABCD A	GR ENADE	
ABCCDAEFC	CONNECTIN G	ABCD A	ERASE	
ABCCDAEFDGG	CORRECTNESS	ABCD A	OP ERATE	
ABCCDEA	GASSING	ABCD A	R ESCUE	
ABCCDEA	GETTING	ABCD A	PR ESIDE	NT
ABCCDEA	ST RAGGLER	ABCD A	R ESUME	
ABCCDEA	IN TERRUPT	ABCD A	D EVICE	
ABCCDEAB	IN TERRUPT E D	ABCD A	D EVICE	
ABCCDEAD	COMMENCE	ABCD A	GOING	
ABCCDEAD	COMMERCE	ABCD A	T HOUGH	
ABCCDEADCDE	COMMENCEMEN T	ABCD A	C HURCH	
ABCCDEBFGHDA	DISSEMINATED	ABCD A	F IIGHTI	NG
ABCCDEFA	COMMUNIC ATE	ABCD A	INFLI	CT
ABCCDEFA	SUPPLIES	ABCD A	EXT INGUI	SH
ABCCDEFAGHFBE	COMMUNICATION	ABCD A	INQUI	RE
ABCCDEFBGHDGAD	CORRESPONDENCE	ABCD A	INQUI	RY
ABCCDEFGA	R EAPPOINTE D	ABCD A	INSPI	RE
ABCCDEFGHAFG	R EAPPOINTEMENT	ABCD A	LOCAL	
ABCD A	S ABOTA GE	ABCD A	LAU NCHIN	G
ABCD A	R AILWA Y	ABCD A	CO NDEM N	
ABCD A	ANIMA L	ABCD A	MACHI NEGUN	
ABCD A	S ANITA RY	ABCD A	NOTIN	G
ABCD A	M ARSHA L	ABCD A	EXPA NSION	

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Table D-3 (2). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCD A	CO	NTAIN		ABCDABAB		INCLININ	G
ABCD A	MOU	NTAIN		ABCDABC	M	AIN TAIN	
ABCD A	I	NTERN	AL	ABCDABC	M	AIN TAIN	ED
ABCD A	FRO	N TLIN	E	ABCDABCEFD		PHOSPHORUS	
ABCD A	I	NTREN	CH	ABCDABEFA		ENTRENCH E	D
ABCD A	C	ONTRO	L	ABCDAC	L	ANGUAG	E
ABCD A	H	ORIZO	N	ABCDAC		ANYWAY	
ABCD A		OUTBO	ARD	ABCDAC	GOV	ERNMEN	T
ABCD A		PROMP	T	ABCDAC	I	NSTANT	
ABCD A		RECOR	D	ABCDAC	I	NSTANT	LY
ABCD A		REPOR	T	ABCDAC	DI	SPERSE	
ABCD A		RETUR	N	ABCDAC	RES	TRICTI	ON
ABCD A	P	RIMAR	Y	ABCDAC	PA	TRIOTI	C
ABCD A		RIVER		ABCDACB	CO	NDEM NED	
ABCD A		ROGER		ABCDACDAEFG B	I	NSTANTANEOUS	
ABCD A	FA	R THER		ABCDACEFDF		COINCIDENCE	
ABCD A	FU	R THER		ABCDAD		MOVEME	NT
ABCD A	NO	R THER	LY	ABCDAD	A	MUSEME	NT
ABCD A		SATIS	FY	ABCDAD		RIGORO	US
ABCD A		SHIPS		ABCDADC	S	ANITATI	ON
ABCD A	WAR	SHIPS		ABCDADEDAFB		INSTITUTION	
ABCD A		THIRT	Y	ABCDAD EFEAGC		ANTI AIRCRAFT	
ABCD A	WI	THOUT		ABCDAEA		EXTREME	
ABCD A	EX	TRACT		ABCDAEA		MAXIMUM	
ABCD A		TRACT		ABCDAEAB	SU	ITABILIT	Y
ABCD A	INS	TRUCT		ABCDAEABD	UNI	TEDSTATES	
ABCD A	DES	TRUCT	ION	ABCDAEAE	PAR	ENTHESES	
ABCD A		TWENT	Y	ABCD AEB	F	IGHTING	
ABCD A	B	UREAU		ABCD AEB	S	IGHTING	
ABCD A		WESTW	ARD	ABCD AEB		RAILROA	D
ABCDAA	R	EFUGEE		ABCD AEB		REPORTE	D
ABCDAA	C	ODEBOO	K	ABCD AEB		RETURNE	D
ABCDAA	BU	SINESS		ABCD AEB		TRACTOR	
ABCDAA	DI	STRESS		ABCD AEB	INS	TRUCTOR	
ABCDAA		STRESS		ABCD AEB A		RECORDER	
ABCD AAD	F	ORENOON		ABCD AEB C	DE	TONATION	
ABCDAB		DECIDE		ABCD AEB FBDC	U	NIDENTIFIED	
ABCDAB		DECODE		ABCD AEB FC		SATISFACT	ORY
ABCDAB	SP	EARHEA	D	ABCD AEC		AVERAGE	
ABCDAB	R	EDUCED		ABCD AEC	D	ISTRIC	
ABCDAB		ENTREN	CH	ABCD AEC		OUTPOST	
ABCDAB		ERASER		ABCD AECA		TWENTIET	H
ABCDAB		GEORGE		ABCD AECAB	I	NTERNMENT	
ABCDAB		POSTPO	NE	ABCD AECB	D	ISTRIC	
ABCDAB		RETIRE		ABCD AECD	L	ABORATOR	Y
ABCDAB	ES	TIMATI	ON	ABCD AECE		OUTPOSTS	
ABCDABA		DECIDED		ABCD AECFD	EX	AMINATION	

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCD AED	T	RAVERSE		ABCD BCEA	A	ERODROME	
ABCD AEE		ACTUALL	Y	ABCD BEA		INCENDI	ARY
ABCD AEE		EXPRESS		ABCD BEA	PR	OTECTIO	N
ABCD AEE		THIRTEE	N	ABCD BEA	IN	TERCEPT	
ABCD AEEFAB		THIRTEENTH		ABCD BEAB	IN	TERCEPTE	D
ABCD AEF A	OV	ERWHELME	D	ABCD BEAE	C	ONTINUOU	S
ABCD AEF AB		INFLICTIN	G	ABCD BEAFB		INVENTION	
ABCD AEF B	P	RESCRIBE	D	ABCD BEAFCD B	QU	ARTERMAS TER	
ABCD AEF BE	O	NEHUNDRED		ABCD BEAFD		INCENTIVE	
ABCD AEF C	M	ANUFACTU	RE	ABCD BEAFD		INTENSIVE	
ABCD AEF C	PR	ESIDENTI	AL	ABCD BECA	E	NCIRCLIN	G
ABCD AEF C	D	ISTRIBUT	E	ABCD BEFAGABC		ENTANGLEMENT	
ABCD AEF CA	D	ISTRIBUTI	NG	ABCD BEFAGEB		TEMPERATURE	
ABCD AEF CA	D	ISTRIBUTI	ON	ABCD BEFBA		DECREASED	
ABCD AEF D	F	LASHLIGH	T	ABCD BEFCDAB	C	ONTINUATION	
ABCD AEF D	C	ONTROVER	SY	ABCD BEFGA		YESTERDAY	
ABCD AEF D	A	SCENSION		ABCD BEFGAB		ARMORED CAR	
ABCD AEF D		WINDWARD		ABCD BEFGBCHIA		DISTINGUISHED	
ABCD AEF DB		RESTRICTE	D	ABCD BEFGHA	P	ERFORMANCE	
ABCD AEF DE		RESTRICTI	ON	ABCD CA		AIRCRA	FT
ABCD AEF E	PAR	ENTHESIS		ABCD CA		CRITIC	
ABCD AEF E		RETURNIN	G	ABCD CA		CRITIC	AL
ABCD AEF EGE	RE	SPONSIBILI	TY	ABCD CA	D	EFICIE	NT
ABCD AEF F		REDCROSS		ABCD CA		ENGAGE	
ABCD AEF GAHB		INSPIRATION		ABCD CA	P	OSITIO	N
ABCD AEF GC		REGARDING		ABCD CA	PR	OVISIO	N
ABCD AEF GD		RESTRAINT		ABCD CA	FI	REALAR	M
ABCD AEF GFE	TR	ANSPACIFIC		ABCD CAAC		PHILIPPI	NES
ABCD AEF GHC		TWENTYFIVE		ABCD CAB		ANTITAN	K
ABCD AEF GHFBC		CONSCRIPTION		ABCD CABCA	I	NDEPENDEN T	
ABCD BA	PR	ACTICA	L	ABCD CAC		CRITICI	SE
ABCD BA	W	ATERTA	NK	ABCD CAC		CRITICI	SM
ABCD BA	DIV	EBOMBE	R	ABCD CAD		OPINION	
ABCD BA		ENGINE		ABCD CAEAB		ENGAGEMENT	T
ABCD BA	S	ENTINE	L	ABCD CAEB	P	OSITIONS	
ABCD BA	R	EVOLVE		ABCD CAED	D	EFICIENC Y	
ABCD BA	S	ITUATI	ON	ABCD CAED	PR	OVISIONS	
ABCD BAA		ENGINEE	R	ABCD CAEFD		CHARACTER	
ABCD BAAEDBC		ENGINEERING		ABCD CAEFDGHEGA		CHARACTERISTIC	
ABCD BAB		LIABILI	TY	ABCD CBABC		TERPRETER	
ABCD BAD	RE	TALIATI	ON	ABCD CBCEA	IN	STILITIES	
ABCD BAEAD	D	ISPOSITIO	N	ABCD CEA	BRI	DGEHEAD	
ABCD BAEBE	U	NEXPENDED		ABCD CEA	M	EDICINE	
ABCD BBA		ANTENNA		ABCD CEA	D	EFINITE	
ABCD BBA	D	ISCUSSI	ON	ABCD CEA	S	EPARATE	
ABCD BBDEA	TRA	NMISSION		ABCD CEA		SURPRIS E	
ABCD BCAEB		INTENTION		ABCD CEAF C	QU	ALIFICATI	ON

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Table D-3 (c). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCDCEAFE	P	ERSISTENT	ABCDEA	R	EPULSE	D
ABCDCEBA		ELIGIBLE	ABCDEA	CONSID	ERABLE	
ABCDCECA	D	ESTITUTE	ABCDEA	INT	ERPOSE	
ABCDCECDA	CO	NSTITUTIN G	ABCDEA	S	ERVICE	
ABCDCEFGAB		PHOTOGRAPH Y	ABCDEA		EUROPE	
ABCDCEFGCA	DEM	OBILIZATIO N	ABCDEA		EUROPE	AN
ABCDCEFGCA	M	OBILIZATIO N	ABCDEA		EXCITE	
ABCDDA	R	ECOMME ND	ABCDEA	T	HROUGH	
ABCDDA	T	OBACCO	ABCDEA		IDENTI	CAL
ABCDDA		SHELLS	ABCDEA		IDENTI	FY
ABCDDAB	B	EACHHEA D	ABCDEA		INHABI	TED
ABCDDAEACBE		INEFFICIENC Y	ABCDEA	D	RECTI	ON
ABCDDAEFAF	R	ECOMMENDE D	ABCDEA		MEDIUM	
ABCDDAEFGHICE	R	ECOMMENDATION	ABCDEA	SY	NCHRON	IZE
ABCDDEA		DROPPED	ABCDEA	JU	NCTION	
ABCDDEA	AI	RSUPPOR T	ABCDEA	CO	NFIDEN	T
ABCDDEA	A	RTILLER Y	ABCDEA		NOTHIN	G
ABCDDEAEC		COEFFICIE NT	ABCDEA	E	NTRAIN	
ABCDDECDFA		SCHOOLHOU S E	ABCDEA	L	OCATIO	N
ABCDDEFCGHA	MI	SCELLANEOUS	ABCDEA	REV	OLUTIO	N
ABCDDEFEACGE		CLASSIFICATI ON	ABCDEA	DEC	ORATIO	N
ABCDDEFGGEDBA	R	ECONNAISSANCE	ABCDEA	T	ORPEDO	
ABCDEA		AERONA UTICS	ABCDEA		OVERCO	MING
ABCDEA	R	AILHEA D	ABCDEA	T	RAILER	S
ABCDEA		AIRPLA NE	ABCDEA	T	RAWLER	
ABCDEA		AMBULA NCE	ABCDEA	DI	RECTOR	
ABCDEA	CO	ASTGUA RD	ABCDEA		REPAIR	
ABCDEA	M	ATERIA L	ABCDEA	NO	RTHWAR	D
ABCDEA	S	ATURDA Y	ABCDEA	C	RUISER	
ABCDEA	C	AUSEWA Y	ABCDEA	I	SLANDS	
ABCDEA	N	AUTICA L	ABCDEA		STRIPS	
ABCDEA		BLOCKB USTER	ABCDEA		SUNRIS	E
ABCDEA	ME	CHANIC	ABCDEA		TARGET	
ABCDEA		CHEMIC AL	ABCDEA	NOR	THEAST	
ABCDEA		CONDUCT	ABCDEA		THREAT	
ABCDEA		DISLOD GE	ABCDEA	NOR	THWEST	
ABCDEA		DOWNED	ABCDEA		TWELFT	H
ABCDEA	B	ECAUSE	ABCDEA	L	UMINOUS	S
ABCDEA	D	ECIPHE R	ABCDEAA		EIGHTEEN	N
ABCDEA	D	ECLARE	ABCDEAAE		SUBMISSI ON	
ABCDEA	OBJ	EACTIVE	ABCDEAAFED		EIGHTEENTH	
ABCDEA	L	ECTURE	ABCDEAB		INVADIN G	
ABCDEA	V	EHICLE S	ABCDEAB	F	LEXIBLE	
ABCDEA		ENCODE	ABCDEAB		NATIONA L	
ABCDEA	COMP	ENSATE	ABCDEAB		REQUIRE	
ABCDEA		ENTIRE	ABCDEAB		RESTORE D	
ABCDEA	R	EPLACE	ABCDEAB	OU	TSKIRTS	

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCDEABA	DEMANDED	ABCDEBAED	ARBITRATI ON
ABCDEABD	IMPEDIME NTA	ABCDEBFBA	B RIGADIER
ABCDEABE	AT OMICBOMB	ABCDEBFAGA	ENCOUNTERE D
ABCDEABF	REPAIRED	ABCDEBFCAGBF	INTERNATIONA L
ABCDEABFB	REQUIREME NT	ABCDEBFDGA	NAVIGATION
ABCDEABFD	NATIONALI SM	ABCDEBFGAF	H EADQUARTER S
ABCDEABFDC	NATIONALIT Y	ABCDEBFGHA	R ESONSIBLE
ABCDEABFE	MARKSMANS HIP	ABCDEBFGHBCGIA	NATURALIZATION
ABCDEABFFGHD	SHARPSHOOTER	ABCDECA	E NLISTIN G
ABCDEAC	AUTOMAT IC	ABCDECA	PRINCIP AL
ABCDEAC	AI RCONTRO L	ABCDECA	PRINCIP LE
ABCDEACFB	ANTEDATIN G	ABCDECA	SKIRMIS H
ABCDEAD	CONTACT	ABCDECAB	I NTERMENT
ABCDEAD	V ICTORIO US	ABCDECAC	I NTERVENE
ABCDEAD	C RUISERS	ABCDECACFE	M AINTENANCE
ABCDEADFD	THREATENE D	ABCDECAFCD A	TRANSATLANT IC
ABCDEAE	ENCODED	ABCDECBA	NEGLIGEN T
ABCDEAE	P ERMANEN T	ABCDECBA	REVOLVER
ABCDEAE	FORTIFI ED	ABCDECBA	P ROTECTOR
ABCDEAE	REQUIRI NG	ABCDECBAFB	NEGLIGENCE
ABCDEAEFGC	TRADITIONA L	ABCDECCFA	DISCUSSED
ABCDEAFA	R EPLACEME NT	ABCDECDCAF C	I NTERFERENCE
ABCDEAFAGE	EXCITEMENT	ABCDECFA	ENCIRCLE
ABCDEAFAGHEAID	IDENTIFICATION	ABCDECFA	EVACUATE
ABCDEAFB	CLERICAL	ABCDECFBA	SEAPLANES
ABCDEAFB	INVASION	ABCDECFEA	STANDARDS
ABCDEAFBC	RESOURCES	ABCDEDA	N EWSPAPE R
ABCDEAFC	DES IGNATION	ABCDEDA	MARITIM E
ABCDEAFC	RES IGNATION	ABCDEDA	CO NTRABAN D
ABCDEAFC	CO NFIDENTI AL	ABCDEDA	C OALITIO N
ABCDEAFD	D IMENSION	ABCDEDA	BA ROMETER
ABCDEAFE	ADJUTANT	ABCDEDA	GY ROMETER
ABCDEAFE	INTERIOR	ABCDEDA	HYD ROMETER
ABCDEAFE	I NFLUENCE	ABCDEDA	HYG ROMETER
ABCDEAFF	R EADINESS	ABCDEDA	PSYCH ROMETER
ABCDEAFGA	D ECIPHERME NT	ABCDEDAB	C ONDITION
ABCDEAFGAFB	MEDIUMBOMBE R	ABCDEDAC	REC OGNITION
ABCDEAFGD	LEGISLATI ON	ABCDEDAFC	N EWSPAPERS
ABCDEAFGE	CO MPARTMENT	ABCDEDF A	DICTATED
ABCDEAFGEE	SMOKESCREE N	ABCDEDF A	EXCAVATE
ABCDEBA	DELAYED	ABCDEDF A	EXHIBITE D
ABCDEBA	D ETONATE	ABCDEDFAC	ANTICIPAT E
ABCDEBA	INDEMNI TY	ABCDEDFAC	CLEARANCE
ABCDEBA	D ISPERSI ON	ABCDEDFACDGB	ANTICIPATION
ABCDEBA	RECOVER	ABCDEDFCAB	INTERESTIN G
ABCDEBA	SURPLUS	ABCDEDFCGA HB	INAUGURATION
ABCDEBAB	ARBITRAR Y	ABCDEDFDA	ARTIFICIA L

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Table D-3 (c). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS-- Continued

ABCDEFDFEAB	C	ONSTITUTION	ABCDEF	SERIOUS	LY
ABCDEFDFDGHAI		CHRONOLOGICAL	ABCDEF	E	STABLIS H
ABCDEFDFGA	PR	OCLAMATIO N	ABCDEF		TONIGHT
ABCDEFDFGA	P	RELIMINAR Y	ABCDEF		EMPLOYEE
ABCDEFDFGABHD		INDETERMINATE	ABCDEF	T	RANSFERRE D
ABCDEFDFGADB	P	RELIMINARIE S	ABCDEF	T	RANSFERRIN G
ABCDEFDFGHAGD		ADMINISTRATI VE	ABCDEF		INCLUDIN G
ABCDEFDFGHAGDIE		ADMINISTRATION	ABCDEF		RADIOGRA M
ABCDEEA		ENROLLE D	ABCDEF	P	REMATURE
ABCDEEA	P	ERSONNE L	ABCDEF		EMPLACEME NT
ABCDEEA		IMPOSSI BLE	ABCDEF		INTEGRIT Y
ABCDEEACB	S	IGNALLING	ABCDEF	P	RISONERS
ABCDEEAFDBC		INTELLIGENT	ABCDEF	IN	TRODUCTOR Y
ABCDEEAFDBGD		INTELLIGENCE	ABCDEF		ALTERNATE
ABCDEEDFGBA		RECONNOITER	ABCDEF		ALTERNATIN G
ABCDEEDFGBAFE		RECONNOITERIN G	ABCDEF		CONTRACT
ABCDEEFAB		ENROLLMEN T	ABCDEF	D	ESTROYER
ABCDEEFAB	C	ONFESSION	ABCDEF		INTERVIE W
ABCDEEFAE		EMBASSIES	ABCDEF		OPERATOR
ABCDEEFDGFA		DISAPPEARED	ABCDEF	FI	RECONTRO L
ABCDEEFGCAHB		INTERRUPTION	ABCDEF	P	ROCEDURE
ABCDEF	C	ABLEGRA M	ABCDEF	D	ESTROYERS
ABCDEF		AMERICA N	ABCDEF	T	RANSVERSE
ABCDEF	C	AMOUFLA GE	ABCDEF	D	ISCONTIN UE
ABCDEF		CHRONIC AL	ABCDEF	D	ISCONTINUANC E
ABCDEF		CONFLIC T	ABCDEF		EXPANDED
ABCDEF	DIS	CREPANC Y	ABCDEF	I	MPROVEME NT
ABCDEF	S	EABORNE	ABCDEF	R	ADIOSTATIO N
ABCDEF		EMPLOYE R	ABCDEF		ENCIPHERE D
ABCDEF		ENCIPHE R	ABCDEF		ENFORCEMEN T
ABCDEF		ENFORCE	ABCDEF		AEROPLANE
ABCDEF		ENLISTE D	ABCDEF	D	ETACHMENT
ABCDEF	D	EPLOYME NT	ABCDEF		INFLATION
ABCDEF		EQUIPME NT	ABCDEF		REINFORCE
ABCDEF	FIGHT	ERPLANE	ABCDEF		TRAJECTOR Y
ABCDEF		ESCORTE D	ABCDEF		REIMBURSEME NT
ABCDEF	D	ESCRIBE	ABCDEF		REINFORCEMEN T
ABCDEF	J	ETPLANE	ABCDEF		INTERDICT
ABCDEF		EXCLUDE	ABCDEF		INTERDICTION
ABCDEF		INCLUSI VE	ABCDEF	D	EPARTMENT
ABCDEF		LOGICAL	ABCDEF	D	EPARTMENTA L
ABCDEF	F	ORMATIO N	ABCDEF		REGISTRATI ON
ABCDEF	T	RANSFER	ABCDEF		ENCIPHERMEN T
ABCDEF		REGULAR	ABCDEF		CONFISCATION
ABCDEF	P	RISONER	ABCDEF		INVESTIGATE
ABCDEF		SAILORS	ABCDEF		INVESTIGATION
ABCDEF		SECTORS	ABCDEF		INVESTIGATIONS

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued

MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCDEFAGHIF	B	REAKTHROUGH	ABCDEFGA	M	ECHANIZE	D
ABCDEFBA		DECLARED	ABCDEFGA	T	ECHNIQUE	
ABCDEFBA		DEPARTED	ABCDEFGA	R	ECOGNIZE	
ABCDEFBA		DEPLOYED	ABCDEFGA		ENFILADE	
ABCDEFBA		DEPORTED	ABCDEFGA		EQUALIZE	
ABCDEFBA		DETACHED	ABCDEFGA		EQUIPAGE	
ABCDEFBA		EMPLOYME	ABCDEFGA		EQUIVALE	NT
ABCDEFBA		ENTRAINE	ABCDEFGA	D	ESIGNATE	
ABCDEFBA		REGISTER	ABCDEFGA		EXCHANGE	
ABCDEFBA	P	ROJECTOR	ABCDEFGA		GROUPING	
ABCDEFBAB		MEASUREME	ABCDEFGA		GUARDING	
ABCDEFBABGHD		MEASUREMENTS	ABCDEFGA		INSECURI	TY
ABCDEFBGA		ENDURANCE	ABCDEFGA	D	IPLOMATI	C
ABCDEFBGBA		DECIPHERED	ABCDEFGA	E	NTRUCKIN	G
ABCDEFCA		ESTIMATE	ABCDEFGA		NUMBERIN	G
ABCDEFCA		NORTHERN	ABCDEFGA		OBJECTIO	N
ABCDEFCA		ESTIMATES	ABCDEFGA		OPERATIO	N
ABCDEFCA		OMINATION	ABCDEFGA		SOLDIERS	
ABCDEFCAD	D	ESTIMATEDAT	ABCDEFGA	DI	SPATCHES	
ABCDEFCA		DETONATED	ABCDEFGA		WITHDRAW	
ABCDEFCA		DISTRESSED	ABCDEFGA		WITHDREW	
ABCDEFCEA		DISPERSED	ABCDEFGAB	D	ESPATCHES	
ABCDEFCEA		ELABORATE	ABCDEFGAB	U	NDERSTAND	
ABCDEFCEA	D	EPARTURE	ABCDEFGAB		WITHDRAWI NG	
ABCDEFCEA	C	USTOMHOUS	ABCDEFGABF		ENLISTMENT	
ABCDEFCEA		INTERVENIN	ABCDEFGAC	I	NSTRUMENT	
ABCDEFCEA		INTERVENTION	ABCDEFGAC	F	OUNDATION	
ABCDEFCEA		INTERFERIN	ABCDEFGACB	I	NSTRUMENTS	
ABCDEFCEA	DEM	ONSTRATION	ABCDEFGAD		SOUTHEAST	
ABCDEFCEA		INTERMEDIATE	ABCDEFGAD		SOUTHWEST	
ABCDEFCEA		HYDROGRAPH	ABCDEFGADG		SOUTHWESTE RN	
ABCDEFCEA	R	EINSTATE	ABCDEFGAEHBC		CONSTRUCTION	
ABCDEFCEA	F	INGERPRIN	ABCDEFGAFE		IMPRACTICA BLE	
ABCDEFCEA	R	EINSTATEMENT	ABCDEFGAG		WITHDRAWA L	
ABCDEFCEA		CERTIFICATE	ABCDEFGAHB		INSPECTION	
ABCDEFCEA		THERMOMETER	ABCDEFGAHCGIDE		RECONSTRUCTION	
ABCDEFCEA		CONFERENCE	ABCDEFGBA		DESCRIBED	
ABCDEFCEA		INTERPRETATION	ABCDEFGBA		DESTROYED	
ABCDEFCEA	C	OMPETITIO	ABCDEFGBA		DETRAINED	
ABCDEFCEA	D	EMOBILIZE	ABCDEFGBA		REMAINDER	
ABCDEFCEA	C	OMPUTATIO	ABCDEFGBA		TRANSPORT	
ABCDEFCEA	UN	DERSTOOD	ABCDEFGBACAHGD		TRANSPORTATION	
ABCDEFCEA		IMPRESSI	ABCDEFGBAE		TRANSPORTS	
ABCDEFCEA		IMPRESSIVE	ABCDEFGBHA		ESTABLISHE	D
ABCDEFCEA		INSTALLATIONS	ABCDEFGBHIAC		ESTABLISHMENT	
ABCDEFCEA	C	ONGRESSION	ABCDEFGCAG		CONFIDENCE	
ABCDEFCEA		DISARMED	ABCDEFGCHEA		RANGEFINDER	

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Table D-3 (C). List of words used in military text arranged alphabetically according to word pattern (U)--Continued
MISCELLANEOUS PATTERNS--Continued

ABCDEFGHI DAHB		INSTRUCTION		ABCDEFGHIHBA		DESPATCHED
ABCDEFGHI DAHBC		INSTRUCTIONS		ABCDEFGHIHBIKA		DISORGANIZED
ABCDEFGHI DDBFHA	CE	NTRALIZATION		ABCDEFGHIHCAEB		INTRODUCTION
ABCDEFGHI DHAIC		OBSTRUCTIONS		ABCDEFGHIHCAEB	D	ISCREPANCIES
ABCDEFGHI DHFAE		ORGANIZATION		ABCDEFGHIHDAB	C	ONFIRMATION
ABCDEFGHI GEA	H	EAVYBOMBE R		ABCDEFGHIHDGCA		NORTHWESTERN
ABCDEFGHI GEHA	D	ESCRPTIVE		ABCDEFGHIHDIKA		REVOLUTIONAR Y
ABCDEFGHI GFABF	I	NCOMPETENCE		ABCDEFGHIHEEHA		COUNTERATTAC K
ABCDEFGHI GFAG	I	NCOMPETENT		ABCDEFGHIHF A	D	EMONSTRATE
ABCDEFGHI GGAG	H	EAVYLOSSES		ABCDEFGHIHF CAG		AGRICULTURAL
ABCDEFGHI GHA		CONSPIRAC Y		ABCDEFGHIHIA		DISPATCHED
ABCDEFGHI GHA		DOMINATED		ABCDEFGHIHIA		OBSERVATIO N
ABCDEFGHI GHA	C	ENTRALIZE		ABCDEFGHIHIA		SUBMARINES
ABCDEFGHI GHA		EXCLUSIVE		ABCDEFGHIHIAB	C	ONVERSATION
ABCDEFGHI GHA		EXPANSIVE		ABCDEFGHIHIAE	C	OMPENSATION
ABCDEFGHI GHA		EXPLOSIVE		ABCDEFGHIHIAF	R	OADJUNCTION
ABCDEFGHI GHA		MECHANISM		ABCDEFGHIHIDAB	C	ONSIDERATION
ABCDEFGHI GHAB	C	ONSUMPTION		ABCDEFGHIHIFKA		SEARCHLIGHTS
ABCDEFGHI GHADB		INFORMATION		ABCDEFGHIHIGBA		DEMONSTRATED
ABCDEFGHI GHAGC		CONVALESCEN T		ABCDEFGHIHJDA		SIMULTANEOUS
ABCDEFGHI GHBA		DESIGNATED				

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Table D-4 (C). List of general digraphic idiomorphs (U)

		AB	AB					AB	--	AB			
-G	EN	ER	AL	AL	AR	M-		TH	ER	EF	ER	EN	CE
		NE	ED	ED				TH	ER	ES	ER	VE	
-P	RO	CE	ED	ED				WH	ER	EV	ER		
-S	UC	CE	ED	ED				EL	ES	SN	ES	S-	
-D	ET	RA	IN	IN	G-			SC	GE	OR	GE		
		-L	IN	IN	G-			UM	HO	OL	HO	US	E-
	OB	-M	IN	IN	G-				IN	AT	IN	G	
		TA	IN	IN	G-				IN	CL	IN	E-	
		QU	IN	IN	E-			-F	IR	GL	IN	E-	
		RA	IN	IN	G-			MA	IN	TA	IN		
	RE	MA	IN	IN	G-			NF	AL	LI	LI	TY	
		SH	IN	IN	G-			-A	ME	ND	ME	NT	
	-T	RA	IN	IN	G-			SO	ME	TI	ME		
		CR	IS	IS				-O	NE	NI	NE		
PO	SI	TI	ON	ON					NO	TK	NO	WN	
		-A	RE	RE	EN	FO	RC	ED	NO	WK	NO	WN	
		-A	SU	SU	AL				NT	ME	NT		
		BO	TH	TH	E-			-A	PP	OI	NT		
		WI	TH	TH	E-			-C	ON	TE	NT	IS	E-
	-P	AR	TI	TI	ON					-C	OM	PR	OM
	RE	PE	TI	TI	ON			-T		HR	OU	GH	OU
			VI	VI	D-			-N			OW	KN	OW
									TR	OO	PH	OS	PH
										PA	PS	PO	PO
										-P	RA	HI	PS
											RE	PH	RA
											RE	FE	RE
											RE	FE	RE
											RE	FO	RE
											RE	PA	RE
											RE	TI	RE
											RE	VE	RE
											RO	SS	RO
											RE	SS	RO
											RE	NE	SS
											CA	RE	SS
													TE
													MP
													TH
													AT
													TH
													WI
													TH
													GA
													TI
													MA
													TI
													NA
													VI
													TI
													UM
													DR
													UM

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Table D-4 (C). List of general digraphic idiomorphs (U) -Continued

		AB	--	--	AB		
	-P	AN	AM	AC	AN	AL	
		AR	BI	TR	AR	Y-	
		AS	SO	ON	AS		
	AC	CE	PT	AN	CE		
		EM	PL	AC	EM	EN	T-
-Q	UA	RT	ER	MA	ST	ER	
	-I	NT	ER	PR	ET	ER	
	-A	CC	ES	SO	RI	ES	
		IN	CL	UD	IN	G-	
	-D	IR	EC	TF	IR	E-	
	TO	MO	RR	OW	MO	RN	IN G-
	PA	NA	MA	CA	NA	L-	
	-I	NT	ER	ME	NT		
	-I	NT	ER	VE	NT	IO	N-
	CO	NT	IN	GE	NT		
	-C	ON	DI	TI	ON		
	-T	OM	OR	RO	WM	OR	NI NG
			RA	DI	OG	RA	M-
			RE	AS	SU	RE	
	-P		RE	MA	TU	RE	
-D	EF	EN	SI	VE	PO	SI	TI ON
		IN	TE	RD	IC	TE	D-
	QU	AR	TE	RM	AS	TE	R-
		IN	TE	RP	RE	TE	R-
		IN	TE	RR	UP	TE	D-
	-F	OR	TI	FI	CA	TI	ON

		AB	--	--	--	AB		
		AR	MO	RE	DC	AR		
		EN	FO	RC	EM	EN	T-	
	RE	EN	FO	RC	EM	EN	TS	
		IN	DE	TE	RM	IN	AT	E-
		IN	TE	RE	ST	IN	G-	
		IN	TE	RF	ER	IN	G-	
		IN	TE	RV	EN	IN	G-	
	-I	NC	OM	PE	TE	NC	E-	
	-C	ON	GR	ES	SI	ON	AL	
-D	EM	ON	ST	RA	TI	ON		
	-C	ON	SU	MP	TI	ON		
		PH	OT	OG	RA	PH		
		TH	IR	TE	EN	TH		

		AB	--	--	--	AB		
	-I	NS	TA	LL	AT	IO	NS	
	-C	ON	CE	NT	RA	TI	ON	
	-C	ON	FL	AG	RA	TI	ON	
	-C	ON	SI	DE	RA	TI	ON	

		AB	--	AB	AB		
		IN	CL	IN	IN	G-	
MA		IN	TA	IN	IN	G-	

Table D-5 (φ). List of playfair digraphic idiomorphs (U)

		AB	BA			AB	BA								
	SC	AB	BA	RD		SH	EL	LE	D-						
		AF	FA	BL	E-	-H	EM	ME	DI	N-					
		AF	FA	IR		ST	EM	ME	D-						
	-B	AG	GA	GE		ST	EP	PE	D-						
	-H	AW	AI	IA	N-	AV	ER	RE	D-						
		AL	LA	RE	AS	CO	NF	ER	RE	D-					
	-B	AL	LA	ST		-I	NT	ER	RE	D-					
	-F	AL	LA	CY		-R	EF	ER	RE	D-					
	IN	ST	AL	LA	TI			ES	SE	NC	E-				
	-P	AR	AL	LA	X-			ES	SE	NT	IA	L-			
		AP	PA	RA	TU	S-	AD	DR	ES	SE	S-				
		AP	PA	RE	L-	S-	-C	OM	PR	ES	SE	D-			
		AP	PA	RE	NT		CO	NF	ES	SE	D-				
		AP	PA	RE	NT	LY	IM	PR	ES	SE	D-				
		AR	RA	NG	E-			-L	ES	SE	N-				
		AR	RA	Y-				-M	ES	SE	NG	ER			
	-B	AR	RA	CK	S-		PR	ES	SE	D-					
	-B	AR	RA	GE			PR	OF	ES	SE	D-				
	-E	MB	AR	RA	SS	ED	-P	RO	GR	ES	SE	D-			
		-N	AR	RA	TI	ON		-S	TR	ES	SE	D-			
			AS	SA	IL	AN		-S	TR	ES	SE	S-			
			AS	SA	UL	T-			-V	ES	SE	L-			
	-A	MB	AS	SA	DO	R-	WI	TN	ES	SE	S-				
	-I	MP	AS	SA	BL	E-		AB	ET	TE	D-				
		-M	AS	SA	CR	E-	-C	IG	AR	ET	TE	S-			
		-P	AS	SA	GE			-B	ET	TE	R-				
			AT	TA	CH			-L	ET	TE	R-				
			AT	TA	CK			IG	HT	TH	RE	E-			
			AT	TA	IN			-R	IB	BI	NG				
	-B		AT	TA	LI	ON		FO	RB	ID	DI	NG			
	-R		AT	TA	N-				-D	IF	FI	CU	LT		
			BO	OB	YT	RA	P-		-B	IL	LI	ON			
	IN		DE	ED					-F	IL	LI	NG			
	-W		EB	BE	D-				-K	IL	LI	NG			
			EF	FE	CT				-M	IL	LI	ME	TE	R-	
			EF	FE	CT	IV	E-		-M	IL	LI	NG			
	CO	MP	EL	LE	D-				-M	IL	LI	ON			
	-E	XC	EL	LE	NC	E-			SH	IL	LI	NG			
	-E	XC	EL	LE	NT				SP	IL	LI	NG			
	-E	XP	EL	LE	D-				-T	IL	LI	NG			
	-I	MP	EL	LE	D-				-W	IL	LI	AM			
		-P	EL	LE	T-				-W	IL	LI	NG			
	PR	OP	EL	LE	D-					IM	MI	GR	AN	T-	
	-R	EP	EL	LE	D-					IM	MI	GR	AT	IO	N-

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Table D-5 (C). List of playfair digraphic idiomorphs (U) -Continued

		AB	BA					AB	BA					
		IM	MI	NE	NT			PR	AC	TI	CA	BL	E-	
		IM	MI	NG				PR	AC	TI	CA	L-		
-B	SW	IN	NI	NG				-T	AC	TI	CA	L-		
	EG	IN	NI	NG				IV	EB	OM	BE	R-		
	SP	IN	NI	NG					EN	GI	NE	ER		
	-W	IP	PI	NG				-G	EN	UI	NE			
	CL	IP	PI	NG				-I	NT	ER	FE	RE		
	SH	IP	PI	NG				-I	NT	ER	FE	RE	NC	E-
-S	TR	IP	PI	NG				-P	EN	ET	RA	TE		
		IR	RI	GA	TI	ON		-R	EV	OL	VE	R-		
	-M	IS	SI	NG					IN	FI	NI	TE		
	-M	IS	SI	ON				-D	IS	PO	SI	TI	ON	
-A	DM	IS	SI	ON				-S	IT	UA	TI	ON		
	EM	IS	SI	ON				CA	NA	DI	AN			
	-H	IS	SI	NG				RI	NA	RI	AN			
TR	PE	RM	IS	ON			VE	TE	RI	NA	RI	AN		
	AN	SM	IS	ON					NI	NE	TE	EN		
		EM	IT	NG					NI	NE	TE	EN	TH	
	-F	IT	TI	NG						PE	RC	EP	TI	
	PL	IT	TI	NG						RE	MI	ER	ON	
	PE	RM	IT	NG				-P	UR	RE	ND	ER		
-A	FT	ER	NO	ON				-S	UR	RE	ND	ER		
	FO	RE	NO	ON				-O	UR	SE	LV	ES		
			NO	ON	TI	ME		TH	EM	SE	LV	ES		
	-F	OL	LO	W-					DE	SE	RV	ES		
	-H	OL	LO	W-					RE	SE	RV	ES		
	-C	OM	MO	N-						SE	RV	ES		
	-C	OM	MO	TI	ON					SE	RV	ES		
PO	SI	TI	ON	NO	RT	HO	F-			SE	RV	ES		
	-R	EC	ON	NO	IT	ER				SE	RV	ES		
			OP	PO	RT	UN	E-			SE	RV	ES		
			OP	PO	RT	UN	IT	Y-		SE	RV	ES		
			OP	PO	SE					SE	RV	ES		
			OP	PO	SI	TE				SE	RV	ES		
			OP	PO	SI	TI	ON			SE	RV	ES		
	-C	OR	RO	BO	RA	TE				SE	RV	ES		
	-C	OR	RO	DE						SE	RV	ES		
-T	OM	OR	RO	W-						SE	RV	ES		
	-B	OT	TO	M-						SE	RV	ES		
	-C	OT	TO	N-						SE	RV	ES		
	CA	RE	ER							SE	RV	ES		
	-S	UC	CU	MB	ED					SE	RV	ES		

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Table D-5 (Ø). List of playfair digraphic idiomorphs (U) -Continued

AB		---	---	BA		
	DE	BA	RK	ED		
	DE	CL	AR	ED		
	DE	FE	ND	ED		
	DE	MA	ND	ED		
	DE	PA	RT	ED		
	DE	PL	OY	ED		
	DE	PO	RT	ED		
	DE	SE	RT	ED		
	DE	TA	CH	ED		
PR	EC	ED	EN	CE		
	EM	PL	OY	ME	NT	
	EN	TR	AI	NE	D-	
	ME	AS	UR	EM	EN	T-
	NE	GL	IG	EN	CE	
	NO	TA	TI	ON		
	PA	RA	GR	AP	H-	
	RE	CE	IV	ER		
	RE	CO	RD	ER		
	RE	GI	ST	ER		
	RE	PE	AT	ER		
	RE	PO	RT	ER		
	RE	VO	LV	ER		
-P	RO	JE	CT	OR		
AS	SE	MB	LI	ES		

AB		---	---	---	BA		
	DE	SE	CR	AT	ED		
	DE	SI	GN	AT	ED		
	DE	SP	AT	CH	ED		
	EN	EM	YP	LA	NE	S-	
-D	ET	ER	IO	RA	TE		
-S	EV	EN	TY	FI	VE		
	IR	RE	GU	LA	RI	TY	
	NO	MI	NA	TI	ON		
	SU	SP	IC	IO	US		

AB		---	---	---	BA		
	DE	MO	NS	TR	AT	ED	
	NO	TI	FI	CA	TI	ON	

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Table D-6 (C). List of four-square digraphic idiomorphs (U)
 (Grouped by number of significant letters in the idiomorphic pattern)

TWO LETTERS

B LO CK I NV D AM AG E CO MM AN DS I SL AN DS A IR PL AN ES E NE MY PL AN ES DE SI GN AT ED E ST IM AT ED I ND IC AT ED C AV AL RY N AV AL P RO CE DU RE ME CH AN IZ ED IM ME DI AT EL Y WI TH DR AW WI TH DR EW EM ER GE NC Y L IE UT EN AN T FI FT EE N FI FT H FI FT Y BR ID GE HE AD V IC IN IT Y W IT HD RA W A DD IT IO NA L A MM UN IT IO N CO ND IT IO N RE CO GN IT IO N E LE ME NT MI LI TA RY MI NI MU M NI NT H P OI NT T OM OR RO W PO NT ON	A- A-	RE QU ES T RE QU IR E P RI SO NE R RE SI ST AN CE D IS PO SI TI ON PO SI TI ON SO UT H SQ UA DR ON FI GH TE RP LA NE MO TO RI ZE D D EP AR TU RE UN US UA L A- - A- S AB OT AG E D ET AC HM EN T H AS BE EN BA TT AL IO N BO MB ED CA SU AL TI ES CA SU AL TY CO MB AT CO OR DI NA TE S DI RE CT IO N DI SP AT CH ME DI UM BO MB ER DI VE BO MB ER R OA DJ UN CT IO N R EP LA CE ME NT R ET RE AT S EV ER AL JU NC TI ON CO NF IR MA TI ON I NF OR MA TI ON I NT EL LI GE NC E PA TR OL	A- - A- SA BO TA GE SE VE RE AC TI VI TY A TT EN TI ON S UC CE SS FU LL Y A- - - A- AR TI LL ER Y AT TA CK ED R EE NF OR CE R EE NF OR CE ME NT ID EN TI FY IM PO SS IB LE MO VE ME NT E MP LA CE ME NT PE RS ON NE L A RT IL LE RY A- - - - A- CO MM UN IC AT IO NS CO NC EN TR AT E R EO RG AN IZ AT IO N LI EU TE NA NT CO NS TR UC TI ON A- - - - - A- CO MM IS SI ON ED -B -B UN AB LE OB ST AC LE AD VA NC E AG AI NS T R AI LH EA D PR EP AR AT IO N A SS AU LT
--	-------	---	--

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Table D-6 (c). List of four-square digraphic idiomorphs (U)--Continued

TWO LETTERS --Continued

	<u>-B -B</u>		<u>-R -B</u>		<u>-B - -B</u>
B OM	BA RD		C OL ON		CA RR IE RS
A IR	BO RN E		C OL ON EL		MI SS IO NS
S EA	BO RN E	SU PE RI	OR IT Y		TW EN TY
A DV AN	CI NG		M OT OR IZ ED		RE EQ UE ST ED
VI	CI NI TY		OU TS KI RT S		
	DE TA CH	EQ UI	PM EN T		<u>-B - - -B</u>
	DE TA CH ME NT	A VE	RA GE		I DE NT IF IC AT IO N
H AV	EB EE N	B AR	RA GE		M EC HA NI ZE D
M OV	EM EN T	AI	RC RA FT		D EP LO YM EN T
	EN EM Y	AN TI AI	RC RA FT		M ES SE NG ER
R	ES ER VE		RE MA IN		D ES TR OY ER
R	ET UR N	R EQ UI	RE ME NT		A IR SU PP OR T
	FL AN K	M IS	SI NG		V IS IB IL IT Y
	FO LL OW	P	ER SO NN EL		M E SS EN GE R
B AG	GA GE	ES TI	MA TE DA T		I MP AS SA BL E
	HA SB EE N	P	LA TO ON		I MP OS SI BL E
A PP RO AC	HI NG		S UP PL Y		A NT IA IR CR AF T
DE BO UC	HI NG		S UP PO RT		C OM MA ND IN G
L AU NC	HI NG		NA VA LB AS E		OP ER AT IO N
I MM ED	IA TE LY	F	OR WA RD		PR IS ON ER
IN IT	IA TE	WI	ND WA RD		PR OC ED UR E
F	IF TH				RE EN FO RC E
TE RR	IT OR Y	<u>-B - -B</u>			TR AN SP OR TA TI ON
S	IX TY	C	AS UA LT Y		YE ST ER DA Y
M IS CE	LL AN EO US	P	AT RO LS		
E	LE VA TI ON	B AT TL	ES HI PS		<u>-B - - - -B</u>
E	LE VE N		GE NE RA L		R EC OM ME ND ED
	LI AI SO N	W IL	LA TT AC K		HE AV YL OS SE S
DA	MA GE	T RA	NS MI SS IO N		R EC OM ME ND AT IO N
	MO RN IN G	R EC	OG NI TI ON		C OM MU NI CA TI ON
U	NU SU AL	T RO	OP SH IP		R EC ON NO IT ER IN G
OB JE	CT IV E		RE GI ME NT		

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Table D-6 (C). List of four-square digraphic idiomorphs (U)--Continued

THREE LETTERS

<u>A- A- A-</u> N AV AL BA SE R EQ UI SI TI ON	<u>A- A- - A-</u> RE QU ES TE D	<u>-B -B -B</u> B OM BA RD ME NT EL EM EN TS EN GA GE ME NT
--	--	--

FOUR LETTERS

<u>AB A- -B</u> H EA DQ UA RT ER S EL EV EN	<u>A- A- - -B -B</u> RE QU IR EM EN T	<u>-B A- AB</u> RE PE AT ED
<u>AB -B A-</u> CA NC EL RE CO NN AI SS AN CE	<u>A- -B AB</u> M OR NI NG P OS TP ON E	<u>-B A- A- -B</u> DE ST RO YE R
<u>AB -B - A-</u> AD VA NC ED EN EM YT AN KS	<u>A- -B -B - A-</u> RE CO NN OI TE R	<u>-B A- -B - A-</u> UN ID EN TI FI ED
<u>AB - A- -B</u> SI GH TI NG	<u>A- -B - AB</u> IN TE RD IC T	<u>-B A- - AB</u> U NS UC CE SS FU L
<u>A- AB -B</u> AD DI TI ON AL	<u>A- -B - A- -B</u> S AT IS FA CT OR Y	<u>-B A- - A- -B</u> ME DI UM BO MB ER
<u>A- AB - -B</u> SO UT HW ES T	<u>A- - A- C- C-</u> DI SP AT CH ES	<u>-B A- - -B A-</u> VI SI BI LI TY
<u>A- A- -B -B</u> W IT HD RA WA L	<u>A- - - C- A- C-</u> RO AD JU NC TI ON	<u>-B A- - - AB</u> IN FO RM AT IO N
<u>A- A- - A- A-</u> CO MM AN DI NG	<u>-B AB A-</u> DI SP OS IT IO N P OS IT IO N PR ES EN T RE PR ES EN T	<u>-B A- - - A- -B</u> IN ST AL LA TI ON
		<u>-B -D -B - -D</u> CR OS SR OA DS

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Table D-6 (d). List of four-square digraphic idiomorphs (U)--Continued

FOUR LETTERS -Continued

$\frac{-B -D -D -B}{AI RS UP PO RT }$	$\frac{-B - A- AB}{F IG HT ER PL AN ES }$	$\frac{-R - R A- A-}{ EN CO IN TE RE D}$
$\frac{-B -D - -D -B}{C ON ST RU CT IO N}$	$\frac{-B - A- - - AB}{E ST AB LI SH ME NT }$	$\frac{-B - - -R -D -D}{ RE IN FO RC EM EN T}$

FIVE LETTERS

$\frac{A- -B AB - -B}{ NA VA LA TT AC K}$	$\frac{-B A- A- - AB}{ DI ST RI BU TI ON}$	$\frac{-R -D - -D -B -D}{ IN ST RU CT IO NS }$
$\frac{A- -B - -B AB}{R EC ON NA IS SA NC E}$	$\frac{-B A- -B AB}{RE PL AC EM EN T}$	

SIX LETTERS

$\frac{AB CB C- A-}{P OS IT IO NS }$	$\frac{A- A- -B AB A-}{ RE QU IS IT IO N}$	$\frac{A- - CB A- - CB}{ ID EN TI FI CA TI ON}$
$\frac{AB -D -D AB}{C ON DI TI ON }$	$\frac{A- CB - A- CB}{Q UA RT ER MA ST ER }$	$\frac{-R AB AD -D}{A DM IN IS TR AT IV E}$
$\frac{AB -D -D AB}{C ON DI TI ON }$	$\frac{A- CB - CB A-}{ SC HO OL HO US E}$	

Table D-6 (e). List of four-square digraphic idiomorphs (U)--Continued

SEVEN LETTERS

$\frac{-B AD - -B -D AD}{ RE EN FO RC EM EN T}$
--

EIGHT LETTERS

$\frac{AB -B AD - -B AD}{ QU AR TE RM AS TE R}$	$\frac{AB -B C- AB CB}{ EM PL AC EM EN T}$	$\frac{AB -D C- AD C- -B}{ IN TE RD IC TI ON }$
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Table D-7 (7). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U)

AA	RU	BBER	AA	CR	EEK
AA	RU	BBLE	AA	DECR	EE
AA	A	CCEPT	AA	DEGR	EE
AA	A	CCEPTABLE	AA	EIGHT	EEN
AA(5)A	A	CCEPTANCE	AA	EIGHT	EENTH
AA	A	CCESS	AA	EMPLOY	EE
AA	A	CCESSORY	AA	ENGIN	EER
AA	A	CCIDENTIAL	AA	ENGIN	EERING
AA	A	CCOMPANY	AA	F	EEL
AA	A	CCOMMODATION	AA	F	EET
AA(5)A	A	CCORDANCE	AA	FIFT	EEN
AA	A	CCORDING	AA	FIFT	EENTH
AA	O	CCUPATION	AA	FL	EE
AA	O	CCUPY	AA	FL	EET
AA	SU	CCEDED	AA	FOURT	EEN
AA	SU	CCESS	AA	FOURT	EENTH
AA	SU	CCESSFUL	AA	HASB	EEN
AA	SU	CCESSFULLY	AA	HAVEB	EEN
AA	SU	CCESSIVE	AA	IND	EED
AA	TOBA	CCO	AA	K	EEP
AA	UNSU	CCESSFUL	AA(1)A	K	EUPER
AA	A	DD	AA	M	EET
AA	A	DDITIONAL	AA	NINET	EEN
AA	A	DDRESSES	AA	NINET	EENTH
AA	A	DDRESS	AA	PROC	EED
AA(5)A	A	DDRESSED	AA(1)A	PROC	EEDED
AA	BE	DDING	AA	QU	EEN
AA	LA	DDER	AA(5)A	R	EENFORCE
AA	SU	DDEN	AA(5)A(1)A	R	EENFORCEMENT
AA(1)A	AGR	EEMENT	AA	R	EENLIST
AA	B	EEN	AA(5)A	R	EENLISTED
AA(1)A	BEENN	EEDED	AA(6)A	R	EENLISTMENT
AA(2)AA(1)A	B	EENNEEDED	AA	REFUG	EE
AA(2)A	B	EETLE	AA	SCR	EEN
AA	BETW	EEN	AA	SCR	EENING
AA(1)A	BR	EEZE	AA	S	EE
AA(1)A	CH	EESE	AA	S	EEN
AA	COFF	EE	AA	SEVENT	EEN
AA	COMMAND	EER	AA	SEVENT	EENTH
AA	COMMITT	EE	AA	SIXT	EEN

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Table D-7 (Q). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U)-Continued

AA	SIXT	EENTH	AA	SU	GGEST
AA	SMOKESCR	EEN	AA	TRI	GGER
AA	SP	EED	AA	BEAC	HHEAD
AA	ST	EEL	AA	ACTUA	LLY
AA	STR	EET	AA	A	LL
AA(1)A	SUCC	EEDED	AA	A	LLEGE
AA	SW	EERING	AA	A	LLEGIANCE
AA	THIRT	EEN	AA	A	LLIED
AA	THIRT	EENTH	AA	A	LLIES
AA	THR	EE	AA	A	LLOCATION
AA	W	EEK	AA	A	LLOTMENT
AA	WH	EEL	AA	A	LLOWANCE
AA	A	FFAIR	AA	A	LLOW
AA	CHAU	FFEUR	AA	A	LLY
AA	COE	FFICINT	AA	ARTI	LLERY
AA	CO	FFEE	AA	BA	LLISTICS
AA	DI	FFERENCE	AA	BA	LLOON
AA	DI	FFERENT	AA	BE	LLIGERENT
AA	DI	FFICULT	AA	BI	LLET
AA	DI	FFICULTIES	AA	BI	LLETED
AA	E	FFECT	AA	BU	LLETIN
AA	E	FFECTED	AA	CA	LL
AA	E	FFECTIVE	AA	CANCE	LLATION
AA	E	FFICACY	AA	CANCE	LLED
AA	E	FFICIENT	AA	CE	LL
AA	E	FFICIENCY	AA	CHA	LLERGE
AA	E	FFORT	AA	CO	LLAPSED
AA	GENERALSTA	FF	AA	CO	LLECT
AA	INE	FFICIENCY	AA	CO	LLECTION
AA	JUMPO	FF	AA	CO	LLEGE
AA	O	FF	AA	CO	LLISION
AA	O	FFEND	AA	COMPE	LLED
AA	O	FFENDED	AA	DISTI	LL
AA	O	FFENSE	AA	DO	LLAR
AA	O	FFENSIVE	AA	DRI	LL
AA	O	FFICE	AA	ENRO	LL
AA	O	FFICER	AA	ENRO	LLED
AA	O	FFICIAL	AA	ENRO	LLMENT
AA	POSTO	FFICE	AA	EXPE	LLED
AA	STA	FF	AA	FA	LL
AA	SU	FFER	AA	FA	LLING
AA	SU	FFERED	AA	FE	LL
AA	SU	FFICIENT	AA	FI	LLING
AA	TRA	FFIC	AA	FO	LLOW
AA(1)A	BA	GGAGE	AA	FU	LL
AA	FO	GGY	AA	HI	LL
AA	STRA	GGLER	AA	I	LL

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Table D-7 (Q). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U)-Continued

AA(3)A	I	LLEGAL	AA	CO	MMANDANT
AA	I	LLITERATE	AA	CO	MMANDED
AA	I	LLNESS	AA	CO	MMANDEER
AA	I	LLUMINATE	AA	CO	MMANDER
AA	I	LLUMINATING	AA	CO	MMANDING
AA	I	LLUMINATION	AA	CO	MMENCE
AA	I	LLUSTRATE	AA(4)A	CO	MMENCEMENT
AA	I	LLUSTRATION	AA	CO	MMEND
AA	INSTA	LL	AA	CO	MMENDATION
AA	INSTA	LLATIONS	AA	CO	MMENT
AA	INTE	LLIGENCE	AA	CO	MMERCE
AA	INTE	LLIGENT	AA	CO	MMISSARY
AA	KI	LLED	AA	CO	MMISSION
AA	KI	LLING	AA	CO	MMISSIONER
AA	MI	LLIMETER	AA	CO	MMIT
AA	MISCE	LLANEIOUS	AA(2)A	CO	MMITMENT
AA	OSCI	LLATE	AA	CO	MMITTEE
AA	PARA	LLAX	AA	CO	MMON
AA(1)A	PARA	LLEL	AA	CO	MMUNICATE
AA	PATRO	LLING	AA	CO	MMUNICATION
AA	PAYRO	LL	AA	CO	MMUNIQUE
AA	RA	LLY	AA	CO	MMUTE
AA	REBE	LLION	AA	HA	MMER
AA	REFI	LL	AA	I	MMEDIATE
AA	REFI	LLING	AA	I	MMIGRATION
AA	REPE	LLED	AA	INFLA	MMABLE
AA	RESPECTFU	LLY	AA	RECO	MMEND
AA	SHE	LL	AA	RECO	MMENDATION
AA	SHE	LLED	AA	RECO	MMENDED
AA	SHE	LLFIRE	AA	SU	MMARY
AA	SHE	LLING	AA	SU	MMER
AA	SHE	LLS	AA	SU	MMIT
AA	SIGNA	LLING	AA	SU	MMON
AA	SMA	LL	AA	SWI	MMING
AA	SPE	LL	AA	A	NNEX
AA	SUCCESSFU	LLY	AA	A	NNOUNCE
AA	VA	LLEY	AA(2)A(4)A	A	NNOUNCEMENT
AA	VI	LLAGE	AA	A	NNUAL
AA	WE	LL	AA	ANTE	NNA
AA	WI	LL	AA	BA	NNER
AA	WI	LLATTACK	AA	BEE	NNEEDED
AA	WI	LLIAM	AA(1)A	BEGI	NNING
AA	ACCO	MMODATION	AA	CA	NNOT
AA	A	MMETER	AA	CHA	NNEL
AA	A	MMUNITION	AA(4)A	CO	NNECTING
AA	CO	MMA	AA(5)A	CO	NNECTION
AA	CO	MMAND	AA	GU	NNER

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) - Continued

AA	MA	NNER	AA	A	PPARATUS
AA(1)A	MA	NNING	AA	A	PPARENT
AA	PERSO	NNEL	AA	A	PPARENTLY
AA(1)A	PLA	NNING	AA	A	PPEAR
AA(5)A	RECO	NNAISSANCE	AA	A	PPEARANCE
AA	RECO	NNOITER	AA	A	PPEARED
AA(6)A	RECO	NNOITERING	AA	A	PPLICATION
AA	RU	NNER	AA	A	PPLY
AA(1)A	RU	NNING	AA	A	PPOINT
AA	TO	NNAGE	AA	A	PPOINTED
AA	AFTERN	OON	AA	A	PPOINTMENT
AA	ASS	OONAS	AA	A	PPROACH
AA	BALL	OON	AA(2)A	A	PPROPRIATE
AA	B	OOK	AA	A	PPROVAL
AA	B	OOTH	AA	A	PPROVE
AA	CODEB	OOK	AA	A	PPROXIMATE
AA	C	OOK	AA	CLI	PPER
AA	C	OOPERATE	AA	DISA	PPEAR
AA(6)A	C	OOPERATION	AA	DISA	PPEARANCE
AA	C	OORDINATE	AA	DISA	PPEARED
AA(7)A	C	OORDINATION	AA	DRO	PPED
AA(2)A	F	OOTHOLD	AA	HA	PPEN
AA	FOREN	OON	AA	MA	PPING
AA	H	OOK	AA	O	PPOSE
AA	L	OOK	AA	O	PPOSITE
AA(1)A	L	OOKOUT	AA	O	PPOSITION
AA	N	OON	AA	PHILI	PPINES
AA	PLAT	OON	AA	REA	PPOINTED
AA	PONT	OON	AA	REA	PPOINTMENT
AA	PR	OOF	AA	SHI	PPING
AA	SCH	OOL	AA	STO	PPED
AA(2)A	SCH	OOLHOUSE	AA	SU	PPLIES
AA	SHARPSH	OOTER	AA	SU	PPLY
AA	S	OON	AA	SU	PPORT
AA	SP	OOLS	AA	SU	PPORTING
AA	SP	OONS	AA	SU	PPOSE
AA	TATT	OO	AA	A	RRANGE
AA	T	OO	AA	A	RRANGEMENT
AA	T	OOK	AA	A	RREST
AA	T	OOL	AA	A	RESTED
AA	TR	OOPS	AA	A	RRIVAL
AA	TR	OOPSHIP	AA	A	RRIVE
AA	TR	OOPSHIPS	AA	BA	RRACKS
AA	UNDERST	OOD	AA	BA	RRAGE
AA	W	OODED	AA	CA	RRIAGE
AA	W	OODS	AA(2)A	CA	RRIER
AA	AIRSU	PPORT	AA	CA	RRY

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Table D-7 (φ). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) - Continued

AA	CONFE	RRED	AA	A	SSEMBLE
AA	CO	RRECT	AA	A	SSEMBLY
AA	CO	RRECTED	AA(6)A	A	SSEMBLIES
AA	CO	RRECTION	AA(1)AA(4)A	A	SSESSMENTS
AA	CO	RRECTNESS	AA(4)A	ASSE	SSMENTS
AA	CO	RRESPONDENCE	AA	A	SSET
AA	CO	RRESPONDING	AA(2)A	A	SSETS
AA(3)A	CO	RRIDOR	AA	A	SSIGNED
AA	CU	RRENT	AA	A	SSIGNMENT
AA	DEFE	RRED	AA(7)A	A	SSIGNMENTS
AA	DE	RRICK	AA(1)A	A	SSIST
AA(1)A	E	RROR	AA(1)A	A	SSISTANT
AA	FE	RRY	AA(1)A	A	SSISTANCE
AA	GA	RRISON	AA	A	SSOCIATE
AA	HU	RRICANE	AA	A	SSOCIATION
AA	INTE	RRUPT	AA(4)A	A	SSOONAS
AA	INTE	RRUPTED	AA	A	SSURANCE
AA	INTE	RRUPTION	AA	A	SSURE
AA(5)A	I	RREGULAR	AA	BUSINE	SS
AA(5)A	I	RREGULARITIES	AA	CARELE	SS
AA(5)A	I	RREGULARITY	AA(2)AA	CARELE	SSNESS
AA	I	RRIGATION	AA	CARELESSNE	SS
AA(1)A	MI	RROR	AA(1)A	CHA	SSIS
AA	PREA	RRANGED	AA	CLA	SSIFICATION
AA	PREFE	RRED	AA	COMMI	SSARY
AA(4)A	SU	RRENDER	AA	COMMI	SSION
AA(4)A	SU	RRENDERED	AA	COMMI	SSIONER
AA	SU	RROUND	AA	COMPA	SS
AA	TE	RRAIN	AA	COMPLETENE	SS
AA	TE	RRIBLE	AA	COMPRE	SSED
AA	TE	RRIFIC	AA	CONCE	SSION
AA(3)A	TE	RRITORY	AA	CONFE	SSION
AA(1)A	TE	RROR	AA	CONGRE	SS
AA	TOMO	RROW	AA	CONGRE	SSIONAL
AA	TRANSFE	RRED	AA	CORRECTNE	SS
AA	TRANSFE	RRING	AA	CRO	SS
AA	TU	RRET	AA	CRO	SSING
AA	ACCE	SS	AA(4)A	CRO	SSROADS
AA	ACCE	SSORY	AA	DARKNE	SS
AA	ACRO	SS	AA	DEPRE	SSION
AA	ADDRE	SSED	AA	DISCU	SS
AA	ADDRE	SS	AA	DISCU	SSED
AA(1)A	ADDRE	SSES	AA	DISCU	SSION
AA	ADMI	SSION	AA	DISMI	SS
AA	AMBA	SSADOR	AA	DISMI	SSAL
AA	ASPO	SSIBLE	AA	DI	SSEMINATED
AA	A	SSAULT	AA	DI	SSEMINATION

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) - Continued

AA	DISTRE	SS	AA(1)AA	PO	SSESSION
AA	DISTRE	SSED	AA	PO	SSIBLE
AA	DRE	SS	AA	PREPAREDNE	SS
AA	DRE	SSING	AA	PRE	SS
AA(2)A	EMBA	SSIES	AA	PRE	SSED
AA	EMBA	SSY	AA	PRE	SSURE
AA	EXCE	SS	AA	PROGRE	SSIVE
AA	EXCE	SSIVE	AA	PROGRE	SS
AA	EXPRE	SS	AA	READINE	SS
AA	FORTRE	SS	AA	RECONNAI	SSANCE
AA	GA	SSING	AA	REDCRO	SS
AA(1)A	GLA	SSES	AA	SE	SSION
AA(1)A	HEAVYLO	SSES	AA	STRE	SS
AA	ILLNE	SS	AA	SUBMI	SSION
AA	IMPA	SSABLE	AA	SUCCE	SS
AA	IMPO	SSIBLE	AA	SUCCE	SSFUL
AA	IMPRE	SSED	AA	SUCCE	SSFULLY
AA	IMPRE	SSION	AA	SUCCE	SSIVE
AA	IMPRE	SSIVE	AA	TRANSMI	SSION
AA	I	SSUE	AA	UNLE	SS
AA(2)A	I	SSUES	AA	UNSUCCE	SSFUL
AA	I	SSUING	AA	USELE	SS
AA	LE	SS	AA	VE	SSEL
AA	LE	SSON	AA(2)A	VE	SSELS
AA	LO	SS	AA	WIRELE	SS
AA(1)A	LO	SSES	AA	WITNE	SS
AA	MA	SS	AA(1)A	WITNE	SSES
AA	ME	SS	AA	A	TTACH
AA	ME	SSAGE	AA(6)A	A	TTACHMENT
AA(3)A	ME	SSAGES	AA	A	TTACK
AA	ME	SSENGER	AA	A	TTAIN
AA	ME	SSING	AA(6)A	A	TTAINMENT
AA	MI	SSING	AA(3)A	A	TTEMPT
AA	MI	SSION	AA(3)A	A	TTEMPTED
AA(3)A	MI	SSIONS	AA(2)A	A	TTENTION
AA	NECE	SSARY	AA	BA	TTALION
AA	NECE	SSITY	AA	BA	TTEN
AA	NECE	SSITATE	AA	BA	TTERED
AA	PA	SS	AA	BA	TTERIES
AA	PA	SSAGE	AA	BA	TTERY
AA	PA	SSED	AA	BA	TTLE
AA	PA	SSENGER	AA	BA	TTLEFIELD
AA(1)A	PA	SSES	AA	BA	TTLESHIP
AA	PA	SSIVE	AA	BE	TTER
AA	PA	SSPORT	AA	BI	TTER
AA	PERMI	SSION	AA	BO	TTOM
AA	POSSE	SSION	AA	BOYCO	TT

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) - Continued

AA	CIGARE	TTE	A-A	COMB	ATANT
AA	COMMI	TTEE	A-A	CONTR	ABAND
AA	COUNTERA	TTACK	A-A	D	AMAGE
AA	FI	TTING	A-A	D	AMAGED
AA	GE	TTING	A-A	D	AMAGING
AA	LE	TTER	A-A	DISAPPE	ARANCE
AA	LE	TTERED	A-A	EXC	AVATE
AA	LI	TTER	A-A	EXC	AVATION
AA	LI	TTLE	A-A	EXPL	ANATION
AA	NAVALA	TTACK	A-A	F	ATAL
AA	NAVALBA	TTLE	A-A	F	ATALITY
AA	OMI	TTED	A-A	FIRE	ALARM
AA	SE	TTLE	A-A	G	ARAGE
AA	SPO	TTING	A-A(1)A	GENER	ALALARM
AA	SUBMI	TTED	A-A	GENERAL	ALARM
AA	TA	TTOO	A-A	J	APAN
AA	THA	TTHE	A-A	M	ANAGE
AA	WILLA	TTACK	A-A	M	ANAGEMENT
AA	WRI	TTEN	A-A	N	AVAL
AA	MU	ZZLE	A-A(1)A(2)A	N	AVALATTACK
AA	NO	ZZLE	A-A(2)A	NAV	ALATTACK
A-A		ABANDON	A-A(2)A	N	AVALBASE
A-A		AGAIN	A-A(2)A	N	AVALBATTLE
A-A		AGAINST	A-A	N	AVALFORCES
A-A		ALARM	A-A	NONCOMB	ATANT
A-A(2)A		ALASKA	A-A(1)A	P	ANAMA
A-A	ALM	ANAC	A-A	PAN	AMA
A-A		ANALYSIS	A-A	P	ARACHUTE
A-A		ANALYZE	A-A	P	ARADE
A-A	APP	ARATUS	A-A(2)A	P	ARAGRAPH
A-A	APPE	ARANCE	A-A(2)A	P	ARALLAX
A-A(2)A		ARABIA	A-A	P	ARALLEL
A-A(2)A		AVAILABLE	A-A	PREP	ARATION
A-A		AWAIT	A-A	PROCL	AMATION
A-A		AWARD	A-A	QU	ARANTINE
A-A		AWAY	A-A	S	ALARY
A-A	C	ALAMITY	A-A	SEP	ARATE
A-A(1)A	C	ANADA	A-A	SEP	ARATION
A-A	CAN	ADA	A-A	T	AXATION
A-A	C	ANAL	A-A	V	ACANCY
A-A	C	APABILITY	A-A	WITHDR	AWAL
A-A	C	APACITY	A-A	PRO	BABLE
A-A	C	ATASTROPHE	A-A	PRO	BABLY
A-A	C	AVALRY	A-A	BI	CYCLE
A-A	CH	ARACTER	A-A		CYCLONE
A-A	CH	ARACTERISTIC	A-A	EFFI	CACY
A-A	CLE	ARANCE	A-A	MOTOR	CYCLE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A-A	BEENNEE	DED	A-A	COLL	EGE
A-A	BLOCKA	DED	A-A	COMMENC	EMENT
A-A	BOMBAR	DED	A-A	COMPL	ETELY
A-A	COMMAN	DED	A-A	COMPL	ETE
A-A	DECI	DED	A-A	COMPLET	ENESS
A-A		DEDICATE	A-A(1)A	COMPL	ETENESS
A-A		DEDICATION	A-A	CONCR	ETE
A-A	DEFEN	DED	A-A(2)A	CONF	ERENCE
A-A	DEMAN	DED	A-A	CONFIN	EMENT
A-A	ENCO	DED	A-A	CONQU	ERED
A-A	EXPAN	DED	A-A	COV	ERED
A-A	EXPEN	DED	A-A	CR	EDENTIAL
A-A	EXTEN	DED	A-A(2)A	D	ECEMBER
A-A	GROUN	DED	A-A(7)A	D	ECENTRALIZE
A-A	GUAR	DED	A-A(7)A	D	ECENTRALIZED
A-A	INVA	DED	A-A	DECIPH	ERED
A-A	LAN	DED	A-A	D	EFEAT
A-A	OFFEN	DED	A-A(2)A	D	EFEATED
A-A	PROCEE	DED	A-A	D	EFFECT
A-A	RAI	DED	A-A(4)A	D	EFFECTIVE
A-A	RECOMMEN	DED	A-A	D	EFEND
A-A	SUCCEE	DED	A-A(2)A	D	EFENDER
A-A	SUSPEN	DED	A-A(2)A	D	EFENDED
A-A	UNEXPEN	DED	A-A(2)A	D	EFENSE
A-A	WOO	DED	A-A(4)A	D	EFENSIVE
A-A	WOUN	DED	A-A	D	EFER
A-A		DID	A-A(2)A	D	EFERRED
A-A	AGRE	EMENT	A-A	D	EPEND
A-A	ALL	EGE	A-A	D	EPENDABILITY
A-A	AMM	ETER	A-A(5)A	D	EPENDABLE
A-A	AMUS	EMENT	A-A(2)A	D	EPENDENT
A-A	ANNOUNC	EMENT	A-A	D	ESERT
A-A	ARRANG	EMENT	A-A(2)A	D	ESERTED
A-A	BAROM	ETER	A-A(2)A	D	ESERTER
A-A	BATT	ERED	A-A	D	ETECTOR
A-A	BEENNE	EDED	A-A	D	ETENTION
A-A	BELLIG	ERENT	A-A(6)A	D	ETERIORATE
A-A	BESI	EGED	A-A	D	ETERMINATION
A-A	BILL	ETED	A-A(4)A	D	ETERMINE
A-A	BRE	EZE	A-A(4)A	D	ETERMINED
A-A	BRIDG	EHEAD	A-A	D	EVELOP
A-A	CAR	ELESS	A-A(3)A	D	EVELOPED
A-A(3)A	CAR	ELESSNESS	A-A(4)A	D	EVELOPMENT
A-A	CEM	ETERY	A-A	DIFF	ERENT
A-A(1)A	C	EMETERY	A-A(2)A	DIFF	ERENCE
A-A	CENT	ERED	A-A	DISPLAC	EMENT
A-A	CHE	ESE	A-A	DYNAMOM	ETER

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Table D-7 (φ). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A-A		ELECTRICITY	A-A(2)A	INTERF	ERENCE
A-A	EL	EMENT	A-A	INTERPR	ETER
A-A	EL	EMENTARY	A-A	INTERV	ENE
A-A(1)A		ELEMENT	A-A	KE	EPER
A-A(1)A		ELEMENTARY	A-A	KILOM	ETER
A-A(3)A		ELEVATE	A-A	LETT	ERED
A-A		ELEVATION	A-A	L	EVEL
A-A(1)A		ELEVEN	A-A	MANAG	EMENT
A-A	EL	EVEN	A-A	MANGAN	ESE
A-A	ELSEWH	ERE	A-A	MEASUR	EMENT
A-A(2)A		EMERGENCY	A-A	MEASUR	EMENTS
A-A	EMPLAC	EMENT	A-A	M	ETEOROLOGICAL
A-A	ENCIPH	ERED	A-A	M	ETER
A-A	ENCOUNT	ERED	A-A	MILLIM	ETER
A-A(2)A		ENEMIES	A-A	MOV	EMENT
A-A		ENEMY	A-A	N	CESSARY
A-A(6)A		ENEMYPLANES	A-A	N	CESSITY
A-A		ENEMYTANKS	A-A(6)A	N	CESSITATE
A-A	ENFORC	EMENT	A-AA	NIN	ETEEN
A-A	ENGAG	EMENT	A-AA	NIN	ETEENTH
A-A	ENTANGL	EMENT	A-A	OBSOL	ETE
A-A		EVERY	A-A	ORD	ERED
A-A	EXCIT	EMENT	A-A	PARENTH	ESES
A-A(5)A		EXECUTIVE	A-A	P	ENETRATION
A-A(4)A		EXERCISE	A-A(4)A	P	ENETRATE
A-A	EXTR	EME	A-A	P	ETER
A-A		EYE	A-A	PLAC	EMENT
A-A	F	EDERAL	A-A	PREC	EDE
A-A	G	ENERAL	A-A(1)A	PR	ECED
A-A	G	ENERALALARM	A-A(2)A	PREC	EDENCE
A-A	G	ENERALSTAFF	A-A(1)A(2)A	PR	ECEDENCE
A-A	GONIOM	ETER	A-A	PR	ECEDING
A-A	GYROM	ETER	A-A	PR	EFER
A-AA	HAV	EBEEN	A-A(2)A	PREF	ERENCE
A-A	H	ERE	A-A(1)A(2)A	PR	EFERENCE
A-A	HIND	ERED	A-A(2)A	PR	EFERRED
A-A	HYDROM	ETER	A-A	PR	ESENT
A-A	HYGROM	ETER	A-A	PR	ESERVATION
A-A	IC	EBERG	A-A(2)A	PR	ESERVE
A-A	IMPROV	EMENT	A-A	PROCE	EDED
A-A(2)A	INCOMP	ETENCE	A-A	PSYCHROM	ETER
A-A	INCOMP	ETENT	A-A	R	EBELLION
A-A(2)A	IND	EPENDENT	A-A	R	ECEIPT
A-A(6)A	IND	ETERMINATE	A-A(2)A	R	ECEIVE
A-A	INT	EREST	A-A(2)A	R	ECEIVER
A-A	INT	ERESTING	A-A	R	ECEIVING
A-A	INTERF	ERE	A-A(5)A	R	ECEPTACLE

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Table D-7 (b). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A-A	REENFORC	EMENT	A-A	SUCCE	EDED
A-A	R	EFER	A-A	SUFF	ERED
A-A(2)A	REF	ERENCE	A-A	SURREND	ERED
A-A(1)A(2)A	R	EFERENCE	A-A	T	ELEGRAM
A-A	REIMBURS	EMENT	A-A(4)A	T	ELEPHONE
A-A	REINFORC	EMENT	A-A	TH	ERE
A-A	REINSTAT	EMENT	A-A(3)A	TH	EREFOR
A-A	R	EJECT	A-A	THERMOM	ETER
A-A(2)A	R	EJECTED	A-A	TH	ESE
A-A	R	EJECTOR	A-A	THREAT	ENED
A-A(2)A	R	ELEASE	A-A	US	ELESS
A-A	RELI	EVE	A-A	V	ETERINARIAN
A-A(2)A	R	EMEDIES	A-A	W	ERE
A-A	R	EMEDY	A-A	WH	ERE
A-A(2)A	R	EMEMBER	A-A	WIR	ELESS
A-A(2)A	R	EPEATED	A-A		FIFTEEN
A-A(2)A	R	EPEATER	A-A		FIFTEENTH
A-A	R	EPEL	A-A		FIFTH
A-A(2)A	R	EPELLED	A-A		FIFTY
A-A	REPLAC	EMENT	A-A	BAG	GAGE
A-A	REPR	ESENT	A-A	EN	GAGE
A-A	REPR	ESENTATION	A-A	EN	GAGEMENT
A-A(6)A	REPR	ESENTATIVE	A-A(2)A	EN	GAGING
A-A	REQUIR	EMENT	A-A	EIG	HTH
A-A	R	ESEARCH	A-A	WIT	HTHE
A-A	R	ESERVATION	A-A	ACT	IVITY
A-A(2)A	R	ESERVE	A-A	ACTIV	ITIES
A-A	R	ETENTION	A-A(1)A	ACT	IVITIES
A-A(2)A	R	EVENUE	A-A	ADD	ITIONAL
A-A(2)A	R	EVERSE	A-A(5)A	ADM	INISTRATIVE
A-A	REVI	EWED	A-A(5)A	ADM	INISTRATION
A-A	SCH	EME	A-A	ADV	ISING
A-A	SEAL	EVEL	A-A	AMMUN	ITION
A-A	S	ELECT	A-A	ANT	IAIRCRAFT
A-A(2)A	S	ELECTED	A-A	ANT	ICIPATE
A-A	S	EVEN	A-A(3)A	ANT	ICIPATION
A-A(2)AA	S	EVENTEEN	A-A	ARTIF	ICIAL
A-A(2)AA	S	EVENTEENTH	A-A(1)A	ART	IFICIAL
A-A	S	EVENTH	A-A	AUDIB	ILITY
A-A	S	EVENTY	A-A(1)A	AUD	IBILITY
A-A(6)A	S	EVENTYFIVE	A-A	CAPAB	ILITY
A-A	S	EVERAL	A-A	CERT	IFICATE
A-A	SEV	ERE	A-A	CIV	ILIAN
A-A(1)A	S	EVERE	A-A(1)A	C	IVILIAN
A-A	SI	EGE	A-A(3)A	CLASS	IFICATION
A-A	SPH	ERE	A-A	COAL	ITION
A-A	STAT	EMENT	A-A	COEFF	ICIENT

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Table D-7 (c). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A-A	COLL	ISION	A-A	FACIL	ITIES
A-A	COLL	ISIONS	A-A(1)A	FAC	ILITIES
A-A	COMPET	ITION	A-A	F	ILING
A-A	COMPOS	ITION	A-A	F	INISH
A-A(2)A	CONC	ILIATION	A-A	F	IRING
A-A	COND	ITION	A-A	FORT	IFIED
A-A	CR	ISIS	A-A	HOST	ILITY
A-A	CR	ITIC	A-A	HOSTIL	ITIES
A-A	CR	ITICAL	A-A(1)A	HOST	ILITIES
A-A	CRIT	ICISE	A-A(3)A	IDENT	IFICATION
A-A	CRIT	ICISM	A-A	IGN	ITION
A-A(1)A	CR	ITICISE	A-A	INCL	INING
A-A(1)A	CR	ITICISM	A-A	IND	IVIDUAL
A-A	CR	ITIQUE	A-A	INEFF	ICIENCY
A-A	DEC	ISION	A-A	IN	ITIAL
A-A	DEF	ICIENCY	A-A(1)A		INITIAL
A-A	DEF	ICIENT	A-A	IN	ITIATE
A-A	DEF	INITE	A-A(1)A		INITIATE
A-A	DEFIN	ITION	A-A	IRREGULAR	ITIES
A-A(1)A	DEF	INATION	A-A	LIAB	ILITY
A-A	DEMOB	ILIZE	A-A	L	IAISON
A-A(3)A	DEMOB	ILIZATION	A-A	L	IMIT
A-A	DEPENDAB	ILITY	A-A(3)A	L	IMITATION
A-A	DETRA	INING	A-A(1)A	L	IMITING
A-A	DIET	ITIAN	A-A	LIM	ITING
A-A	DIM	INISH	A-A	L	INING
A-A(1)A	D	IMINISH	A-A	MAR	ITIME
A-A	DIR	IGIBLE	A-A	MED	ICINE
A-A(1)A	D	IRIGIBLE	A-A	M	ILITARY
A-A	D	ISINFECT	A-A(1)A	M	ILITIA
A-A	D	ISINFECTED	A-A	MIL	ITIA
A-A	DISPOS	ITION	A-A	M	INIMUM
A-A	D	IVIDE	A-A	M	INING
A-A	DIV	IDING	A-A(3)A	MOB	ILIZATION
A-A(1)A	D	IVIDING	A-A	MOB	ILIZE
A-A	DIV	ISION	A-A	MUN	ITIONS
A-A(1)A	D	IVISION	A-A	OBTA	INING
A-A	EFF	ICIENT	A-A	OFF	ICIAL
A-A	EFF	ICIENCY	A-A	OP	INION
A-A	ELECTR	ICITY	A-A	OPPOS	ITION
A-A	EL	IGIBLE	A-A	PAC	IFIC
A-A	ENTERPR	ISING	A-A	PART	ITION
A-A	EXH	IBITED	A-A(2)A	PH	ILIPPINES
A-A	EXHIB	ITION	A-A	POL	ITICAL
A-A(1)A	EXH	IBITION	A-A	POL	ITICS
A-A	EXPED	ITING	A-A	POS	ITION
A-A	EXPED	ITION	A-A	POS	ITIONS

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Table D-7 (ϕ). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A-A	POS	ITIVE	A-A(1)A	VIS	IBILITY
A-A	PRA	IRIE	A-A(1)A(1)A	V	ISIBILITY
A-A(3)A	PREL	IMINARIES	A-A	V	ISIBLE
A-A	PREL	IMINARY	A-A	V	ISIT
A-A	PROH	IBIT	A-A	V	ISITOR
A-A	PROV	ISION	A-A	V	ISITS
A-A	PROV	ISIONS	A-A	W	IRING
A-A	PROX	IMITY	A-A	GENERA	LALARM
A-A(3)A	QUAL	IFICATION	A-A	PARAL	LEL
A-A	RA	IDING	A-A	AR	MAMENT
A-A	RA	INING	A-A	DYNA	MOMETER
A-A	RECE	IVING	A-A	MAXI	MUM
A-A	RECOGN	ITION	A-A		MEMBER
A-A	RECRU	ITING	A-A		MEMORANDA
A-A	REMA	INING	A-A(6)A		MEMORANDUM
A-A	REQU	IRING	A-A		MEMORIAL
A-A(1)A	REQU	ISITION	A-A	MINI	MUM
A-A	REQUIS	ITION	A-A	RE	MEMBER
A-A(1)A	RESPONS	IBILITY	A-A	THER	MOMETER
A-A	RESPONSIB	ILITY	A-A	A	NONYMOUS
A-A	RET	IRING	A-A	BEGIN	NING
A-A	R	IDING	A-A	CONCER	NING
A-A	R	IGID	A-A	CONTI	NENTAL
A-A	SEMIR	IGID	A-A	DETRAI	NING
A-A(1)A	SEM	IRIGID	A-A	DOMI	NANCE
A-A	SERV	ICING	A-A	DOMI	NANT
A-A	SIGN	IFICANT	A-A	INCLI	NING
A-A	SIGN	IFICANCE	A-A	INTERVE	NING
A-A	S	IMILAR	A-A	LIEUTE	NANT
A-A(3)A	S	IMILARITY	A-A	LI	NING
A-A	SPEC	IFIC	A-A	MAINTE	NANCE
A-A(3)A	SPEC	IFICATION	A-A	MAN	NING
A-A	SUFF	ICIENT	A-A	MI	NING
A-A	SUITAB	ILITY	A-A	MOR	NING
A-A	SUSP	ICION	A-A		NAN
A-A	SUSP	ICIONS	A-A		NINE
A-A	SUSP	ICIOUS	A-A(4)A		NINETEEN
A-A	TERR	IFIC	A-A(4)A		NINETEENTH
A-A	TRAD	ITIONAL	A-A		NINETY
A-A	TRA	INING	A-A		NINTH
A-A	TRANSPAC	IFIC	A-A(7)A		NONCOMBATANT
A-A	UNIDENT	IFIED	A-A	OBTAI	NING
A-A	UT	ILITY	A-A	ORD	NANCE
A-A(3)A	VER	IFICATION	A-A	PERMA	NENT
A-A	VIC	INITY	A-A	PLAN	NING
A-A(1)A	V	ICINITY	A-A	RAI	NING
A-A	VISIB	ILITY	A-A	REMAI	NING

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Table D-7 (φ). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A-A	RETUR	NING	A-A	CA	RTRIDGE
A-A	RUN	NING	A-A	D	RYRUN
A-A	SCREE	NING	A-A	ENTE	RPRISE
A-A	TRAI	NING	A-A	ENTE	RPRISING
A-A(2)A	U	NKNOWN	A-A	ER	ROR
A-A	AUT	OMOBILE	A-A	FINGE	RPRINT
A-A	CHRON	OLOGICAL	A-A	FO	RTRESS
A-A(1)A	CHR	ONOLOGICAL	A-A	INTE	RPRETATION
A-A	C	OLON	A-A(3)A	INTE	RPRETER
A-A	C	OLONEL	A-A	LIB	RARY
A-A	C	OLORS	A-A	MIR	ROR
A-A	EC	ONOMIC	A-A	NEA	RER
A-A	H	ONOR	A-A	SU	RPRISE
A-A	LOC	OMOTIVE	A-A	TER	ROR
A-A(1)A	L	OCOMOTIVE	A-A	ADDRES	SES
A-A	LO	OKOUT	A-A	ANALY	SIS
A-A	METEOR	OLOGICAL	A-AA	AS	SESSMENT
A-A(1)A	METE	OROLOGICAL	A-AA(4)A	AS	SESSMENTS
A-A	MON	OPOLY	A-A	AS	SIST
A-A(1)A	M	ONOPOLY	A-A	AS	SISTANT
A-A	M	OTOR	A-A	AS	SISTANCE
A-A	M	OTORCYCLE	A-A	CA	SES
A-A	M	OTORIZED	A-A	CHAS	SIS
A-A		OBOE	A-A	CRI	SIS
A-A	PH	OTOGRAPHY	A-A	DEFEN	SES
A-A	PR	OMOTE	A-A	DI	SASTER
A-A(2)A	PR	OMOTION	A-A	EXERCI	SES
A-A(3)A	PR	OPORTION	A-A	EXPEN	SES
A-A	PR	OPOSALS	A-A	CLAS	SES
A-A	PR	OPOSE	A-A	HEAVYLOS	SES
A-A	PROT	OCOL	A-A	LOS	SES
A-A(1)A	PR	OTOCOL	A-A	OUTPO	STS
A-A	PR	OVOST	A-A	PARENTH	SES
A-A	RIG	OROUS	A-A	PARENTH	SIS
A-A	SEMIC	OLON	A-A	PAS	SES
A-A(2)A	T	OMORROW	A-A	PER	SISTENT
A-A	T	OPOGRAPHIC	A-AA	POS	SESSION
A-A	VIG	OROUS	A-A	PROTE	STS
A-A	NEWS	PAPER	A-A	PURPO	SES
A-A	NEWS	PAPERS	A-A	RE	SIST
A-A		PIPE	A-A	RE	SISTANCE
A-A		POPULATED	A-AA		SESSION
A-A		POPULATION	A-A	SUB	SISTENCE
A-A	AI	RCRAFT	A-A		SUSPECTED
A-A	AI	RDROME	A-A		SUSPEND
A-A	ANTIAI	RCRAFT	A-A		SUSPENDED
A-A	ARBIT	RARY	A-A(3)A		SUSPENSE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A-A(3)A		SUSPENSION	A-A	TEN	TATIVE
A-A		SUSPICION	A-A		TITLE
A-A(6)A		SUSPICIONS	A-A		TOTAL
A-A(6)A		SUSPICIOUS	A-A		TOTALING
A-A		SYSTEM	A-A	TRANSPOR	TATION
A-A	WITNES	SES	A-A	UNITEDS	TATES
A-A	AL	TITUDE	A-A	WI	THTHE
A-A	AN	TITANK	A-A	A	UGUST
A-A	CI	TATION	A-A	CONTIN	UOUS
A-A	COMPE	TITION	A-A	F	UTURE
A-A	COMPU	TATION	A-A	INA	UGURATION
A-A	CONSTI	TUTE	A-A	UN	USUAL
A-A	CONSTI	TUTING	A-A(1)A		UNUSUAL
A-A(1)A	CONS	TITUTING	A-A		USUAL
A-A	CONSTI	TUTION	A-A	SUR	VIVED
A-A(1)A	CONS	TITUTE	A-A	A	WKWARD
A-A(1)A	CONS	TITUTION	A(2)A		ADJACENT
A-A	DESTI	TUTE	A(2)A		ADVANCING
A-A(1)A	DES	TITUTE	A(2)A	ADV	ANTAGEOUS
A-A	DIC	TATED	A(2)A	ADV	ANTAGE
A-A	DIC	TATOR	A(2)A(2)A		ADVANTAGE
A-A	DIE	TITIAN	A(2)A(2)A		ADVANTAGEOUS
A-A	INSTI	TUTION	A(2)A		ADVANCE
A-A(1)A	INS	TITUTION	A(2)A		ADVANCED
A-A	INTERPRE	TATION	A(2)A		AFFAIR
A-A	INVI	TATION	A(2)A	AL	ASKA
A-A	LA	TITUDE	A(2)A(1)A		ALMANAC
A-A	LIMI	TATION	A(2)A		ALWAYS
A-A	NECESSI	TATE	A(2)A	AMB	ASSADOR
A-A	PAR	TITION	A(2)A(2)A		AMBASSADOR
A-A	RADIOS	TATION	A(2)A(1)A		APPARATUS
A-A	REINS	TATE	A(2)A		APPARENT
A-A(4)A	REINS	TATEMENT	A(2)A		APPARENTLY
A-A	REPRESEN	TATIVE	A(2)A	AR	ABIA
A-A	REPRESEN	TATIONS	A(2)A		AREA
A-A	SANI	TATION	A(2)A		ARMAMENT
A-A(4)A	S	TATEMENT	A(2)A		ARRANGE
A-A	S	TATES	A(2)A		ARRANGEMENT
A-A	S	TATION	A(2)A		ASIA
A-A	S	TATIONS	A(2)A		ASIATIC
A-A(2)A	S	TATISTICS	A(2)A		ASSAULT
A-A	S	TATUS	A(2)A		ATLANTIC
A-A	SUBSTI	TUTE	A(2)A		ATTACH
A-A	SUBSTI	TUTION	A(2)A		ATTACHEMENT
A-A(1)A	SUBS	TITUTE	A(2)A		ATTACK
A-A(1)A	SUBS	TITUTION	A(2)A		ATTAIN
A-AA		TATTOO	A(2)A		ATTAINMENT

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(2)A	AV	AILABLE	A(2)A	ST	ANDARD
A(2)A		AVIATION	A(2)A	ST	ANDARDS
A(2)A		AVIATOR	A(2)A	TH	ATHAVE
A(2)A	B	AGGAGE	A(2)A	TRANS	ATLANTIC
A(2)A	B	ARRACKS	A(2)A(2)A	TR	ANSATLANTIC
A(2)A	B	ARRAGE	A(2)A	V	ARIATION
A(2)A	B	ATTALION	A(2)A	VETERIN	ARIAN
A(2)A	C	AMPAIGN	A(2)A	W	ARFARE
A(2)A	C	ANVAS	A(2)A	WILL	ATTACK
A(2)A	C	APTAIN	A(2)A	ATOMIC	BOMB
A(2)A	C	ASUAL	A(2)A		BARBED
A(2)A	C	ASUALTIES	A(2)A		BOMB
A(2)A	C	ASUALTY	A(2)A		BOMBARD
A(2)A	CH	APLAIN	A(2)A		BOMBARDED
A(2)A	CO	ASTAL	A(2)A		BOMBARDMENT
A(2)A	COMM	ANDANT	A(2)A		BOMBER
A(2)A	COUNTER	ATTACK	A(2)A		BRIBE
A(2)A	DEB	ARKATION	A(2)A		BRIBERY
A(2)A	DI	AGRAM	A(2)A		BULB
A(2)A	EMB	ARKATION	A(2)A	DIVE	BOMBER
A(2)A	EV	ACUATE	A(2)A	HEAVY	BOMBER
A(2)A	EV	ACUATING	A(2)A	LIGHT	BOMBER
A(2)A	EV	ACUATION	A(2)A	MEDIUM	BOMBER
A(2)A	EV	ALUATION	A(2)A		CANCEL
A(2)A	GR	ADUAL	A(2)A		CANCELLATION
A(2)A	INFL	AMMABLE	A(2)A		CANCELLED
A(2)A	INST	ALLATIONS	A(2)A		CHECK
A(2)A	INST	ANTANEOUS	A(2)A		CIRCLE
A(2)A	J	ANUARY	A(2)A		CIRCUIT
A(2)A	M	ANDATE	A(2)A		CIRCUITOUS
A(2)A	M	ANDATED	A(2)A		CIRCULAR
A(2)A	M	ANGANESE	A(2)A		CIRCULATE
A(2)A	M	ANUAL	A(2)A		CIRCULATION
A(2)A	MEMOR	ANDA	A(2)A		CIRCUMSTANTIAL
A(2)A	NAVAL	ATTACK	A(2)A(6)A		CIRCUMSTANCES
A(2)A	NAV	ALBASE	A(2)A		CONCEAL
A(2)A	NAV	ALBATTLE	A(2)A		CONCEALMENT
A(2)A	P	ACKAGE	A(2)A		CONCENTRATE
A(2)A	PAR	AGRAPH	A(2)A		CONCENTRATING
A(2)A	PAR	ALLAX	A(2)A		CONCENTRATION
A(2)A	P	ASSAGE	A(2)A		CONCERNING
A(2)A	PRE	ARRANGED	A(2)A		CONCESSION
A(2)A	R	ADIAL	A(2)A		CONCILIATION
A(2)A	R	ADIATE	A(2)A		CONCLUDE
A(2)A	R	ADIATION	A(2)A		CONCLUSION
A(2)A	RET	ALIATION	A(2)A		CONCRETE
A(2)A	SE	APLANES	A(2)A	EN	CIRCLE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(2)A	EN	CIRCLING	A(2)A	CONVAL	ESCENT
A(2)A	IMPRA	CTICABLE	A(2)A	CONV	ENIENT
A(2)A	PRA	CTICAL	A(2)A	CORR	ECTED
A(2)A	SE	CRECY	A(2)A	CORRESPOND	ENCE
A(2)A	SIGNIFI	CANCE	A(2)A	DEC	EMBER
A(2)A	TA	CTICAL	A(2)A	DECIPH	ERMENT
A(2)A	TA	CTICS	A(2)A	DECR	EASE
A(2)A	VA	CANCY	A(2)A	DECR	EASED
A(2)A	HUN	DRED	A(2)A(2)A	D	ECREASE
A(2)A	IN	DEED	A(2)A(2)A	D	ECREASED
A(2)A	ONEHUN	DRED	A(2)AA	D	ECREE
A(2)A	STAN	DARD	A(2)A	DEF	EATED
A(2)A	STAN	DARDS	A(2)A	DEF	ENDER
A(2)A	ABS	ENCE	A(2)A	DEF	ENDED
A(2)A	ADDR	ESSED	A(2)A	DEF	ENSE
A(2)A	ADDR	ESSES	A(2)A	DEF	ENSES
A(2)A	AGR	EEMENT	A(2)A	DEF	ERRED
A(2)A	APP	EARED	A(2)AA	D	EGREE
A(2)A	ARR	ESTED	A(2)A	DEP	ENDENT
A(2)A	BATT	ERIES	A(2)A	D	EPRESSION
A(2)A	BATTL	EFIELD	A(2)A	DES	ERTED
A(2)AA(1)A	BE	ENNEEDED	A(2)A	DES	ERTER
A(2)A	BEENN	EEDED	A(2)A	DIFFER	ENCE
A(2)A	BE	ETLE	A(2)A	DISAPP	EARED
A(2)A(1)A	B	ESIEGED	A(2)A	DIS	EASE
A(2)A	B	ETTER	A(2)A	DISINF	ECTED
A(2)AA	B	ETWEEN	A(2)A	DISP	ERSED
A(2)A	BR	EEZE	A(2)A	DISP	ERSE
A(2)A	CANC	ELLED	A(2)A	DISTR	ESSED
A(2)A	C	EASE	A(2)A		EAGER
A(2)A	C	ENTER	A(2)A		ECHELON
A(2)A(1)A	C	ENTERED	A(2)A(3)A		ECHELONED
A(2)A	C	ENTERING	A(2)A(4)A		ECHELONMENT
A(2)A	CHALL	ENGE	A(2)A		EDGE
A(2)A	CH	EESE	A(2)A		EFFECT
A(2)A	CIGAR	ETTE	A(2)A	EFF	ECTED
A(2)A	COINCID	ENCE	A(2)A(2)A		EFFECTED
A(2)A	COMM	ENCE	A(2)A(4)A		EFFECTIVE
A(2)A(1)A	COMM	ENCEMENT	A(2)A(1)A	ELS	EWHERE
A(2)A	COMM	ERCE	A(2)A(2)A(1)A		
A(2)A	COMP	ELLED	A(2)A	EM	ERGENCY
A(2)A	COMPR	ESSED	A(2)A	ENCIPH	ERMENT
A(2)A	COND	EMNED	A(2)A	EN	EMIES
A(2)A	COND	ENSED	A(2)A	ENT	ENTE
A(2)A	CONFER	ENCE	A(2)A(2)A		ENTENTE
A(2)A	CONF	ERRED	A(2)A		ENTER
A(2)A	CONFID	ENCE	A(2)A		ENTERING

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(2)A		ENTERPRISING	A(2)A	INT	ERCEPT
A(2)A(5)A		ENTERPRISE	A(2)A	INTERC	EPTED
A(2)A(6)A		ENTERTAINMENT	A(2)A(2)A	INT	ERCEPTED
A(2)A		ENVELOP	A(2)A	INTERFER	ENCE
A(2)A(3)A		ENVELOPE	A(2)A	INT	ERFERING
A(2)A		ETHER	A(2)A(1)A	INT	ERFERE
A(2)A		EXCEPT	A(2)A(1)A(2)A	INT	ERFERENCE
A(2)A		EXCESS	A(2)A	INT	ERMENT
A(2)A(4)A		EXCESSIVE	A(2)A(4)A	INT	ERMEDIATE
A(2)A		EXPECT	A(2)A	INT	ERVENING
A(2)A		EXPEDITING	A(2)A(1)A	INT	ERVENE
A(2)A		EXPEDITION	A(2)A	INT	ERVENTION
A(2)A(3)A		EXPEDITE	A(2)A	INV	ENTED
A(2)A	EXP	ELLED	A(2)A	K	EUPER
A(2)A(2)A		EXPELLED	A(2)A	L	EADER
A(2)A		EXPEND	A(2)A	L	EAVE
A(2)A	EXP	ENDED	A(2)A	L	ETTER
A(2)A(2)A		EXPENDED	A(2)A(1)A	L	ETTERED
A(2)A	EXP	ENSES	A(2)A	LIC	ENSE
A(2)A(2)A		EXPENSES	A(2)A	LI	EUTENANT
A(2)A(4)A		EXPENSIVE	A(2)A	MAN	EUVER
A(2)A	EXPERI	ENCE	A(2)A	MAT	ERIEL
A(2)A(2)A	EXP	ERIENCE	A(2)A	M	EAGER
A(2)A(2)A(2)A		EXPERIENCE	A(2)A	M	EMBER
A(2)A(3)A		EXPERIMENT	A(2)A	MESS	ENGER
A(2)A		EXTEND	A(2)A(2)A	M	ESSENGER
A(2)A	EXT	ENDED	A(2)A	N	EARER
A(2)A(2)A		EXTENDED	A(2)A	N	EAREST
A(2)A		EXTENDING	A(2)A	NEGLIG	ENCE
A(2)A		EXTENSION	A(2)A	NIN	ETEEN
A(2)A(4)A		EXTENSIVE	A(2)A	NIN	ETEENTH
A(2)A		EXTENT	A(2)A	NORTHW	ESTERN
A(2)A		EXTERIOR	A(2)A	NOV	EMBER
A(2)A		EXTERMINATION	A(2)A	OBS	ERVE
A(2)A(6)A		EXTERMINATE	A(2)A	OBS	ERVER
A(2)A	FI	ERCE	A(2)A	OFF	ENDED
A(2)A	GR	EASE	A(2)A	OFF	ENSE
A(2)A	HAV	EBEEN	A(2)A	OVERWH	ELMED
A(2)A	H	ELPER	A(2)A	PASS	ENGER
A(2)A	IMPR	ESSED	A(2)A	PRECED	ENCE
A(2)A	INCID	ENCE	A(2)A	PREFER	ENCE
A(2)A	INCOMPET	ENCE	A(2)A	PREF	ERRED
A(2)A	INCR	EASED	A(2)A	PREPAR	EDNESS
A(2)A	INDEP	ENDENT	A(2)A	PRES	ERVE
A(2)A	INF	ECTED	A(2)A	PR	ESSED
A(2)A	INFLU	ENCE	A(2)A	PROC	EEDED
A(2)A	INTELLIG	ENCE	A(2)A	PROT	ECTED

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(2)A	PROT	ESTED	A(2)A	SOUTHW	ESTERN
A(2)A	REC	EIVE	A(2)A	ST	EAMER
A(2)A	REC	EIVER	A(2)A	SUBSIST	ENCE
A(2)A	RECOMM	ENDED	A(2)A	SUCC	EEDED
A(2)A	R	ECREATION	A(2)A	SURR	ENDER
A(2)A	R	ECREATIONAL	A(2)A(1)A	SURR	ENDERED
A(2)A	REFER	ENCE	A(2)A	SUSP	ECTED
A(2)A	REJ	ECTED	A(2)A	SUSP	ENDED
A(2)A	REL	EASE	A(2)A	SUSP	ENSE
A(2)A	R	ELIEF	A(2)A(5)A	T	EMPERATURE
A(2)A(1)A	R	ELIEVE	A(2)A(1)A	THR	EATENED
A(2)A	REM	EDIES	A(2)A	TRANSF	ERRED
A(2)A	REM	EMBER	A(2)A	TRANSV	ERSE
A(2)A	REP	EATED	A(2)A	TRAV	ERSE
A(2)A	REP	EATER	A(2)A	TW	ELVE
A(2)A	REP	ELLED	A(2)A	UNEXP	ENDED
A(2)A(1)A	R	EPRESENT	A(2)A(2)A	UN	EXPENDED
A(2)A(1)A	R	EPRESENTATION	A(2)A	V	ESSEL
A(2)A(1)A(6)A	R	EPRESENTATIVE	A(2)A	V	ESSELS
A(2)A	R	EQUEST	A(2)A	W	EDNESDAY
A(2)A	REQU	ESTED	A(2)A	W	ESTERLY
A(2)A(2)A	R	EQUESTED	A(2)A	W	ESTERN
A(2)A	RES	ERVE	A(2)A	WH	ETHER
A(2)A	RES	ERVES	A(2)A	WITN	ESSES
A(2)A	R	ESPECT	A(2)A	WR	ECKED
A(2)A	R	ESPECTFULLY	A(2)A	Y	ESTERDAY
A(2)A	R	ESPECTS	A(2)A	BA	GGAGE
A(2)A	R	ETREAT	A(2)A	DAMA	GING
A(2)A	REV	ENUE	A(2)A	ENGA	GING
A(2)A	REV	ERSE	A(2)A	FOR	GING
A(2)A	R	EVIEW	A(2)A		GAUGE
A(2)A(1)A	R	EVIEWED	A(2)A		GEOGRAPHIC
A(2)A	R	EVIEWING	A(2)A		GEOGRAPHICAL
A(2)A(1)A	S	EALEVEL	A(2)A	LAN	GUAGE
A(2)A	S	EAMEN	A(2)A	NE	GLIGENT
A(2)A	S	ECRECY	A(2)A	NE	GLIGENCE
A(2)A	S	ECRETARY	A(2)A	ZI	GZAG
A(2)A	S	EIZE	A(2)A		HIGH
A(2)A	SEL	ECTED	A(2)A		HIGHER
A(2)A	SENT	ENCE	A(2)A		HIGHEST
A(2)A(2)A	S	ENTENCE	A(2)A	T	HATHAVE
A(2)A	SEPT	EMBER	A(2)A	W	HETHER
A(2)A(2)A	S	EPTEMBER	A(2)A	W	HICH
A(2)A	S	ERGEANT	A(2)A	ADM	SSION
A(2)AA	SEV	ENTEEN	A(2)A	A	IRFIELD
A(2)AA	SEV	ENTEENTH	A(2)A	AS	IATIC
A(2)A	SH	ELLED	A(2)A	ASSOC	IATION

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(2)A	AV	LATION	A(2)A	INTERD	CTION
A(2)A	BALL	ISTIC	A(2)A(3)A		INVITATION
A(2)A	BALL	ISTICS	A(2)A(3)A		IRRIGATION
A(2)A	BEG	INNING	A(2)A	K	ILLING
A(2)A	B	INDING	A(2)A(1)A	L	IABILITY
A(2)A	BU	ILDING	A(2)A	L	IFTING
A(2)A	CHARACTER	ISTIC	A(2)A	L	IQUID
A(2)A	CO	INCIDENCE	A(2)A	LOG	ISTICS
A(2)A	COMM	ISSION	A(2)A	M	IDNIGHT
A(2)A	COMM	ISSIONER	A(2)A	M	ILLIMETER
A(2)A	COUNCIL	IATION	A(2)A	M	ISFIRE
A(2)A	CONSCR	PTION	A(2)A	M	ISFIRES
A(2)A	DESCR	PTIVE	A(2)A	M	ISSING
A(2)A	DESCR	PTION	A(2)A	M	ISSION
A(2)A(1)A	D	IETITIAN	A(2)A	M	ISSIONS
A(2)A	D	IFFICULT	A(2)A	PATR	IOTIC
A(2)A(4)A	D	IFFICULTIES	A(2)A	PERM	ISSION
A(2)A	DISC	IPLINE	A(2)A	PHIL	IPPINES
A(2)A(2)A	D	ISCIPLINE	A(2)A	PR	INCIPAL
A(2)A	D	ISSMISS	A(2)A	PR	INCIPLE
A(2)A	D	ISSMISSAL	A(2)A	PR	INTING
A(2)A	D	ISTILL	A(2)A	PR	ORITY
A(2)A(3)A	D	ISTINCTION	A(2)A	RAD	IATION
A(2)A	DISTINGU	ISHING	A(2)A	REF	ILLING
A(2)A(3)A	D	ISTINGUISH	A(2)A	RESTR	CTION
A(2)A(3)A	D	ISTINGUISHED	A(2)A	RETAL	IATION
A(2)A(3)A(2)A	D	ISTINGUISHING	A(2)A	REV	IEWING
A(2)A	DR	IFTING	A(2)A	SH	IPPING
A(2)A	ENL	ISTING	A(2)A(1)A	S	IGNIFICANT
A(2)A	F	ILLING	A(2)A(1)A	S	IGNIFICANCE
A(2)A	F	INDING	A(2)A	S	IGNIFY
A(2)A	F	ISHING	A(2)A	S	INKING
A(2)A	F	ITTING	A(2)A	SK	IRMISH
A(2)A(1)A		IGNITION	A(2)A	STAT	ISTICS
A(2)A		ILLITERATE	A(2)A	SUBM	SSION
A(2)A(4)A		IMMIGRATION	A(2)A	SUPER	ORITY
A(2)A		INCIDENCE	A(2)A	SW	IMMING
A(2)A		INCIDENT	A(2)A	TRANSM	SSION
A(2)A		INDICATE	A(2)A	VAR	IATION
A(2)A		INDICATED	A(2)A	V	ICTIM
A(2)A(3)A		INDICATING	A(2)A	W	ILLIAM
A(2)A(3)A		INDICATION	A(2)A	W	ITHIN
A(2)A		INDIRECT	A(2)A	AVAI	LABLE
A(2)A(1)A		INDIVIDUAL	A(2)A	FUE	LOIL
A(2)A	INFL	ICTING	A(2)A	PARA	LLEL
A(2)A	INS	IGNIA	A(2)A	COM	MITMENT
A(2)A(2)A		INSIGNIA	A(2)A		MAIM

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(2)A	MEDIU	MBOMBER	A(2)A	I	NCENDIARY
A(2)A	ABA	NDON	A(2)A	I	NCENTIVE
A(2)A	ADVA	NCING	A(2)A	INDEPE	NDENT
A(2)A	AFTER	NOON	A(2)A	I	NFANTRY
A(2)A	AN	NOUNCE	A(2)A	I	NLAND
A(2)A(4)A	AN	NOUNCEMENT	A(2)A	INSTA	NTANEOUS
A(2)AA	A	NTENNA	A(2)A	I	NTEND
A(2)A	ASSIG	NMENT	A(2)A	I	NTENSIVE
A(2)A	ASSIG	NMENTS	A(2)A	I	NTENT
A(2)A	ATTAI	NMENT	A(2)A(3)A	I	NTENTION
A(2)A	BEGI	NNING	A(2)A	INTER	NMENT
A(2)A	BI	NDING	A(2)A	I	NVENT
A(2)A	COMMA	NDANT	A(2)A	I	NVENTED
A(2)A	COMMA	NDING	A(2)A(3)A	I	NVENTION
A(2)A	CO	NCENTRATE	A(2)A	LA	NDING
A(2)A(5)A	CO	NCENTRATING	A(2)A(1)A	MAI	NTENANCE
A(2)A(6)A	CO	NCENTRATION	A(2)A	MA	NGANESE
A(2)A	CO	NDENSED	A(2)A	MA	NNING
A(2)A	CO	NFINE	A(2)A		NOON
A(2)A(3)A	CO	NFINEMENT	A(2)A	OPI	NION
A(2)A(1)A	CO	NTINENTAL	A(2)A	PAI	NTING
A(2)A(2)A	CO	NTINGENT	A(2)A	PLA	NNING
A(2)A	CONTI	NGENT	A(2)A	PO	NTON
A(2)A	CO	NTINUAL	A(2)A	PRI	NTING
A(2)A	CO	NTINUE	A(2)A	QUARA	NTINE
A(2)A	CO	NTINUOUS	A(2)A	RU	NNING
A(2)A(5)A	CO	NTINUATION	A(2)A	SE	NTENCE
A(2)A	CONVE	NIENT	A(2)A	SE	NTINEL
A(2)A(2)A	CO	NVENIENT	A(2)A	SI	NKING
A(2)A	CORRESPO	NDENCE	A(2)A	SU	NKEN
A(2)A	CORRESPO	NDING	A(2)A	U	NION
A(2)A	DEPE	NDENT	A(2)A	UNK	NOWN
A(2)A	DISCONTI	NUANCE	A(2)A	U	NTENABLE
A(2)A	DISCO	NTINUE	A(2)A(4)A	ACC	OMMODATION
A(2)A(2)A	DISCO	NTINUANCE	A(2)A	AER	ODROME
A(2)A	ECHELO	NMENT	A(2)A	B	OTTOM
A(2)A	E	NGINE	A(2)A	B	OYCOTT
A(2)A	E	ENGINEER	A(2)A	C	OMMON
A(2)A(4)A	E	NGINEERING	A(2)A	C	OMPOSED
A(2)A(5)A	E	NTANGLEMENT	A(2)A(4)A	C	OMPOSITION
A(2)A	E	NTENTE	A(2)A(5)A	C	ONFORMATION
A(2)A	ENTERTAI	NMENT	A(2)A	C	ONVOY
A(2)A	EXTE	NDING	A(2)A	C	ORPORAL
A(2)A	FI	NDING	A(2)A(4)A	C	ORPORATION
A(2)A	FLA	NKING	A(2)A	CUST	OMHOUSE
A(2)A	FORE	NOON	A(2)A	D	OCTOR
A(2)A	GOVER	NMENT	A(2)A	EN	ORMOUS

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(2)A	EXPL	OSION	A(2)A	DEPA	RTURE
A(2)A	EXPL	OSIONS	A(2)A	DESE	RTER
A(2)A	F	OGHORN	A(2)A	DETE	RIORATE
A(2)A	F	OLLOW	A(2)A	E	RROR
A(2)A	FO	OTHOLD	A(2)A	EXTE	RIOR
A(2)A	G	ONIOMETER	A(2)A(4)A	EXT	RAORDINARY
A(2)A	GYR	OSCOPIE	A(2)A	FEB	RUARY
A(2)A	L	OOKOUT	A(2)A	FO	RWARD
A(2)A	N	ONCOMBATANT	A(2)A	HA	RBOR
A(2)A		OBSOLETE	A(2)A	HEADQUA	RTERS
A(2)A		OCTOBER	A(2)A	HYD	ROGRAPHIC
A(2)A		OPPOSE	A(2)A	INTE	RFERE
A(2)A		OPPOSITE	A(2)A	INTE	RFERENCE
A(2)A(4)A		OPPOSITION	A(2)A	INTE	RFERING
A(2)A	P	OISION	A(2)A	INTE	RIOR
A(2)A	P	ONTON	A(2)A	MI	RROR
A(2)AA	P	ONTOON	A(2)A	MO	RTAR
A(2)A	P	OSTOFFICE	A(2)A	MU	RDER
A(2)A	PROM	OTION	A(2)A	OBSE	RVER
A(2)A	REC	ONNOITER	A(2)A	O	RDER
A(2)A	REC	ONNOITERING	A(2)A	O	RDERED
A(2)A	SCHO	OLHOUSE	A(2)A	O	RDERS
A(2)A	TOM	ORROW	A(2)A	PA	RAGRAPH
A(2)A	VICT	ORIOUS	A(2)A	PE	RFORMANCE
A(2)A	AP	PROPRIATE	A(2)A	P	RAIRIE
A(2)A	IM	PROPER	A(2)AA	P	REARRANGED
A(2)A		PREPARATION	A(2)A	P	RIOR
A(2)A		PREPARE	A(2)A	P	RORITY
A(2)A		PREPAREDNESS	A(2)A	P	ROGRAM
A(2)A		PREPARING	A(2)A	P	ROGRESS
A(2)A		PROPER	A(2)A	P	ROGRESSIVE
A(2)A		PROPORTION	A(2)A	QUA	RTER
A(2)A		PROPOSALS	A(2)A	QUA	RTERS
A(2)A		PROPOSE	A(2)A(5)A	QUA	RTERMASTER
A(2)A		PUMP	A(2)A		REAR
A(2)A		PURPOSE	A(2)A(3)A		REARGUARD
A(2)A		PURPOSES	A(2)A	RECO	RDER
A(2)A	AE	RODROME	A(2)A		RECREATION
A(2)A	AI	RBORNE	A(2)A		RECREATIONAL
A(2)A	APP	ROPRIATE	A(2)A		RECRUIT
A(2)A	A	RMOR	A(2)A		RECRUITING
A(2)A(4)A	A	RMOREDCAR	A(2)A		REORGANIZATION
A(2)A	A	RMORY	A(2)A		REPRESENT
A(2)A	CAR	RIER	A(2)A		REPRESENTATIVE
A(2)A	CO	RPORAL	A(2)A		REPRESENTATION
A(2)A	CO	RPORATION	A(2)A		REPRISAL
A(2)A	COU	RIER	A(2)A		REPRISALS

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) --Continued

A(2)A		RETREAT	A(2)A	ADJU	TANT
A(2)A		RETROACTIVE	A(2)A	ADMINIS	TRATIVE
A(2)A	STA	RTER	A(2)A	ADMINIS	TRATION
A(2)A	SUPE	RJOR	A(2)A	ARBI	TRATION
A(2)A	SUPE	RORITY	A(2)A	ASSIS	TANT
A(2)A	TE	RROR	A(2)A	AT	TENTION
A(2)A	WA	RFARE	A(2)A	CA	TASTROPHE
A(2)A	ADDRE	SSES	A(2)A	CIRCUMS	TANTIAL
A(2)AA	A	SPOSSIBLE	A(2)A	COMBA	TANT
A(2)A	AS	SESSMENT	A(2)A	CONCEN	TRATE
A(2)A(4)A	AS	SESSMENTS	A(2)A	CONCEN	TRATING
A(2)AA	A	SSESSMENT	A(2)A	CONCEN	TRATION
A(2)AA(4)A	A	SSESSMENTS	A(2)A	CON	TACT
A(2)A	AS	SETS	A(2)A	DEMONS	TRATE
A(2)A	A	SSIST	A(2)A	DEMONS	TRATED
A(2)A	A	SSISTANT	A(2)A	DEMONS	TRATION
A(2)A	A	SSISTANCE	A(2)A	DE	TECTOR
A(2)AA	CARELES	SNES	A(2)A	DE	TENTION
A(2)A	CEN	SORSHIP	A(2)A	EN	TENTE
A(2)A	CHA	SSIS	A(2)A(6)A	EN	TERTAINMENT
A(2)A	CRUI	SERS	A(2)A	EX	TENT
A(2)AA	DI	SCUSS	A(2)A	ILLUS	TRATE
A(2)AA	DI	SCUSSED	A(2)A	ILLUS	TRATION
A(2)AA	DI	SCUSSION	A(2)A	IMPOR	TANT
A(2)A	DI	SEASE	A(2)A	INCOMPE	TENT
A(2)AA	DI	SMISSAL	A(2)A	INI	TIATE
A(2)AA	DI	SMISS	A(2)A	INS	TANT
A(2)A	DI	SPOSITION	A(2)A	INS	TANTANEOUS
A(2)A	EMBAS	SIES	A(2)A	INS	TANTLY
A(2)A	GLA	SSES	A(2)A	IN	TENT
A(2)A	HEAVYLO	SSES	A(2)A	IN	TENTION
A(2)A	IS	SUES	A(2)A	NONCOMBA	TANT
A(2)A	LO	SSES	A(2)A	OU	TPUT
A(2)A	PA	SSES	A(2)A	PENE	TRATE
A(2)A	POS	SESSION	A(2)A	PENE	TRATION
A(2)AA	PO	SSESSION	A(2)A	PERSIS	TENT
A(2)A	PROPO	SALS	A(2)A	PRO	TECT
A(2)A	REPRI	SALS	A(2)A	PRO	TECTED
A(2)A		SESSION	A(2)A	PRO	TECTION
A(2)A(1)A		SUBSISTENCE	A(2)A	PRO	TECTOR
A(2)A		SUBSTITUTE	A(2)A	PRO	TEST
A(2)A		SUBSTITUTION	A(2)A	PRO	TESTED
A(2)A		SUNSET	A(2)A	PRO	TESTS
A(2)AA	TRAN	SMISSION	A(2)A	REGIS	TRATION
A(2)A	VES	SELS	A(2)A	RE	TENTION
A(2)A	VI	SITS	A(2)A	SI	TUATION
A(2)A	WITNE	SSES	A(2)A	S	TART

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Table D-7 (Ø). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(2)A	S	TARTER	A(3)A	ESTIM	ATEDAT
A(2)A	STA	TISTICS	A(3)A	EX	AMINATION
A(2)A	S	TRATEGIC	A(3)A	GENER	ALALARM
A(2)A	S	TRATEGICAL	A(3)A	GENER	ALSTAFF
A(2)A	S	TRATEGY	A(3)A	HE	ADQUARTERS
A(2)A		TACTICAL	A(3)A	L	ABORATORY
A(2)A		TACTICS	A(3)A	L	ANGUAGE
A(2)A		TATOO	A(3)A	M	AINTAIN
A(2)A		TENT	A(3)A	M	AINTAINED
A(2)A(1)A		TENTATIVE	A(3)A	M	ANUFACTURE
A(2)A		TENTH	A(3)A	M	ARSHAL
A(2)A		TEXT	A(3)A	M	ARTIAL
A(2)A		THAT	A(3)A	N	ATURAL
A(2)A		THATHAVE	A(3)A	N	ATURALIZE
A(2)AA		THATTHE	A(3)A	NATUR	ALIZATION
A(2)A	TWEN	TIETH	A(3)A(3)A	N	ATURALIZATION
A(2)A	WA	TERTANK	A(3)A	N	AVIGATION
A(2)A	AGRIC	ULTURAL	A(3)A	ORG	ANIZATION
A(2)A	D	UGOUT	A(3)A	P	ANAMA
A(2)A	O	UTGUARD	A(3)A	R	AILWAY
A(2)A	O	UTPUT	A(3)A	RE	ARGUARD
A(2)A	P	URSUE	A(3)A	RECONN	AISSANCE
A(2)A	P	URSUIT	A(3)A	REORG	ANIZATION
A(2)A(6)A		UNSUCCESSFUL	A(3)A	S	ABOTAGE
A(2)A		UNSUITABLE	A(3)A	S	ANITARY
A(2)A	RE	VOLVE	A(3)A	S	ANITATION
A(2)A	RE	VOLVER	A(3)A	SPE	ARHEAD
A(2)A	AN	YWAY	A(3)A	TR	ANSPACIFIC
A(2)A		ZIGZAG	A(3)A		CAPACITY
A(3)A		ACTUALLY	A(3)A		CHURCH
A(3)A		ANIMAL	A(3)A(4)A		COINCIDENCE
A(3)A		ANNUAL	A(3)A		CONSCRIPTION
A(3)A(4)A		ANTIAIRCRAFT	A(3)A		COUNCIL
A(3)A		ANYWAY	A(3)A	DEFI	CIENCY
A(3)A		APPEAR	A(3)A	EFFI	CIENCY
A(3)A(1)A		APPEARANCE	A(3)A	ELE	CTRICITY
A(3)A		APPEARED	A(3)A	GYROS	COPIC
A(3)A		AVERAGE	A(3)A	INEFFI	CIENCY
A(3)A		AWKWARD	A(3)A	PA	CIFIC
A(3)A	C	ANADA	A(3)A	SPE	CIFIC
A(3)A	C	ARRIAGE	A(3)A	SPE	CIFICATION
A(3)A	CENTR	ALIZATION	A(3)A	TE	CHNICAL
A(3)A	CIRCUMST	ANTIAL	A(3)A	TRANSPA	CIFIC
A(3)A	DIS	APPEAR	A(3)A		DECIDE
A(3)A	DIS	APPEARED	A(3)A(1)A		DECIDED
A(3)A	E	ASTWARD	A(3)A		DECODE
A(3)A	EL	ABORATE	A(3)A		DIVIDE

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Table D-7 (U). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(3)A		DIVIDING	A(3)A	ENV	ELOPE
A(3)A	HIN	DERED	A(3)A		ERASE
A(3)A	IN	DIVIDUAL	A(3)A		ERASER
A(3)A	MAN	DATED	A(3)A	EXP	EDITE
A(3)A	OR	DERED	A(3)A	EXP	ERIMENT
A(3)A	RE	DUCTED	A(3)A		EXPRESS
A(3)A	SURREN	DERED	A(3)A(1)A		EXTREME
A(3)A	WE	DNESDAY	A(3)A	FUS	ELAGE
A(3)A	WIN	DWARD	A(3)A	G	EORGE
A(3)A	ASS	EMBLE	A(3)A	GOV	ERNMENT
A(3)A	ASS	ESSMENT	A(3)A	GR	ENADE
A(3)A	ASS	ESSMENTS	A(3)A	H	EAVIER
A(3)A	ATT	EMPTED	A(3)A	ILLIT	ERATE
A(3)A	AV	ERAGE	A(3)A	IMP	EDIMENTA
A(3)AA(1)A	B	EENNEEDED	A(3)A	INS	ECURE
A(3)A(1)A	BE	ENNEEDED	A(3)A	INT	ERNMENT
A(3)A	B	EETLE	A(3)A	INT	ERPRETATION
A(3)A	B	EFORE	A(3)A(1)A	INT	ERPRETER
A(3)A	B	ETWEEN	A(3)A	INT	ERVIEW
A(3)A	CAREL	ESSNESS	A(3)A	L	EAGUE
A(3)A	C	EMETERY	A(3)A	OP	ERATE
A(3)A	COMPL	ETENESS	A(3)A(2)A	OV	ERWHELMED
A(3)A	CONC	EALMENT	A(3)A	PAR	ENTHESIS
A(3)A	COOP	ERATE	A(3)A(1)A	PAR	ENTHESES
A(3)A	CORR	ECTNESS	A(3)A	PR	ECEDE
A(3)A	D	ECIDE	A(3)A(2)A	PR	ECEDENCE
A(3)A	D	ECIDED	A(3)A(2)A	PR	EFERENCE
A(3)A	D	ECODE	A(3)A	PR	EPARE
A(3)A	D	ECREE	A(3)A(2)A	PR	EPAREDNESS
A(3)A	D	EGREE	A(3)A	PR	ESIDENT
A(3)A	D	ELAYED	A(3)A	PR	ESIDENTIAL
A(3)A	D	ELIVER	A(3)A	PROC	EDURE
A(3)A	DEV	ELOPE	A(3)A	R	EACHED
A(3)A	DEV	ELOPED	A(3)A	R	ECOVER
A(3)A	D	EVICE	A(3)A	R	EDUCE
A(3)A	D	EWISE	A(3)A	R	EDUCED
A(3)A		EASTERLY	A(3)A(2)A	R	EFERENCE
A(3)A		EASTERN	A(3)A	R	EFUGE
A(3)A	ECH	ELONED	A(3)AA	R	EFUGEE
A(3)A		EITHER	A(3)A	R	EFUSE
A(3)A		ELEMENT	A(3)A	R	EGIMENTAL
A(3)A		ELEMENTARY	A(3)A	R	EGIMENT
A(3)A	EL	EVATE	A(3)A	R	ESCUE
A(3)A		ELEVEN	A(3)A	R	ESUME
A(3)A		ENTRENCH	A(3)A	R	ETIRE
A(3)A(3)A		ENTRENCHED	A(3)A	SCH	EDULE
A(3)A	ENTR	ENCHED	A(3)A	S	ECURE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) --Continued

A(3)A	S	ETTL	A(3)A	D	ISTRIBUTE
A(3)A	SEV	ENTEEN	A(3)A	DISTR	IBUTING
A(3)A	SEV	ENTEENTH	A(3)A	DISTR	IBUTION
A(3)A	S	EVERE	A(3)A(3)A	D	ISTRIBUTING
A(3)AA	SMOK	ESCREEN	A(3)A(3)A	D	ISTRIBUTION
A(3)A	SP	EARHEAD	A(3)A	D	ISTRICT
A(3)A	THER	EFORE	A(3)A	D	ISTRICTS
A(3)A	TW	ENTIETH	A(3)A	D	IVIDING
A(3)A	W	EATHER	A(3)A	D	IVISION
A(3)A		GARAGE	A(3)A	D	IVISIONS
A(3)A		GEORGE	A(3)A	DOM	INATION
A(3)A		GOING	A(3)A	ENC	IRCLING
A(3)A	C	HURCH	A(3)A	EST	IMATION
A(3)A	FLAS	HLIGHT	A(3)A	EXAM	INATION
A(3)A	P	HOSPHEROUS	A(3)A	EXH	IBITION
A(3)A	SC	HOOHOUSE	A(3)A	EXTERM	INATION
A(3)A	SEARC	HLIGHTS	A(3)A	EXT	INGUISH
A(3)A	T	HATTHE	A(3)A	FAC	ILITIES
A(3)A	T	HOUGH	A(3)A	F	IGHTING
A(3)A	ACT	IVITIES	A(3)A	HOST	ILITIES
A(3)A	ANTIC	IPATION	A(3)A	IDENTIF	ICATION
A(3)A	APPL	ICATION	A(3)A	ILLUM	INATING
A(3)A	ART	IFICIAL	A(3)A	ILLUM	INATION
A(3)A	AUD	IBILITY	A(3)A(1)A		INCLINING
A(3)A	BR	IGADIER	A(3)A	IND	ICATING
A(3)A	CENTRAL	IZATION	A(3)A	IND	ICATION
A(3)A	C	IRCUIT	A(3)A		INFLECT
A(3)A	C	IRCUITOUS	A(3)A(2)A		INFLECTING
A(3)A	C	ITATION	A(3)A		INITIATE
A(3)A	CLASSIF	ICATION	A(3)A		INQUIRE
A(3)A	COMMUN	ICATION	A(3)A		INQUIRY
A(3)A	CONST	ITUTING	A(3)A	INSP	IRATION
A(3)A	CONST	ITUTION	A(3)A(3)A		INSPIRATION
A(3)A	COORD	INATION	A(3)A		INSPIRE
A(3)A	CR	ITICISE	A(3)A	INST	ITUTION
A(3)A	CR	ITICISM	A(3)A(3)A		INSTITUTION
A(3)A	DED	ICATION	A(3)A	INVEST	IGATION
A(3)A	DEF	INATION	A(3)A	INVEST	IGATIONS
A(3)A	DEMIBIL	IZATION	A(3)A	INV	ITATION
A(3)A	DETERM	INATION	A(3)A	IRR	IGATIONS
A(3)A	D	IMINISH	A(3)A		ISSUING
A(3)A	D	IRIGIBLE	A(3)A	LIM	ITATION
A(3)A	DISSEM	INATION	A(3)A	L	IMITING
A(3)A	DIST	INCTION	A(3)A	MA	INTAIN
A(3)A	DIST	INGUISH	A(3)A	MA	INTAINED
A(3)A	DIST	INGUISHED	A(3)A	M	ILITIA
A(3)A(2)A	DIST	INGUISHING	A(3)A	MOBIL	IZATION

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) — Continued

A(3)A	NATURAL	IZATION	A(3)A	E	NCOUNTERED
A(3)A	NAV	IGATION	A(3)A	E	NTRENCH
A(3)A	ORGAN	IZATION	A(3)A	E	NTRENCHED
A(3)A	PRELIM	INARIES	A(3)A	EXPA	NSION
A(3)A	QUALIF	ICATION	A(3)A	EXTE	NSION
A(3)A	RECONNO	ITERING	A(3)A	ILLUMI	NATING
A(3)A	REORGAN	IZATION	A(3)A	I	NDEMNITY
A(3)A	REQU	ISITION	A(3)A	I	NSIGNIA
A(3)A	RESPONS	IBILITY	A(3)A	I	NSTANT
A(3)A	SAN	ITATION	A(3)A	I	NSTANTLY
A(3)A	SEM	IRIGID	A(3)A(2)A	I	NSTANTANEOUS
A(3)A	S	IGHTING	A(3)A	INTE	NTION
A(3)A	SIM	ILARITY	A(3)A	I	NTERNAL
A(3)A	SPECIF	ICATION	A(3)A(4)A	I	NTERNATIONAL
A(3)A	SUBST	ITUTION	A(3)A(2)A	I	NTERNMENT
A(3)A(1)A	SU	ITABILITY	A(3)A	INTERVE	NTION
A(3)A	VERIF	ICATION	A(3)A	I	NTRENCH
A(3)A	VETER	INARIAN	A(3)A	INVE	NTION
A(3)A	V	ICINITY	A(3)A	LAU	NCHING
A(3)A	VIS	IBILITY	A(3)A	MACHI	NEGUN
A(3)A(1)A	V	ISIBILITY	A(3)A	MAI	NTAIN
A(3)A	CO	LONEL	A(3)A	MAI	NTAINED
A(3)A	COMP	LETELY	A(3)A	MOU	NTAIN
A(3)A	F	LASHLIGHT	A(3)A		NOTING
A(3)A	IL	LEGAL	A(3)A	O	NEHUNDRED
A(3)A		LEVEL	A(3)A	PO	NTOON
A(3)A		LITTLE	A(3)A	REAPPOI	NTMENT
A(3)A		LOCAL	A(3)A	RETE	NTION
A(3)A	SEA	LEVEL	A(3)A	SEVE	NTEEN
A(3)A	A	MUSEMENT	A(3)A	SEVE	NTEENTH
A(3)A	CO	MMITMENT	A(3)A	SUSPE	NSION
A(3)A(1)A		MAXIMUM	A(3)A	U	NIDENTIFIED
A(3)A(1)A		MINIMUM	A(3)A	AIRC	ONTROL
A(3)A		MOVEMENT	A(3)A	AN	ONYMOUS
A(3)A	ALTER	NATING	A(3)A	CHR	ONOLOGICAL
A(3)A(4)A	A	NNOUNCEMENT	A(3)AA	C	ODEBOOK
A(3)A	A	NTENNA	A(3)A	C	ONTROL
A(3)A	APPOI	NTMENT	A(3)A	C	ONTROVERSY
A(3)A	ASCE	NSION	A(3)A	CR	OSSROADS
A(3)A	ATTE	NTION	A(3)A	FIREC	ONTROL
A(3)A(1)A	CO	NCERNING	A(3)A	F	OOThOLD
A(3)A	CO	NDEMN	A(3)AA	F	ORENOON
A(3)A	CO	NDEMNED	A(3)A	H	ORIZON
A(3)A	CONFI	NEMENT	A(3)A	LAB	ORATORY
A(3)A	CO	NTAIN	A(3)A	L	OCOMOTIVE
A(3)A	DETE	NTION	A(3)A	METE	OROLOGICAL
A(3)A	DIME	NSION	A(3)A	M	ONOPOLY

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(3)A		OUTBOARD	A(3)A	REA	RGUARD
A(3)A		OUTPOST	A(3)A		RECORD
A(3)A		OUTPOSTS	A(3)A(2)A		RECORDER
A(3)A	PH	OSPHORUS	A(3)A		REDCROSS
A(3)A	P	ONTOON	A(3)A		REFER
A(3)A	P	OSTPONE	A(3)A		REFERENCE
A(3)A	PROP	ORTION	A(3)A		REGARDING
A(3)A	PR	OTOCOL	A(3)A		REPORT
A(3)A	A	PPROPRIATE	A(3)A		REPORTED
A(3)A		PASSPORT	A(3)A		RESERVATION
A(3)A		PHOSPHORUS	A(3)A		RESERVE
A(3)A		POSTPONE	A(3)A		RESERVES
A(3)A		PROMPT	A(3)A		RESTRAINT
A(3)A	TROO	PSHIP	A(3)A		RESTRICTED
A(3)A	TROO	PSHIPS	A(3)A		RESTRICTION
A(3)A	A	RBITRATION	A(3)A		RETIRE
A(3)A	B	RIBERY	A(3)A		RETIRING
A(3)A	CA	RRIER	A(3)A		RETURN
A(3)A	CONT	ROVERSY	A(3)A		RETURNED
A(3)A	COR	RIDOR	A(3)A		RETURNING
A(3)A	C	ROSSROADS	A(3)A		REVERSE
A(3)A	DEST	ROYERS	A(3)A		RIGOROUS
A(3)A	DEST	ROYER	A(3)A		RIVER
A(3)A	E	RASER	A(3)A		ROGER
A(3)A	FA	RATHER	A(3)A	SEC	RETARY
A(3)A	FU	RATHER	A(3)A	TEMPE	RATURE
A(3)A	IMP	ROPER	A(3)A	TER	RITORY
A(3)A	INTERP	RETER	A(3)A	THE	REFORE
A(3)A	LABO	RATORY	A(3)A	T	RAVERSE
A(3)A	NO	RATHERN	A(3)A	VETE	RINARIAN
A(3)A	NO	RATHERLY	A(3)A	A	SCENSION
A(3)A	OPE	RATOR	A(3)A	A	SPOSSIBLE
A(3)A	P	REARRANGED	A(3)A	A	SSESSMENT
A(3)A	P	REFER	A(3)A(4)A	A	SSESSMENTS
A(3)A	P	REFERENCE	A(3)A	A	SSETS
A(3)AA	P	REFERRED	A(3)A	BALLI	STICS
A(3)A	P	REPARATION	A(3)A	BATTLE	SHIPS
A(3)A	P	REPARE	A(3)AA	BU	SINESS
A(3)A	P	REPAREDNESS	A(3)AA	CARELE	SSNESS
A(3)A	P	REPARING	A(3)A	CARELES	SNNESS
A(3)A	P	RESCRIBED	A(3)A	COLLI	SIONS
A(3)A	P	RESERVATION	A(3)A	DI	SCUSS
A(3)A	P	RESERVE	A(3)A	DI	SCUSSSED
A(3)A	P	RIMARY	A(3)A	DI	SCUSSION
A(3)A	P	ROPER	A(3)A	DI	SMISSAL
A(3)A	P	ROPORTION	A(3)A	DI	SMISS
A(3)A		RAILROAD	A(3)A	DI	SPERSE

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Table D-7 (U). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(3)A	DI	SPERSED	A(3)A	DEPAR	TMENTAL
A(3)A	DI	SPERSION	A(3)A	DES	TITUTE
A(3)AA	DI	STRESS	A(3)A	DES	TRUCTION
A(3)AA	DI	STRESSED	A(3)A	DE	TONATE
A(3)A	DIVI	SIONS	A(3)A	DE	TONATED
A(3)A	EMBA	SSIES	A(3)A	DE	TONATION
A(3)A	EXPLO	SIONS	A(3)A	DIS	TINCTION
A(3)A	I	SSUES	A(3)A	DIS	TRICT
A(3)A	LOGI	STICS	A(3)A	DIS	TRICTS
A(3)A	MARK	SMANSHIP	A(3)A	EIGH	TEENTH
A(3)A	MES	SAGES	A(3)A	ENLIS	TMENT
A(3)A	MIS	SIONS	A(3)A	ES	TIMATE
A(3)A	PO	SSESSION	A(3)A	ES	TIMATION
A(3)A	PROVI	SIONS	A(3)A	ESTIMA	TEDAT
A(3)A	RE	SPONSIBLE	A(3)A	ES	TIMATES
A(3)A	RE	SPONSIBILITY	A(3)A(3)A	ES	TIMATEDAT
A(3)A		SATISFACTORY	A(3)A	EX	TRACT
A(3)A		SATISFY	A(3)A	FA	TALITY
A(3)A		SHIPS	A(3)A	FIF	TEENTH
A(3)A	STATI	STICS	A(3)A	FOUR	TEENTH
A(3)AA		STRESS	A(3)A	HOS	TILITY
A(3)A	SU	SPENSE	A(3)A	HOS	TILITIES
A(3)A	SU	SPENSION	A(3)A	ILLI	TERATE
A(3)A	TRAN	SMISSION	A(3)A	INS	TITUTION
A(3)A	TRAN	SVERSE	A(3)A	INS	TRUCT
A(3)A	TROOP	SHIPS	A(3)A	INS	TRUCTION
A(3)AA	U	SELESS	A(3)A	INS	TRUCTIONS
A(3)A	VE	SSELS	A(3)A	INS	TRUCTOR
A(3)A	WAR	SHIPS	A(3)A	INVES	TIGATE
A(3)A	AC	TIVITY	A(3)A	INVES	TIGATION
A(3)A	AC	TIVITIES	A(3)A	INVES	TIGATIONS
A(3)A	ALLO	TMENT	A(3)A	NINE	TEENTH
A(3)A	AN	TEDATING	A(3)A	OBS	TRUCTIONS
A(3)A	APPOIN	TMENT	A(3)A	OU	TPOST
A(3)A	A	TLANTIC	A(3)A	OU	TPOSTS
A(3)A	AT	TEMPT	A(3)A	PA	TRITIC
A(3)A	AT	TEMPTED	A(3)A	REAPPOIN	TMENT
A(3)A	A	TENTION	A(3)A	RECONS	TRUCTION
A(3)A	AU	TOMATIC	A(3)A	REENLIS	TMENT
A(3)A	COMMI	TMENT	A(3)A	RES	TRICTED
A(3)A	COMPAR	TMENT	A(3)A	RES	TRITION
A(3)A	CONS	TITUTE	A(3)A	RE	TREAT
A(3)A	CONS	TITUTION	A(3)A	SEVEN	TEENTH
A(3)A	CONS	TRUCTION	A(3)A	SIX	TEENTH
A(3)A	CON	TRACT	A(3)A	S	TREET
A(3)AA	COUN	TERATTACK	A(3)A	SUBS	TITUTE
A(3)A	DEPAR	TMENT	A(3)A	SUBS	TITUTION

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Table D-7 (c). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(3)A		TAXATION	A(4)A	GEOGR	APHICAL
A(3)A		THATTHE	A(4)A	IMPR	ACTICABLE
A(3)A		THIRTEEN	A(4)A	IN	AUGURATION
A(3)A	THIR	TEENTH	A(4)A	INTERN	ATIONAL
A(3)A(3)A		THIRTEENTH	A(4)A	M	ARKSMANSHIP
A(3)A		THIRTY	A(4)A	M	ATERIAL
A(3)A		TRACT	A(4)A	N	ATIONAL
A(3)A		TRACTOR	A(4)A	N	ATIONALISM
A(3)A	TRANSA	TLANTIC	A(4)A	N	ATIONALITY
A(3)A(2)A		TWENTIETH	A(4)A	N	AUTICAL
A(3)A		TWENTY	A(4)A	NAV	ALATTACK
A(3)A		TWENTYFIVE	A(4)A	N	AVALBASE
A(3)A(1)A	UNI	TEDSTATES	A(4)A	N	AVALBATTLE
A(3)A	U	TILITY	A(4)A	P	ARAGRAPH
A(3)A	WARDEPAR	TMENT	A(4)A	P	ARALLAX
A(3)A	WI	THOUT	A(4)A	PR	ACTICAL
A(3)A	B	UREAU	A(4)A	R	AILHEAD
A(3)A	CHA	UFFEUR	A(4)A	R	AILROAD
A(3)A	CIRC	UITOUS	A(4)A	RECRE	ATIONAL
A(3)A	COMM	UNIQUE	A(4)A	S	ATISFACTORY
A(3)A	S	URPLUS	A(4)A	S	ATURDAY
A(3)A	S	URROUND	A(4)A	T	ACTICAL
A(3)A		UNUSUAL	A(4)A	W	ARDEPARMENT
A(3)A		WESTWARD	A(4)A	W	ATERTANK
A(3)A		WINDWARD	A(4)A		BLOCKBUSTER
A(4)A		ADJUTANT	A(4)A		CHARACTER
A(4)A		AERONAUTICS	A(4)A(7)A		CHARACTERISTIC
A(4)A		AIRCRAFT	A(4)A		CHEMICAL
A(4)A		AIRPLANE	A(4)A		CLERICAL
A(4)A		ALASKA	A(4)A	COIN	CIDENCE
A(4)A		ALLOCATION	A(4)A		COLLECT
A(4)A		ALLOWANCE	A(4)A		COLLECTION
A(4)A		ALMANAC	A(4)A		CONDUCT
A(4)A		AMBULANCE	A(4)A		CONNECTING
A(4)A		ANTEDATING	A(4)A		CONNECTION
A(4)A	ANTI	AIRCRAFT	A(4)A		CONTACT
A(4)A		ANTITANK	A(4)A		CORRECTED
A(4)A		APPARATUS	A(4)A		CORRECTION
A(4)A		APPROACH	A(4)A		CORRECTNESS
A(4)A		ARABIA	A(4)A		CORRECT
A(4)A		ARRIVAL	A(4)A		CRITIC
A(4)A		ASSURANCE	A(4)A		CRITICAL
A(4)A		AUTOMATIC	A(4)A		CRITICISE
A(4)A		AVAILABLE	A(4)A	IN	CIDENCE
A(4)A	BE	ACHHEAD	A(4)A	ME	CHANIC
A(4)A	C	AUSEWAY	A(4)A	PRE	CEDENCE
A(4)A	CO	ASTGUARD	A(4)A	RE	CEPTACLE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(4)A		CRITICISM	A(4)A	D	ESERTED
A(4)A	CON	DEMNEED	A(4)A	D	ESERTER
A(4)A	CON	DENSED	A(4)A	D	ETACHED
A(4)A		DEFEND	A(4)A	DET	ERMINE
A(4)A		DEFENDER	A(4)A	DET	ERMINED
A(4)A(1)A		DEFENDED	A(4)A	DEV	ELOPMENT
A(4)A(1)A		DEMANDED	A(4)A	DIFF	ERENCE
A(4)A		DEPEND	A(4)A	DIV	EBOMBER
A(4)A		DEPENDABLE	A(4)A	ECH	ELONMENT
A(4)A		DEPENDABILITY	A(4)A	EFF	ECTIVE
A(4)A		DEPENDENT	A(4)AA		EIGHTEEN
A(4)A		DISLODGE	A(4)AA		EIGHTEENTH
A(4)A		DOWNED	A(4)A	ELS	EWHERE
A(4)A	IN	DEPENDENT	A(4)A		EMERGENCY
A(4)A	ALT	ERNATE	A(4)A		ENCODE
A(4)A	ASS	EMBLIES	A(4)A		ENCODED
A(4)A	B	EACHHEAD	A(4)A		ENEMIES
A(4)A	B	ECAUSE	A(4)A		ENGAGE
A(4)A(1)A	B	EENNEEDED	A(4)A(1)A		ENGAGEMENT
A(4)A(1)A	B	ELLIGERENT	A(4)A		ENGINE
A(4)A	B	ESIEGED	A(4)AA		ENGINEER
A(4)A	C	ENTERED	A(4)AA		ENGINEERING
A(4)A	COMM	ENCEMENT	A(4)A		ENTIRE
A(4)A	COMP	ENSATE	A(4)A		EUROPE
A(4)A	CONF	ERENCE	A(4)A		EUROPEAN
A(4)A	CONSID	ERABLE	A(4)A	EXC	ESSIVE
A(4)A	D	ECEMBER	A(4)A		EXCITE
A(4)A	D	ECIPHER	A(4)A(1)A		EXCITEMENT
A(4)A(1)A	D	ECIPHERED	A(4)A	EX	ERCISE
A(4)A(2)A	D	ECIPHERMENT	A(4)A	EX	ERCISES
A(4)A	D	ECLARE	A(4)A	EXP	ENSIVE
A(4)A	D	ECLARED	A(4)A	EXT	ENSIVE
A(4)A	D	EFEATED	A(4)A	FL	EXIBLE
A(4)A	DEF	ECTIVE	A(4)A	IMM	EDIATE
A(4)A	D	EFENDER	A(4)A	IMPR	ESSIVE
A(4)A	D	EFENDED	A(4)A	INC	ENTIVE
A(4)A	D	EFENSE	A(4)A	INCOMP	ETENCE
A(4)A	D	EFENSES	A(4)A	IND	EPENDENT
A(4)A	DEF	ENSIVE	A(4)A	INT	ELLIGENT
A(4)A	D	EFERRED	A(4)A(2)A	INT	ELLIGENCE
A(4)A	D	EFICIENT	A(4)A	INT	ENSIVE
A(4)A	D	EFICIENCY	A(4)A	INTERF	ERENCE
A(4)A	D	EMANDED	A(4)A	INT	ERFERE
A(4)A	D	EPARTED	A(4)A(2)A	INT	ERFERENCE
A(4)A	D	EPENDENT	A(4)A	INTERM	EDIATE
A(4)A	D	EPLOYED	A(4)A	INT	ERPOSE
A(4)A	D	EPORTED	A(4)A	INT	ERVENE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(4)A	L	LECTURE	A(4)A	R	EQUIRE
A(4)A	L	ETTERED	A(4)A(1)A	R	EQUIREMENT
A(4)A	MAINT	ENANCE	A(4)A	R	ESERVE
A(4)A(1)A	M	EASUREMENT	A(4)A	R	ESERVES
A(4)A(1)A	M	EASUREMENTS	A(4)A	R	ESTORED
A(4)A	M	ESSAGE	A(4)A	R	ETURNED
A(4)A	M	ESSAGES	A(4)A	R	EVENUE
A(4)A	MISC	ELLANEOUS	A(4)A	R	EVERSE
A(4)A	N	EGLIGENT	A(4)A	R	EVIEWED
A(4)A(2)A	N	EGLIGENCE	A(4)A	R	EVOLVE
A(4)A	OBJ	ECTIVE	A(4)A	R	EVOLVER
A(4)A	OFF	ENSIVE	A(4)A	S	EALEVEL
A(4)A	PEN	ETRATE	A(4)A	S	ELECTED
A(4)A	P	ERMANENT	A(4)A	S	ENTINEL
A(4)A	PREC	EDENCE	A(4)A	S	ERVICE
A(4)A	PREF	ERENCE	A(4)AA	S	EVENTEEN
A(4)A	PR	EFERRED	A(4)AA	S	EVENTEENTH
A(4)A	PR	ESERVE	A(4)A	SMOK	ESCREEN
A(4)A	PR	ESSURE	A(4)A	SUCC	ESSIVE
A(4)A	PROGR	ESSIVE	A(4)A	SURR	ENDERED
A(4)A	RANG	EFINDER	A(4)A	TEL	EPHONE
A(4)A	R	EADINESS	A(4)A(1)A	TH	ERMOMETER
A(4)A	R	ECEIVE	A(4)A	THR	EATENED
A(4)A	R	ECEIVER	A(4)A	UNT	ENABLE
A(4)A	R	ECOMMEND	A(4)A	V	EHICLES
A(4)A	R	ECOMMENDATION	A(4)A		FORTIFIED
A(4)A(2)A	R	ECOMMENDED	A(4)A	EN	GAGING
A(4)A	R	ECORDER	A(4)A	FI	GHTING
A(4)A	REF	ERENCE	A(4)A	SI	GHTING
A(4)A	R	EFUGEE	A(4)A	BREAKT	HROUGH
A(4)A	R	EGISTER	A(4)A	S	HARPSHOOTER
A(4)A	R	EJECTED	A(4)A	T	HROUGH
A(4)A	R	ELEASE	A(4)A	ARB	ITRATION
A(4)A	R	ELIEVE	A(4)A	CONC	ILIATION
A(4)A	R	EMEDIES	A(4)A	CONF	IDENTIAL
A(4)A	R	EMEMBER	A(4)A	CONF	IRMATION
A(4)A	R	EPAIRED	A(4)A	CONF	ISCATION
A(4)A	R	EPEATED	A(4)A	CONT	INUATION
A(4)A	R	EPEATER	A(4)A	DES	IGNATION
A(4)A	R	EPELLED	A(4)A	D	IETITIAN
A(4)A	R	EPLACE	A(4)A	DIFF	ICULTIES
A(4)A(1)A	R	EPLACEMENT	A(4)A	D	IMENSION
A(4)A	R	EPORTED	A(4)A	D	IRECTION
A(4)A	R	EPRESENT	A(4)A(1)A	D	ISPOSITION
A(4)A	R	EPRESENTATION	A(4)A	D	ISSEMINATED
A(4)A(6)A	R	EPRESENTATIVE	A(4)A(3)A	D	ISSEMINATION
A(4)A	R	EPULSED	A(4)A	ENG	INEERING

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Table D-7 (ϕ). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(4)A		IDENTICAL	A(4)A	ANNOU	NCEMENT
A(4)A		IDENTIFY	A(4)A	A	NTITANK
A(4)A(1)A(3)A		IDENTIFICATION	A(4)A	ARRA	NGEMENT
A(4)A		IGNITION	A(4)A	CE	NTERING
A(4)A		ILLUMINATE	A(4)A	COI	NCIDENCE
A(4)A(3)A		ILLUMINATING	A(4)A	COMME	NCEMENT
A(4)A(3)A		ILLUMINATION	A(4)A	CO	NFERENCE
A(4)A		IMMEDIATE	A(4)A	CO	NFIDENCE
A(4)A	IMM	IGRATION	A(4)A	CO	NFIDENT
A(4)A		IMPEDIMENTA	A(4)A	CO	NFIDENTIAL
A(4)A		INDIVIDUAL	A(4)A	CON	NECTING
A(4)A(1)A		INEFFICIENCY	A(4)A	CO	NTINENTAL
A(4)A		INHABITED	A(4)A	COORDI	NATION
A(4)A		INTERIOR	A(4)A	DEFI	NITION
A(4)A		INVADING	A(4)A	DESIG	NATION
A(4)A		INVASION	A(4)A	DETERMI	NATION
A(4)A	LEG	ISLATION	A(4)A	DETO	NATION
A(4)A	L	IABILITY	A(4)A	DISSEMI	NATION
A(4)A	NAT	IONALISM	A(4)A	DISTI	NCTION
A(4)A	NAT	IONALITY	A(4)A	DOMI	NATION
A(4)A	PH	ILIPPINES	A(4)A	E	NDURANCE
A(4)A	PRES	IDENTIAL	A(4)A	E	NGAGING
A(4)A	RES	IGNATION	A(4)A	ENGI	NEERING
A(4)A	S	IGNIFICANT	A(4)A	E	NTERING
A(4)A	S	IGNIFICANCE	A(4)A	E	NTRAIN
A(4)A	S	ITUATION	A(4)A	E	NTRAINED
A(4)A(1)A	UN	IDENTIFIED	A(4)A	EXAMI	NATION
A(4)A	V	ICTORIOUS	A(4)A	EXPLA	NATION
A(4)A	AGRICU	LTURAL	A(4)A	EXTERMI	NATION
A(4)A	BATT	LEFIELD	A(4)A	IG	NITION
A(4)A	E	LIGIBLE	A(4)A	ILLUMI	NATION
A(4)A	F	LEXIBLE	A(4)A	I	NCIDENT
A(4)A	I	LLEGAL	A(4)A	I	NCIDENCE
A(4)A		LEGISLATION	A(4)A(2)A	I	NDEPENDENT
A(4)A		LIABILITY	A(4)A	I	NFLUENCE
A(4)A	NAVA	LBATTLE	A(4)A	INTER	NATIONAL
A(4)A	ATO	MICBOMB	A(4)A	I	NVADING
A(4)A	BO	MBARDMENT	A(4)A	JU	NCTION
A(4)A	COM	MENCEMENT	A(4)A	MAI	NTENANCE
A(4)A	CO	MPARTMENT	A(4)A	MU	NITIONS
A(4)A	E	MPLOYMENT	A(4)A		NATIONALITY
A(4)A	I	MPEDIMENTA	A(4)A		NATIONAL
A(4)A		MARKSMANSHIP	A(4)A		NATIONALISM
A(4)A		MEDIUM	A(4)A	NI	NETEEN
A(4)A(2)A		MEDIUMBOMBER	A(4)A	NI	NETEENTH
A(4)A		MILLIMETER	A(4)A		NOTHING
A(4)A	AMMU	NITION	A(4)A	RA	NGEFINDER

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(4)A	RECOG	NITION	A(4)A	EXTRAO	RDINARY
A(4)A	RESIG	NATION	A(4)A	FI	REALARM
A(4)A	ROADJU	NCTION	A(4)A	INST	RUCTOR
A(4)A	SIG	NALLING	A(4)A	NO	RTHWARD
A(4)A	SY	NCHRONIZE	A(4)A	P	REFERRED
A(4)A	U	NEXPENDED	A(4)A	P	RESSURE
A(4)A	U	NKNOWN	A(4)A		REPAIR
A(4)A	VETERI	NARIAN	A(4)A		REPAIRED
A(4)A	ACCOMM	ODATION	A(4)A		REQUIRE
A(4)A	ALL	OCATION	A(4)A		REQUIREMENT
A(4)A	AT	OMICBOMB	A(4)A		REQUIRING
A(4)A	C	ODEBOOK	A(4)A		RESEARCH
A(4)A	COMP	OSITION	A(4)A		RESOURCES
A(4)A	CORP	ORATION	A(4)A		RESTORED
A(4)A	C	ORRIDOR	A(4)A		RUBBER
A(4)A	DEC	ORATION	A(4)A		RUNNER
A(4)A	DET	ONATION	A(4)A	SUR	RENDER
A(4)A	DISP	OSITION	A(4)A	SUR	RENDERED
A(4)A	F	ORENOON	A(4)A	TE	RRITORY
A(4)A	INTR	ODUCTORY	A(4)A	T	RACTOR
A(4)A	L	OCATION	A(4)A	T	RAILERS
A(4)A		OPINION	A(4)A	T	RAWLER
A(4)A	OPP	OSITION	A(4)A	T	RIGGER
A(4)A		OVERCOMING	A(4)A	WA	RDEPARTMENT
A(4)A	P	OSITION	A(4)A	ASSES	SMENTS
A(4)A	P	OSITIONS	A(4)A	AS	SOONAS
A(4)A	PR	OJECTOR	A(4)A	BU	SINESS
A(4)A	PR	OMOTION	A(4)A	CARELE	SSNESS
A(4)A	PR	OTECTOR	A(4)A	CROS	SROADS
A(4)A	PR	OVISION	A(4)A	DI	STRESS
A(4)A	PR	OVISIONS	A(4)A	DI	STRESSED
A(4)A	REV	OLUTION	A(4)A	I	SLANDS
A(4)A	REV	OLUTIONARY	A(4)A	ME	SSAGES
A(4)A	T	OBACCO	A(4)A	MI	SFIRES
A(4)A	T	OMORROW	A(4)A	MI	SSIONS
A(4)A	T	ORPEDO	A(4)A	OUT	SKIRTS
A(4)AA		PHILIPPINES	A(4)A	PRI	SONERS
A(4)A	TO	POGRAPHIC	A(4)A	RE	SERVES
A(4)A	AI	RCONTROL	A(4)A	RE	SPECTS
A(4)A	ARMO	REDCAR	A(4)A		SHARPSHOOTER
A(4)A	CHA	RACTER	A(4)A		SHELLS
A(4)A	CHA	RACTERISTIC	A(4)A		SMOKESCREEN
A(4)A	CI	RCULAR	A(4)A		SPOOLS
A(4)A	CO	RRIDOR	A(4)A		SPOONS
A(4)A	C	RUISER	A(4)A		STATES
A(4)A	C	RUISERS	A(4)A(3)A		STATISTICS
A(4)A	DI	RECTOR	A(4)A		STATUS

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(4)A		STRESS	A(4)A	TARGET
A(4)A		STRIPS	A(4)A	TENTATIVE
A(4)AA		SUBMISSION	A(4)A	TERRITORY
A(4)A		SUBSISTENCE	A(4)A	THREAT
A(4)AA		SUCCESSIVE	A(4)A	THREATENED
A(4)AA		SUCCESS	A(4)A	TRADITIONAL
A(4)AA		SUCCESSFUL	A(4)A	TURRET
A(4)AA		SUCCESSFULLY	A(4)A	TWELFTH
A(4)A		SUGGEST	A(4)A	L UMINOUS
A(4)A		SUNRISE	A(4)A	MAN UFACTURE
A(4)A		SUPPOSE	A(5)A	ACCEPTANCE
A(4)A	TRAN	SPORTS	A(5)A	ACCEPTABLE
A(4)A	UNITED	STATES	A(5)A	ACCOMPANY
A(4)AA	UN	SUCCESSFUL	A(5)A	ACCORDANCE
A(4)A	U	SELESS	A(5)A	ADVANTAGEOUS
A(4)A	AL	TERNATING	A(5)A	ADVANTAGE
A(4)A	AL	TERNATE	A(5)A	AEROPLANE
A(4)A	A	TTEMPT	A(5)A	ALLEGIANCE
A(4)A	A	TTEMPTED	A(5)A	ALTERNATING
A(4)A	CHARAC	TERISTIC	A(5)A	ALTERNATE
A(4)A	CON	TINENTAL	A(5)A	AMBASSADOR
A(4)A	CON	TINUATION	A(5)A	AMERICAN
A(4)A	COUN	TERATTACK	A(5)A	ANTENNA
A(4)A	DIS	TRIBUTE	A(5)A	APPEARANCE
A(4)A	DIS	TRIBUTION	A(5)A	APPLICATION
A(4)A	DIS	TRIBUTING	A(5)A	APPROVAL
A(4)A	ELEC	TRICITY	A(5)A	ARBITRARY
A(4)A	EXCI	TEMENT	A(5)A	ARBITRATION
A(4)A	INS	TALLATIONS	A(5)A	ASSISTANT
A(4)A	IN	TEGRITY	A(5)A	ASSISTANCE
A(4)A	IN	TEREST	A(5)A	ASSOCIATE
A(4)A	IN	TERESTING	A(5)A	ASSOCIATION
A(4)A	IN	TERNATIONAL	A(5)A	ASSOONAS
A(4)A	LIEU	TENANT	A(5)A	C ABLEGRAM
A(4)A	NOR	THEAST	A(5)A	C AMOUFLAGE
A(4)A	NOR	THWEST	A(5)A	C ANCELLATION
A(4)A	NOR	THWESTERN	A(5)A	DIS APPEARANCE
A(4)A	OU	TSKIRTS	A(5)A	EXTR AORDINARY
A(4)A	REINSTA	TEMENT	A(5)A	M AINTENANCE
A(4)A	RES	TRAI NT	A(5)A	QU ALIFICATION
A(4)A	RE	TAL IATION	A(5)A	QU ARTERMASTER
A(4)A	RE	TROACTIVE	A(5)A	R ADIOGRAM
A(4)A	SOU	THEAST	A(5)A	R ADIOSTATION
A(4)A	SOU	THWEST	A(5)A	STR ATEGICAL
A(4)A	SOU	THWESTERN	A(5)A	TR ANSATLANTIC
A(4)A	STA	TEMENT	A(5)A	AC CEPTANCE
A(4)A	S	TATISTICS	A(5)A	AC CORDANCE

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Table D-7 (g). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(5)A		CHRONICLE	A(5)A	DISCR	EPANCIES
A(5)A		COEFFICIENT	A(5)A	DISS	EMINATED
A(5)A		COMMENCE	A(5)A		EFFECTED
A(5)A		COMMENCEMENT	A(5)A		EFFICIENT
A(5)A		COMMERCE	A(5)A		EFFICIENCY
A(5)A		CONFISCATION	A(5)A		EIGHTEEN
A(5)A		CONFLICT	A(5)A		EIGHTEENTH
A(5)A		CONTACT	A(5)A		ELEVATE
A(5)A	DIS	CREPANCIES	A(5)A(1)A		ELSEWHERE
A(5)A	DIS	CREPANCY	A(5)A(1)A		EMPLACEMENT
A(5)A	E	CONOMIC	A(5)AA		EMPLOYEE
A(5)A	AD	DRESSED	A(5)A		EMPLOYER
A(5)A	A	DVANCED	A(5)A(2)A		ENCIPHERMENT
A(5)A	BRI	DGEHEAD	A(5)A(1)A		ENCIPHERED
A(5)A		DAMAGED	A(5)A		ENCIPHER
A(5)A		DECIDED	A(5)A(1)A		ENFORCEMENT
A(5)A		DELAYED	A(5)A		ENFORCE
A(5)A		DROPPED	A(5)A		ENGINEER
A(5)A	IN	DICATED	A(5)A		ENGINEERING
A(5)A	ACC	EPTANCE	A(5)A		ENLISTED
A(5)A	ACC	EPTABLE	A(5)A		ENROLLED
A(5)A	ALL	EGIANCE	A(5)A		ENTENTE
A(5)A	APP	EARANCE	A(5)A	ENT	ERPRISE
A(5)A	CAR	ELESSNESS	A(5)A		EQUIPMENT
A(5)A	CL	EARANCE	A(5)A		ESCORTED
A(5)A	CO	EFFICIENT	A(5)A		EXCLUDE
A(5)A	CONC	ENTRATE	A(5)A	EX	ECUTIVE
A(5)A(2)A	CORR	ESPONDENCE	A(5)A		EXPANDED
A(5)A	D	ECREASE	A(5)A		EXPELLED
A(5)A	D	ECREASED	A(5)A		EXPENDED
A(5)A	D	EDICATE	A(5)A		EXPENSES
A(5)A	D	EFINITE	A(5)A	EXP	ERIENCE
A(5)A	D	EPARTMENT	A(5)A(2)A		EXPERIENCE
A(5)A	D	EPARTMENTAL	A(5)A		EXTENDED
A(5)A	DEP	ENDABLE	A(5)A		EXTREME
A(5)A	D	EPLOYMENT	A(5)A	FIGHT	ERPLANE
A(5)A	D	ESCRIBE	A(5)A	IN	EFFICIENCY
A(5)A	D	ESCRIBED	A(5)A	INT	ERCEPTED
A(5)A	D	ESTROYERS	A(5)A	INT	ERPREFER
A(5)A	D	ESTROYED	A(5)A	INT	ERRUPTED
A(5)A	D	ESTROYER	A(5)A	J	ETPLANE
A(5)A	D	ETACHMENT	A(5)A	M	EDICINE
A(5)A	D	ETONATE	A(5)A	M	ESSENGER
A(5)A	D	ETONATED	A(5)A	N	EWSPAPER
A(5)A	D	ETRAINED	A(5)A	N	EWSPAPERS
A(5)A	D	EVELOPED	A(5)A	ON	EHUNDRED
A(5)A	DISAPP	EARANCE	A(5)A	PAR	ENTHESES

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(5)A	P	ERSISTENT	A(5)A	INCENTIVE
A(5)A	P	ERSONNEL	A(5)A	INCLINING
A(5)A	PR	EMATURE	A(5)A	INCLUDING
A(5)A	PR	ESCRIBED	A(5)A	INCLUSIVE
A(5)A	QUART	ERMASTER	A(5)A	INDEMNITY
A(5)A	REC	EPTACLE	A(5)A	INFLATION
A(5)A(1)A	RE	ENFORCEMENT	A(5)A	INSIGNIA
A(5)A	RE	ENFORCE	A(5)A	INTEGRITY
A(5)A	RE	ENLISTED	A(5)A	INTELLIGENCE
A(5)A	R	EMAINDER	A(5)A	INTELLIGENT
A(5)A	R	EQUESTED	A(5)A	INTENSIVE
A(5)A	R	ESOURCES	A(5)A	INTENTION
A(5)A	S	EABORNE	A(5)A(2)A	INTERDICTION
A(5)A	S	EAPLANES	A(5)A	INTERDICT
A(5)A	S	ENTENCE	A(5)A	INTERVIEW
A(5)A	S	EPARATE	A(5)A	INVENTION
A(5)A	S	EPTEMBER	A(5)A(3)A	INVESTIGATION
A(5)A	S	EVENTEEN	A(5)A(3)A	INVESTIGATIONS
A(5)A	S	EVENTEENTH	A(5)A	INVESTIGATE
A(5)A	SH	ELLFIRE	A(5)A	L IMITATION
A(5)A	TEMP	ERATURE	A(5)A	MOB ILIZATION
A(5)A	T	ERRIBLE	A(5)A	PREL IMINARIES
A(5)A	TH	EREFORE	A(5)A	QUAL IFICATION
A(5)A	UN	EXPENDED	A(5)A	RAD IOSTATION
A(5)A	UNID	ENTIFIED	A(5)A	REG ISTRATION
A(5)A	UNIT	EDSTATES	A(5)A	S IGNALLING
A(5)A	WARD	EPARTMENT	A(5)A	S IMILARITY
A(5)A	BE	GINNING	A(5)A	SPEC IFICATION
A(5)A		GASSING	A(5)A	SU ITABILITY
A(5)A		GETTING	A(5)A	VER IFICATION
A(5)A	RE	GARDING	A(5)A	V ISIBILITY
A(5)A	EIG	HTEENTH	A(5)A	CHRONO LOGICAL
A(5)A	ADMIN	ISTRATIVE	A(5)A	C LERICAL
A(5)A	ADMIN	ISTRATION	A(5)A	INF LAMMABLE
A(5)A	ANT	ICIPATION	A(5)A	LOGICAL
A(5)A	CLASS	IFICATION	A(5)A	METEORO LOGICAL
A(5)A	CONS	IDERATION	A(5)A	PO LITICAL
A(5)A	DEMOB	ILIZATION	A(5)A	CO MMENCEMENT
A(5)A	D	ISCIPLINE	A(5)A	E MPLACEMENT
A(5)A	D	ISCONTINUE	A(5)A	I MPROVEMENT
A(5)A	D	ISCONTINUANCE	A(5)A	MANAGEMENT
A(5)A	D	ISCUSSION	A(5)A	MARITIME
A(5)A	D	ISPERSION	A(5)A	MAXIMUM
A(5)A	IDENT	IFICATION	A(5)A	MINIMUM
A(5)A		IMPASSIBLE	A(5)A	REI MBURSEMENT
A(5)A		IMPOSSIBLE	A(5)A	COMME NDATION
A(5)A		INCENDIARY	A(5)A	COMPE NSATION

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(5)A	CONCE	NTRATING	A(5)A	PRINCIPAL
A(5)A	CO	NCERNING	A(5)A	PRINCIPLE
A(5)A	CO	NDITION	A(5)A	AI
A(5)A	CO	NNECTING	A(5)A	A
A(5)A	CON	NECTION	A(5)A	A
A(5)A	CO	NTINGENT	A(5)A	BA
A(5)A	CONTI	NUATION	A(5)A	B
A(5)A	CO	NTRABAND	A(5)A	FI
A(5)A	CO	NVENIENT	A(5)A	GENE
A(5)A	DISCO	NTINUANCE	A(5)A	GY
A(5)A	E	NEMYTANKS	A(5)A	HYD
A(5)A	E	NLISTING	A(5)A	HYG
A(5)A	ENTA	NGLEMENT	A(5)A	INTE
A(5)A	FOU	NDATION	A(5)A	IR
A(5)A	I	NCLINING	A(5)A	IR
A(5)A	I	NCLUDING	A(5)A	IR
A(5)A	I	NTERMENT	A(5)A	P
A(5)A(3)A	I	NTERVENTION	A(5)A	P
A(5)A(1)A	I	NTERVENING	A(5)A	P
A(5)A	I	NTERVENE	A(5)A	P
A(5)A	I	NVASION	A(5)A	PSYCH
A(5)A	MA	NAGEMENT	A(5)A	QUARTE
A(5)A	RECOMME	NDATION	A(5)A	MASTER
A(5)A	RECON	NAISSANCE	A(5)A	RADIOGRAM
A(5)A	REPRESE	NTATION	A(5)A	RECOVER
A(5)A	SIG	NIFICANCE	A(5)A	REENFORCE
A(5)A	SIG	NIFICANT	A(5)A	REENFORCEMENT
A(5)A	TRA	NSATLANTIC	A(5)A	REGISTRATION
A(5)A	ASS	OCIATION	A(5)A	REGULAR
A(5)A	C	OALITION	A(5)A	REIMBURSEMENT
A(5)A	C	OLLISION	A(5)A	REINFORCE
A(5)A	C	OLLISIONS	A(5)A	REINFORCEMENT
A(5)A	C	ONDITION	A(5)A	ST
A(5)A	CONF	ORMATION	A(5)A	SU
A(5)A	C	ONTINUOUS	A(5)A	SU
A(5)A	C	ORRESPONDENCE	A(5)AA	T
A(5)A	C	ORRESPONDING	A(5)AA	T
A(5)A	F	ORMATION	A(5)A	T
A(5)A	INF	ORMATION	A(5)A	T
A(5)A	INTR	ODUCTION	A(5)A	T
A(5)A		OPERATOR	A(5)A	T
A(5)A	PR	OPORTION	A(5)A	ASSE
A(5)A	PR	OTECTION	A(5)A	A
A(5)A	RADI	OSTATION	A(5)A	CIRCUM
A(5)A	REC	OGNITION	A(5)A	CRO
A(5)A	TRANSP	ORTATION	A(5)A	DI
A(5)A		PHILIPPINES	A(5)A	E
				STABLISH

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Table D-7 (2). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(5)A	E	STABLISHED	A(5)A	S	UBSTITUTE
A(5)A	E	STABLISHMENT	A(5)A	S	UBSTITUTION
A(5)A	NEW	SPAPERS	A(6)A		ANTICIPATE
A(5)A	PHO	SPHORUS	A(6)A		ANTICIPATION
A(5)A	PO	SITIONS	A(6)A	CL	ASSIFICATION
A(5)A	RE	SOURCES	A(6)A	DEP	ARTMENTAL
A(5)A		SAILORS	A(6)A	TR	ADITIONAL
A(5)A		SECTORS	A(6)A	TR	ANSPORTATION
A(5)A		SERIOUSLY	A(6)A	A	CCEPTANCE
A(5)A		SKIRMISH	A(6)A	A	CCORDANCE
A(5)A		SUBMISSION	A(6)A		CERTIFICATE
A(5)A		SUCCESSIVE	A(6)A	CIR	CUMSTANCES
A(5)A		SUCCESS	A(6)A		CLEARANCE
A(5)A		SUCCESSFUL	A(6)A		COMMUNICATE
A(5)A		SUCCESSFULLY	A(6)A		COMMUNICATION
A(5)A		SURPLUS	A(6)A		CONSTRUCTION
A(5)A		SURPRISE	A(6)A	RE	CONSTRUCTION
A(5)A		SUSPENSE	A(6)A	A	DDRESSED
A(5)A		SUSPENSION	A(6)A		DECLARED
A(5)A	UN	SUCCESSFUL	A(6)A		DEFEATED
A(5)A	AN	TICIPATE	A(6)A		DEFENDED
A(5)A	AN	TICIPATION	A(6)A		DEFERRED
A(5)A	CER	TIFICATE	A(6)A		DEMANDED
A(5)A	CON	TINGENT	A(6)A		DEPARTED
A(5)A	IDEN	TIFICATION	A(6)A		DEPLOYED
A(5)A	INS	TRUMENT	A(6)A		DEPORTED
A(5)A	INS	TRUMENTS	A(6)A		DESERTED
A(5)A	IN	TERCEPT	A(6)A		DETACHED
A(5)A	IN	TERCEPTED	A(6)A		DICTATED
A(5)A	IN	TERDICT	A(6)A		DISARMED
A(5)A	IN	TERDICTION	A(6)A	UN	DERSTAND
A(5)A	IN	TERMENT	A(6)A	UN	DERSTOOD
A(5)A(1)A	IN	TERPRETATION	A(6)A	A	ERODROME
A(5)A	IN	TERPRETER	A(6)A	A	EROPLANE
A(5)A	IN	TERRUPT	A(6)A	B	EENNEEDED
A(5)A	IN	TERRUPTED	A(6)A	B	ELLIGERENT
A(5)A	IN	TERRUPTION	A(6)A	D	ECIPHERED
A(5)A	IN	TERVENTION	A(6)A	D	EFFECTIVE
A(5)A	IN	TRODUCTION	A(6)A	D	EFENSIVE
A(5)A	IN	TRODUCTORY	A(6)A	D	EPARTURE
A(5)A	QUAR	TERMASTER	A(6)A	D	ESIGNATE
A(5)A	SA	TISFACTORY	A(6)A	D	ESIGNATED
A(5)A	SUI	TABILITY	A(6)A	D	ESPATCHES
A(5)A		TONIGHT	A(6)A	D	ESPATCHED
A(5)A		TRAJECTORY	A(6)A	D	ESTITUTE
A(5)A(3)A		TRANSATLANTIC	A(6)A	DET	ERIORATE
A(5)A	UNI	TEDSTATES	A(6)A	D	ETERMINE

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(6)A	D	ETERMINED	A(6)A	R	EENFORCE
A(6)A	D	EVELOPMENT	A(6)A(1)A	R	EENFORCEMENT
A(6)A		ECHELONED	A(6)A	R	EENLISTED
A(6)A		ELIGIBLE	A(6)A	RE	ENLISTMENT
A(6)A		EMBASSIES	A(6)A	R	EFERENCE
A(6)A		EMPLOYEE	A(6)A(1)A	R	EIMBURSEMENT
A(6)A		EMPLOYMENT	A(6)A(1)A	R	EINFORCEMENT
A(6)A		ENCIRCLE	A(6)A	R	EINFORCE
A(6)A(1)A		ENCOUNTERED	A(6)A(1)A	R	EINSTATEMENT
A(6)A	EN	EMYPLANES	A(6)A	R	EINSTATE
A(6)A		ENFILADE	A(6)A	R	EPLACEMENT
A(6)A		ENGAGEMENT	A(6)A	REPRES	ENTATIVE
A(6)A		ENLISTMENT	A(6)A	R	EQUIREMENT
A(6)A		ENROLLMENT	A(6)A	R	ESTRICTED
A(6)A(1)A		ENTANGLEMENT	A(6)A	SEV	ENTYFIVE
A(6)A	ENT	ERTAINMENT	A(6)A	T	ECHNIQUE
A(6)A		ENTRAINED	A(6)A	T	ELEPHONE
A(6)A		ENVELOPE	A(6)A	T	ENTATIVE
A(6)A		EQUALIZE	A(6)A	TH	ERMOMETER
A(6)A		EQUIPAGE	A(6)A	TW	ENTYFIVE
A(6)A		EQUIVALENT	A(6)A	DISTIN	GUISHING
A(6)A		ESTIMATE	A(6)A		GROUPING
A(6)A		ESTIMATEDAT	A(6)A		GUARDING
A(6)A		ESTIMATES	A(6)A	SI	GNALLING
A(6)A		EVACUATE	A(6)A	C	IRCULATION
A(6)A		EXCAVATE	A(6)A	D	IPLOMATIC
A(6)A		EXCHANGE	A(6)A	D	ISORGANIZED
A(6)A		EXCITEMENT	A(6)A	D	ISPOSITION
A(6)A		EXERCISE	A(6)A	D	ISTINCTION
A(6)A		EXERCISES	A(6)A	D	ISTINGUISH
A(6)A		EXHIBITED	A(6)A	D	ISTINGUISHED
A(6)A		EXPEDITE	A(6)A(2)A	D	ISTINGUISHING
A(6)A		EXPERIMENT	A(6)A	DIST	INGUISHING
A(6)A	EXT	ERMINATE	A(6)A	F	INGERPRINT
A(6)A	INDET	ERMINATE	A(6)A(3)A		IDENTIFICATION
A(6)A	INV	ESTIGATE	A(6)A		IMPRACTICABLE
A(6)A	M	EASUREMENT	A(6)A		IMPRESSION
A(6)A	M	EASUREMENTS	A(6)A		IMPRESSIVE
A(6)A	M	ECHANIZED	A(6)A		INDICATING
A(6)A	NEC	ESSITATE	A(6)A		INDICATION
A(6)A	OV	ERWHELMED	A(6)A		INEFFICIENCY
A(6)A	P	ENETRATE	A(6)A		INFLECTING
A(6)A	PR	EARRANGED	A(6)A		INSECURITY
A(6)A	PR	ECEDENCE	A(6)A		INSPECTION
A(6)A	PR	EFERENCE	A(6)A		INVITATION
A(6)A	PR	EPAREDNESS	A(6)A		IRRIGATION
A(6)A	R	ECOGNIZE	A(6)A	UN	IDENTIFIED

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(6)A	W	ITHDRAWING	A(6)A	C	ONCESSION
A(6)A		MEASUREMENT	A(6)A	C	ONCLUSION
A(6)A		MEASUREMENTS	A(6)A	C	ONFESSION
A(6)A	ME	MORANDUM	A(6)A	C	ONNECTION
A(6)A	A	NTEDATING	A(6)A	CO	OPERATION
A(6)A	COMMU	NICATION	A(6)A	C	ORRECTION
A(6)A	CO	NCEALMENT	A(6)A	D	OMINATION
A(6)A	CONCE	NTRATION	A(6)A	F	OUNDATION
A(6)A	CO	NCESSION	A(6)A		OBJECTION
A(6)A	CO	NCLUSION	A(6)A		OPERATION
A(6)A	CO	NFESSION	A(6)A	P	OPULATION
A(6)A	CO	NFINEMENT	A(6)A	P	OSSESSION
A(6)A	CO	NNECTION	A(6)A		PARAGRAPH
A(6)A	DISTI	NGUISHING	A(6)A	AG	RICULTURAL
A(6)A	E	NCIRCLING	A(6)A	B	RIGADIER
A(6)A	E	NEMYPLANES	A(6)A	INT	RODUCTORY
A(6)A	E	NLISTMENT	A(6)A	I	RREGULAR
A(6)A	E	NROLLMENT	A(6)A	I	RREGULARITIES
A(6)A(2)A	E	NTERTAINMENT	A(6)A	I	RREGULARITY
A(6)A	E	NTRUCKING	A(6)A	P	ROJECTOR
A(6)A	FI	NGERPRINT	A(6)A	P	ROTECTOR
A(6)A	I	NDICATING	A(6)A		REARGUARD
A(6)A	I	NFLATION	A(6)A		RECEIVER
A(6)A	I	NFLICTING	A(6)A		RECONSTRUCTION
A(6)A	I	NSTANTANEOUS	A(6)A		RECORDER
A(6)A	I	NSTRUMENT	A(6)A		REGISTER
A(6)A	I	NSTRUMENTS	A(6)A		REJECTOR
A(6)A	I	NTENTION	A(6)A		REMEMBER
A(6)A	I	NTERNMENT	A(6)A		REPEATER
A(6)A	I	NVENTION	A(6)A		REVOLVER
A(6)A		NEGLIGENT	A(6)A	THE	RMOMETER
A(6)A		NEGLIGENCE	A(6)A	T	RAJECTORY
A(6)A		NINETEEN	A(6)A	T	RANSFERRED
A(6)A		NINETEENTH	A(6)A	T	RANSFERRING
A(6)A		NORTHERN	A(6)A	AS	SEMBLIES
A(6)A		NUMBERING	A(6)A	CA	SUALTIES
A(6)A	ORGA	NIZATION	A(6)A	CU	STOMHOUSE
A(6)A	RECO	NNAISSANCE	A(6)A	DE	SPATCHES
A(6)A	RECON	NOITERING	A(6)A	DE	STROYERS
A(6)A	REE	NLISTMENT	A(6)A	DI	SPATCHES
A(6)A	REORGA	NIZATION	A(6)A	DI	STINGUISH
A(6)A	SA	NITATION	A(6)A	DI	STINGUISHED
A(6)A	TRA	NSFERRING	A(6)A	DI	STINGUISHING
A(6)A	U	NDERSTAND	A(6)A	E	STIMATES
A(6)A	C	OLLECTION	A(6)A		SOLDIERS
A(6)A	C	OMMISSION	A(6)A		SOUTHEAST
A(6)A	C	OMMISSIONER	A(6)A		SOUTHWEST

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(6)A		SOUTHWESTERN	A(7)A	DECREASED
A(6)A		STATIONS	A(7)A	DESCRIBED
A(6)A		SUPPLIES	A(7)A	DESTROYED
A(6)A	SU	SPICIONS	A(7)A	DETONATED
A(6)A	SU	SPICIOUS	A(7)A	DETRAINED
A(6)A	AT	TACHMENT	A(7)A	DEVELOPED
A(6)A	AT	TAINMENT	A(7)A	DISCUSSED
A(6)A	CEN	TRALIZATION	A(7)A	DISPERSED
A(6)A	DE	TACHMENT	A(7)A	DOMINATED
A(6)A	DE	TERIORATE	A(7)A	UNI DENTIFIED
A(6)A	DE	TERMINATION	A(7)A	C ENTRALIZE
A(6)A	ENTER	TAINMENT	A(7)A	DEC ENTRALIZE
A(6)A	EX	TERMINATE	A(7)A	DEC ENTRALIZED
A(6)A	EX	TERMINATION	A(7)A	D ENCIPHERMENT
A(6)A	INDE	TERMINATE	A(7)A	D EMOBILIZE
A(6)A	IN	TERNMENT	A(7)A	D EPENDABLE
A(6)A	NA	TIONALITY	A(7)A	ECHELONMENT
A(6)A	REINS	TATEMENT	A(7)A	EFFECTIVE
A(6)A	S	TATEMENT	A(7)A	ELABORATE
A(6)A		TEMPERATURE	A(7)A	EMPLACEMENT
A(6)A		TWENTIETH	A(7)A	ENCIPHERED
A(6)A	C	USTOMHOUSE	A(7)A	ENDURANCE
A(6)A	SIM	ULTANEOUS	A(7)A	ENFORCEMENT
A(6)A	S	UCCESSFUL	A(7)A	ENTRENCHED
A(6)A	S	UCCESSFULLY	A(7)A	EXCESSIVE
A(6)A	S	USPICIOUS	A(7)A	EXCLUSIVE
A(6)A	UNS	UCCESSFUL	A(7)A	EXECUTIVE
A(6)A	SE	VENTYFIVE	A(7)A	EXPANSIVE
A(6)A		WITHDRAW	A(7)A	EXPENSIVE
A(6)A		WITHDRAWAL	A(7)A	EXPLOSIVE
A(6)A		WITHDRAWING	A(7)A	EXTENSIVE
A(6)A		WITHDREW	A(7)A	H EADQUARTERS
A(7)A		ACCIDENTAL	A(7)A	H EAVYBOMBER
A(7)A		ACCOMMODATION	A(7)A	H EAVYLOSSES
A(7)A		ADDITIONAL	A(7)A	INT ELLIGENCE
A(7)A		APPROPRIATE	A(7)A	INT ERMEDIATE
A(7)A		APPROXIMATE	A(7)A	N EGLIGENCE
A(7)A		ARMORED CAR	A(7)A	R EAPPOINTED
A(7)A		ARTIFICIAL	A(7)A	R ECEPTACLE
A(7)A	N	ATURALIZATION	A(7)A	R ECOMMENDED
A(7)A	CHARA	CTERISTIC	A(7)A	R ECONNOITER
A(7)A		CLASSIFICATION	A(7)A	R ECONNOITERING
A(7)A		CONFERENCE	A(7)A	RE ENFORCEMENT
A(7)A		CONFIDENCE	A(7)A	R EENLISTMENT
A(7)A		CONSPIRACY	A(7)A	R ESISTANCE
A(7)A		CONVALESCENT	A(7)A	EN GINEERING
A(7)A	IN	COMPETENCE	A(7)A	P HOTOGRAPHY

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Table D-7 (C). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(7)A	T	HIRTEENTH	A(7)A	REI	NSTATEMENT
A(7)A	ADM	INISTRATIVE	A(7)A	TRA	NSMISSION
A(7)A	ADM	INISTRATION	A(7)A	ACC	OMMODATION
A(7)A	D	IFFICULTIES	A(7)A	C	OMPETITION
A(7)A	D	ISTRIBUTING	A(7)A	C	OMPOSITION
A(7)A	D	ISTRIBUTION	A(7)A	C	OMPUTATION
A(7)A		IMMIGRATION	A(7)A	C	ONGRESSIONAL
A(7)A		INDETERMINATE	A(7)A	C	ONSUMPTION
A(7)A		INFORMATION	A(7)A	C	OOPERATION
A(7)A		INSPIRATION	A(7)A	CO	ORDINATION
A(7)A		INSTITUTION	A(7)A	C	ORPORATION
A(7)A		INSTRUCTION	A(7)A	DEM	ONSTRATION
A(7)A		INSTRUCTIONS	A(7)A		OCCUPATION
A(7)A		INTERESTING	A(7)A		OPOSITION
A(7)A		INTERFERING	A(7)A	PR	OCLAMATION
A(7)A		INTERMEDIATE	A(7)A		PHOTOGRAPHY
A(7)A		INTERNATIONAL	A(7)A	A	RMOREDCAR
A(7)A		INTERVENING	A(7)A	EXT	RAORDINARY
A(7)A		MECHANISM	A(7)A	NO	RTHWESTERN
A(7)A		MEDIUMBOMBER	A(7)A	P	RELIMINARIES
A(7)A	AN	NOUNCEMENT	A(7)A	P	RELIMINARY
A(7)A	CO	NGRESSIONAL	A(7)A		REMAINDER
A(7)A	CO	NSTITUTING	A(7)A	SHA	RPSHOOTER
A(7)A	CO	NSUMPTION	A(7)A	A	SSEMBLIES
A(7)A	CO	NVALESCENT	A(7)A	AS	SESSMENTS
A(7)A	DEMO	NSTRATION	A(7)A	AS	SIGNMENTS
A(7)A	E	NFORCEMENT	A(7)A	HO	STILITIES
A(7)A	E	NGINEERING	A(7)A	IN	STRUMENTS
A(7)A	I	NCOMPETENT	A(7)A	MEA	SUREMENTS
A(7)A	I	NCOMPETENCE	A(7)A		SEAPLANES
A(7)A	I	NDEPENDENT	A(7)A		STANDARDS
A(7)A	I	NDETERMINATE	A(7)A	A	TTACHMENT
A(7)A	I	NDICATION	A(7)A	A	TTAINMENT
A(7)A	I	NEFFICIENCY	A(7)A	ES	TIMATEDAT
A(7)A	I	NSPECTION	A(7)A	IN	TELLIGENT
A(7)A	I	NTELLIGENCE	A(7)A	IN	TERMEDIATE
A(7)A	I	NTELLIGENT	A(7)A	IN	TERPRETATION
A(7)A	I	NTERESTING	A(7)A	NA	TURALIZATION
A(7)A	I	NTERFERENCE	A(7)A		THERMOMETER
A(7)A	I	NTERFERING	A(7)A		THIRTEENTH
A(7)A	I	NTERVENING	A(7)A(1)A		TRANSPORTATION
A(7)A	I	NVITATION	A(7)A		TRANSPORT
A(7)A	NO	NCOMBATANT	A(7)A		TRANSPORTS
A(7)A	PE	NETRATION	A(7)A		YESTERDAY
A(7)A	RECO	NNOITERING	A(8)A		ADMINISTRATIVE
A(7)A	REE	NFORCEMENT	A(8)A		ADMINISTRATION
A(7)A	REI	NFORCEMENT	A(8)A		ANTIAIRCRAFT

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Table D-7 (ø). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) —Continued

A(8)A		COINCIDENCE	A(8)A		MEMORANDUM
A(8)A	DIS	CONTINUANCE	A(8)A	ADMI	NISTRATION
A(8)A		DECIPHERED	A(8)A	A	NNOUNCEMENT
A(8)A		DESIGNATED	A(8)A	CA	NCELLATION
A(8)A		DESPATCHED	A(8)A	CO	NCENTRATING
A(8)A		DETERMINED	A(8)A	CO	NCILLIATION
A(8)A		DISPATCHED	A(8)A	CO	NFIRMATION
A(8)A		DISTRESSED	A(8)A	CO	NFISCATION
A(8)A	C	ERTIFICATE	A(8)A	CO	NFORMATION
A(8)A	CORR	ESPONDENCE	A(8)A	CO	NSCRIPTION
A(8)A	D	EMONSTRATE	A(8)A	CO	NSTITUTION
A(8)A	D	EMONSTRATED	A(8)A	CO	NSTRUCTION
A(8)A	D	ESCRPTIVE	A(8)A	CO	NTINUATION
A(8)A	D	ETERIORATE	A(8)A	CO	NVERSATION
A(8)A		ENCIPHERMENT	A(8)A	E	NCIPHERMENT
A(8)A		ENCOUNTERED	A(8)A	E	NTANGLEMENT
A(8)A		ENEMYPLANES	A(8)A	E	NTERPRISING
A(8)A		ENTANGLEMENT	A(8)A	I	NFORMATION
A(8)A		ENTERPRISE	A(8)A	I	NSPIRATION
A(8)A		ESTABLISHED	A(8)A	I	NSTITUTION
A(8)A	IND	ETERMINATE	A(8)A	I	NSTRUCTION
A(8)A	IRR	EGULARITIES	A(8)A	I	NSTRUCTIONS
A(8)A	M	EDIUMBOMBER	A(8)A	I	NTERNATIONAL
A(8)A	N	ECESSITATE	A(8)A		NAVIGATION
A(8)A	P	ERFORMANCE	A(8)A	RECO	NSTRUCTION
A(8)A	PR	ELIMINARIES	A(8)A	C	OMMENDATION
A(8)A	R	EAPPOINTMENT	A(8)A	C	OMPENSATION
A(8)A	R	EENFORCEMENT	A(8)A	C	ONCILIATION
A(8)A	R	EIMBURSEMENT	A(8)A	C	ONFIRMATION
A(8)A	R	EINFORCEMENT	A(8)A	C	ONFISCATION
A(8)A	R	EINSTATEMENT	A(8)A	C	ONFORMATION
A(8)A	REPR	ESENTATIVE	A(8)A	C	ONSCRIPTION
A(8)A	R	ESPONSIBLE	A(8)A	C	ONSTITUTION
A(8)A	R	ETROACTIVE	A(8)A	C	ONSTRUCTION
A(8)A	S	EVENTYFIVE	A(8)A	C	ONTINUATION
A(8)A	T	EMPERATURE	A(8)A	C	ONVERSATION
A(8)A		HYDROGRAPHIC	A(8)A	DEM	OBILIZATION
A(8)A	D	ISCREPANCIES	A(8)A	M	OBILIZATION
A(8)A		ILLUSTRATION	A(8)A		OBSERVATION
A(8)A		INAUGURATION	A(8)A		OBSTRUCTIONS
A(8)A		INSTALLATIONS	A(8)A	REC	OMMENDATION
A(8)A		INTERDICTION	A(8)A	REC	ONSTRUCTION
A(8)A		INTERRUPTION	A(8)A	R	OADJUNCTION
A(8)A		INTERVENTION	A(8)A	QUA	RTERMASTER
A(8)A		INTRODUCTION	A(8)A	A	SSESSMENTS
A(8)A(1)A		IRREGULARITIES	A(8)A	A	SSIGNMENTS
A(8)A		IRREGULARITY	A(8)A	IN	STRUCTIONS

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Table D-7 (φ). List of words containing like letters repeated at various intervals (U) -Continued

A(8)A	INVE	STIGATIONS	A(9)A	C	COMMUNICATION
A(8)A	OB	STRUCTIONS	A(9)A	C	ONCENTRATION
A(8)A	REPRE	SENTATIONS	A(9)A	C	ONSIDERATION
A(8)A		SCHOOLHOUSE	A(9)A		ORGANIZATION
A(8)A		SUBMARINES	A(9)A	RE	ORGANIZATION
A(8)A		SUSPICIONS	A(9)A		RANGEFINDER
A(8)A		SUSPICIOUS	A(9)A		RECONNOITER
A(8)A	AN	TIAIRCRAFT	A(9)A		RECONNOITERING
A(8)A	EN	TANGLEMENT	A(9)A	DI	SCREPANCIES
A(9)A		AGRICULTURAL	A(9)A	IN	STALLATIONS
A(9)A		CHRONOLOGICAL	A(9)A	IN	STANTANEOUS
A(9)A		CIRCUMSTANCES	A(9)A	MI	SCCELLANEOUS
A(9)A	RE	CONNAISSANCE	A(9)A	EN	TERTAINMENT
A(9)A		DISAPPEARED	A(9)A	ES	TABLISHMENT
A(9)A		DISINFECTED	A(9)A		TRANSATLANTIC
A(9)A	D	ECENTRALIZE	A(9)A		TRANSPORTATION
A(9)A	D	ECENTRALIZED	A(9)A		UNSUCCESSFUL
A(9)A		ENTERTAINMENT	A(10)A		COUNTERATTACK
A(9)A		ESTABLISHMENT	A(10)A		DEMONSTRATED
A(9)A		EXTERMINATE	A(10)A		DISORGANIZED
A(9)A	C	IRCUMSTANTIAL	A(10)A		DISSEMINATED
A(9)A		INVESTIGATION	A(10)A		INTERPRETATION
A(9)A		INVESTIGATIONS	A(10)A		IRREGULARITIES
A(9)A	A	NTICIPATION	A(10)A	CE	NTRALIZATION
A(9)A	CO	NCENTRATION	A(10)A	I	NVESTIGATION
A(9)A	CO	NSIDERATION	A(10)A	I	NVESTIGATIONS
A(9)A	E	NTERTAINMENT	A(10)A		NORTHWESTERN
A(9)A	IDE	NTIFICATION	A(10)A		REVOLUTIONARY
A(9)A	I	NAUGURATION	A(10)A		SEARCHLIGHTS
A(9)A	I	NSTALLATIONS	A(10)A		SIMULTANEOUS
A(9)A	I	NTERDICTION	A(11)A		CORRESPONDENCE
A(9)A	I	NTERRUPTION	A(11)A		DECENTRALIZED
A(9)A	I	NTERVENTION	A(11)A		DISTINGUISHED
A(9)A	I	NTRODUCION	A(11)A	R	ECONNAISSANCE
A(9)A		NONCOMBATANT	A(11)A	I	NTERPRETATION
A(9)A	TRA	NSPORTATION	A(12)A		NATURALIZATION

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APPENDIX E (φ)
USEFUL TABLES

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Table E-1 (C). Expected number of repetitions, polyalphabetic ciphers (U)

Number of letters	Expected number of digraphs occurring exactly x times								
	E(2)	E(3)	E(4)	E(5)	E(6)	E(7)	E(8)	E(9)	E(10)
100	6.21	0.298	0.011						
200	21.8	2.12	0.154	0.009					
300	42.5	6.23	0.683	0.060	0.004				
400	65.3	12.8	1.87	0.220	0.022	0.002			
500	88.1	21.6	3.97	0.582	0.071	0.008			
600	110	32.3	7.11	1.25	0.184	0.023	0.003		
700	129	44.3	11.4	2.35	0.403	0.059	0.008	0.001	
800	145	57.1	16.8	3.96	0.777	0.130	0.019	0.003	
900	158	70.1	23.2	6.16	1.36	0.257	0.043	0.006	0.001
1000	169	83.0	30.6	9.03	2.21	0.466	0.085	0.014	0.002

Number of letters	Expected number of trigraphs		
	E(2)	E(3)	E(4)
100	0.269	0.001	
200	1.10	0.004	
300	2.48	0.014	
400	4.40	0.033	
500	6.85	0.064	
600	9.81	0.111	0.001
700	13.3	0.175	0.002
800	17.3	0.261	0.003
900	21.8	0.371	0.005
1000	26.8	0.505	0.008

Number of letters	Tetragraphs	
	E(2)	E(3)
100	0.010	
200	0.043	
300	0.096	
400	0.171	
500	0.270	
600	0.389	
700	0.530	
800	0.693	
900	0.877	
1000	1.08	0.001

Number of letters	Penta-graphs
	E(2)
100	
200	0.002
300	0.004
400	0.007
500	0.011
600	0.015
700	0.021
800	0.027
900	0.034
1000	0.042

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Table E-2 (C): Expected values of ϕ_r and ϕ_p (U)

N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p	N	ϕ_r	ϕ_p
11	4.23	7.34	29	31	54	47	83	144	65	160	277	83	262	454
12	5.08	8.80	30	33	58	48	87	150	66	165	286	84	268	465
13	6.00	10.4	31	36	62	49	90	157	67	170	295	85	275	476
14	7.00	12.1	32	38	66	50	94	163	68	175	304	86	281	488
15	8.08	14.0	33	41	70	51	98	170	69	180	313	87	288	499
16	9.23	16.0	34	43	75	52	102	177	70	186	322	88	294	511
17	10.5	18.1	35	46	79	53	106	184	71	191	331	89	301	522
18	11.8	20.4	36	48	84	54	110	191	72	197	341	90	308	534
19	13.2	22.8	37	51	89	55	114	198	73	202	351	91	315	546
20	14.6	25.3	38	54	94	56	118	205	74	208	360	92	322	558
21	16.2	28.5	39	57	99	57	123	213	75	213	370	93	329	571
22	17.8	30.8	40	60	104	58	127	221	76	219	380	94	336	583
23	19.5	33.8	41	63	109	59	132	228	77	225	390	95	343	596
24	21.2	36.8	42	66	115	60	136	236	78	231	401	96	351	608
25	23.1	40.0	43	69	120	61	141	244	79	237	411	97	358	621
26	25.0	43.4	44	73	126	62	145	252	80	243	422	98	366	634
27	27.0	46.8	45	76	132	63	150	261	81	249	432	99	373	647
28	29.1	50.4	46	80	138	64	155	269	82	255	443	100	381	660

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Table E-3 (U), Factor table (U)

NUMBERS 1-400

1	Prime	36	2 3 4 6 9 12 18	70	2 5 7 10 14 35
2	Prime	37	Prime	71	Prime
3	Prime	38	2 19	72	2 3 4 6 8 9 12 18 24 36
4	2	39	3 13	73	Prime
5	Prime	40	2 4 5 8 10 20	74	2 37
6	2 3	41	Prime	75	3 5 15 25
7	Prime	42	2 3 6 7 14 21	76	2 4 19 38
8	2 4	43	Prime	77	7 11
9	3	44	2 4 11 22	78	2 3 6 13 26 39
10	2 5	45	3 5 9 15	79	Prime
11	Prime	46	2 23	80	2 4 5 8 10 16 20 40
12	2 3 4 6	47	Prime	81	3 9 27
13	Prime	48	2 3 4 6 8 12 16 24	82	2 41
14	2 7	49	7	83	Prime
15	3 5	50	2 5 10 25	84	2 3 4 6 7 12 14 21 28 42
16	2 4 8	51	3 17	85	5 17
17	Prime	52	2 4 13 26	86	2 43
18	2 3 6 9	53	Prime	87	3 29
19	Prime	54	2 3 6 9 18 27	88	2 4 8 11 22 44
20	2 4 5 10	55	5 11	89	Prime
21	3 7	56	2 4 7 8 14 28	90	2 3 5 6 9 10 15 18 30 45
22	2 11	57	3 19	91	7 13
23	Prime	58	2 29	92	2 4 23 46
24	2 3 4 6 8 12	59	Prime	93	3 31
25	5	60	2 3 4 5 6 10 12 15 20 30	94	2 47
26	2 13	61	Prime	95	5 19
27	3 9	62	2 31	96	2 3 4 6 8 12 16 24 32 48
28	2 4 7 14	63	3 7 9 21	97	Prime
29	Prime	64	2 4 8 16 32	98	2 7 14 49
30	2 3 5 6 10 15	65	5 13	99	3 9 11 33
31	Prime	66	2 3 6 11 33	100	2 4 5 10 20 25 50
32	2 4 8 16	67	Prime	101	Prime
33	3 11	68	2 4 17 34	102	2 3 6 17 34 51
34	2 17	69	3 23	103	Prime
35	5 7			104	2 4 8 13 26 52

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Table E-3 (U). Factor Table (U)--Continued
NUMBERS 1-400 -- Continued

105	3 5 7 15 21 35	142	2 71	178	2 89
106	2 53	143	11 13	179	Prime
107	Prime	144	2 3 4 6 8 9 12 16	180	2 3 4 5 6 9 10 12 15
108	2 3 4 6 9 12 18 27		18 24 36 48 72		18 20 30 36 45 60 90
	36 54	145	5 29	181	Prime
109	Prime	146	2 73	182	2 7 13 14 26 91
110	2 5 10 11 22 55	147	3 7 21 49	183	3 61
111	3 37	148	2 4 37 74	184	2 4 8 23 46 92
112	2 4 7 8 14 16 28 56	149	Prime	185	5 37
113	Prime	150	2 3 5 6 10 15 25 30	186	2 3 6 31 62 93
114	2 3 6 19 38 57		50 75	187	11 17
115	5 23	151	Prime	188	2 4 47 94
116	2 4 29 58	152	2 4 8 19 38 76	189	3 7 9 21 27 63
117	3 9 13 39	153	3 9 17 51	190	2 5 10 19 38 95
118	2 59	154	2 7 11 14 22 77	191	Prime
119	7 17	155	5 31	192	2 3 4 6 8 12 16 24
120	2 3 4 5 6 8 10 12	156	2 3 4 6 12 13 26 39		32 48 64 96
	15 20 24 30 40 60		52 78	193	Prime
121	11	157	Prime	194	2 97
122	2 61	158	2 79	195	3 5 13 15 39 65
123	3 41	159	3 53	196	2 4 7 14 28 49 98
124	2 4 31 62	160	2 4 5 8 10 16 20 32	197	Prime
125	5 25		40 80	198	2 3 6 9 11 18 22 33
126	2 3 6 7 9 14 18 21	161	7 23		66 99
	42 63	162	2 3 6 9 18 27 54 81	199	Prime
127	Prime	163	Prime	200	2 4 5 8 10 20 25 40
128	2 4 8 16 32 64	164	2 4 41 82		50 100
129	3 43	165	3 5 11 15 33 55	201	3 67
130	2 5 10 13 26 65	166	2 83	202	2 101
131	Prime	167	Prime	203	7 29
132	2 3 4 6 11 12 22 33	168	2 3 4 6 7 8 12 14	204	2 3 4 6 12 17 34 51
	44 66		21 24 28 42 56 84		68 102
133	7 19	169	13	205	5 41
134	2 67	170	2 5 10 17 34 85	206	2 103
135	3 5 9 15 27 45	171	3 9 19 57	207	3 9 23 69
136	2 4 8 17 34 68	172	2 4 43 86	208	2 4 8 13 16 26
137	Prime	173	Prime		52 104
138	2 3 6 23 46 69	174	2 3 6 29 58 87	209	11 19
139	Prime	175	5 7 25 35	210	2 3 5 6 7 10 14 15
140	2 4 5 7 10 14 20 28	176	2 4 8 11 16 22		21 30 35 42 70 105
	35 70		44 88	211	Prime
141	3 47	177	3 59	212	2 4 53 106

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Table E-3 (U). Factor Table (U)--Continued
NUMBERS 1-400 --Continued

213	3 71	246	2 3 6 41 82 123	280	2 4 5 7 8 10 14 20
214	2 107	247	13 19		28 35 40 56 70 140
215	5 43	248	2 4 8 31 62 124	281	Prime
216	2 3 4 6 8 9 12 18 24 27 36 54 72 108	249	3 83	282	2 3 47 94 141
217	7 31	250	2 5 10 25 50 125	283	Prime
218	2 109	251	Prime	284	2 4 71 142
219	3 73	252	2 3 4 6 7 9 12 14 18 21 28 36 42 63 84 126	285	3 5 15 19 57 95
220	2 4 5 10 11 20 22 44 55 110	253	11 23	286	2 11 13 22 26 143
221	13 17	254	2 127	287	7 41
222	2 3 6 37 74 111	255	3 5 15 17 51 85	288	2 3 4 6 8 9 12 16 18 24 32 36 48 72 96 144
223	Prime	256	2 4 8 16 32 64 128	289	17
224	2 4 7 8 14 16 28 32 56 112	257	Prime	290	2 5 10 29 58 145
225	3 5 9 15 25 45 75	258	2 3 6 43 86 129	291	3 97
226	2 113	259	7 37	292	2 4 73 146
227	Prime	260	2 4 5 10 13 20 26 52 65 130	293	Prime
228	2 3 4 6 12 19 38 57 76 114	261	3 9 29 87	294	2 3 6 7 14 21 42 49 98 147
229	Prime	262	2 131	295	5 59
230	2 5 10 23 46 115	263	Prime	296	2 4 8 37 74 148
231	3 7 11 21 33 77	264	2 3 4 6 8 11 12 22 24 33 44 66 88 132	297	3 9 11 27 33 99
232	2 4 8 29 58 116	265	5 53	298	2 149
233	Prime	266	2 7 14 19 38 133	299	13 23
234	2 3 6 9 13 18 26 39 78 117	267	3 89	300	2 3 4 5 6 10 12 15 20 25 30 50 60 75 100 150
235	5 47	268	2 4 67 134	301	7 43
236	2 4 59 118	269	Prime	302	2 151
237	3 79	270	2 3 5 6 9 10 15 18 27 30 45 54 90 135	303	3 101
238	2 7 14 17 34 119	271	Prime	304	2 4 8 16 19 38 76 152
239	Prime	272	2 4 8 16 17 34 68 136	305	5 61
240	2 3 4 5 6 8 10 12 15 16 20 24 30 40 48 60 80 120	273	3 7 13 21 39 91	306	2 3 6 9 17 18 34 51 102 153
241	Prime	274	2 137	307	Prime
242	2 11 22 121	275	5 11 25 55	308	2 4 7 11 14 22 28 44 77 154
243	3 9 27 81	276	2 3 4 6 12 23 46 69 92 138	309	3 103
244	2 4 61 122	277	Prime	310	2 5 10 31 62 155
245	5 7 35 49	278	2 139	311	Prime
		279	3 9 31 93		

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Table E-3 (U). Factor Table (U)--Continued

NUMBERS 1-400 --Continued

312	2 3 4 6 8 12 13 24 26 39 52 78 104	342	2 3 6 9 18 19 38 57 114 171	372	2 3 4 6 12 31 62 93 124 186
313	Prime	343	7 49	373	Prime
314	2 157	344	2 4 8 43 86 172	374	2 11 17 22 34 187
315	3 5 7 9 15 21 35 45 63 105	345	3 5 15 23 69 115	375	3 5 15 25 75 125
316	2 4 79 158	346	2 173	376	2 4 8 47 94 188
317	Prime	347	Prime	377	13 29
318	2 3 6 53 106 169	348	2 3 4 6 12 29 58 87 116 174	378	2 3 6 7 9 14 18 21 27 42 54 63 126
319	11 29	349	Prime	379	Prime
320	2 4 5 8 10 16 20 32 40 64 80 160	350	2 5 7 10 14 25 35 50 70 175	380	2 4 5 10 19 20 38 76 95 190
321	3 107	351	3 9 13 27 39 117	381	3 127
322	2 7 14 23 46 161	352	2 4 8 11 16 22 32 44 88 176	382	2 191
323	17 19	353	Prime	383	Prime
324	2 3 4 6 9 12 18 27 36 54 81 108 162	354	2 3 6 59 118 177	384	2 3 4 6 8 12 16 24 32 48 64 96 128
325	5 13 25 65	355	5 71	385	5 7 11 35 55 77
326	2 163	356	2 4 89 178	386	2 193
327	3 109	357	3 7 17 21 51 119	387	3 9 43 129
328	2 4 8 41 82 164	358	2 179	388	2 4 97 194
329	7 47	359	Prime	389	Prime
330	2 3 5 6 10 11 13 22 30 33 55 66 110 165	360	2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 12 15 18 20 24 30 36 40 45 60 72 90 120 180	390	2 3 5 6 10 13 15 26 30 39 65 78 130 195
331	Prime	361	19	391	17 23
332	2 4 83 166	362	2 181	392	2 4 7 8 14 28 49 56 98 196
333	3 9 37 111	363	3 11 33 121	393	3 131
334	2 167	364	2 4 7 13 14 26 28 52 91 182	394	2 197
335	5 67	365	5 73	395	5 79
336	2 3 4 6 7 8 12 14 16 21 24 28 42 48 56 84 112 168	366	2 3 6 61 122 183	396	2 3 4 6 9 11 12 18 22 33 36 44 66 99 132 198
337	Prime	367	Prime	397	Prime
338	2 13 26 169	368	2 4 8 16 23 46 92 184	398	2 199
339	3 113	369	3 9 41 123	399	3 7 19 21 57 133
340	2 4 5 10 17 20 34 68 84 170	370	2 5 10 37 74 185	400	2 4 5 8 10 16 20 25 40 50 80 100 200
341	11 31	371	7 53		

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Table E-4 (g). Table of primes up to 2000 (U)

1	139	337	557	769	1013	1249	1493	1741
2	149	347	563	773	1019	1259	1499	1747
3	151	349	569	787	1021	1277	1511	1753
5	157	353	571	797	1031	1279	1523	1759
7	163	359	577	809	1033	1283	1531	1777
11	167	367	587	811	1039	1289	1543	1783
13	173	373	593	821	1049	1291	1549	1787
17	179	379	599	823	1051	1297	1553	1789
19	181	383	601	827	1061	1301	1559	1801
23	191	389	607	829	1063	1303	1567	1811
29	193	397	613	839	1069	1307	1571	1823
31	197	401	617	853	1087	1319	1579	1831
37	199	409	619	857	1091	1321	1583	1847
41	211	419	631	859	1093	1327	1597	1861
43	223	421	641	863	1097	1361	1601	1867
47	227	431	643	877	1103	1367	1607	1871
53	229	433	647	881	1109	1373	1609	1873
59	233	439	653	883	1117	1381	1613	1877
61	239	443	659	887	1123	1399	1619	1879
67	241	449	661	907	1129	1409	1621	1889
71	251	457	673	911	1151	1423	1627	1901
73	257	461	677	919	1153	1427	1637	1907
79	263	463	683	929	1163	1429	1657	1913
83	269	467	691	937	1171	1433	1663	1931
89	271	479	701	941	1181	1439	1667	1933
97	277	487	709	947	1187	1447	1669	1949
101	281	491	719	953	1193	1451	1693	1951
103	283	499	727	967	1201	1453	1697	1973
107	293	503	733	971	1213	1459	1699	1979
109	307	509	739	977	1217	1471	1709	1987
113	311	521	743	983	1223	1481	1721	1993
127	313	523	751	991	1229	1483	1723	1997
131	317	541	757	997	1231	1487	1733	1999
137	331	547	761	1009	1237	1489		










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INDEX (2)

	Paragraph	Page
Accidental repeats in periodic polyalphabetic systems.....	12-7b	12-5
Addressee, <i>see</i> definition.		
Advantages of code systems.....	15-4	15-6
Alphabet:		
Cipher.....	1-8a	1-3
Components.....	7-2c	7-1
Dual, nature.....	7-2a	7-1
Enciphering, use.....	7-7a	7-3
Mixed cipher.....	7-4c	7-2
Mixed cipher types.....	8-1a	8-1
Plain.....	1-8a	1-3
Plain component.....	7-4a	7-2
Plain, relation to cipher.....	7-3a	7-2
Reciprocal.....	7-6a	7-3
Reciprocal as inverse alphabets.....	7-6c	7-3
Standard cipher.....	7-4b	7-2
Anagramming:		
Column, association.....	4-8c(3)	4-5
Digraphs, expansion.....	4-8c, 4-11b(2)	4-4, 4-11
Letters, of low frequency.....	4-11a, 4-11b(1)	4-10
Recovery of plaintext.....	4-8b	4-4
Trigraphs, use.....	4-8c	4-4
Vowel-consonant ratio.....	4-4c	4-2
Analysis:		
Aperiodic ciphers.....	14-4b	14-3
Code charts.....	15-9a	15-9
Digraphs in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-6c	14-10
Four-squares cipher systems.....	11-2a, 11-3a	11-1, 11-4
Horizontal two-square systems.....	11-6a	11-11
Idiomorphs in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-6b	14-10
Interrupter letters in aperiodic cipher.....	14-7a	14-12
Isologs in multilateral systems.....	9-12a	9-13
Keying units in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-5a	14-8
Polygraphic substitution.....	11-1a	11-1
Probable words in periodic ciphers.....	13-7a	13-6
Stacked cycles in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-6a	14-9
Superimposed text in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-6c	14-10
Syllabary spelling in matrix codes.....	15-11b(2)	15-11
Syllabary squares.....	15-10a	15-9
Symmetry of position in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-4c	14-4
Text beginnings in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-8b	14-14
Vertical two-square.....	11-6a	11-11
Vowel-consonant relationships.....	8-14a	8-13
Aperiodic polyalphabetic substitution.....	1-12b(2)(b)	1-6
Aperiodic ciphers:		
Analysis.....	14-6c	14-10
Idiomorphs.....	14-6b	14-10
Interrupter letters.....	14-7a	14-12
Keying units.....	14-5a	14-8
Stacked cycles.....	14-6a	14-9
Superimposed text.....	14-6c	14-10
Text beginnings.....	14-8a	14-14
Arbitrary group encipherment.....	14-3b	14-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

	Paragraph	Page
Aperiodic ciphers—Continued		
Cipher sequence, juxtaposition.....	14-4c(2)	14-4
Cryptographic classification.....	14-1c	14-1
Principle of aperiodicity.....	14-1a	14-1
Produced:		
Arbitrary group encipherment.....	14-3b	14-3
Successive word encipherment.....	14-2c	14-1
Variable group encipherment.....	14-3a	14-2
Repetition:		
Partial periodic.....	14-3c	14-3
True periodic.....	14-3b	14-3
Suppression of periodicity.....	14-1b	14-1
Application:		
Cryptographic systems.....	2-1d	2-1
Transposition systems.....	1-12c	1-6
		
Bilateral substitution:		
Digraphic I.C. test.....	9-7b	9-5
Digraphic Phi test.....	9-7a	9-5
Identification.....	9-6a	9-5
Methods.....	9-3a(2)	9-2
Process.....	9-2c	9-2
Simple.....	9-2c	9-1
With variants.....	9-3c	9-2
Bilateral systems:		
Matrix dimensions.....	9-8	9-7
Recovery of matrix.....	9-8a	9-6
Blanks, use of, in monome-dinome systems.....	9-15a	9-18
Book codes, classification of.....	15-1b	15-1
		
Categories of placement in Playfair ciphers.....	10-3f	10-4
Causal repetitions in periodic polyalphabetic systems.....	12-7a	12-5
Chaining equivalent values in multilateral systems.....	9-12g	9-13
Characteristics:		
Four-square digraphic systems.....	11-3b	11-4
Mixed alphabets in periodic ciphers.....	13-9a	13-9
Monoalphabetic substitution.....	7-1f	7-1
Monome-dinome-trinome systems.....	9-16a	9-21
Polyalphabetic:		
Monoalphabeticity.....	12-10a	12-8
Substitution.....	12-1f	12-1
Polygraphic encipherment.....	10-5b	10-5
		
Trinomic systems.....	9-17a	9-22
Unilateral frequency distributions.....	2-11f	2-6
Cipher alphabets:		
Alphabetic sequence.....	1-8a	1-3
Components.....	7-3a	7-2
Configurations of, polyalphabetic.....	12-4b	12-4
Decimation of, mixed.....	8-4a, 8-4b	8-2, 8-3
Derived from, polyalphabetic.....	12-4a(2)	12-3
Identification:		
Direct standard.....	2-12c	2-9
Periodic cipher.....	13-1d, 13-12a, 13-13a	13-1, 13-15
Reversed standard.....	2-12d	2-9
Independent, polyalphabetic.....	12-4a: 1	12-3
Keyword mixed.....	8-2a	8-1
Mixed.....	7-4c	7-2
Patterns in transposition mixed.....	8-3b	8-2
Plain component.....	7-4a	7-2
Polyalphabetic configurations.....	12-4b	12-4
Randomly mixed.....	8-1c	8-1
Reciprocal keyword mixed.....	8-2a	8-1
Relationship cipher to plain.....	7-3a, 8-2b	7-2, 8-1




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	Paragraph	Page
Cipher alphabets—Continued		
Standard.....	7-4b	7-2
Transposition mixed.....	8-3a	8-2
Type components of mixed.....	8-1a, 8-1b	8-1
Unrelated polyalphabetic.....	12-4a(1)	12-3
Cipher device.....	1-9a	1-3
Cipher equivalents, placement of, in solution of four-square ciphers.....	11-3a(2)	11-4
Cipher machine.....	1-9a	1-3
Cipher sequence, juxtaposition of, in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-4c(2)	14-4
Cipher systems:		
Four-square, identification.....	11-2a	11-1
Playfair, analysis.....	11-7a	11-14
Two-square, identification.....	11-4a	11-8
Cipher table.....	1-9a	1-3
Cipher to plain:		
Equivalencies in syllabary codes.....	15-10c	15-10
Ratios in monome-dinome systems.....	9-15a	9-18
Relationship:		
Cipher alphabets.....	8-2b	8-1
[REDACTED].....	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Cipher values, periodic polyalphabetic systems.....	12-6a(3)	12-5
Classification of transposition systems.....	3-2	3-1
Code charts:		
Analysis.....	15-9a	15-9
Classification.....	15-2e	15-4
Code systems:		
Advantages.....	15-4a	15-6
Analysis:		
Code charts.....	15-9a	15-9
Syllabary squares.....	15-10a	15-9
Book codes.....	15-1b	15-1
Classification.....	1-9b	1-3
Code charts.....	15-2e	15-4
Enciphered codes.....	15-3a	15-5
Identification.....	15-7a	15-8
Matrix codes:		
Classification.....	15-2a	15-2
Identification.....	15-7b	15-8
Reconstruction.....	15-8a	15-8
One-part codes.....	15-1b(1)	15-1
Open codes.....	15-1a	15-1
Principles of analysis.....	15-6a	15-7
Syllabary codes.....	15-2d	15-4
Two-part codes.....	15-1b(2)	15-1
Columnar keyed transposition.....	3-11a	3-6
Columnar order:		
[REDACTED].....	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
In two-square matrices.....	11-6a(3)	11-11
Columns:		
Association in anagramming.....	4-8c	4-4
Isolation of, in ciphertext.....	4-11b(5)	4-12
Juxtaposition of, in matrix recovery.....	4-10d	4-7
Limitations of, length.....	4-10c	4-6
Minimum-maximum length.....	4-10d	4-7
Communications:		
Intelligence (COMINT).....	2-4	2-2
Intercept operations.....	2-4a(1)(a)	2-2
Means of, definition.....	1-5b	1-2
Secret origins of.....	1-6b	1-2
Completing the plain component.....	7-12a, 7-12c	7-9, 7-10
In periodic ciphers.....	13-4a	13-3
Computation of digraphic I.C. test.....	9-7e	9-6
Condensed table of repetitions, use of.....	8-13d	8-12
Consonant line in vowel-consonant determination.....	8-17a	8-18
[REDACTED].....	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Constant interval polyalphabetic periodicity.....	12-9a	12-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~







	Paragraph	Page
Construction of grilles:		
Simple	6-2a	6-1
[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]		
Cryptanalysis:		
Definition	1-4	1-1
Determination of language	2-5a	2-3
Fundamental operations	2-4b	2-3
General system determination	2-6a	2-3
Steps	2-9	2-4
Cryptanalyst, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Cryptanalytics, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Cryptograms, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Cryptographer, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Cryptographic:		
Classification of aperiodic ciphers	14-1c	14-1
Systems:		
Application	2-1d	2-1
Exploitation	2-3	2-2
Flexibility	2-1c	2-1
General	1-9	1-3
Rapidly	2-1b	2-1
Reliability	2-1a	2-1
Requirements	2-1	2-1
Security	2-1b	2-1
Soundness	2-3a	2-2
Cryptography, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Cryptology, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Cyclic permutations of Playfair cipher matrix	11-9a	11-20
Cyclic phenomena in polyalphabetic substitution:		
External	12-3b	12-3
Latent	12-3b	12-3
Patent	12-3b	12-3
Decimation:		
Determination of interval	8-9b(4)	8-5
Mixed cipher alphabets	8-4a, 8-4b	8-2, 8-3
Mixed sequences:		
Keyword based	8-9b	8-7
Recovery	8-9a	8-6
Deciphering alphabet	7-7b	7-4
Decrypt, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Deduced values, substituting for	8-16a	8-17
Definitions:		
Addressee	1-5f	1-2
Cryptanalysis	1-4	1-1
Cryptography	1-4	1-1
Cryptology	1-4	1-1
Externals	1-5g	1-2
Means of communications	1-5b	1-2
Message center	1-5c	1-2
Message text	1-5h	1-2
Originator	1-5e	1-2
Signal communications	1-5a	1-2
Writer	1-5d	1-2
Derived polyalphabetic cipher alphabets	12-4a(2)	12-3
Determination:		
General system in cryptanalysis	2-6	2-3
Interval in decimation of mixed sequences	8-9b(4)	8-5
Matches in multilateral systems	9-10c	9-11
Diagonal encipherment, Playfair ciphers	11-7b(3)	11-15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Paragraph	Page
Digraphic:		
Blank expectation test.....	10-6a	10-6
Distribution of multiliteral systems.....	9-12d	9-13
I.C. test, computation.....	9-7e	9-6
Idiomorphs in four-square systems.....	11-3d	11-6
Phi test.....	10-7a	10-6
Substitution:		
Four-square matrix.....	10-3a	10-3
Playfair.....	10-3d	10-4
Two-square matrix.....	10-3b	10-3
With matrices.....	10-2e	10-3
Systems, identification.....	10-8a	10-6
Digraphs:		
Expansion of, in anagramming.....	4-11b(2)	4-11
Identification of, in Playfair ciphers.....	11-7d	11-15
Use of, in anagramming.....	4-8c	4-4
Reducing to uniliteral terms.....	9-8c	9-7
Dinomic distributions of multiliteral systems.....	9-12e	9-14
Direct transparencies in two-square systems.....	11-5a	11-8
Direct standard cipher alphabets, identification.....	2-12c	2-9
Direct symmetry of position:		
Implication of, in periodic ciphers.....	13-9b	13-9
In periodic ciphers.....	13-10a	13-9
In alphabet recovery.....	13-10d	13-10
Disadvantages of multiliteral substitution.....	9-4	9-4
Discriminant.....	1-10a	1-4
Disruption of columnar order in polyphase transposition.....	5-1c	5-1
Distribution:		
Triliteral frequency.....	8-13a	8-11
In periodic ciphers.....	13-11e	8-10
Use.....	8-14c	8-14
Uniliteral frequency:		
As solution aid.....	7-11a	7-7
Characteristics.....	2-11c	2-6
Comparisons.....	7-11b	7-8
English.....	2-11b	2-6
Use of, general.....	2-12	2-7
Distributions:		
Dinomic, of multiliteral systems.....	9-12c	9-14
Frequency, variations.....	2-13a, 2-13b	2-9
		
		
		
Elimination on generatrices in periodic ciphers.....	13-5b	13-6
Enciphered code.....	1-9c	1-4
Enciphered codes, classification code systems.....	15-3a	15-5
Encipherment:		
Playfair cipher:		
Diagonal.....	11-7b(3)	11-15
Letter position limitations.....	11-7c	11-15
Reciprocal.....	11-7b(1)	11-14
Reversible.....	11-7b(1)	11-14
Enciphering alphabet.....	7-7a	7-3
Encipherment, Polygraphic:		
Characteristics.....	10-5b	10-5
Numeric variant.....	10-4d	10-5
Recognition.....	10-5a	10-5


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Encipherment, Polygraphic—Continued

	Paragraph	Page
		
Variant forms.....	10-4a	10-4
Encoded ciphers.....	1-9c	1-4
Encrypt, <i>see</i> definitions.		
English uniliteral frequency distribution.....	2-11b	2-6
Equivalencies, cipher to plain, in syllabary codes.....	15-10c	15-10
Equivalent values:		
By chaining.....	9-12g	9-15
Multiliteral systems.....	9-11b	9-12
		
Expansion of digraphs in anagramming.....	4-11b(2)	4-11
Expectation test, digraphic, blank.....	10-6a	10-5
Exploitation of cryptographic systems.....	2-3	2-2
External cyclic phenomena in polyalphabetic systems.....	12-3b	12-3
Externals, <i>see</i> definitions.		
Factor analysis:		
In periodic ciphers.....	13-11b	13-10
Period length of periodic ciphers.....	13-2d	13-2
		
Fixed polyalphabetic periodicity.....	12-3b(1)	12-3
Flexibility of cryptographic systems.....	2-1c	2-1
Flexible polyalphabetic periodicity.....	12-3b(2)	12-3
Four-square matrix, digraphic substitution.....	10-3a	10-3
Four-square cipher systems:		
Analysis.....	11-2a, 11-3a	11-1, 11-4
Digraphic:		
Idiomorphs.....	11-5d	11-5
Patterns.....	11-2d	11-2
Identification.....	11-2b	11-2
Matrix recovery.....	11-3e	11-7
Placement of cipher equivalents.....	11-3a(2)	11-4
Word assumptions.....	11-3c(1)	11-5
Frequency distribution:		
Normal theoretical deviations.....	2-13b	2-9
Profile in multiliteral systems.....	9-10b	9-10
Triliteral.....	8-13a	8-11
Variations.....	2-13a	2-9
Fundamental operations of cryptanalysis.....	2-4b	2-3
General:		
Cryptographic system.....	1-9	1-3
		
Generatrices, periodic ciphers:		
Elimination.....	13-5b	13-6
Logarithmic test.....	13-6a	13-6
Selection.....	13-5a	13-5
Geometric design of transposition matrices.....	3-4	3-1
Grille:		
		
		
Transposition.....	1-12a(3)	1-5



Paragraph Page



Horizontal:

Two-square matrix, encipherment.....	10-3b	10-3
Two-square matrix, analysis.....	11-6a	11-11



Identification:

Aperiodic cipher, numerically keyed.....	14-4a	14-3
Bilateral substitution.....	9-6a	9-5
Cipher alphabets:		
Direct standard.....	2-12c	2-9
Periodic.....	13-1d, 13-12a	13-1, 13-13
Reversed standard.....	2-12d	2-9
Code systems, matrix.....	15-7a	15-7
Digraphs, Playfair ciphers.....	11-7d	11-15
Digraphic systems.....	10-8a	10-6
Four-square matrix cipher systems.....	11-2a	11-1
Incompletely filled matrices.....	4-3b	4-1
Matrix codes through code groups.....	15-7b	15-8
Monoalphabetic substitution.....	2-12b	2-8
Monoalphabetic mixed substitution.....	8-10a	8-8
Monome-dinome systems.....	9-15a	9-18
Nonmonoalphabetic substitution.....	2-12b	2-8
Transposition systems.....	2-12a, 4-6a	2-7, 4-3



Two-square matrix cipher systems.....	11-4a	11-8
Unilateral substitution.....	7-10a	7-7

Idiomorphism in aperiodic ciphers, analysis.....	14-4c	14-4
--	-------	------

Idiomorphs:

Analysis of, in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-6b	14-10
Appearance of, in Playfair ciphers.....	11-8a	11-16
Four-square digraphic.....	11-3d	11-8
Word patterns derived.....	8-15c	8-16

Incompletely filled matrices:

Identification.....	4-3b	4-1
Recovery.....	4-10b	4-6

Independent or unrelated polyalphabetic cipher alphabets.....	12-4a(1)	12-3
---	----------	------

Index of coincidence, use of, in:

Monoalphabetic mixed substitution.....	8-11c	8-9
Polyalphabetic substitution.....	12-12a	12-9

Inscription routes:

Four-square matrix.....	11-3a(2)	11-4
-------------------------	----------	------

Intercept operations.....	2-4a(1)(a)	2-2
---------------------------	------------	-----

Interrupter letters, analysis of, in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-7a	14-12
---	-------	-------

Invisible or unintelligible writing.....	1-6d	1-3
--	------	-----

Isologous segments in multilateral systems.....	9-12c	9-13
---	-------	------

Isologs, analysis of, in multilateral systems.....	9-12a	9-13
--	-------	------

Isomorphic patterns in multilateral systems.....	9-11a	9-12
--	-------	------

Juxtaposition:

Cipher alphabets, periodic ciphers.....	13-13a	13-15
Cipher sequences, aperiodic ciphers.....	14-4c(2)	14-4
Columns in matrix recovery.....	4-10d	4-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Paragraph	Page
Key:		
Numerical, derivation.....	3-10b	3-5
Selection of literal.....	3-10c	3-5
Specific.....	1-10b	1-4
Recovery.....	2-7	2-4
Transposition, recovery.....	4-5	4-3
Key recovery:		
[REDACTED].....	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Transposition mixed sequence.....	8-8a	8-6
Keyed columnar transposition:		
Operation.....	3-11b	3-6
Security.....	3-12a	3-6
Variations.....	3-13	3-7
Keying units, analysis of, in aperiodic cipher.....	14-5a	14-8
Keyword based decimation, mixed sequence.....	8-9b	8-7
Keyword mixed:		
Cipher alphabets reciprocal.....	8-2a	8-1
Sequence, recovery.....	8-6b	8-4
Lambda (blank):		
Expectation test.....	2-14a	2-10
Monoalphabetic mixed substitution, use.....	8-11a	8-9
Language determination in cryptanalysis.....	2-5a	2-3
Latent cyclic phenomena in polyalphabetic systems.....	12-3b	12-3
Letters:		
Anagramming.....	4-11a	4-10
Classification of periodic ciphers.....	13-12c	13-14
Positional limitations of letters:		
Four-square ciphers.....	11-3b	11-5
Playfair cipher.....	11-7c	11-15
Literal key selection.....	3-10c	3-5
Logarithmic test for generatrix selection in periodic ciphers.....	13-6a	13-6
Long-term security.....	2-2b	2-1
Machine ciphers.....	1-9a	1-3
Match determination in multiliteral systems.....	9-10c	9-11
Matching, principles of, in periodic ciphers.....	13-19a	13-24
Matching variants by frequency in multiliteral systems.....	9-10a	9-9
Matrices:		
Columnar order of, in two-square system.....	11-6a 3)	11-11
Cyclic permutations of, in Playfair cipher.....	11-9a	11-20
Dimensions:		
Bilateral systems.....	9-3b	9-7
Transposition systems.....	4-7a	4-3
Geometric design.....	3-4	3-1
Horizontal two-square systems.....	10-3b	10-3
Identification of incompletely filled.....	4-3b	4-1
Juxtaposition of columns.....	4-10d	4-7
Recovery of, in:		
Bilateral systems.....	9-8a	9-6
Four-square systems.....	11-3c	11-7
Incompletely filled.....	4-10b	4-6
Two-square systems.....	11-6a	11-11
Vertical two-square systems.....	10-3c	10-4
Matrix codes:		
Code systems:		
Classification.....	15-2a	15-2
Identification.....	15-7b	15-8
Reconstruction.....	15-8a	15-8
Means of communications, see definitions.		
Message:		
Center, see definitions.		
Text, see definitions.		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Paragraph	Page
Military terminology as stereotypes.....	4-12a	4-13
Minimum-maximum column length.....	4-10d	4-7
Mixed alphabets, characteristics of, periodic cipher.....	13-9a	13-9
Mixed cipher alphabet:		
Sequences:		
Decimation.....	8-4a	8-2
Keyword mixed.....	8-2a	8-1
Randomly mixed.....	8-1c	8-1
Transposition mixed.....	8-3a	8-2
Types.....	7-4a, 8-1a, 8-1b	7-2, 8-1
Monoalphabetic substitution:		
Characteristics.....	7-1c	7-1
Identification.....	2-12b	2-8
Methods of solution.....	7-8a	7-4
Systems.....	1-12b(1)	1-6
Monoalphabetic substitution, mixed cipher alphabets:		
Identification.....	8-10a	8-8
Index of coincidence.....	8-11c	8-9
Lambda test.....	8-11a	8-9
Phi test.....	8-11b	8-9
Monographic substitution systems.....	1-12b(1)(a)	1-6
Monome-dinome:		
Cipher to plain ratios.....	9-15a	9-18
Identification and characteristics of.....	9-15c	9-19
Use of blanks in.....	9-15a	9-18
Monome-dinome-trinome-systems:		
Characteristics of.....	9-16a	9-21
Solution of.....	9-16b	9-22
.....		
Multiliteral substitution:		
Analysis.....	9-5a	9-4
Chaining equivalent values.....	9-12g	9-15
Classification.....	9-1b	9-1
Determination of match.....	9-10c	9-11
Dinomic distributions.....	9-12e	9-14
Disadvantages.....	9-4	9-4
Equivalent values.....	9-11b	9-12
Frequency profile.....	9-10b	9-10
Isologs, analysis.....	9-12a	9-13
Isologous segments.....	9-12c	9-13
Isomorphic patterns.....	9-11a	9-12
Match determination.....	9-10c	9-11
Matching variants by frequency.....	9-10a	9-9
Security.....	9-1c	9-1
Systems.....	1-12b(1)(a)(2)	1-6
Multinomic systems:		
Classification.....	9-13c	9-16
Columnar numeric:		
Analysis.....	9-14d	9-17
.....		
Nonmonoalphabetic substitution, identification.....	2-12b	2-8
Nonreciprocal tables, polygraphic substitution.....	10-2c	10-2
Normal deviation of frequency distributions.....	2-13b	2-9
Numeric variations of polygraphic encipherment.....	10-4d	10-5
Numerical key, derivation of.....	3-10b	3-5
Numerical key in columnar transposition.....	3-10a	3-5
Operation:		
Keyed columnar transposition.....	3-11b	3-6
Polyalphabetic substitution.....	12-2b	12-2
Simple grilles.....	6-2b	6-1
Transposition systems.....	3-6a	3-3
Originator, see definitions.		
Origins of secret communications.....	1-6b	1-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Paragraph	Page
Partial periodic repetition in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-3c	14-3
Patterns in transposition, mixed cipher alphabets.....	8-3b	8-2
.....		
Period determination in periodic polyalphabetic ciphers.....	12-6a(1)	12-5
Periodic polyalphabetic systems:		
Accidental repeats.....	12-7a	12-5
Analysis:		
Factors.....	13-11b	13-10
Probable words.....	13-7a, 13-8a	13-6, 13-7
Causal repetitions.....	12-7a	12-5
Cipher values.....	12-6a(3)	12-5
Completing the plain component.....	13-4a	13-3
Determination of cipher alphabet.....	13-1c, 13-10a, 13-11d, 13-13a	13-1, 13-9, 13-11, 13-15
Direct symmetry of position.....	13-10a	13-9
Factor analysis.....	13-11b	13-10
Generatrix:		
Elimination.....	13-5b	13-6
Selection.....	13-5a	13-5
Identification.....	12-6c	12-5
Juxtaposed sequences.....	13-13a	13-15
Letter classification.....	13-12d	13-14
Logarithmic test generatrix selection.....	13-6a	13-6
Matching.....	13-19a	13-24
Matrix recovery.....	13-13a	13-15
Period determination.....	12-6a(1)	12-5
Repeating key.....	12-5a	12-4
Substitution.....	1-12b(2)(a)	1-6
Triliteral frequency distribution.....	13-11e	13-11
Unilateral terms as special solutions.....	13-15e	13-24
Periodicity:		
Constant interval.....	12-9a	12-7
Determination.....	12-5a	12-6
Fixed.....	12-3b(1)	12-3
Flexible.....	12-3b(2)	12-3
Progressive key.....	12-3c(2)	12-3
Repeating key.....	12-3c(1)	12-3
Suppression of, in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-1b	14-1
Phi test:		
Digraphic.....	10-7c	10-6
Explanation.....	2-15b	2-12
Monoalphabetic substitution.....	8-11b	8-9
Use.....	2-15b	2-12
Variant form, use.....	12-14a	12-10
Placements, categories of, in Playfair ciphers.....	10-3d	10-4
Placement of cipher equivalents in four-square system.....	11-3a(2)	11-4
Plain:		
Alphabet.....	1-8a	1-3
Alphabet relation to cipher.....	7-3a	7-2
Text recovery.....	2-8a	2-4
Plain component:		
Cipher alphabet.....	7-4a	7-2
Completion in periodic ciphers.....	13-4a	13-3
Plaintext:		
Recovery by anagramming.....	4-8a	4-4
Recovery of, in Playfair ciphers.....	11-8c	11-18
.....		
Playfair cipher:		
Appearance of idiomorphs.....	11-8a	11-16
Categories of placement.....	10-3d	10-4
Diagonal encipherment.....	11-7b(3)	11-15
Identification of digraphs.....	11-7d	11-15
Letter position limitations.....	11-7c	11-15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Playfair cipher—Continued

	Paragraph	Page
Matrix:		
Cyclic permutations.....	11-9a	11-20
Recovery.....	11-9a	11-20
Plaintext values, recovery.....	11-8c	11-18
Procedures of analysis.....	11-8a	11-16
Reciprocal encipherment.....	11-7b(1)	11-14
Reversible encipherment.....	11-7b(1)	11-14
Systems.....	11-7a	11-14
Polyalphabetic:		
Accidental repeats in periodic systems.....	12-7a	12-5
Aperiodic substitution.....	1-12b(2)(b)	1-6
Causal repetitions in periodic systems.....	12-7a	12-5
Characteristics:		
Monoalphabeticity.....	12-10a	12-5
Substitution.....	12-1b	12-1
Cipher values in periodic system.....	12-6a(3)	12-5
Configurations of cipher alphabets.....	12-4b	12-4
Constant interval in periodicity.....	12-9a	12-7
Cyclic phenomena:		
External.....	12-3b	12-3
Latent.....	12-3b	12-3
Patent.....	12-3b	12-3
Derived cipher alphabets.....	12-4a(2)	12-3
Determination of periodicity.....	12-8a	12-6
Expected repetitions.....	12-7c	12-6
External cyclic phenomena.....	12-3b	12-3
Independent cipher alphabets.....	12-4a(1)	12-3
Object of substitution.....	12-1b	12-1
Operation of substitution.....	12-2b	12-2
Period determination in periodic systems.....	12-6a(1)	12-5
Substitution:		
Aperiodic.....	1-12b(2)(b)	1-6
Periodic.....	1-12b(2)(a)	1-6
Types.....	12-3a	12-3
Unrelated cipher alphabets.....	12-4a(1)	12-3
Use:		
Index of coincidence.....	12-12a	12-9
Phi test.....	12-11a	12-8
Phi test, variant form.....	12-14a	12-10
Table of expected values.....	12-13	12-9
Polygraphic substitution:		
Analysis.....	10-2a, 11-1a	10-1, 11-1
Characteristics of encipherment.....	10-3b	10-5
Cipher systems:		
Playfair.....	11-7a	11-14
Two-square.....	11-4a	11-8
Encipherment by variant forms.....	10-4a	10-4
Methods.....	10-2a	10-1
Nonreciprocal table.....	10-2c	10-2
Numeric variant encipherment.....	10-4d	10-5
Purpose.....	10-1c	10-1
Reciprocal tables.....	10-2b, 10-2d	10-1, 10-3
Recognition.....	10-5a	10-5
Security.....	10-2b	10-2
Solution principles.....	11-1b	11-1
Positional limitations in four-square systems.....	11-3b	11-5
Principle:		
Analysis of code systems.....	15-6a	15-7
Aperiodicity in aperiodic cipher.....	14-1a	14-1
Probable word in periodic cipher analysis.....	13-7a, 13-7d, 13-8a	13-6, 13-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Paragraph	Page
Progressive key in special solutions:		
Same length message.....	4-14b	4-16
Superimposed message.....	4-14e	4-16
Use of, to recover numeric key.....	4-14g	4-18
Radio direction finding.....	2-4a(1)(c)	2-2
Radiofingerprinting.....	2-4a(1)(b)	2-2
Rail fence cipher.....	3-8f	3-5
Randomly mixed cipher sequences.....	8-1c	8-1
Ratios:		
Cipher to plain in monome-dinome systems.....	9-15a	9-18
Vowel-consonant in anagramming.....	4-4c	4-2
Reciprocal:		
Alphabet.....	7-6a	7-3
Cipher alphabets, keyword mixed.....	8-2a	8-1
Encipherment in Playfair ciphers.....	11-7b(1)	11-14
Polygraphic substitution tables.....	10-2b, 10-2d	10-2, 10-3
Reconstruction of matrix codes.....	15-8a	15-8
Recovery:		
Decimated sequences.....	8-9a	8-6
Incompletely filled matrix.....	4-10b	4-6
Matrices:		
Bilateral systems.....	9-8a	9-6
Four-square systems.....	11-3e	11-7
Playfair ciphers.....	11-9a	11-20
Two-square systems.....	11-3e	11-7
Plaintext.....	2-8	2-4
Plaintext values, Playfair cipher.....	11-8c	11-18
Playfair cipher plaintext values.....	11-8c	11-18
Specific key.....	2-7	2-4
Transposition matrix dimensions.....	4-7a	4-3
Transposition mixed sequence.....	8-7a	8-5
Reducing digraphs to uniliteral terms.....	9-8c	9-7
Relationship:		
Cipher to plain:		
Alphabets.....	8-25	8-1
Sequences in progressive key.....	4-14d	4-16
Vowel-consonants:		
Analysis.....	8-14i	8-13
Use.....	8-14i	8-14
Reliability of cryptographic systems.....	2-1a	2-1
Repeating key periodic polyalphabetic.....	12-3a	12-4
Repetitions:		
Condensed table.....	8-13d	8-12
Expected polyalphabetic.....	12-7b	12-5
Partial periodic, aperiodic cipher.....	14-3c	14-3
True periodic, aperiodic ciphers.....	14-3b	14-3
Requirements of cryptographic systems.....	2-1a	2-1
Reversed transparencies in two-square systems.....	11-5a	11-8
Reversed standard cipher alphabet identification.....	2-12d	2-9
Reversed writing.....	3-8b	3-4
Reversible encipherment, Playfair cipher.....	11-7b(1)	11-14
<div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>		
Routes of inscription:		
Four-square systems.....	11-3a(2)	11-4
Transposition systems.....	3-5b	3-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Paragraph	Page
Same:		
Beginnings, special solutions of transposition systems.....	4-13a	4-13
Endings, special solutions of transposition systems.....	4-13d	4-15
Length message, special solutions of transposition systems.....	4-14a	4-15
Scytale.....	1-6b	1-2
Secret communications origins.....	1-6b	1-2
Security:		
Long term.....	2-2b	2-1
Short term.....	2-2b	2-1
Cryptographic systems.....	2-1b	2-1
Keyed columnar transposition.....	3-12a	3-6
Multilateral substitution.....	9-1c	9-1
Polygraphic substitution.....	10-2b	10-2
Selection of generatrix, periodic ciphers.....	13-5a	13-5
Sequence relationship:		
Decimation mixed, interval determination.....	8-9b(4)	8-8
Transposition, mixed key recovery.....	8-7a, 8-8a	8-5, 8-6
Short term security.....	2-2b	2-1
Signal communications, see definitions.		
Simple grilles:		
Construction.....	6-2a	6-1
Operation.....	6-2b	6-1
Solutions:		
Monoalphabetic ciphers.....	7-8a	7-4
Polygraphic substitution.....	11-1b	11-1
Special:		
Periodic ciphers.....	13-17a, 13-15c	13-19, 13-24
Transposition:		
Same beginnings.....	4-13a	4-13
Same endings.....	4-13d	4-15
Same length message.....	4-14a	4-15
Specific key, recovery.....	2-7	2-4
Stacked cycles, analysis of, in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-6a	14-9
Standard cipher alphabet.....	7-4b	7-2
Steps of cryptanalysis.....	2-9	2-4
Stereotypes common to military operations.....	4-12a	4-13
Substituting deduced values.....	8-16a	8-17
Successive words produced by aperiodic ciphers.....	14-2c	14-1
Superimposed message, use of, in solution of progressive key.....	4-14c	4-16
Superimposed text, analysis of, in aperiodic cipher.....	14-6c	14-10
Suppression of periodicity in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-1b	14-1
Syllabary codes:		
Classification.....	15-2d	15-4
Equivalencies of, in cipher to plain.....	15-10c	15-10
Unilateral terms of, in cipher to plain.....	15-10e	15-10
Syllabary spelling, analysis of, in matrix codes.....	15-11b	15-11
Syllabary squares, analysis of.....	15-10a	15-9
Symmetry of position in aperiodic cipher, analysis.....	14-4c	14-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Systems cryptographic:

Paragraph	Page
2-1d	2-1
2-3	2-2
2-1c	2-1
2-1b	2-1
2-1a	2-1
2-1	2-1
2-1b	2-1
2-3a	2-2

Application.....	
Exploitation.....	
Flexibility.....	
Rapidity.....	
Reliability.....	
Requirements.....	
Security.....	
Soundness.....	



Test, digraphic Phi.....	10-7a	10-6
Explanation.....	2-15b	2-12
Use.....	2-15c	2-12
Text beginnings, analysis of, in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-8a	14-14
Traffic analysis:		
Definition.....	2-4a(2)	2-2
Purposes.....	2-4a(2)(a)	2-3
Transparencies:		
Direct two-square.....	11-5a	11-8
Reversed two-square.....	11-5a	11-8
Test for two-square.....	11-5a	11-8
Transposition:		
Cipher systems.....	1-11a, 3-2	1-4, 3-1
Columnar.....	3-5c	3-2
Keyed columnar.....	3-11a	3-6
Trigraphs, use of, in anagramming.....	4-8c	4-4
Trilateral frequency distribution.....	8-13a	8-11
In periodic cipher.....	13-11e	13-11
Use.....	8-14c	8-14
Trinomic systems characteristics.....	9-17a	9-22



True periodic repetition in aperiodic ciphers.....	14-3b	14-3
Two-part codes.....	15-1b(2)	15-1
Two-square cipher systems:		
Digraphic text.....	11-5a	11-8
Direct transparencies.....	11-5a	11-8
Horizontal analysis.....	11-6a	11-11
Identification.....	11-4a	11-8
Matrix:		
Columnar order.....	11-6a(3)	11-11
Horizontal.....	10-3b	10-3
Recovery.....	11-6a(2)	11-11
Vertical.....	10-3c	10-4
Polygraphic.....	11-4a	11-8
Reversed transparencies.....	11-5a	11-8
Row and column movement.....	11-6c, 11-6d	11-13
Transparencies, test.....	11-5a	11-8
Unilateral substitution:		
Identification.....	7-10a	7-7
Solution.....	7-9a	7-4
Spatial relationships.....	7-9c	7-6
Systems.....	1-12b(1)(b)	1-6

CONFIDENTIAL

	Paragraph	Page
Unilateral frequency distribution:		
As solution aid.....	7-11a	7-7
Characteristics.....	2-11c	2-6
Comparisons.....	7-11b	7-8
English.....	2-11b	2-6
Use.....	2-12	2-7
Unilateral terms:		
Reducing digraphs.....	9-8c	9-7
Special solutions in periodic ciphers.....	13-18e	13-24
Unrelated polyalphabetic cipher alphabets.....	12-4a(1)	12-3
Upper and lower case code systems.....	15-2c	15-3
Use:		
Blanks in monome-dinome systems.....	9-15a	9-18
Condensed table of repetitions.....	8-13d	8-12
██████████.....	██████████	██████████
Index of coincidence, polyalphabetic systems.....	12-12a	12-9
Phi test.....	2-15c	2-12
Phi test, polyalphabetic systems.....	12-11a	12-8
Phi test variant form in polyalphabetic systems.....	12-14a	12-10
██████████.....	██████████	██████████
Trilateral frequency distributions.....	8-14c	8-14
Unilateral frequency distributions.....	2-12	2-7
Vowel-consonant relationships.....	8-14d	8-14
Variable grouping, encipherment of aperiodic ciphers.....	14-3a	14-2
Variant forms:		
Keyed columnar transposition.....	3-13	3-7
Multilateral systems.....	9-9b	9-8
Polygraphic encipherment.....	10-4a	10-4
Vertical:		
Two-square matrices.....	10-3c	10-4
Two-square analysis.....	11-6a	11-11
Vowel-consonant:		
Determination of consonant line.....	8-17a	8-18
Relationships, use.....	8-14d	8-14
Relationships, analysis.....	8-14a	8-13
Word patterns derived from idiomorphs.....	8-15c	8-16
Writer, <i>see</i> definition.		
Writing, invisible or unintelligible.....	1-6d	1-3

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Index 15